



MILITARY OPERATIONS
OF
GENERAL BEAUREGARD

ALFRED ROMAN



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VOLUME II



From a photograph taken in 1883.

G. J. Kinnegon

THE MILITARY OPERATIONS
OF
GENERAL BEAUREGARD

IN THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES

1861 to 1865

INCLUDING A BRIEF PERSONAL SKETCH AND A
NARRATIVE OF HIS SERVICES IN THE
WAR WITH MEXICO, 1846-8

By ALFRED ROMAN

FORMERLY COLONEL OF THE 18TH LOUISIANA VOLUNTEERS, AFTERWARDS AIDE-DE-CAMP
AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL ON THE STAFF OF GENERAL BEAUREGARD

IN TWO VOLUMES.—Vol. II.

*"Those generals only who have never commanded
armies in the field have not committed errors"*

NAPOLEON AT ST. HELENA

NEW YORK
HARPER & BROTHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE

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WHEN it was learned in Richmond that General Beauregard had reported for duty a strong effort was made to obtain for him a command suitable to his rank. A personal friend of his, the Hon. C. J. Villeré,* on September 1st, telegraphed him as follows: "Would you prefer the Trans-Mississippi to Charleston?"

* Member of Congress from Louisiana, and brother-in-law to General Beauregard.

His characteristic reply was: "Have no preference to express. Will go wherever ordered. Do for the best."

The War Department had already issued orders assigning him to duty in South Carolina and Georgia, with head-quarters at Charleston; but he did not become aware of the fact until the 10th of September.* He left the next day for his new field of action, and, in a telegram apprising General Cooper of his departure, asked that copies of his orders and instructions should be sent to meet him in Charleston.

Thus it is shown that the petition to President Davis, spoken of in the preceding chapter, was presented while General Beauregard was on his way to his new command, in obedience to orders from Richmond, and that he knew nothing of the step then being taken in his behalf.

Charleston was a familiar spot to General Beauregard, and one much liked and appreciated by him. With the certainty he now had of not being reinstated in his former command, no other appointment could have given him so much pleasure. He arrived there on the 15th of September, and received a warm and cordial greeting both from the people and from the authorities. It was evident that grave apprehensions were felt for the safety of the city—"that cradle of the rebellion," as it was called by the Northern press. And all the more was General Beauregard welcomed to Charleston because General Pemberton, whom he was to relieve, did not enjoy the confidence and esteem of the Carolinians. General Pemberton was a brave and zealous officer, but was wanting in polish, and was too positive and domineering in manner to suit the sensitive and polite people among whom he had been thrown. He commenced his administration of affairs there by removing the guns from Cole's Island, and opening the Stono River to the invasion of the Federal fleet and army; after which there was no quiet for Charleston.

Two unfortunate circumstances had further contributed to the distrust of General Pemberton. Shortly before General Beauregard's arrival he had proclaimed martial law in the city of Charleston without authority, it was alleged, from the President, and contrary to the wishes of the Governor of the State. This added to his unpopularity. He had also officially advised the

* See General Cooper's despatch, in the Appendix to this chapter.

abandonment of the whole coast-line of defences, and commenced preparations therefor.* This was done in apprehension of the attack of the new monitors and ironclads, highly extolled at that time by all the Northern newspapers. This act had so exasperated the State and city authorities that Governor Pickens had written to the War Department, demanding the immediate removal of General Pemberton. He had also telegraphed to General Beauregard, requesting him to come again "to fight our batteries." His despatch ended thus: "We must now defend Charleston. Please come, as the President is willing—at least for the present. Answer." And, as has been already shown, General Beauregard, believing that such a transfer would take him permanently from Department No. 2 and his army at Tupelo, declined to accept Governor Pickens's proposal.†

In writing upon this phase of the war we are met by two serious obstacles: first, the necessity of condensing into a few chapters a narrative of events which of itself would furnish material for a separate work; second, the loss of most of General Beauregard's official papers, from September, 1862, to April, 1864; in other words, all those that referred to the period during which he remained in command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. It may be of interest to tell how that loss occurred.

When, in the spring of 1864, General Beauregard was ordered to Virginia, to assist General Lee in the defence of Richmond, he sent to General Howell Cobb, at Macon, for safe-keeping, all his official books and papers collected since his departure from the West. After the surrender of General Joseph E. Johnston's army at Greensboro', North Carolina, in April, 1865, he telegraphed General Cobb to forward these important documents to Atlanta, through which city he knew he would have to pass on his way to Louisiana. They never reached that point. General Wilson, commanding the Federal cavalry in Georgia, took possession of them while *in transitu* to Atlanta, with a portion of General Beauregard's personal baggage. Immediate efforts were made to secure their restoration, but in vain: baggage and papers

* See, in Appendix, General Thomas Jordan's letter on the subject.

† Governor Pickens's despatch, here alluded to, and General Beauregard's answer, were given in the Appendix to the preceding chapter.

were sent to Washington by order, it was said, of Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War. At a later date General Beauregard succeeded in recovering his baggage; but, despite his endeavors and the promise of high Federal officials, he could not get his papers. These were finally placed in the War Records office, and through the attention of the gentlemanly officers in charge he has been able to procure such copies of them as were indispensable for the purposes of this work. We are credibly informed that military papers and documents belonging to General A. S. Johnston, and embracing only six or seven months of the beginning of the war, were bought, a few years ago, from his heirs for the sum of ten thousand dollars; while General Beauregard's papers, relating to upwards of twenty months of a most interesting part of our struggle, are kept and used by the Government with no lawful claim to them and in violation, as we hold, of the articles of surrender agreed upon by Generals Johnston and Sherman. We may add that General Beauregard is not only deprived of his property, but is forced to pay for copies of his own papers whenever the necessity arises to make use of them.

General Pemberton was anxious to turn over his command to General Beauregard, but the latter would not accept it until he had examined, in company with that officer, all the important points and defences of the Department as it then stood. Accordingly, on the 16th of September, they began a regular tour of inspection which lasted until the 21st. They were, at that date, in Savannah. On the 24th, having returned to Charleston, General Beauregard went through the usual formality of assuming command.

The result of his inspection is given in his official notes, to be found in the Appendix to the present chapter. He made his report as favorable as possible, and was not over-critical, especially in matters of engineering, as he well knew his predecessor had but a limited knowledge of that branch of the service, and had, besides, no experienced military engineer to assist him. Many changes, it was apparent to General Beauregard, were necessary, and he determined to effect them as soon as circumstances should permit.

It may not be out of place to mention here some of the defensive works constructed under General Pemberton's orders.

He had adopted a line from Secessionville, on the east, guard-

ing the water approaches of Light-House Inlet, to Fort Pemberton, up the Stono River—a distance of fully five miles—thus giving up to the enemy, for his offensive operations, a large extent of James Island. General Beauregard subsequently reduced that long and defective line to two and a quarter miles, from Secessionville to Fort Pringle, on the Stono, four miles below Fort Pemberton. This was not only a much shorter line, but a stronger and more advantageous one, as it greatly reduced the space the enemy could occupy in any hostile movement from the Stono.

In the defensive line originally constructed by General Pemberton the infantry cover had been put in front of his redoubts and redans, and the redans were before the redoubts; so that, when the lines were held by the infantry, the guns of the redoubts and redans could not be used, as the country there was perfectly level on all sides. Again, the redans, being in front of the redoubts, masked the fire of the latter—thus completely reversing Rogniat's system of field-works, which requires that redans should be in rear of and between redoubts, and the infantry cover in rear of both—thus leaving the artillery fire free, and the infantry in supporting distance, unexposed, and ready, if required, to repel any assault made upon the works.

On Morris Island, south of Sumter, an important position, a small open battery was commenced, distant about three-quarters of a mile south of Cummings's Point, and a mile and a half from Fort Sumter. It ran from the sea to Vincent Creek, on a very narrow part of the island, but had no guns bearing on the outer harbor, or ship-channel, as it was called. General Beauregard had that work considerably enlarged, gave it a bastioned front, closed its gorge or rear, added enormous bomb-proofs and traverses to it, and mounted several heavy guns pointing to the sea, or outer harbor. Indeed, he made it so strong that it successfully withstood, during some fifty-eight days, the heaviest land and naval attacks known in history.

On Sullivan's Island, north of Sumter, was old Fort Moultrie, and half a mile east of it Battery Beauregard, planned by General Beauregard and by him ordered to be built, as early as April, 1861. There were also three or four other batteries, west of Moultrie, some of which had taken a part in the attack on Fort Sumter at the opening of the war. A small work had likewise

been commenced by General Pemberton on the extreme east of the island, which General Beauregard afterwards increased considerably, building besides four detached batteries between it and Battery Beauregard, to prevent a landing of the enemy's force in that quarter, though the danger of such an occurrence was much less than on Morris Island, in front of which was a good roadstead, where the Federal fleet lay till the end of the war.*

In his first conference with General Pemberton, General Beauregard learned, with surprise and regret, that the system of coast defences he had devised in April, 1861, had been entirely abandoned, because of the anticipated attack of Federal monitors and ironclads, not yet completed; and that an interior system of defences, requiring much additional labor, armament, and expense, had been adopted, which opened many vulnerable points to an energetic and enterprising enemy. And yet, incredible as it may appear, this is the system which an over-zealous admirer of General Lee, and a former member of his staff, General A. L. Long,† has been injudicious enough to attribute—no less than the other defences of South Carolina—to that distinguished Confederate general and engineer. If it were not that the utter insignificance of General Long's unsubstantiated statements shuts them out from serious notice, we could easily point out many unpardonable errors into which he has fallen; but the mere recital of what General Beauregard accomplished after his arrival in that Department, and the production of evidence, not drawn from imagination but from facts in its support, will satisfy the reader's mind and amply meet the requirements of history.

General Thomas Jordan, the able chief of staff, who so faithfully served in that capacity under General Beauregard from the first battle of Manassas to the latter part of April, 1864, has forcibly exposed what he very aptly terms "the wholly erroneous and wrongful conclusions" of General Long in regard to the sea-coast and other defences of South Carolina and Georgia. We quote the following passage from his reply to General Long:

* See General Beauregard's report of the defence of Morris Island in July, August, and September, 1863.

† See, in vol. i., No. 2, February, 1876, "Southern Historical Society Papers," General Long's article, entitled "Sea-coast Defences of South Carolina and Georgia," page 103.

"Pemberton, as I have always understood, had materially departed from General Lee's plan of defensive works for the Department. Be that so or not, the system which Beauregard found established upon the approaches to Charleston and Savannah he radically changed with all possible energy. *** And so comprehensive were these changes that, had General Long chanced to visit those two places and the intermediate lines about the first day of July, 1863, he would have been sorely puzzled to point out, in all the results of engineering skill which must have met and pleased his eyes in the Department, any trace of what he had left there something more than one year before."*

But General Long clung to his error. Instead of acknowledging the injustice he had committed, he wrote and forwarded to the "Southern Historical Society Papers" a second article, wherein, after declaring his intention not to recede from his former statement, he ventures upon the following extraordinary assertion:

"It is well known that after being battered down during a protracted siege, Fort Sumter was remodelled, and rendered vastly stronger than it had previously been, by the skilful hand of General Gilmer, Chief of the Confederate Engineer Corps, and that various points were powerfully strengthened to resist the formidable forces that threatened them."†

This stress laid upon Fort Sumter shows General Long's narrow appreciation of the subject. But as to Fort Sumter itself, General Gilmer had nothing to do with the remodelling of its battered walls, nor with the preparation and strengthening of the defences in and around Charleston and its harbor; nor has he ever made any such claim. The fact is, that he only reported for duty in that Department about the middle of August, 1863, shortly before the evacuation of Morris Island, which occurred on the 7th of September. At that time the works in South Carolina and Georgia were already planned, and in process of construction, almost all of them being entirely completed. General Gilmer was an educated Engineer, doubtless worthy of the rank he held in the Confederate service; and no one denies that, had General Lee been sent to Charleston, in the fall of 1862, instead of General Beauregard, he would have been equal to the task laid out

* General Jordan's letter to the Rev. J. W. Jones, in vol. i., No. 6, June, 1876, "Southern Historical Society Papers," page 403.

† General Long's second article, "Southern Historical Society Papers," vol. ii., No. 1, July, 1876, p. 239.

before him. What is alleged is—and the proof in support is derived from the unvarying testimony of facts—that it was General Beauregard, and not General Lee, who conceived and built the “impenetrable barrier,” which, as General Long truthfully says, defeated the plans of “the combined Federal forces operating on the coast” of South Carolina and Georgia.

General Long had forgotten that General Beauregard was the first Confederate general sent to Charleston, and that he was, in fact, at that time, the only Confederate general in existence; that after he had taken Fort Sumter, and while it was being rehabilitated, he made, as early as 1861, by request of Governor Pickens, a thorough reconnoissance of the South Carolina coast, from Charleston to Port Royal; that he recommended, in a memoir written to that effect, the erection of important works at the mouths of the Stono, the two Edistos, and Georgetown Harbor.* But General Long further fails to remember that the different points he mentions as having particularly fixed General Lee’s attention—the “most threatened points”—when he (December, 1861) assumed command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida (namely, the Stono, the Edisto, the Combahee, Coosawhatchie, the sites opposite Hilton Head, on the Broad, on the Salkahatchie, etc.) were not, after all, the points actually attacked by the united land and naval forces of the enemy—were not the sites of the “impenetrable barrier” against which the combined efforts of Admiral Dahlgren and General Gillmore were fruitlessly made. The real barrier that stopped them, and through which they could never break, consisted in the magnificent works on James, Sullivan’s, and Morris Islands, and in different parts of the Charleston Harbor, and in the city proper—all due to the engineering capacity of General Beauregard, who conceived and executed them.

Unreflecting friends are worse at times than avowed enemies. They often belittle instead of elevating the object of their predilection. Groundless and fanciful praise of this kind could only lead to doubt of their subject’s claim to merit in other matters, even where it is a just one. General Lee’s reputation rests upon a more solid foundation than such formal eulogies, and he needs no borrowed laurels. The attempt of General Long to deprive

* For further details on this subject see Chapter V. of this book.

General Beauregard of his due in this instance is certainly not justifiable.

Before relieving General Pemberton, General Beauregard called on him for an estimate of the minimum forces, of all arms, in his opinion essential for a successful defence of Charleston and its dependencies, of the District of South Carolina, of Savannah and its dependencies, and of the District of Georgia.

This was the estimate furnished. It bore date September 24th, 1862:

STATIONS.	Infantry.	Heavy Artillery.	Light Art'y or Field-w'ks.	Cavalry.	Total.
James Island	10,000	1,000	5	500	11,500
Morris Island	1,000	250	..	50	1,300
Sullivan's Island.....	1,500	800	1	50	2,350
Christ Church.....	1,000	100	1	200	1,300
Saint Andrews.....	2,000	200	2	200	2,400
Fort Sumter.....	100	500	600
	15,600	2,850	9	1,000	19,450
Second District.....	5,000	200	2	800	6,000
Third District.....	5,000
Savannah.....	10,000	1,200	8	2,000	13,200
Grand total of all arms.....					43,650

Seven companies of cavalry, three batteries of artillery, and three companies of infantry, for the defence of Georgetown and Winyaw Bay, and to prevent marauding, were also mentioned in General Pemberton's estimate.†

General Beauregard adopted this estimate as a basis for his future calculations, and on that day assumed command in an order which ran as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPT. S. C. & GA.,
CHARLESTON, *Sept. 24th*, 1862.

"I assume command of this Department pursuant to Paragraph XV., Special Orders No. 202, Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office, Richmond, August 29th, 1862. All existing orders will remain in force until otherwise directed from the headquarters.

"In entering upon my duties, which may involve at an early day the defence of two of the most important cities in the Confederate States against the most formidable efforts of our powerful enemy, I shall rely on the ardent

* See General Beauregard's letter to that effect, Appendix to this chapter.

† See General Pemberton's letter, in Appendix to this chapter.

patriotism, the intelligence, and unconquerable spirit of the officers and men under my command to sustain me successfully. But to maintain our posts with credit to our country and our own honor, and avoid irremediable disaster, it is essential that all shall yield implicit obedience to any orders emanating from superior authority.

"Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan is announced as Adjutant and Inspector-General, and Chief of Staff of the Department.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General Commanding.

"Official.

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff, and A. A. G.

"Official.

"J. J. STODDARD, A. D. C."

General Pemberton was regularly relieved on the same day, and, in obedience to orders, repaired to Richmond, where, shortly afterwards, he was made a lieutenant-general, and, to the astonishment of all men, even the President's own partisans, sent to take command of the Department of the Mississippi, with headquarters at Vicksburg, one of the most important posts in the South.

General Pemberton, as was well known, had not been engaged in any of the battles or actions of the war. He had not been under fire, and was looked upon not only as a new man but as an officer of little merit. He had accompanied General Lee to the Department of South Carolina and Georgia, with the rank of brigadier-general, and had succeeded him some time in December, 1861, receiving additional promotion soon afterwards, for he was made a major-general in January of the following year. Thus, in scarcely more than a year, and merely because he enjoyed the support of the Administration, General Pemberton, who was only a colonel when he joined the Confederate service, became first a brigadier-general, then a major-general, and then again a lieutenant-general, over the heads of many Confederate officers who had already distinguished themselves, and given unquestioned evidence of capacity, efficiency, and other soldierly qualities.

As soon as he had sufficiently familiarized himself with the condition of his Department, which was divided into four districts—South Carolina having three, and Georgia one—General Beauregard determined to bring the question of the defence of Charleston and its harbor before a council, composed of the principal military and naval officers who had long been stationed there. His object was, not only to gain enlightenment, but to create

self-confidence in those officers, and increase their importance in the eyes of their subordinates. He prepared a series of questions, which were officially submitted to them, and thoroughly discussed at his headquarters. The conclusions arrived at were as follows :

“IN THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE
DEPARTMENT, CHARLESTON, *Sept. 29th, 1862.*”

“At a conference to which General Beauregard had invited the following officers; Com. D. N. Ingraham and Capt. J. R. Tucker, C. S. N., Brigadier-Gen'l's S. R. Gist and Thos. Jordan, Col's. G. W. Lay, Inspector-Gen'l., and A. J. Gonzales, Chief of Artillery, and Capt. F. D. Lee, Engrs., Capt. W. H. Echols, Chief Engineer, being absent from the city :

“The Genl. Commanding proposed for discussion a number of queries, prepared by himself, in relation to the problem of the defence of the Harbor, Forts, and City of Charleston, against the impending naval attacks by a formidable ironclad fleet.

“It was agreed to separate the consideration of these questions, so as to discuss—

“1st. The entrance, *i. e.*, all outside of a line drawn from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter; thence to Cummings's Point, including, also—outside of this line—Battery Beauregard, at the entrance of the Maffit Channel.

“2d. The Gorge, *i. e.*, the section included between that line and the line of a floating boom from Fort Sumter, to the west end of Sullivan's Island.

“3d. The Harbor, comprising all of the bay within the second line.

“4th. The City, its flanks and rear.

“In the discussion no guns were classed as heavy, if not above the calibre of 32, except rifled 32-pounders.

“The following conclusions were arrived at :

“1st. The existing defences of the entrance are : Beauregard Battery, with two heavy guns; Fort Moultrie, with nine; the Sand Batteries on the west end of Sullivan's Island, with but four yet mounted; and Fort Sumter, with thirty-eight.

“Of the Gorge, say nine guns in Fort Moultrie, thirty-two in Fort Sumter (not including seven 10-inch mortars), and as yet but four in the Sand batteries.

“Of the Harbor, say fourteen guns of Fort Sumter, and the four guns in the new Sand batteries. Fort Johnson has one rifled 32-pounder, but it is not banded, and is unsafe.

“For the City defence, some batteries have been arranged and commenced, but heavy guns are neither mounted nor disposable.

“2d. The floating boom is incomplete.

“3d. It is no barrier now.

“4th. The boom, even if completed on the present plan, might be forced, although it would serve as a check, but it cannot be depended upon, if attacked by the enemy on a scale commensurate with his means. It has already been broken in parts by the force of the tides and currents. On

account of its having to bear the strain of the depth of water (up to 70 feet) and the difficulties of the anchorage ground, of the limited means at disposal in anchors and chains, the indifferent quality of the iron, and the deficient buoyancy of the whole (the pine being green and sappy and getting heavier with time), a modification of the construction is required.

"5th. We have no means or material at hand for the construction of a better boom. It is thought, however, that the one now under construction will be materially improved by discarding the continuous chain of bar and railroad iron and links; and by linking together the logs, as they are now arranged, by short chains, so as to make a continuous chain of each section of the spars, there will be a saving of iron and greater buoyancy attained by this.

"6th. A rope barrier has been devised and constructed to place in advance of the spar-boom, but has not been placed in position, as the rope will rot in the water, and some anchors are still wanting. They are being searched for.

"7th. Ironclads in forcing the harbor must pass the gorge or throat everywhere within point-blank range of our batteries, and must consequently be in great danger of damage from the concentration of the metal that can be brought to bear upon them, especially from the elevation of Fort Sumter.

"NOTE.—*Distance between Sumter and Moultrie, 1775 yards; air-line of obstruction, 1550 yards.*

"8th. The plan of naval attack apparently best for the enemy would be to dash with as many ironclads as he can command, say fifteen or twenty, pass the batteries and forts, without halting to engage or reduce them. Com. Ingraham thinks they will make an attack in that way by daylight.

"9th. Ironclad vessels cannot approach or pass so close to the walls of Fort Sumter as not to be within the reach of the barbette guns. Those guns may be depressed to strike the water at a distance of 154 yards of the walls. Vessels of the probable draught of gunboats cannot be brought closer than 200 yards.

"10th. After forcing the passage of the forts and barriers, and reaching the inner harbor, gunboats may lay within 600 yards of the city face of Fort Sumter, exposed to the fire of about fifteen guns. The magazines would be unsafe as now situated, or until counter-forts shall have been extended sufficiently along the city face.

"11th. If ironclads pass the forts and batteries at the gorge or throat of the harbor, then the guns at Forts Ripley and Johnson and Castle Pinckney would be of no avail to check them. In consequence of the exposed condition of the foundations of Fort Ripley, and the general weakness of Castle Pinckney, it would not be advisable to diminish the armament of the exterior works to arm them; and this necessarily decides that Fort Johnson cannot be armed at the expense of the works covering the throat of the harbor. Fort Johnson must be held, however, to prevent the possibility of being carried by the enemy by a land attack, and the establishment there of breaching batteries against Fort Sumter. The batteries at White Point Garden, Half-moon, Lawton's, and McLeod's, for the same reason, cannot be prudently armed at present with heavy guns.

"12th. The line of pilings near Fort Ripley is of no service, and is rapidly falling to pieces.

"13th. The city could not be saved from bombardment by any number of batteries along the city front, if the enemy reach the interior harbor with ironclads. It can then only be defended by infantry against landing of troops.

"14th. We have no resources at present for the construction of efficient obstructions at the mouth of, or in, the Ashley and Cooper rivers, and we have no guns disposable for the armament of interior harbor defences.

"15th. Should gunboats effect a lodgment in the harbor and in the Stono, the troops and armaments on James Island may be withdrawn, especially after the construction of a bridge and road across James Island Creek, about midway the island, near Holmes house. From the western part they can be withdrawn under cover of Fort Pemberton. McLeod's battery is intended to protect the mouth of Wappoo Creek, and Lawton's battery the mouth of James Island Creek, when armed.

"16th. With the harbor in the hands of the enemy, the city could still be held by an *infantry* force by the erection of strong barricades, and with an arrangement of traverses in the streets. The line of works on the neck could also be held against a naval and land attack by the construction of frequent and long traverses. The approaches thereto are covered by woods in front; possibly a more advanced position might have been better, though also protected by the woods, but so much has been done that it were best to retain the line, remedying the defects by long and numerous traverses.

"Two ironclad gunboats, carrying four guns each, will be ready for service in two weeks, as an important auxiliary to the works defending all parts of the harbor, and in that connection it will be important to secure for them a harbor of refuge and a general depot up the Cooper River as soon as the guns for its protection can be secured.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

"D. N. INGRAHAM,

"Com. Comdg. C. S. Naval Forces, Charleston Harbor."

That sketch of the situation, together with General Beauregard's "Notes of Inspection," dated September 24th, and General Pemberton's minimum estimate of men and guns required for a proper defence of the Department, give so complete and correct a statement of its condition and needs, at that time, that we deem it unnecessary to add anything further.

On the day following this conference of officers General Beauregard began to carry out its conclusions, as to the armament of the different forts and the completion of the modified boom and rope obstructions in the main pass, between Forts Sumter and Moultrie. He determined also to make an extensive use of floating torpedoes for the defence of the harbors of his Department, particularly that of Charleston, which he placed in charge of Cap-

tain F. D. Lee, an efficient and energetic young officer, whose former profession had been that of civil engineer. The construction of the boom above alluded to was already under the superintendence of Doctor J. R. Cheves.

General Beauregard soon found that he would have to be his own chief-engineer, as the officers of that branch of the service he then had under him, although intelligent and prompt in the discharge of their duties, did not possess sufficient experience. He hastened, therefore, to apply for Captain D. B. Harris, who had been so useful to him in the construction of the works at Centreville, Va., and on the Mississippi River, from Island No. Ten to Vicksburg, and who, he was sure, would greatly relieve him of the close supervision required for the new works to be erected, and the many essential alterations to be made in the old ones. His chiefs of artillery and of ordnance were also wanting in experience, but they soon came up to the requirements of their responsible positions, and eventually proved of great assistance to him. Not so with the officers in charge of the Commissary Department. These, in many instances, were not directly under General Beauregard's orders, but under those of Colonel Northrop, who, despite requests and remonstrances, continued to follow his own bent, which was to mismanage the affairs of his Department and set at naught the authority of generals commanding in the field or elsewhere. The worst feature of the case was that, in doing so, he invariably counted upon—and almost always obtained—the full support of the Administration.

The scarcity of iron just then was very great—so much so, that it became all but impossible to procure what was needed, not only for the construction of the boom across the main channel, but also for the anchors required to maintain it in position. At the suggestion of Governor Pickens, large granite blocks, collected at Columbia for the erection of the State House, were brought to Charleston, and used as substitutes for the anchors.* The expedient proved quite a success, for a time, but the stone anchors could not long withstand the force of the tide.

General Beauregard now caused the following instructions to be given to his chief of ordnance:

* See, in Appendix, General Jordan's letter to Captain Echols, Chief-Engineer.

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *October 1st, 1862.*

"Major J. J. POPE, Chief of Ordnance, etc.:

"*Major*,—The commanding general instructs me to direct that the order of 25th ult. stands thus: That you cause the immediate transfer of the 10-inch columbiad (old pattern), now in the Water Battery, to the left of Fort Pemberton, to Fort Sumter, with carriage, implements, and ammunition. Also that three 32-pounders, smooth, from Fort Sumter, and on barbette carriages, be moved to the said Water Battery, to the left of Fort Pemberton.

"You will likewise transfer to the new batteries, on Sullivan's Island, the 8-inch columbiad, now at Fort Johnson, with its implements, carriage, and ammunition, and report the execution of the foregoing.

"The 8-inch gun in Fort Ripley, and casemate 32-pounder in Fort Sumter, near Condenser, and the one on the wharf, referred to by you, will be assigned eventually to other positions.

"Very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

Thus it appears that, immediately after his arrival in Charleston, General Beauregard began to concentrate as many heavy guns as were available in the first line of works, including Fort Sumter, so that they might be used with greater advantage against any naval attack. And the War Department was called upon to allow the transfer to Charleston of other heavy pieces from Ovenbluff, on the Tombigbee River, and Choctaw Bluff, on the Alabama River, where they could be of no use and might be easily dispensed with. The application was granted, provided no objection should be made by the commander of the Department of Alabama and Western Florida. No objection was made.

But General Beauregard's efforts did not stop there. He asked the War Department for additional guns, which he considered indispensable for the safety of Charleston, as he placed no great reliance upon the strength and stability of the boom then being constructed. His letter to Colonel Miles, M.C., Chairman of the Military Committee of the House (extracts from which are given in the Appendix to this chapter), fully explains his views on the subject. So do his communications, dated September 30th and October 2d, to General Cooper.*

The Northern newspapers were filled with indications of an approaching attack upon Charleston. The preparatory measures for such an expedition were represented as very formidable.

* See Appendix to this chapter.

Without entirely believing those rumors, General Beauregard used every endeavor to put himself in a state of readiness. He advised Governor Pickens, if it were the intention of the people and State to defend the city to the last extremity—as he was disposed to do—to prepare, out of its limits, a place of refuge for non-combatants. He ordered his chief-engineer to obstruct and defend the mouths of the Cooper and Ashley rivers. That officer was also instructed closely to examine both banks of the Stono, from Church Flats to the Wappoo Cut, and place there such obstructions as might impede the progress of the enemy, and prevent him from turning our works in that vicinity.

But the enemy, not being sufficiently prepared to make his projected attack on Charleston or Savannah, determined to strike a blow farther south, on the St. John's River, in the Department of Florida, commanded by Brigadier-General Joseph Finegan. General Finegan had only a small force under him, and, when he realized the extent of his danger, immediately telegraphed the War Department for reinforcements. The Secretary of War ordered General Beauregard to send two regiments of infantry to his assistance. They were to be withdrawn from Georgia, General Mercer's command. Although fears were still entertained of an offensive movement against South Carolina and Georgia, General Beauregard, whose forces were also very limited, complied promptly with the order, but took occasion to call the attention of the War Department to his numerical weakness, and to the fact that the enemy's lodgment in Florida, even if really intended—which was doubtful—would be of less gravity than an assault, at this juncture, upon either Charleston or Savannah. General Beauregard was accordingly authorized to recall his regiments, which he did without delay. They would have arrived too late to be of any assistance to General Finegan, as, upon that officer reaching St. John's Bluff, on the 3d, he found it already abandoned, though, in his opinion, there was a sufficient force to hold it, had Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Hopkins, commanding the post, shown more spirit and determination.* Six days later General Finegan informed the War Department that the enemy had embarked on their transports and gunboats, and were moving down the river.

* A court of inquiry, held October 11, at Colonel Hopkins's demand, exonerated him, however, from all blame in regard to this matter.

Being much concerned about the security and efficiency of the boom which was being built in the Charleston Harbor,* General Beauregard ordered his chief-engineer to alter its construction so as to increase its floating capacity, and reduce the resistance it offered to the strong flood and ebb tides. He also instructed him to protect the pile foundations of Fort Ripley, which were exposed to view at low-water.

At that time he forwarded to the Adjutant-General's office at Richmond the official report of his inspection of the Department. It is entirely similar to the notes of inspection inserted by us in the Appendix to this chapter, and need not, therefore, be transcribed here. It had been somewhat hurriedly made, however, and did not include all the defensive points of the Department, nor was General Beauregard's criticism of the works visited so comprehensive then as at a later period, when based upon more thorough knowledge. The many and great alterations effected by him show how defective most of the works were, and how well-founded were the concluding remarks of his report to General Cooper: "Adaptation 'of means to an end' has not always been consulted in the works around this city and Savannah. Much unnecessary work has been bestowed upon many of them."

The Third Military District of South Carolina, with headquarters at McPhersonville, under Colonel (afterwards General) W. S. Walker, was not then in a very promising condition. Reports, considered trustworthy, indicated the enemy's early intention of taking the offensive in that quarter. The lines of defence and the detached works constructed in that district were calculated for the occupation of fully ten thousand men—the number assembled there during the preceding winter, with a proportionate artillery force. General Beauregard had had nothing to do in the establishment of these lines, nor had he either planned or recommended the erection of the works spoken of. The abandonment by the Government of the plan of defending the coast with heavy artillery, and the consequent reduction of the force thus employed to a corps of observation, chiefly of cavalry, rendered the greater part of these works useless. Colonel Walker was alive to the danger of such a state of affairs, and had addressed a communica-

* A full description of it is given in General Beauregard's "Notes of Inspection," to be found in Appendix to this chapter.

tion to General Beauregard asking that reinforcements should be sent him to remedy the evil, and, as far as possible, secure that region of country.*

General Beauregard's answer was as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPT. S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 8th, 1862.

"Col. W. S. WALKER, Comdg. Third Mil. Dist., McPhersonville, S. C.:

"*Colonel*,—Your letter of 3d instant, with its enclosures, has been received. Your instructions to the Commanding Officer at Hardeeville and to your pickets are approved of; none more in detail can be furnished you from here. Our means are so limited at present, that it is impossible to guard effectually the whole country and line of railroad, from here to Savannah, against a determined attack of the enemy; but we must endeavor to make up in zeal and activity what we lack in numbers. I shall, however, send you a light battery of artillery, to be posted by you wherever most advantageous. Being still unacquainted with the district of country under your command, I must rely greatly, in this and other corresponding matters, on your judgment and thorough knowledge of its topography. * * *

"Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

The forthcoming chapter will show what occurred in Colonel Walker's district a fortnight after this letter was written. In the mean time it is proper here to remark that on General Beauregard's arrival in Charleston he found no regular system by which news of the movements of the enemy along the coast of South Carolina and Georgia could be ascertained with any degree of certainty, and he determined to correct so great a deficiency in the service, rendered all the more necessary by the fact that his Department, as will soon be seen, had just been enlarged.

The system inaugurated may be thus explained: He established signal (flag) stations at the most important points along the coast of South Carolina (from Georgetown), Georgia, and Florida, where the enemy's ships or fleets could be observed. An exact register was kept in his office of all Federal vessels plying along the coast and their precise whereabouts. Whenever any change took place among them it was reported at once to Department Headquarters, and a minute account kept of it. And when an accumulation of the enemy's ships occurred at any point, indicating an attack, the small reserves General Beauregard had at Charleston or Savannah

* See Colonel Walker's letter, in Appendix to this chapter.

were prepared to move by rail in that direction, with the usual amount of provisions and ammunition, one or more trains being always held in readiness to receive the detachment. Thus was inferiority of number, to a certain extent, remedied by unremitting vigilance. The flag-stations above described communicated with the nearest railroad stations by sub-flag-stations, or by couriers, as circumstances required. The result was that clear and trustworthy information of the enemy's ships, or of his land-forces, was given to General Beauregard, once in every twenty-four hours, from all the various quarters of his extensive Department. It is satisfactory to state that, during the twenty months he remained in command there, he was never, on any occasion, taken by surprise. His reinforcements always arrived at the threatened point as soon as our limited means of transportation would permit.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Extension of General Beauregard's Command.—Grave Errors in the Construction of the Fortifications around Charleston.—Alterations Ordered by General Beauregard.—His Desire for Additional Torpedo-rams.—He foresees the Federal Movement in Colonel Walker's District.—Sends Captain F. D. Lee to Richmond.—Prepares himself for the Enemy's Attack.—Bank of Louisiana.—Effort to Save its Funds.—Secretary of War Orders their Seizure.—Instructions to General Ripley.—Memoranda on the Defences of Savannah.—Minute Instructions to General Mercer.—Suggestion for a Conference of Southern Governors.—Captain Lee's Report of his Visit to Richmond.—Attack of the Federals on Pocotaligo.—Colonel Walker Repulses them with Loss.—Federal Force Engaged in the Affair.—General Beauregard Recommends Colonel Walker for Promotion.—Estimate called for, and given, of Men and Material Needed for a Successful Defence of Charleston and its Harbor.

FROM Richmond, on the 7th of October, the following telegram was sent to General Beauregard:

"Your command this day extended, in order to embrace South Carolina, Georgia, and that part of Florida east of the Appalachian River. The camps of instruction for conscripts, in the several States, are under special control of the Secretary of War.

"S. COOPER, A. & I. G."

This was not welcome news, for if it implied increase of territorial authority, it indicated no prospect of corresponding numerical strength in the Department. General Beauregard answered in these terms:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPT. S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 8th, 1862.

"General SAMUEL COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

"*General*,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, this day, of your telegram of the 7th instant, communicating information of the extension of the limits of this Department to include all of the State of Georgia, and so much of Florida as is situated east of the Appalachian River. I beg to say that I trust this extension of the territory of the Department will be followed, at an early day, by a commensurate increase of the forces to guard it. It is proper for me to say, that the more urgent importance of the defence of the ports of Charleston and Savannah must necessarily occupy so much of my

time, that I cannot be absent long enough to visit and make myself acquainted personally with the defensive resources and capabilities of Florida, and hence must rely entirely on the local commander.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

General Beauregard's solicitude was great for the safety of the approaches to Charleston. In the many works thrown up and directed by Engineers lacking experience grave errors had been committed, not only in their location but in their plans and profiles. Guns were put in position without regard to their range or calibre; traverses seemed to be ignored where most needed; enfilading fires by the enemy, the worst of all, had been almost entirely overlooked; yet one gun, well protected by traverses and merlons, is considered equivalent to five, unprotected. During the defence of Charleston, General Beauregard had all his heavy barbette guns surrounded with merlons and traverses, thus incasing them as if in a chamber. The bomb-proofs and service magazines, which he also placed in the traverses, protected the artilleryists and, in doing so, materially increased their confidence, which was "half the battle."

He had previously ordered the chief-engineer to enlarge the work at Rantowle's Station, on the Savannah Railroad, and to build a *tête de pont* and battery at the New Bridge, Church Flats. The same engineer had likewise been commanded to prepare a plan for the defence of the streets and squares of Charleston, in case of a successful land attack.

But General Beauregard's greatest efforts were directed towards the harbor. There, he was convinced, the land and naval forces against us would strike their heaviest blows. He wrote to Governor Pickens about his need of additional heavy guns; told him how little he relied on the effectiveness of the original boom; but spoke very encouragingly of Captain F. D. Lee's plan for a torpedo-ram, "which," General Beauregard thought, "would be equivalent to several gunboats." He added that "he feared not to put on record, now, that half a dozen of these torpedo-rams, of small comparative cost, would keep this harbor clear of four times the number of the enemy's ironclad gunboats." *

On the 10th he ordered a new work to be put up on the left of

* See, in Appendix to this chapter, letter to Governor Pickens.

the "New Bridge, city side of the Ashley River, and to repair the battery at New Bridge," Church Flats; and the chief-engineer was specially instructed as to the transfer and new location of guns already in position.

On the 12th he addressed this communication to Mr. J. K. Sass, Chairman of the State Gunboat Committee:

"Dear Sir,—In view of the necessity of getting ready, as soon as possible, the proposed torpedo-ram of Capt. F. D. Lee, and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of procuring the materials and machinery for its construction, I have the honor to request that the materials, etc., collected for the State's new gunboat should be applied to the 'torpedo-ram,' which, I am informed, can be got ready sooner (in less than two months), will cost less, and be more efficacious, in my opinion. In other words, I think the State and the country would be the gainers by constructing one of these new engines of destruction, in place of the intended gunboat, now just commencing to be built.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

The next day (13th) there were indications along the coast, especially about Port Royal, that the enemy would soon strike a blow in that vicinity. General Beauregard informed Colonel Walker, at McPhersonville, that every effort would be made to support him in case he was attacked; but that, nevertheless, it would be prudent for him to prepare himself for a retrograde movement, if overpowered. That he must therefore send to the rear all the heavy baggage, and hold his command ready for battle, with three days' cooked rations, forty rounds of ammunition in boxes, and sixty in wagons. That his pickets must be on the alert and his spies actively employed. That reinforcements would be sent him as soon as required, but that he must indicate, with precision, the points most needing relief. That two thousand infantry would come from Charleston (General Gist's district), one thousand from the Second District (General Hagood's), and two thousand from Savannah (General Mercer's headquarters). And he was advised, furthermore, not to look upon General Mitchel as a very formidable adversary, but to prepare against his predatory incursions.

General Beauregard was now most anxious to have built a "torpedo-ram," upon the plan proposed by Captain F. D. Lee. He accordingly sent that officer to Richmond to explain his invention, and urged the necessity of obtaining assistance from the War and Navy Departments. He considered those rams to be far

superior to the ironclad gunboats of the enemy; was convinced that their cost would be one-third less, and that they could be constructed in a much shorter time than the crafts then being built in Charleston. General Beauregard informed the Government that the South Carolina authorities were highly in favor of the new ram, and had already appropriated the sum of \$50,000 for its construction; but that, should the Navy Department take the matter in hand, the result would be better and sooner attained. If successful in Charleston harbor, General Beauregard thought similar rams could be built for the Mississippi and James rivers, and for Port Royal and Savannah. This point he strongly pressed upon the consideration of the War Department, and earnestly recommended Captain Lee for his zeal, energy, and capacity as a practical engineer.

Full and comprehensive orders were given, on the 13th and 14th, to Colonel Walker, and Generals Gist and Mercer, to hold their troops in readiness, with the usual instructions as to provisions and ammunition; and railroad transportation was prepared to take reinforcements to Colonel Walker at a moment's notice. On the same day General Mercer was also ordered to have made a careful reconnoissance of the Ocmulgee, with a view to its effectual obstruction and protection by a fort.

About this period a remarkable occurrence took place which is worthy of note. When New Orleans was about to be evacuated, in April, 1862, the civil and military authorities advised the banks and insurance companies to put their funds in security beyond the reach of the enemy. They nearly all did so, and, among them, the wealthiest of all, namely, the "Bank of Louisiana," which sent its assets, mostly of gold and silver, to the extent of some three millions of dollars, *via* Mobile, to Columbus, Georgia, under the care of its president. These funds were given in charge by him to Mr. W. H. Young, President of the Bank of Columbus, Georgia, with the belief that they would there be perfectly safe. To General Beauregard's surprise, on the 11th of October the following telegram was forwarded to him from Richmond:

"Take possession of the coin of the Bank of Louisiana, in the hands of W. H. Young, President of the Bank of Columbus, Ga., and place it in the hands of John Boston, the depository of the Government, at Savannah. A written order will be sent immediately, but don't wait for it.

"G. W. RANDOLPH, Secy. of War."

Without loss of time, though very reluctantly, General Beauregard sent an officer of his staff, Colonel A. G. Rice, Vol. A. D. C., to execute this disagreeable order. On the 14th, from Columbus, Colonel Rice telegraphed as follows:

"To Genl. T. JORDAN, A. A. G.:

"Mr. Young, under instructions from Mr. Memminger, dated 9th of June, refuses to give up the coin. He has telegraphed to Richmond. No reply yet.

"A. G. RICE, A. D. C."

Forceful possession, however, was taken of the coin; and the Secretary of War, when applied to for further instructions, ordered that, inasmuch as Mr. Young had been "appointed a depositary" by Mr. Boston, "the money be left in the hands of the former, upon his consenting to receipt for it as the depositary of the Treasury Department."* This Mr. Young declined to do; and thereupon General Beauregard was ordered by the Secretary of War to turn over the coin to Mr. T. S. Metcalf, Government depositary at Augusta, Georgia; which was done, Colonel Rice taking triplicate receipts, one for the Secretary of War, one for General Beauregard's files, and one for himself.

Thus was the property belonging to citizens of Louisiana, who were then despoiled by the enemy, in possession of their State, taken away from them by the Government of the Confederate States, from which they had a right to claim protection. What became of that coin is, we believe, even to this day, a mystery. It was, doubtless, spent for the benefit of the Confederacy; but how, and to what purpose—not having been regularly appropriated by Congress—has never been made known to the South, especially to the stockholders and depositors of the "Bank of Louisiana." That institution was utterly ruined by the seizure of its most valuable assets, thus arbitrarily taken from it. It would have been more equitable to leave this coin untouched, or, if not, to take no greater proportion of it than of the coin of all the other banks in the Confederacy.

The movements of the Federals along the coast of Florida kept General Finegan in a state of constant perplexity, on account of the inferior force under him. On the 14th he gave a clear statement of the condition of his district, and asked that reinforce-

* See telegrams, in Appendix.

ments should be sent him without delay.* General Beauregard would gladly have complied with his request, but was unable to do so, as he was apprehensive at that time of an immediate attack at or near Pocotaligo, in Colonel Walker's district. He sent two officers of his staff, Lieutenants Chisolm and Beauregard, to confer with Colonel Walker as to the true condition of his command, and assure him again that he could rely on being reinforced as soon as the enemy further developed his intentions. Colonel Walker reiterated what he had already said about his weakness, and spoke of the want of rifles for his cavalry, which, he said, would have to fight as infantry, owing to the nature of the country in which the contest would probably take place. He designated Pocotaligo, Grahamville, and Hardeeville as points for concentrating his forces and reinforcements, according to circumstances and to the plan of the enemy, detailing his preparatory arrangements for meeting his adversary at any of the three places.

While these events were occurring—to wit, on the 17th of October—General Beauregard received a despatch from the Secretary of War, informing him that news from Baltimore, reported to be trustworthy, spoke of an attack upon Charleston by Commodore Dupont within the ensuing two weeks. General Beauregard communicated the rumor to Commodore Ingraham and to the Mayor of the city, Mr. Charles Macbeth, in order that he and the people of Charleston might be prepared for such an event. General Beauregard also instructed Doctor Cheves, in charge of the harbor obstructions, to hurry the laying of the “rope entanglement” in front of the “boom,” in the efficacy of which he now had but little, if any, faith.

It may be added here that when General Beauregard assumed command of Charleston he found prevalent among a certain class of people the habit of spreading exaggerated reports of the enemy's intended movements against the city. To put a stop to the uneasy state of excitement thus created, he ordered the various officers in command to obtain the names of all persons propagating such rumors, and, after tracing them to their original source, to arrest forthwith whoever was guilty of thus disturbing the public mind. In less than two weeks' time, and before

* See, in Appendix to this chapter, his official letter to that effect.

three arrests had been made, the habit was broken, and from that time forward no more trouble was experienced on this score.

General Beauregard's attention had already been attracted to the construction, or rather completion, of a railroad from Thomasville, Georgia, to Bainbridge, on Flint River, some thirty-six miles, and a branch from Grovesville to the Tallahassee Railroad—about sixteen miles—which would add greatly to the military facilities for the defence of Middle and Eastern Florida, and for sending troops rapidly from Savannah or the interior of Georgia to any point threatened in Florida. The matter was again referred to him, on the 18th, by Judge Baltzell, and he strongly advised the Government to take immediate action in regard to it; but scarcity of iron, it was alleged, and other reasons, not well explained, prevented the construction of either of the roads until the last year of the war, when, it seems, the project was finally sanctioned, but too late to accomplish any good.

Shortly after his arrival in Charleston, General Beauregard, at the suggestion of some of the leading men of the city, called for and obtained the services of Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley. He was a graduate of West Point, and an officer of merit, though erratic at times, and inclined to an exaggerated estimate of his own importance. He was, however, quick, energetic, and intelligent, and, for several months after his assignment to duty in the Department, materially assisted the general commanding in the execution of his plans.

On the 19th General Beauregard, through his chief of staff, gave General Ripley the following instructions:

"As the enemy has shown a design to interrupt or prevent the erection of any works at Mayrant's Bluff, the Commanding General directs me to suggest that the enemy may be foiled by proper efforts.

"Sham works should be attempted at some point in view of the gunboats, and, meanwhile, the real works should be vigorously prosecuted at night.

"It is likewise the wish of the General Commanding that Sullivan's Creek should be effectively obstructed, without delay, against the possible attempts of mortar-boats.

"Some arrangements must also be made for the disposition of the troops on Sullivan's Island, not needed for the service of the batteries, in case of an attack merely by gunboats. To this matter the Commanding General wishes you to give your immediate attention.

"The houses on Sullivan's Island, on the sea-shore, you will take measures to remove at an early day."

We now have before us two important and interesting memoranda, giving an elaborate professional criticism of the defences of Savannah and its different approaches, showing the defects of the system adopted by General Beauregard's predecessor, and demonstrating clearly General Long's error of judgment in attributing the construction of these works—or most of them—to General R. E. Lee. The reader will find these memoranda in the Appendix to this chapter. We insert here the instructions given by General Beauregard to General Mercer, after his second tour of inspection of the defensive works at or around Savannah; they form a necessary supplement to the memoranda just spoken of:

“SAVANNAH, GA., Oct. 28th, 1862.

“Brig.-Genl. H. W. MERCER, Comdg. Dist. of Georgia, etc., etc.:

“*General*,—Before leaving, on my return to Charleston, I think it advisable to leave with you a summary of the additions and changes I have ordered to the works intended for the defence of this city, and which ought to be executed as promptly as practicable, commencing with those on the river and at Caustine's Bluff:

“1. The magazines of several of the river batteries must be thoroughly drained at once, and repaired. They are now unfit for use, on account of their dampness, and the one at Battery Lawton has not yet been commenced. The position selected for it is too far to the rear. It should be closer to the battery, and well drained. Not a moment should be lost in its construction.

“The service magazine should have its entrance enlarged and strengthened at the top. The magazine doors at Fort Jackson do not open freely. This defect must be corrected.

“2. Good and strong traverses must be constructed, as directed, in the Naval Battery, to prevent enfilading.

“3. The two 8-inch columbiads on Fort Jackson must be separated, and one of the barbette 32-pounders (removed, for a traverse to be constructed in its place) must be put in position outside, in rear of the glacis, to fire down the river.

“4. Those river works, when garrisoned, must always be provided with several days' provisions on hand.

“5. The mortar-chamber in Capt. Lamar's battery is too small. The mortars should be mounted as soon as practicable, and the men drilled to it.

“6. It would be important, if possible, to lay a boom obstruction across the river, at or near Hutchinson's Island, under the guns of its battery, and of Fort Boggs, and a three or four gun battery should also be constructed at Screven's Ferry Landing.

“7. Caustine's Bluff must be made an enclosed work, with two mortars and four heavy guns added to its armament. Two of these guns must be placed so as to bear up the Augustine River.

“8. A three-gun battery must be constructed at Greenwich Point, on Augus-

tine River, to cross fire with the two guns just referred to, on Whitmarsh Island, constructed against Caustine's Bluff.

"9. One rifled 32-pounder must be added to the Thunderbolt Battery, and one of its 8-inch shell-guns must be changed in position, as ordered, and the embrasure of its 8-inch columbiad must be reduced in size.

"Several traverses must be raised and lengthened. The upper slope of the battery in front of several of its guns must be increased.

"10. A new battery for four 24-pounder howitzers, on siege-carriages, with some rifle-pits, must be constructed to command the Isle of Hope Causeway.

"11. Several of the guns of Fort Boggs and battery at Beaulieu are in want of elevating screws; and some in the latter battery require smaller trunnion-plates, and the upper slope of its parapet must be lowered in several places.

"12. A new battery and rifle-pits must be constructed on Rosedew Island for five or six pieces, of which one or two should be rifled guns, so as to command Little Ogeechee.

"One rifled 24-pounder is already on its way to this city from Atlanta for said work.

"13. Two rifled guns (one 32-pounder and one 24-pounder) must be added to the work on Genesis Point, and one of its 32-pounders must be changed in position, as ordered, to rake the pilings across the river. Its traverses must be raised and lengthened, and a merlon constructed to protect the two 32-pounders, now raking the obstruction, from being enfiladed. Its magazines must be better protected, and its hot-shot furnace reconstructed as ordered. A more efficient commander than the present one would, I think, be required for this important position, and whoever is sent there should visit, first, the work at Beaulieu, to see its fine condition.

"14. A proper sunken battery should be constructed for the protection of the men and horses of all light batteries intended for the defence of water-courses. This applies especially to the light batteries now on the Little and Great Ogeechees.

"15. No provocation of the enemy's gunboats, to draw the fire of our batteries, should induce officers in command to waste in return their ammunition. They should reserve their fire until the enemy comes within point-blank range of a 32-pounder, placing, meanwhile, all the garrison under close cover. When they fire let them open simultaneously with all their guns upon the foremost vessel, in order to sink it, aiming rather low.

"16. Two mortars have been ordered from Charleston for Fort Jackson and Caustine's Bluff, to fire on river obstructions, and, in respect to the latter battery, to fire also on Whitmarsh Island. They must be placed in position as soon as they shall have arrived, and provided with ammunition, etc., and a detail of men drilled at them regularly.

"17. Ship-yard Creek, in rear of Beaulieu, must be guarded by a light battery, as already indicated for the Little and Great Ogeechees.

"18. Signal-stations must be established forthwith to communicate with each other at Genesis Point, Rosedew Island, Beaulieu, the Isle of Hope Causeway, Thunderbolt, Caustine's Bluff, Fort Jackson, Fort Boggs, and the city.

"19. The two large observatories or spindles towards the mouth of Savannah River must be destroyed forthwith, for fear of their falling into the hands of the enemy uninjured.

"20. Brigade drills must be commenced at once, whenever practicable, and regiments must not be armed with weapons of more than two different calibres, to prevent confusion in providing them with ammunition.

"21. The male residents of this city, not liable to conscription, must be organized at once by the civil authorities, for the defence of their homes and firesides (in case of an attack upon the city), into companies and regiments. They will thus afford material assistance to the Confederate troops in the defence of Savannah.

"22. Ample provision must be made by the civil authorities for the removal of the women and children to a safe locality outside of the city—the farther the better. This removal should take place on the first appearance of real danger.

"23. A sufficient number of switchlock keys should be provided at railroad depots for immediate use in case of necessity.

"24. The Georgia Central Railroad will furnish a reserve train, to be stationed at Ashley River Depot, for the purpose of conveying troops, without delay, from Charleston to the South Carolina lower parishes, or to Georgia. Another one will be held in readiness at the depot of the Central Railroad, in this city, for the purpose of conveying troops towards Charleston when required.

"25. The troops of this district must be vaccinated gradually.

"26. The woods of the island fronting the outworks must be cut down as soon as possible, wherever in too dangerous proximity.

"27. The city must be always provided with at least fifteen days' provisions for ten thousand men, and with the same quantity in a convenient depot not nearer than thirty miles from the city, along the Central Railroad, so as to be beyond the reach of the enemy in every contingency.

"28. Ample supply of fuel should be made for the steamboats and for the troops forming the garrison of the city.

"29. The city authorities must see that the supply of water be ample for all emergencies, in case of a bombardment.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

"P.S.—It is ordered that all laborers employed on the interior of the city lines of defences, except those employed on the magazines, should be at once concentrated, first on the salient faces of the advanced lunettes and cremailières, except those from Fort Mercer, inclusive to Fort Brown, then on the salient faces of the retired lunettes or redans, then on the shoulder faces of the first class, and afterwards of the second.

"The banquettes of Fort Brown must be put forthwith in proper condition. No labor must be expended on the *finish* of the above works, which must be put, with their batteries, magazines, etc., in a *fighting condition* as soon as possible, even if we should have to work day and night.

"Should you not have laborers enough for such a purpose, you must call

on the Governor of the State for additional ones. I earnestly request that the utmost activity should be shown in every department of the service, so as to be ready in time for an intended attack of the enemy. I have called for five 10-inch or 13-inch mortars, and twenty heavy or long-range guns (five 10-inch and five 8-inch columbiads, five 42-pounders, rifled, and five 32-pounders, ditto), which will be distributed to the best advantage, when received, on the river defences and line of outworks.

“G. T. B.”

During his second tour of inspection in Georgia, General Beauregard had directed his thoughts, despite his preoccupation at the time, to a subject, not immediately concerning his military occupations, but referring to, and closely connected with, the ulterior fate of the Confederacy. Believing that our Government could not again directly open the door to peace negotiations with the Federal Government, and knowing, on the other hand, that our Confederate Commissioners in Europe had never been allowed to offer the semblance even of an inducement in our favor to any of the foreign powers, it occurred to him that what could not appropriately be done by the authorized agents of the Confederacy might perhaps be attempted, with some chance of success, by the governors of the Southern States. Acting upon this impulse, he wrote from Savannah, on the 21st of October, the following message to Governors Pickens, of South Carolina; Brown, of Georgia; and Milton, of Florida; and to Colonel William P. Miles, M. C., formerly a member of his staff:

“Why should not governors of Southern States offer to meet those of Northwest States, at Memphis, under flag of truce, to decide on treaty of peace to be submitted to both governments?”

The moment, General Beauregard thought, was propitious for such a step; for the Confederacy, notwithstanding many reverses, was holding out with success; but though the suggestion was at first approved of by two of the three governors written to, it was not acted upon. Governor Pickens, upon reflection, decided that the plan was not feasible, and Colonel Miles was of opinion that nothing could be effected now, and that our only course was “to fight it out.”

At about the same time was received Captain F. D. Lee's report of his visit to the War and Navy departments, at Richmond, with reference to his torpedo-ram. He had been much encouraged by these two departments, by the chief-engineer and the chief of

ordnance of the navy. All spoke in the highest terms of his invention. Unfortunately, he left Richmond without securing the necessary orders for the construction of his boat, and, as a consequence, many untoward delays ensued. In the Appendix will be found Captain Lee's report of his mission to the Confederate capital, and a letter from General Beauregard to the Hon. S. B. Mallory, in acknowledgment of his prompt and favorable support of the marine torpedo-ram project. In this letter he said:

"I confidently believe that with three of these light-draught torpedo-rams, and as many ironclad gunboat-rams, this harbor [meaning the Charleston Harbor] could be held against any naval force of the enemy;" and he added: "The same means can also be used (with one less of each class) for Savannah and Mobile." He disclaimed wishing to take the matter out of the hands of competent naval officers. "All I desired," he wrote, "was to see it [the ram] afloat and ready for action as soon as possible." Time and the progress of naval warfare have only confirmed the opinion he entertained twenty years ago.

At last occurred, on the 22d, the long-expected attack of the Federals against Colonel W. S. Walker, at Pocotaligo and Coosawhatchie. General Beauregard was then in Savannah. So carefully were all his arrangements made in prevision of that occurrence, and so minute his instructions to his chief of staff in Charleston, that he did not forego his inspection of the defensive works in General Mercer's command. Still supervising the movements of the troops, he rapidly sent forward the reinforcements held in readiness for that purpose, and thus materially aided Colonel Walker in securing his brilliant victory.

The enemy, in some thirteen gunboats and transports, came up Bee's Creek, apparently aiming at Coosawhatchie. Effecting a landing at Mackay's Point, and marching thence in the direction of Pocotaligo, they took possession of the railroad at Coosawhatchie and destroyed the telegraphic line at that point, thus compelling us to communicate with Savannah and Hardeeville *via* Augusta. Colonel Walker now telegraphed for reinforcements, as was agreed, and retired to "Old Pocotaligo," one mile from the Pocotaligo station, intending, if necessary, to fall back to the Salkahatchie bridge. This, however, he did not do, but took a fixed position at the junction of the Mackay's Point road and the road between Pocotaligo and Coosawhatchie. The engagement was then

in full progress, the enemy's force being, at first, relatively small, but constantly increasing with the arrival of reserves. Colonel Walker was resolved to hold his ground at "Old Pocotaligo" until reinforcements should arrive, which he again telegraphed for, asking that all troops coming from Savannah should be sent to Coosawhatchie, and those from Charleston to Pocotaligo, as both points were being assailed in force.

The first reinforcements that reached the scene of action, at about 4.30 P. M., came up from Adams Run. They double-quickened to where the fight seemed heaviest, their presence giving additional resolution to Colonel Walker's gallant troops, and showing their commander that he could now count upon success. He was not disappointed. The enemy, after a contest that lasted from 11.30 A. M. to 6 P. M., gave way in disorder, leaving his dead and wounded on the field, with quite a number of small-arms, with ammunition, knapsacks, and other accoutrements. Two companies of cavalry were sent in pursuit, but could not be moved nearer than two miles to the Federal gunboats, which opened and kept up a destructive fire upon them.

Our loss was small, though, in proportion, greater than that of the enemy, and amounted to an aggregate of one hundred and sixty-three, killed, wounded, and missing. The loss on the other side was estimated at not less than three hundred.

Uncertain, however, as to the ulterior object of the enemy, other troops were asked for by Colonel Walker; and Generals Hagood and Gist, with forces kept prepared for that purpose, were rapidly sent to reinforce him. They arrived after the action was over, and took no part in it, General Gist, with two strong regiments, only reaching Pocotaligo the next day, October 23d. It was now evident that no further assistance was needed.

The Federal force engaged in this affair consisted of six regiments, one battery of ten 10-pounder rifled guns, and two boat howitzers. Colonel Walker had, when he first went into the fight, about four hundred effective men of all arms, and was subsequently reinforced by the Nelson Battalion, under Captain Sligh, numbering two hundred men, making in all, towards the close of the fight, a total force of not more than six hundred men, against an aggregate of not less than three thousand five hundred on the part of the enemy. In his official report of the engagement Colonel Walker said:

"The force of the enemy was represented by prisoners, and confirmed by the statement of negroes who had crossed Port Royal Ferry to the mainland on that day and been captured, to be seven regiments, one of which, I judge, went to Coosawhatchie. * * * There were abundant evidences that the retreat of the enemy was precipitate and disordered. One hundred small-arms were picked up, and a considerable amount of stores and ammunition. The road was strewn with the *débris* of the beaten foe. Forty-six of the enemy's dead were found on the battle-field and road-side. Seven fresh graves were discovered at Mackay's Point. I estimate their total killed and wounded at three hundred. * * * We have ample reason to believe that our small force not only fought against great odds, but against fresh troops brought up to replace those first engaged. * * * I beg to express my admiration of the remarkable courage and tenacity with which the troops held their ground. The announcement of my determination to hold my position until reinforcements arrived seemed to fix them to the spot with unconquerable resolution."

General Beauregard the day following informed the War Department of the defeat of the enemy at Pocotaligo; and, recognizing the coolness, intelligence, and foresight displayed by Colonel Walker on that occasion, strongly recommended him for immediate promotion. The War Department acceded to that request, and when, on November 4th, the official report of the fight at Pocotaligo reached Department Headquarters in Charleston, it was signed "W. S. Walker, Brigadier-General, Commanding."

Our success at Pocotaligo, although very encouraging, more than ever demonstrated our numerical weakness, and led General Beauregard to reflect with great uneasiness upon the results which might follow a simultaneous attack by the enemy at various points in his Department. Hesitating to trust his judgment alone relative to the deficiency of troops in the First Military District, he called on its commanding officer for an estimate "of the men and material he thought necessary for a prolonged successful resistance to any attack which the resources of the enemy may enable him to make."

In compliance with this request, Generals Ripley and Gist, the commander and sub-commander of the district referred to, furnished the following report:

"HEADQUARTERS, FIRST MILITARY DIST., S. C.,
CHARLESTON, Oct. 25th, 1862.

"Increase of numerical force called for by Brigadier-General S. R. Gist, commanding:

For Defence of James Island and the Main.

Of all arms	17,661
1 light artillery.....100 }	200
1 company artillery .100 }	

For Morris Island.

1 company artillery for enfilade battery	100
--	-----

Sullivan's Island.

2 regiments.....2000	
1 battalion cavalry... 400	
2 light batteries..... 200	
.....	2,600

For Mount Pleasant.

1 regiment artillery for works in progress	1,000
Total numerical increase called for.....	21,561

“R. S. RIPLEY, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.”

As the effective force, of all arms, on James Island amounted at that time to 2910, and that in the City of Charleston and on the main to 1279 (in all, 4189), it followed that, out of the whole number required—to wit, 21,561, as shown above—there was, on the 25th of October, in Generals Ripley's and Gist's opinion, a deficit of not less than 17,372 men, of all arms, for the proper defence of the First Military District, South Carolina; an alarming deficiency, but one which General Beauregard did not think exaggerated.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

General Beauregard Returns to Charleston.—He informs the War Department of the Result of his Inspection of the Works around Savannah.—Dispositions Taken with Regard to Different Batteries; for the Completion of the Boom; for the Protection of River Obstructions; for Negro Labor upon Works around Charleston.—Letter to Governor Pickens.—Letter to Colonel Chestnut.—Letter to the Hon. W. P. Miles.—Promise of Secretary of War to send Guns to General Beauregard.—His Letter to General Cobb.—Instructions to Major Pope.—War Department withdraws the Order for Guns.—General Beauregard's Letter to General S. Cooper, Explaining Conduct of Major Childs.—Telegram from the Secretary of War.—General Beauregard Requests a Suspension of Decision.—Refusal of the Secretary of War.—Indignation of General Beauregard.—Governor Pickens Dissuades him from Demanding to be Relieved.—Ordnance Department Refuses to Pay for Banding of Guns.—Notice given of Probable Attack.—Canal Cut through the Wappoo.—General Beauregard's Minute Attention to all Details.—Instructions to General Cobb.—Enemy's Fleet directed towards Cape Lookout.—General Beauregard's Letter to General Whiting.—Enemy Retires to Newbern.—Information given of Probable Naval Attack upon Charleston.—General Beauregard Recalls his Troops from North Carolina.—President Davis Refuses to send 7-inch Guns to General Beauregard.—They are sent to Mobile.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD, having accomplished the object of his visit to Savannah, on the 30th of October returned to Charleston, where he found Captain D. B. Harris waiting for him. His pleasure and relief were great indeed, for he knew that this trusted officer would now relieve him of the immediate supervision of the works to be remodelled and constructed in many portions of his extensive command.

It cannot be expected that we shall pass in review and comment upon all the official orders emanating from General Beauregard's headquarters, nor that the reader should be made acquainted with every one of his acts from the time he assumed control of that Department until he left it in the spring of 1864. No more can be looked for than a careful summary, in chronological order, of all events of importance that occurred within

his jurisdiction, showing the part he took in each, and giving such explanation as the occasion may call forth.

1. On November 1st he officially informed General Cooper of the result of his inspection of the defences of Savannah, and expressed his views and recommendations "more," he said, "as an Engineer officer than as the commanding general of the Department."* The preceding chapter and its comprehensive Appendix have already sufficiently apprised the reader of what these views and recommendations were.

2. On November 3d he instructed Major Pope, Chief of Ordnance, to transfer an 18-pounder cannon from White Point Battery, where it was comparatively useless, to one at Church Flats, in the Second Military District, so as to enfilade the John's Island Bridge and Causeway, which were liable to be taken by a sudden *coup de main*.

On the same day he called on Captain Ingraham, C. S. N., commanding the Naval Department in Charleston, to furnish him three hundred pieces of gunboat plating, to be used in completing the boom across the channel between the two main forts of the harbor. He also suggested that the three merchant ships lying off the wharves should be armed with quaker guns, and anchored near the boom, to deceive the enemy.

3. On November 4th he applied to Governor Pickens for the iron plating which protected the old floating battery used, in April, 1861, during the attack on Fort Sumter. He accepted the four regiments of reserves (infantry) offered him by the governor for the defence of the sea-coast of South Carolina. Two of these he immediately ordered to Pocotaligo, in the Third Military District, and the two others to Georgetown, in the Fourth District (a new one), now being organized, which was afterwards placed under the command of Brigadier-General Trapier.

Governor Pickens answered in his usual earnest way, granting General Beauregard's request about the iron. He suggested a plan for the proper management of negroes, and the care to be bestowed upon them while working on the defences of the city and coast, and thought they could be organized into a corps of spadesmen and axemen, to be permanently attached to the army.

* General Beauregard's Report to the War Department, to be found in the War Records Office, Washington, D. C.

4. On November 6th General Beauregard wrote an important letter to Brigadier-General Gist, commanding James Island and the Main, acknowledging receipt of his communication of that date alluding to the good condition of the battery at Mayrant's, near Georgetown. The proposed battery at Frazer's Bluff, though most desirable, was, he feared, liable to be cut off and seized by the enemy. He desired the construction of a work for two or three 24-pounders, to command the North Santee, at a bluff near Ladson's, in the direction of Hame's Ferry. He also inquired about the condition of the battery of one 32-pounder, commanding the South Santee, and wished to know whether or not the stream could be so obstructed as to allow the removal of that gun to the battery at Ladson's.

5. On the 7th General Mercer was requested to confer with Commodore Tatnall, C. S. N., commanding the Naval Department in Savannah, concerning the fitting out of a small gunboat (not ironclad) with heavy guns, to be placed in a cut near the river obstructions, where the ground was known to be low and soft. General Beauregard suggested the construction of an iron shield on board, arranged to protect the guns, and the throwing up of a levee around the gunboat further to secure its safety. He thought it would be a great saving, both of time and labor.

6. On the 8th of November he wrote the following letter to Governor Pickens:

"*Governor*,—Your letter of the 5th inst. was received after I had given the orders for Cash's regiment to report to General Walker, who, being nearest to the enemy, will require one of the best colonels with him; but I will endeavor to leave him in the Georgetown District.

"With regard to the labor furnished for the defences of the city, the planters have done nobly, but they must not stop three-fourths of the way. Should Charleston fall for want of proper works, they will be the largest sufferers in the end. Your idea of organizing negro laborers with the troops is one I have already recommended to the Government long ago. I think that one company of one hundred negroes, as pioneers, per two regiments of one thousand men each, would be a good proportion of laborers, and would leave the troops to attend to their legitimate duties of drill and guard, so that each brigade of the four regiments would have two hundred negro pioneers or laborers. Our Southern soldiers object most strenuously to work with spades and shovels. They will do it in very pressing emergencies, but, on ordinary occasions, do more grumbling than work. They prefer, decidedly, to fight.

"I find so much difficulty in procuring mechanics and materials here for the construction of Captain Lee's marine torpedo-ram, that I will have to stop

building it. Charleston cannot furnish all the labor and material required for the building of three rams at once; one or two of these must be stopped, to enable the other to be completed; otherwise all three will remain unfinished when the enemy will make his appearance here. I am free to confess that I believe our ordinary gunboats will effect but little against the enemy's new gigantic monitors, provided they can get here in safety from the North. We must attack them under water, where they are the most vulnerable, if we wish to destroy them, and the torpedo-ram is the only probable way of accomplishing that desirable end. Moreover, one of these can be furnished in at least half the time required for an ordinary-sized gunboat-ram.

"With regard to your supposition that the enemy will not make a land attack on our coast before disposing of Lee's army, I believe they will do so as soon as the forces in Virginia shall have gone into winter-quarters, thus enabling them to send reinforcements South for a campaign; and, with their great facilities of transportation, they could get them here before we could ours.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

7. Two days after the foregoing letter was penned the following communication was sent to Colonel James Chestnut, Jr., at that time in command of the State Reserves of South Carolina:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPT. S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 10th, 1862.

"*Colonel*,—A few days ago I answered your telegram, informing you that I would be able to furnish an artillery officer to make the examination of the Santee River, referred to by you in your telegram, asking you to name when and where he should report, but thus far I have received no answer. Meanwhile I have read with satisfaction the excellent report of Mr. Niernsee relative to his reconnoissance of the Santee River, from Lowndes's Ferry to Nowell's Point, and of the information obtained by him relative to the North and South Santee, from the point of junction to their mouths. My conclusion is, that Nowell's Point is the proper position to be fortified, and the river ought to be obstructed, not more than four hundred yards below the fort. This obstruction, I think, can be made of several rows of piles (should the bottom permit it), interlaced with a properly constructed abatis of trees—live-oaks, if possible.

"As it is not probable that the enemy's ironclad boats will be able to ascend to that point of the river, the armament of the battery need not consist of heavier guns than 32-pounders, smooth-bore (three or four), and about two rifled 24-pounders. All of these guns to be separated by heavy traverses, or placed by twos in detached batteries. Rifle-pits should also be provided (not enfiladed from the river) for the infantry support to the batteries. The thickness of the parapets of the latter should be about twenty feet, and of the rifle-pits twelve or fifteen feet. The height of the crest of the batteries (which may be half sunk) should be about six feet above the front ground,

and about eight feet above the rear *terre-plein*, for the greater protection of the men.

"I have given orders for the construction of a battery of three or four guns at or about Ladson's Bluff, on the North Santee, which, I suppose, is the one called by Mr. Niernsee 'Bear Hill Bluff.'

"I am informed that the battery at Mayrant's Bay, towards Georgetown, is armed and completed; and I hope that the new regiment of the State Reserves (Cash's) I have ordered to report to General Trapier, in command of Georgetown District, will be able to support these two batteries until other forces can be sent in that direction.

"Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

8. The following letter was addressed to the Hon. William P. Miles:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 11th, 1862.

"Dear Colonel,—* * * I regret much to learn that we are to receive no more additional 10-inch columbiads than the ten referred to by you. Of course I understand the inability of the War Department to furnish more, but it is worth the most serious consideration of the Government to determine which is of most value to us at this moment—the free navigation of the Mississippi, which, from the nature of things, we cannot use; or the port of Charleston, which is now our only means of communication with Europe, especially at this juncture, when we are expecting so many things of vital importance to the country from that quarter. I sent, yesterday, to the Department a letter of General Ripley's on the subject of having a 15-inch gun cast here. It seems it can be done—at a high cost, it is true; but I have great faith in the weight of metal (about 500 pounds) which could be thrown from it. Three of such guns—one at Sumter, one at the Enfilade Battery, and one at Fort Ripley—would, I think, supply the place of a good boom across the channel between Sumter and Moultrie.

"Should you think favorably of the project, I hope you will support it towards the War Department. Why could not 10-inch guns be made at Macon, getting the iron from Spartanburg, which, I understand, is about the best in the country, according to General Ripley?

"Hoping to see you soon, I remain, yours very truly,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

9. On the 17th the gratifying news was received that the Secretary of War had authorized the immediate casting of the 15-inch gun, and that through him Colonel Miles hoped to be able, ere-long, to procure other 10-inch guns for Charleston. But the concluding part of the despatch spoke of Mr. Randolph's resignation, just sent in, and deplored it as "a great loss to us," for he took deep interest in General Beauregard's efforts thoroughly to secure

Charleston and its harbor, and would have done his utmost in furtherance of that end.

On the same day the condition of General Trapier's Military District was made known to the War Department, and prompt action solicited for his immediate relief. The means at his command were alarmingly small. The battery at Mayrant's Bluff, reported to be in a state of readiness, had no other support than such as could be afforded by mounted troops and field artillery. The regiments of infantry under him (Colonel Cash in command) were State Reserves, called out for ninety days, and had been sent to their post of duty without arms or ammunition.

10. On the 21st General Beauregard, in reply to General Howell Cobb's inquiries as to the precise nature of his duties in Middle Florida,* wrote the following letter:

"*Dear General*,—Your letter of the 19th inst. has just been delivered to me by Captain Banon, your Adjutant-General.

"The order you refer to was not understood at first by me either; but I learn that you are to be in command of one of the *Districts* (not Departments) in Florida—under my orders—and Brigadier-General Finegan of the other. Your headquarters are to be at Quincy.

"General Finegan is at present in Tallahassee, where you will go to relieve him, and receive whatever instructions he may have in his possession from the War Department.

"The means at our command, for the defence of my Department (S. C., Ga., and Fla., to the Chattahoochee) are very limited; so much so, that I am unable to spare one man from South Carolina and Georgia for Florida at present; but I hope, after the fall campaign in Virginia, troops will be sent for the defence of my Department. Meanwhile, we must do the best we can, by calling on the State authorities for all the assistance they can furnish us. I think, on assuming command of your district, it would be desirable to draw up a concise statement of its exact defensive condition and resources for the files of this Department. General Finegan will do the same for his own district. In conclusion, I am most happy that you have been ordered to assist me in the defence of so large and so important a section of our country, and I have no doubt that, with sufficient means, the result can but be honorable to yourself and advantageous to our cause.

"I hope, ere long, to have the assistance of your brother in Georgia. I am happy to hear of his recent promotion.

"Yours, very truly,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

* General Cobb had been ordered by the War Department (November 1) to report for duty to General Beauregard.

11. Major Pope, Chief of Ordnance, received the following special instructions on the 22d :

"1. The 8-inch shell (naval) gun, now on the wharf, will be transported and placed on the new battery at John's Island Ferry.

"2. The 32-pounder navy gun, being rifled and banded at Eason's shop, must be sent, when ready for service, to White Point Battery, to be placed in position on the Ashley River, adjoining the position at the salient intended for heavier guns.

"3. The 10-inch bronze (old pattern) mortar on wharf will be placed in Battery Wagner, Morris Island.

"4. New beds and elevating screws will be supplied, as soon as possible, for three 10-inch mortars in Fort Sumter.

"5. If not already done, one rifled and banded 32-pounder will be transferred from Battery Means to Beauregard.

"6. If not already done, a 12-pounder rifled piece outside of Fort Pemberton will be sent, with the proper supply of ammunition, to Winyaw Bay.

"7. Two 24-pounder guns (on siege carriages) now on the eastern *cremaille* lines of James Island will be sent to battery at Willtown Bluff, in Second Military District.

"8. The 32-pounder recently ordered to be banded to replace a defective piece in Fort Moultrie, when ready for service, will be sent to Battery Glover, to take place of a 32-pounder to be brought here by commanding officer of First District, to be banded and rifled.

"9. All guns, when sent or transferred to positions not already sufficiently supplied with ammunition, will be at once furnished with about one hundred rounds of the proper character and proportion."

12. On the same day plans and instructions for placing obstructions, by piling, etc., in the Chattahoochee (Florida) and Flint River (Georgia) were forwarded to Captain F. Moreno, Corps of Provisional Engineers, at Columbus, Ga. And General Finegan, at his own request, was also advised as to obstructing the Appalachian River below the batteries, with a view to avoiding complication with the State authorities.

13. The effects of the resignation of Mr. Randolph, as Secretary of War, were soon felt in Charleston, as will be seen by the following telegrams :

"Genl. BEAUREGARD :

"RICHMOND, Nov. 25th, 1862.

"The two 7-inch guns are turned over to navy for Mobile.

"T. S. RHETT, Col. and Insp. of Ord'ce."

"Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

"RICHMOND, Nov. 26th, 1862.

"After all our efforts we lose the two 7-inch guns. Dispute between Gas and Mallory was laid before President yesterday, and he ordered guns to Mobile. Great disappointment.

WM. PORCHER MILES."

General Beauregard remonstrated, but without avail. In a telegram to General Cooper he said :

"I learn with regret from Colonel Rhett that the two 7-inch rifled guns have been turned over to the navy for Mobile. The necessity for a much larger number of the heaviest guns here is increased, as the boom is likely to prove a failure."

14. A very unpleasant misunderstanding now occurred between the Commanding General of the Department and Major Childs, ordnance officer in charge of the Charleston Arsenal. A clear and comprehensive explanation of it is given in the following letter :

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 27th, 1862.

"Genl. SAM. COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va. :

"General,—About the 20th inst., having ascertained that a sufficient number of guns of the heaviest calibre could not be procured for the defence of this important harbor, and that the floating boom across its entrance would possibly be a failure, I determined to hasten, by all practicable means in my power, the rifling and banding of as many 42 and 32 pounders, already in position in the works of this harbor, as time and the limited means under my control would permit.

"But having ascertained by actual experiment that the rifling and banding of a 32-pounder by the ordnance officer, Major F. L. Childs, in charge of the Arsenal here, had taken more than four weeks to be completed, and having at least twenty other guns of that calibre and of 42-pounders to rifle and band in a similar manner, it became evident to me it would be utterly impossible to complete them in time for the pressing emergencies of our situation.

"About the same time Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, commanding First Military District, having informed me that he felt convinced he could have the alterations desired made in less than half the time taken by the Ordnance Department, if I would place the matter under his control, and being extremely anxious to have the work done as soon as practicable, I issued Special Orders No. 229, of which the following is the section bearing on the case, viz., par. iii. : 'The Commanding General of the First Military District has the authority to direct and order the rifling and banding of such guns as require it within his command, to the extent of the capacity for doing the work effectually, and may make requisitions directly upon the Charleston Arsenal, or other proper source, through his district ordnance officer, for the necessary material for the work.'

"General Ripley immediately took the matter in hand, caused several heavy guns to be dismounted from the works and brought to Messrs. Eason & Co.'s foundry in this city, and made on Major Childs a requisition, in pursuance of the orders already referred to, for two sets of bands for 42-pounder guns in depot. Major Childs declined to issue, enclosing me the requisitions endorsed as follows :

"Respectfully referred to General Beauregard, to know if it is his desire to devolve any portion of my duties upon General Ripley. The bands wanted have been waiting at Cameron's establishment for some time for the guns to be sent up. If General Ripley continues to send guns as fast as they are wanted, he will accomplish all he can possibly do, and not violate the reiterated orders and regulations of the Ordnance Bureau.'

"This paper was returned by me with the following endorsement:

"The necessities of the service require that Special Order No. 229, from these headquarters, shall be carried into effect.'

"But having called on both of said officers for a statement of the shortest time in which the rifling and banding could be done, under the superintendence of each, their answers were as follows:

"General Ripley says:

"Messrs. Eason & Co. inform me they can band and rifle two guns in nine days from this date, and that they can continue to turn out one or two guns thereafter every five or seven days, if they have the bands. They can furnish the bands themselves after ten days. I believe them.'

"Major Childs says:

"That full three weeks have heretofore been taken by Messrs. Eason & Brother in rifling and banding 32-pounder and 42-pounder guns, but that by working at night and on Sunday, and distributing the work between Eason and Cameron, I hope to be able to finish one gun per week. I should state that it is only lately that Cameron & Co. have procured a lathe large enough to hold a 32-pounder.'

"I therefore determined that the former should direct those important alterations, on which might depend the safety of this harbor and city.

"On or about the 23d instant Major Childs called on me to express his objection to Order No. 229, stating that the Ordnance Department would not pay for work done at the foundries of this city not ordered by him. I then remarked that in that event I would procure the money from other sources, intending in that case to call on the City or State authorities to pay for the rifling and banding of the guns intended specially for the defence of this harbor.

"On the 26th instant General Ripley again sent the same requisitions to Major Childs, who reiterated positively his refusal until he had seen me. General Ripley then went to the Arsenal in person, accompanied by an armed force, to compel, if necessary, obedience to Order No. 229. Major Childs, having again refused to issue the bands called for, alleging that he wished to see the General commanding the Department before complying with the Orders he had received, General Ripley felt compelled to arrest him; and as he refused to turn over his duties to the next officer in rank, Lieutenant Fraser, General Ripley called on the latter to inform him where the bands were.

"They were found in a yard adjoining the Arsenal, and were taken possession of; the necessary invoices and receipts were furnished, and the bands transported to the foundry, where the guns were waiting for them. In order, however, not to delay at this critical moment the important operations of the Ordnance Department, the limits of Major Childs had been extended to those

of the City of Charleston, and he had been authorized to attend to all the current duties of his position.

"Charges and specifications have been preferred against Major Childs by General Ripley, as per copy herewith. Before ordering a court I shall await the instructions of the War Department in this case. I can but express my regret at the occurrence just referred to, especially at this critical juncture, when so much energy and harmony should prevail in all the departments of the service. But I must be permitted to state, as my deliberate opinion, that so long as the Arsenal is kept here, in so close proximity to the headquarters of the Department and of the First District, so long will there be a clashing of authority between them; for in the military service an *imperium in imperio* cannot be permitted without a conflict of authority sooner or later. Moreover, the Chiefs of Ordnance of this Department and District, relying too much on the supplies of the Arsenal, of which they are not fully informed, often make requisitions at too short notice, thereby causing unnecessary delays and confusion.

"Again, the failure of the floating boom across the entrance of this harbor, and the impossibility of obtaining a sufficient quantity of the heaviest ordnance (as already called for), renders the removal of the Arsenal to a safer locality a matter of urgent necessity, leaving here only such stores and supplies as may be absolutely required for the immediate wants of this District and Department. Several weeks ago I called the attention of Major Childs to the probable necessity of such a change of locality, and he reported to me, a short time after, that he had made the selection of a place in the northwestern part of this State for the Arsenal to be removed to, and that he had given orders for the immediate construction there of the necessary buildings, etc. I therefore respectfully but earnestly request the War Department to give such orders as will insure the immediate translation of the Arsenal from this city to the place already selected by Major Childs.

"I remain, Sir, very respectfully, your obt. servt.,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

"P.S.—The accompanying papers are enclosed herewith, marked as follows:

"A.—R. S. Ripley, Brig.-Genl. Commanding. Reports circumstances connected with arrest of Major F. L. Childs, and encloses charges and specifications against that officer.

"B.—R. S. Ripley, Brig.-Genl. Charges and specifications preferred against Major F. L. Childs, C. S. Art'y.

"C.—F. L. Childs, Major, C. S. A. In relation to his arrest by Brig.-Genl. Ripley, for refusing to fill a requisition.

"D.—G. T. Beauregard, Genl. Commanding. Giving reasons for the arrest of Major F. L. Childs, etc.

"N.B.—CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 30, 1862.

"This letter and accompanying papers have been delayed to enable Major-General B. Huger to arrange this whole matter without resorting to a court-martial; but he has failed to do so, Major Childs not yet understanding the gravity of his offence. He seems to think that the Ordnance Department was created solely for the special benefit of its officers; and as I will necessarily

be compelled to bring charges against him myself, I have the honor respectfully to suggest that the War Department will order, as soon as practicable, the assembling of a court for his immediate trial.

"Respectfully, G. T. B."

It is proper here to state that, before the foregoing letter had had time to reach General Cooper—for, as it was shown, circumstances prevented it from being forwarded until several days after it was written—a telegram from Richmond, dated December 1st, was received by General Beauregard. It read as follows:

"The Secretary of War directs that you will release Major Childs, restore him to duty, and report the facts to this office.

"JNO. WITHERS, Asst. Adj.-Genl."

In vain was the War Department asked to suspend its decision until the matter could be further examined into. The order was reiterated and insisted upon, as appears by this telegram, dated Richmond, December 2d, 1862:

"The Secretary of War directs that commanding officers of arsenals are immediately responsible to the War Department, and not subject to arrest by the commanding generals, unless under extraordinary circumstances. Unless Major Childs's case be deemed such, he directs that the order of yesterday be executed.

S. COOPER, A. and Ins.-Genl."

General Beauregard thought he had been sufficiently clear in his explanation to the War Department. He would have nothing further to do with the matter; and the order was executed.

Thus was the querulous freak of a subordinate officer openly upheld by the authorities at Richmond, regardless of the pernicious example set by such a precedent, and of the mortification it would bring upon a commanding general, whose only motive was to hurry up his arrangements to meet the threatened assault of the enemy, and who knew what prompt and vigorous action the emergency required.

Governor Pickens happening to be in Charleston at that time, General Beauregard called on him and explained the unwarrantable interference of the Government. The general's indignation was so great that he declared his intention to apply at once to be relieved from the command of his Department and ordered "to the field;" and, should this request be denied, then—as the only alternative left him—to resign his commission. But Governor Pickens, while acknowledging the unfairness of the Administra-

tion, vehemently protested against the adoption of such a course. He appealed to General Beauregard—first as a friend, then as the Governor of South Carolina—and entreated him to remain at his post. He declared that he had faith in no other commander for the safety of Charleston at this juncture, and that South Carolina would willingly defray the expenses of banding and rifling all the guns needed, should Congress fail to pass a special bill to that effect. He was so earnest, and spoke so feelingly on the subject, that General Beauregard determined to overlook this new affront, and continue his efforts to save Charleston, despite the annoyances and obstacles thrown in his way.

It may be added, before dismissing this subject, that General Beauregard was hardly through with the work of banding and rifling his heavy guns when, in April, 1863, the attack of the Federal fleet was made. That event will be discussed hereafter. It is historically true, however, that the repulse of that attack was due, not only to the intrepidity of the troops in forts Sumter and Moultrie, and in the other defensive works in and around the harbor, but also—and in no small degree—to the heavy banded and rifled guns prepared for, and so effectually used on, that memorable occasion. And yet when, several months afterwards, the Ordnance Department was called upon to pay for the important work thus performed for the safety of Charleston and of the Confederate cause, it peremptorily declined to do so. The matter was brought before Mr. Seddon, the successor of Mr. Randolph as Secretary of War, but he would have nothing to do with it, because, as he said, "the Ordnance regulations had to be obeyed and carried out." It was only when Colonel William Porcher Miles, Chairman of the Military Committee in the House, expressed his intention to lay the question before Congress, and demand a special appropriation for that purpose, that Mr. Seddon finally issued the order, and had the bill paid by the Ordnance Department.*

15. On the 29th of November General Beauregard received information from his Signal Corps that the enemy's ordinary fleet had left Hilton Head, either for an expedition to some point on the coast or for the North. If the latter, the movement related

* When General Beauregard left Charleston for Weldon, in 1864, the work had not yet been paid for.

to Burnside's operations; if not, the intention of the enemy was yet to be discovered.

General Beauregard lost no time in apprising the War Department of the facts, and, by special despatches, warned Generals Whiting, at Wilmington; Mercer, at Savannah; and Hagood, Walker, and Trapier, commanders of the Second, Third, and Fourth Military Districts of South Carolina. He also wrote the following letter to General Ripley:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., *Nov. 29th*, 1862.

"Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla.:

"*General*,—I am informed the enemy's fleet has left Hilton Head. We must be prepared to meet him at all points. You will issue three days' provisions to movable troops, and sufficient ammunition. See that all troops are provided with haversacks. Collect cars enough to transport two regiments at a time on the Charleston and Savannah Railroad and the Northeastern Railroad. No trains should be overloaded.

"My impression is that the enemy's demonstration is intended against Georgetown. If so, we may have to march also some troops from here. Make all necessary preparations. You will be put in command of all troops moving in that direction. You will please forward, by express, the enclosed note to General Trapier. Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

The note referred to as addressed to General Trapier was in these terms:

"CHARLESTON, *Nov. 29th*, 1862.

"Brigadier-General J. H. TRAPIER:

"*General*,—The enemy's fleet has left Hilton Head. Destination unknown, but it may be for your district. Be prepared for their reception. See to the provisions, ammunition, and haversacks of your troops. Reinforcements will be sent to you from here in case of necessity. Keep your troops well in hand.

"Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

On the 30th General Walker telegraphed that he had nothing further to report about the enemy's fleet, and that all was quiet in his locality. General Mercer, in his despatch of the same day, said: "Nothing seen of the enemy's fleet in this district. Cars collected ordered to be discharged."

16. The idea of utilizing the gunboat-rams in other localities than the Charleston Harbor, without passing outside the bar, had occupied General Beauregard's mind for some time. On the 2d of December he issued an order to Major Harris, Chief-engineer, to cut a channel, twenty-five feet wide and thirteen feet deep at

high water, in the Wappoo Cut, from the Ashley to the Stono, so that the gunboat-rams might operate in either river, and retake and hold Cole's Island, at the mouth of the Stono, which would enable us to reduce the force on James Island to a minimum.

Major Harris's instructions were to do the work "as quietly as possible, in order not to awaken the suspicions of the enemy's gunboats in the Stono, and afford us the opportunity of taking them, and of re-opening our inland water communications with Port Royal," or of obtaining "stronger engines for our iron gunboats and rams in Charleston."

17. On the following day General Cooper was telegraphed that the enemy's fleet had returned to Port Royal; and Major Pope was ordered to furnish certain guns, implements, and ammunition to Colonel Colcock, at Ocean Landing, and to General Walker, in the Third Military District.

18. The boom across the channel gave no satisfaction. General Beauregard determined to give up all work on it, and resort only to a rope obstruction, to be placed in its front. Major Cheves was instructed accordingly, and was also ordered to turn over to Captain Echols all materials collected for the boom, but to remain in charge of the torpedo constructions for the entrance of the harbor. He was thanked for the zeal and energy displayed by him in the discharge of his duties, in the face of so many difficulties.

19. An important order was also given to Major Harris in relation to General Raines's submarine batteries. The Engineers' Department was told to locate them below Simon Bluff, in the Wadmalaw; below Grimball's, in the Dawhee; and in the South Edisto, opposite Aiken's Mills; or at some proper place in the Pon Pon River. Major Harris was also instructed to construct a magazine at Summerville for the safe-keeping of ordnance stores in an emergency.

20. General Ripley was directed to attend to the armament of the two redoubts in rear of Fort Pemberton, and to transfer thither as soon as possible one 24-pounder on siege-carriage from the *cremaillère* line, and one 24-pounder in barbette from Fort Moultrie or Castle Pinckney.

21. The battery at Church Flats was also ordered to be converted at once into a small enclosed work, to hold two 12-pounder smooth-bore guns, an 18-pounder, and two 6-pounder light pieces,

to be taken from different works indicated and placed in position on the land-front.

The foregoing synopsis is presented to the reader to show that General Beauregard's attention was turned to the minutest details of the service—details which he knew to be of great importance in all military operations; and it is a fact worthy of note that all orders given and executed in relation to any portion of his vast command emanated, directly or indirectly, from him alone. The epithet of "*felix*," so often applied to him during the war, and alluded to by Mr. Pollard, in "The Lost Cause," can be explained in no other way. It was due, not to his having been in reality more favored by chance—some would say "*luck*"—than any other commander, but mainly, if not altogether, because of his incessant toil and vigilance. "*Experrectus*," it is suggested, would have been more appropriate than "*felix*."

22. The following communication, forwarded to the War Department by General Beauregard, is now submitted. It shows how well-founded was his complaint of the slowness of Major Childs's work at the Charleston Arsenal:

"CHARLESTON, Dec. 10th, 1862.

"Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Richmond, Va.:

"Guns are now being rifled and banded here, under my orders, at the rate of one per two and a half days, instead of thirty-five days, as heretofore. Cannot a rifling and banding establishment be added to foundry at Savannah for guns there?

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

23. Turning his thoughts towards the defence of that part of Florida included in his command, General Beauregard caused the following instructions to be written to General Cobb:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 10th, 1862.

"General,—Your communication of the 3d instant has been duly received and considered by the Commanding General, who instructs me to answer it as follows:

"Captain Moreno was at these headquarters some days ago, and received verbal instructions to this effect: The Chattahoochee is to be obstructed at Fort Gaines, and a battery to be erected, to cover the obstructions, for two 32 and one 24 pounder pieces. At Rack Bluff, fifty-four miles above the junction with Flint River, another obstruction is to be established, with three batteries commanding it, one for three 32-pounders, one for two 24-pounders, and the third for two 18-pounder guns.

"At the 'Narrows,' at Fulton's Bend, on the Appalachicola, sixteen miles

below junction with the Flint River, other obstructions and a battery for one 24 and one 18 pounder gun are likewise to be constructed. In this way will be disposed the twelve pieces which Captain Moreno has available at present.

"The positions just named are all regarded as favorable for the end in view.

"Captain Moreno will be further instructed to examine Flint River, with a view to finding a good position (on the north bank, if possible) for a battery for three or five guns, and obstructions not to exceed five hundred yards distant from the work.

"Heavier guns will be procured, if possible.

"In relation to the suggested danger to be apprehended that the enemy may land in force at St. Mark's, march *via* Tallahassee, or by a more direct route, to the left of that place, on the Appalachicola River, and thus turn the obstructions, it is the opinion of the Commanding General that the distance and character of the country to be traversed will be found highly unfavorable for such an attempt. To insure success or guard against serious disaster, the enemy would be obliged to move in larger force than he can bring to bear for such an enterprise at present, it is believed. * * *

"Any force landing at St. Mark's or Port Leon must necessarily have with it its own means of transportation; for as soon as a descent on the coast should be made in such force as to indicate such an expedition, nothing were easier than for you to cause the timely removal beyond the reach of the enemy of all the means of transportation of the planters in Middle Florida. In this way a delay would ensue, during which all the defensive resources of Middle Florida and of the adjoining sections of Georgia could be collected for a successful resistance.

"Under these circumstances the Commanding General is mainly solicitous that such obstructions should be constructed in the Appalachicola and Chattahoochee rivers, with defensive works to cover them at points which cannot be turned by a force thrown up the Appalachicola by transports supported by gun-boats.

"The Commanding General regrets profoundly the utterly inadequate force under your command,* but sees at present no way for increasing it. You are authorized, however, in an emergency to call on the Governors of Florida and Georgia for any troops at their disposition.

"The General will be pleased for you to communicate your views and wishes freely and fully at all times, and will comply with your requirements to the utmost of his limited powers.

"There are certain companies of troops west of the Appalachicola, over which you are to exercise command. A copy of General Forney's letter on the subject will be transmitted to you.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

* His effective force did not reach eight hundred men, with an extent of territory, from the Suwanee to the Choctawhatchee, of about one hundred and forty miles.

"P.S.— Since the forgoing was written Captain Moreno has been telegraphed to construct the battery at the 'Narrows' for three guns instead of two, and to substitute two 32-pounders from Fort Gaines for the 18-pounder originally designed for the 'Narrows' work. "T. J., C. S."

24. On the 12th of December, General Beauregard informed the War Department, by telegram, that General Banks's fleet had left, suddenly, two days before, with about ten thousand men, diverging from its southern course and making directly for Cape Lookout. The information, General Beauregard said, could be relied upon.

The enemy had been making preparations for some time past for a descent along the Southern Atlantic coast, and all General Beauregard's disposable troops were held in readiness to move at once to any threatened point of his Department. To hold his own within its limits was all that he could reasonably hope to do. But, whatever may have been his expectations, he certainly had no idea that troops would be taken from him to reinforce neighboring commands. Such was the case, however, as will appear by the following telegram :

"RICHMOND, VA., Dec. 13th, 1862.

"General BEAUREGARD :

"General Lee has just telegraphed to General Smith* as follows: 'For Wilmington and the coast of North Carolina, draw reinforcements from North Carolina and General Beauregard.' Other intelligence induces General Smith to conjecture the purpose of the enemy to march, in conjunction with the force from the fleet to be landed at Beaufort (N. C.), on the railroad, and then to assail Wilmington in reverse. It is recommended to you, in case of a telegram confirmatory of such movements, to act on the suggestion of General Lee, and send reinforcements, if, and to the extent you think it can be done, without too greatly risking your command. Should communication between Wilmington and this city be broken, you will give to Wilmington special attention and such aid as you can spare. Of this order General Whiting will be notified. JAS. A. SEDDON, Secretary of War."

This telegram was far from explicit, and left upon General Beauregard the responsibility of following or not following its instructions. He determined, however, to give Generals Whiting and Smith all the assistance in his power, even at the risk of the enemy breaking through his coast-line, by a sudden *coup de main*

* General G. W. Smith, then commanding in South Virginia and North Carolina.

—an eventuality not altogether unlikely, owing to the great resources in men and means of transportation at the disposal of the Federals. Immediate orders were issued to the district and sub-district commanders of the Department, and all possible diligence used to hurry on the transfer of the troops.*

On the 14th this letter was written to General Whiting:

"General,—I send one of my volunteer aids, Colonel A. G. Rice, with a telegraphic cipher for use between us in cases of importance. You will please give him all necessary information relative to your present condition, future intentions, and present available means.

"I have ordered 5000 men and three light batteries (all excellent troops) to be held in readiness, under Brigadier-General Gist, to be sent to your assistance whenever called for by you, if they can then be spared from here. Should the contingency contemplated by the War Department occur, and my presence be required by you, I will hasten to join you, although I have little doubt that you will be able to take good care of General Banks and his associates.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the next day the following despatch was forwarded to the War Department:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 15th, 1862.

"General S. COOPER, Richmond, Va.:

"I am sending five thousand infantry and three batteries to Wilmington, to be returned as soon as practicable. All quiet here.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The force of the enemy was greatly exaggerated, though it might with truth have been put down at twenty thousand men. His object was never well understood, nor was it at any time very well defined. He certainly failed to accomplish what his movements seemed to indicate as his purpose. General Beauregard's direct co-operation was desired by Generals Whiting and Smith. The latter was of opinion that, should Banks's forces unite with Foster's, as reported, more troops would be needed from General Beauregard, and that he could come over with them, as "all geographical lines" should then be considered as no longer existing. But General Smith's apprehensions were not realized. On the 18th, from Goldsboro', whither he thought the Carolina and Georgia troops should be sent, he forwarded this despatch:

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"The enemy's army have gone to Newbern, moving in great haste."

* See telegrams, in Appendix.

And on the same day he also telegraphed as follows:

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"The enemy burned the railroad bridge yesterday. They were in force more than twenty thousand. Retired during the night towards Wilmington, devastating the country as they go. I have not transportation sufficient for ammunition even. Will move as soon as possible. They have a large army, and I believe are aiming at Wilmington."

The reason for such "great haste" on the part of the enemy was not perceptible, as General Smith's forces did not exceed six thousand men, without cavalry, and exclusive of the troops sent by General Beauregard, which, owing to unavoidable delays from Wilmington, had not reached their destination in time. On the other hand, the danger apparently threatening General Whiting's Department was not a serious one; and this expedition, from which so much was expected at the North, proved to be a complete failure.

Less than three days after these events General Beauregard was informed, through Colonel Clinch, commanding in Southeast Georgia, that the enemy's gunboats had left St. Simon's Bay, on their way to Charleston, which, it was reported, would soon be attacked, by land and water. This news was in some degree confirmed by the following telegram from the Secretary of War:

"RICHMOND, *Dec. 24th*, 1862.

"General BEAUREGARD:

"Information from L. Heylinger, a friend to our cause in Nassau—with the assurance that it comes from New York by a trustworthy source—states that the attack on Charleston will be made, about the holidays, by four iron-clads. This news has not got into the papers.

"JAS. A. SEDDON, Secretary of War."

The substance of the foregoing despatch being repeated the next day, General Beauregard began to prepare for the emergency.

As might have been expected, his first step was to recall his troops from North Carolina. He telegraphed General Whiting to that effect, and at the same time authorized him to select either a 42-pounder rifled gun or a 10-inch columbiad, which would be sent him from Richmond to Charleston, and to use it for the defence of Wilmington. General Whiting, in a letter dated December 31st, thanked General Beauregard for his readiness to assist him, and took occasion to say, in his characteristic

manner, that, having served under him at the opening of the war, he would ask nothing better than to continue doing so until the very end.

Meanwhile, on the 27th, General Beauregard received the following telegram from Colonel William Porcher Miles:

"Have appealed to President in vain for the two 7-inch guns. Says they belong to navy, and must go to Mobile, for floating-battery just finished and waiting for guns. Secretary of War did all he could for us."

General Beauregard was astonished, for the President knew—or believed, which amounted to the same thing—that Charleston was on the eve of an attack. On the other hand, he should have been aware that no real danger threatened Mobile at that time; and yet, in spite of repeated entreaties, he preferred acceding to the request of General Forney, as though (even admitting that both cities were equally menaced) Charleston were not of more importance than Mobile to the safety of the Confederacy.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Delay of the Federal Attack on Charleston.—General Beauregard makes Arrangements for Concentration of Troops by Rail.—His Letter to General Ripley.—His Desire to Test the Merits of the two Ironclad Rams.—Commodore Ingraham Adopts his Suggestion.—The Federal Fleet is Attacked on the 11th.—The *Palmetto State* Disables the *Mercedita*, and gives Chase to two other Steamers.—The *Chicora* Sets Fire to a Propeller, Cripples the *Quaker City*, and Disables the *Keystone State*.—The whole Blockading Fleet Retires.—The Blockade of Charleston Harbor undoubtedly Raised.—General Pemberton's Error in Abandoning the Defences of the Stono.—Federal Gunboats run up the Stono.—General Beauregard Plans the Capture of the *Isaac Smith*.—Colonel Yates's Report.—Attack upon Genesis Point Battery.—Federal Monitor Crippled and Forced to Withdraw.—General Beauregard's Letter to General Ripley.—His Dread of a Night Attack on Sumter.—Second Attack on Fort McAllister.—Small Force in General Beauregard's Department.—He Demands Additional State Troops from Governor Bonham.—Preparation Made for the Impending Attack on Charleston.

"CHRISTMAS WEEK" and the "holidays" had come, were gone, and the Federal attack on Charleston had not taken place. The rumors circulated were generally well-founded, but the preparations necessary for the accomplishment of so formidable a project consumed more time than had been anticipated. The delay was of advantage to General Beauregard, as it gave him additional time for the completion of his various arrangements.

Foreseeing the eventual necessity of a rapid concentration of troops by rail at any threatened points, in or out of his Department, he caused an earnest request to be sent to the President of the Northeastern Railroad, for the adoption of more efficient measures on the line from Charleston to Wilmington; he drew attention to the necessity of accumulating wood at various stations, and of increasing the *personnel* required for swift and unencumbered running, under any emergency.

The Georgia troops sent back to Savannah were ordered to Charleston, so as to be ready, if necessary, to go again to Wilmington, where, it was reported on the 6th, the enemy might make

his first attempt. General Bonham, who had succeeded the Honorable F. W. Pickens as Governor of South Carolina, was urged to make all timely preparations for the impending Federal expedition, should Charleston, and not Wilmington and Weldon, become the point of attack.

General Beauregard had long studied the problem of how best to deal with the Federal monitors, in the event of their forcing a passage into the harbor of Charleston. The following letter gives one of the conclusions at which he had arrived :

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT, S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Jan. 15th, 1863.

“Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Commanding First Military Dist., etc. :

“*General*.—The Commanding General wishes you to organize and train at least six boarding boat parties, with a view to attacking, at night, any of the enemy's ironclads that may succeed in penetrating the harbor. The men should be armed with revolvers, if practicable, and provided with blankets, with which to close all apertures ; also with iron wedges and sledges, to stop the tower from revolving ; with bottles of burning-fluid, to throw into the tower ; with leather bags of powder, to throw into the smoke-stack ; and with ladders of about ten feet in length, to storm the tower in case of need. The boats should be provided with muffled oars, with water-tight casks secured under the seats, to give buoyancy, in case of injury to the boats from any cause. The men should each, likewise, be furnished with a life-preserver.

“For such a service it will be best to call for volunteers.

“Respectfully,

“THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.”

The plan proposed and the details given for its execution might not have been successfully carried out, but the object in view was well worth the experiment. General Beauregard was of opinion that, in besieged places and while awaiting an attack, it is always judicious to keep the troops busy with or interested in some work or project, even should neither be of real importance. A spirit of cheerfulness is thus maintained, and no uneasiness or disaffection is allowed to grow among the men.

Another project upon which he was very much bent was, to induce Commodore Ingraham to test the efficiency of his two ironclad gunboat-rams, the *Palmetto State* and the *Chicora*, the first under Captain Rutledge, the second under Captain Tucker. There were also three small harbor steamers, the *Governor Clinch*, the *Ettiwan*, and the *Chesterfield*, which could be used as tenders in co-operation with the two former vessels. General Beauregard

advised a night attack by the Confederate rams against the wooden fleet of the enemy, and felt sure that the blockade might be raised, or, at any rate, that considerable damage could thus be effected.

Commodore Ingraham adopted the suggestion, and, having made all necessary preparations, on the 30th of January, at 11.30 P.M., left his anchorage on board the *Palmetto State*, in company with the *Chicora*, and steamed down to the bar; both vessels crossing it at about 4.30 A.M. on the 31st. The sea was smooth, the weather propitious; and the Federal fleet, resting, as usual, in complete security, it realized the danger threatening only when the two Confederate rams were already in its midst. The *Palmetto State* boldly gave out her name, and, making for a steamer immediately ahead—the *Mercedita*—struck and fired into her before she well knew what had befallen her. Disabled, and reported to be in a sinking condition, she called for relief, and instantly surrendered. A second and a third steamer were successively chased by the *Palmetto State*, but, taking advantage of their superior speed, steered to the southward, and soon ran out of range. Meanwhile, the *Chicora*, after setting fire to a schooner-rigged propeller, and engaging and crippling the *Quaker City*, ran into and fired a steamer supposed to be the *Keystone State*, forcing her to strike her flag. Say what the Federal reports may, it is none the less a fact that, before dawn of that day, the stampede of the blockaders was complete, and that, in the space of less than two hours' time, not a sail of the entire Federal fleet was nearer than seven miles from its usual anchorage off the Charleston Harbor. After thus scattering and driving off their enemy, the two Confederate vessels quietly steamed towards the entrance of Beach Channel, where they finally anchored at 8.45 A.M. They remained there fully seven hours, waiting for the tide;* and it must have been at least 3.30 P.M. when they recrossed the bar on their return to the city. Up to that time not a blockader—still less the entire fleet—had given sign of an intention to venture back to its former position. And this continued to be the case during the whole day and night of January 31st.

This easy dispersion of the blockading squadron and the mate-

* Commodore Ingraham's report to Mr. Mallory, February 2d, 1863.

rial injury inflicted upon it show how wise was General Beauregard's advice, and what might have been accomplished had a still bolder course and a less generous one been pursued by the flag-officer commanding. It would not be fair, however, to detract from the merits of an enterprise which, so far as it went, reflected honor on the officers and men engaged in it. It should not be forgotten that Commodore Ingraham had many serious obstacles to contend with: first, the weakness of the machinery of the two boats; second, their very heavy and objectionable draught; and, third, the fact that neither could be looked upon as altogether seaworthy. But, whatever may have been the causes that prevented a more brilliant result, the official statement, as made by General Beauregard, Commodore Ingraham, and the foreign consuls then on the spot, was true: the blockade of the port of Charleston, for the time being, had been raised, and the hostile fleet guarding its outer harbor had been unquestionably dispersed.

The reader is aware that the outer works planned, commenced, and partially completed, in 1861, by General Beauregard, at the entrance of the Stono, had been abandoned by General Pemberton for inner defences believed by him to afford better protection. He removed from Cole's Island, at the mouth of the Stono, eleven guns of large calibre which had protected the entrance. The river was immediately entered, and a permanent lodgment of Federal troops was made on the southeast end of James Island. This proved to be a serious error upon General Pemberton's part. The enemy's gunboats, now unhindered, went up the Stono as near Fort Pemberton as safety permitted, and were thus enabled to fire their long-range rifled guns upon our camps on James and John's islands, thereby causing much annoyance to our troops, and occasionally killing a few men.

It had been ascertained that one of these Federal gunboats—the *Isaac Smith*, carrying nine heavy guns—was the most enterprising of them all; that she approached nearest to the fort, and, under the shelter of a high bluff, with banked fires, often remained there the whole night, unconcerned as if afloat on Federal waters.

While the naval attack just described was being prepared General Beauregard determined to put a stop to the annoying and, thus far, unimpeded incursions of the *Isaac Smith*. He called the Commander of the First Military District to a conference at De-

partment Headquarters, and it was there agreed that masked batteries should be immediately erected on the banks of the Stono at points carefully selected, which the Federal gunboat was known to pass, and especially near the spot where she had been often seen to lie at anchor. She was to be allowed to ascend the river unmolested as far as she might see fit to go, when our batteries were to open upon her suddenly at short range, and, thus cutting off her retreat, compel her to surrender to our forces. The execution of the plan and its general outlines, with such modifications as circumstances might render necessary, was intrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph A. Yates, of the 1st South Carolina Artillery, stationed at Fort Sumter. We submit his official report, and thus acquaint the reader with the details of the engagement:

“HEADQUARTERS, SPECIAL EXPEDITION,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Feb. 1st, 1863.

“Captain W. F. NANCE, A. A. G. :

“*Captain*,—I have the honor to report that, in obedience to instructions from District Headquarters, a secret expedition was organized for the purpose of attacking the enemy's gunboats in Stono River, consisting of the following troops : The siege-train, composed of Captain B. C. Webb's company (A), and Lieutenant S. W. Wilson, Jr., commanding Company B—commanded by Major Charles Allston, Jr. ; Captain F. C. Schultz's company (F), Palmetto Light Artillery Battalion ; light battery, manned by Captain F. H. Harleston's company (D), 1st South Carolina Artillery (regulars) ; one Parrott gun, in charge of Lieutenant T. E. Gregg ; 3d Howitzers (siege-train). Captain John C. Mitchell's company (I), 1st South Carolina Artillery (regulars) ; Company H, Captain S. M. Roof ; and Company I, Lieutenant M. Gunter commanding (20th Regiment South Carolina Volunteers), acted as sharp-shooters.

“On the afternoon of January 30th, at 4.30 o'clock, the enemy's gunboat, *Isaac Smith*, mounting one 30-pounder Parrott gun and eight 8-inch heavy columbiads, came up the Stono River, passing our batteries (which were masked at Legare's Point Place and at Grimball's, on John's Island), and came to anchor a little above them. She was immediately fired upon from our guns posted at Grimball's, on John's Island, when she attempted to make good her escape, fighting our batteries (which had then opened) on John's Island as she passed. She succeeded in getting as far as Legare's Point Place, when she dropped anchor and unconditionally surrendered. We took prisoners her entire crew, consisting of eleven officers, one hundred and five men, and three negroes.

“The enemy's loss was twenty-five killed and wounded ; on our side one man wounded (since died).

“Major Allston commanded the batteries at Grimball's, on John's Island ; Captain Harleston those at Point Place. Captain Mitchell commanded the

sharp-shooters. Lieutenant Charles Inglesby, 1st South Carolina Artillery, acted as Adjutant.

"The officers and men under my command behaved with great coolness and bravery, fighting their guns without breastworks, entirely exposed to the enemy's fire within two or three hundred yards.

"The *Smith* has been towed up the Stono and put under the guns of Fort Pemberton.

"In closing my report, I will not omit to mention the very signal service rendered by the Stono scouts, and also by Captain John (B. L.) Walpole.

"The members of the Signal Corps detailed to accompany the expedition discharged their duties with great efficiency.

"I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOSEPH A. YATES, Lieut.-Colonel comdg. expedition."

The *Isaac Smith* had been but slightly damaged. She was speedily repaired, and, being now named the *Stono*, became a guard-boat in Charleston Harbor, under Captain W. J. Hartstein, C. S. N., of whom mention has already been made in one of the early chapters of this work.

The enemy was unfortunate at this time in General Beauregard's Department. To the precipitate flight of his blockading fleet, and to his loss in the *Stono*, was added a third and more significant reverse, which we are about briefly to describe.

In the early morning of the 1st of February appeared, opposite the battery at Genesis Point (Fort McAllister), in the Georgia District, a Federal ironclad "of the monitor class," accompanied by three gunboats and a mortar-boat. They steamed up to within about one thousand yards of the work, dropped anchor, and soon began a heavy cannonade. The armament of the Genesis Point battery consisted of one 8-inch columbiad, one 42-pounder, five 32-pounders, and one 10-inch mortar. The chief aim of the ironclad (afterwards known to be the single-turreted monitor *Montauk*) was directed against the 8-inch columbiad, just abreast of which she had purposely taken position. She fired 11 and 15 inch shells. The parapet fronting the columbiad was breached, so as to leave the gun exposed; but the cannoneers remained at their post to the last, refusing to be relieved. The fight continued for more than four hours, and then suddenly ceased. The monitor slowly and silently retired, it was believed, in a damaged condition. This was an encouraging result, and showed that ironclads might not be so formidable as they were thought, against sand-batteries.

Very little was known at that time of the capacity of the newly-built and so much talked-of Federal monitors and iron-clads. Hence the importance of the result secured by this attack. General Beauregard had drawn his conclusions accordingly, and, in prevision of the danger threatening the works in front of Charleston, wrote the following letter to General Ripley:

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 8th*, 1863.

“Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Commanding First Mil. Dist., Charleston, S. C.:

“*General*,—The recent attack of the enemy's ironclad monitor *Montauk* on the battery at Genesis Point (the first day at about one mile, and the second at about eight hundred or one thousand yards) would seem to indicate that the enemy is not so confident of the invulnerability of this kind of naval vessels. But I consider also that the attack on Sumter, whenever it takes place, will probably be made at long range, with their heaviest guns and mortars. This being admitted, they will necessarily attack it where it is weakest—*i. e.*, the gorge, southeast angle, and east face—taking their position close along the eastern shore of Morris Island, after silencing Battery Wagner. By adopting this plan their steamers, gunboats, etc., would be, moreover, farther removed from the batteries of Sullivan's Island.

“The enemy may also establish land rifled and mortar batteries on the sand-hills along the sea-shore of Morris Island, at the distance of from one to two miles from Sumter, as was done in the reduction of Fort Pulaski last year. He might possibly send one or more monitors during the night to take a position in the small channel north of Cummings's Point, within close range, to batter down the gorge of Sumter and endeavor to blow up the magazines.

“That mode of attack, being the one most to be apprehended, should be guarded against as well as our limited means will permit—first, by transferring as many heavy rifled guns as can be spared from the other faces of the fort to the gorge-angle and face already referred to; and the Brooke's rifled gun now on its way here from Richmond must likewise be put there, substituting in its place at Fort Johnson the 10-inch now expected from that city, so locating it as to fire towards Morris Island when required; secondly, a strong field-work should be thrown up as soon as sufficient labor can be procured on Cummings's Point, open in the gorge towards Fort Sumter, to act besides as a kind of traverse to this work from the fire of the batteries located by the enemy along the sea-shore of Morris Island. The Cummings's Point Battery should be armed with the heaviest and longest ranged guns we may be able to obtain for that purpose.

“The introduction of heavy rifled guns and ironclad steamers in the attack of masonry forts has greatly changed the condition of the problem applicable to Fort Sumter when it was built; and we must now use the few and imperfect means at our command to increase its defensive features as far as practicable. The Chief-Engineers of this Department and of the State will be ordered

to report to you at once, to confer with you, so as to carry out the views expressed by me in this letter.

"Major Harris, Chief-Engineer, has received my instructions relative to locating some of 'Rain's torpedoes' about Cummings's Point and within the harbor, independently of the electrical torpedoes under the charge of Mr. Waldron.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

What General Beauregard apprehended most, however, was a night attack by the Federal monitors and ironclads. During a dark night nothing could prevent them from taking a position sufficiently near Fort Sumter, and there opening fire upon it, with almost certain impunity. By repeating the manœuvre several nights in succession they might eventually batter down the walls of the fort and dismount most of its guns, or blow up its magazines. It was evident that Sumter, being a large object, could be seen well enough to be fired at with approximate precision even at night; while the monitors, being small, and lying low in the water, would hardly be discernible from the fort, and, if made to change their positions after each discharge, might render impossible any accuracy of aim on the part of our gunners, who would be left with nothing else to guide them but the flash of the enemy's pieces. And General Beauregard was of opinion that, by establishing floating lights of different colors at the entrance of the various channels leading into the inner harbor, and by frequent soundings, rendered easy by most excellent coast-survey maps in the possession of the Federal commanders, the plan of attack just described could have been carried out with no serious difficulty, and to the advantage of the enemy, especially if undertaken while the tides were stationary, or nearly so. Fortunately, however, Admiral Dupont, and the other naval commanders having charge of the hostile fleet, did not adopt this very simple mode of attack, against which the guns of Sumter, and of the works around the harbor, would have been almost powerless.

It was with a view to guard against this danger that the following communication was addressed to Commodore Ingraham:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 1st*, 1863.

"*Sir*,—The movements of the enemy in Port Royal Harbor yesterday looked suspicious, and have the appearance of an early movement of some sort. Thus forewarned, it will appear assuredly the part of prudence to be on the watch. I must therefore request that the Confederate steamer *Stono* should take her

position as a guard-boat, in advance of the forts, as far as practicable to-night, and thereafter every night, for the present.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

Thinking also of the reinforcements he might have to order from General Walker's district, he, on the same day, instructed the President of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad to keep in readiness, at Pocotaligo Station, "a train of cars capable of carrying a thousand men. On the 2d General Walker was written to, and advised as to the course he should pursue to protect the trestle-work across the Savannah River and hold the railroad line to Charleston. "All your movements," he was told, "must look to the final defence of Charleston, where I shall concentrate all my troops when required."

The enemy had evidently some design to accomplish up the Ogeechee River, for, on the 28th of February, he again attacked Fort McAllister, with an ironclad, three gunboats, and a mortar-boat. The engagement was another disappointment to the naval officer commanding, as, after two hours' cannonading, which only resulted in the crippling of the Confederate steamer *Rattlesnake*, then aground a short distance off, the attacking vessels "ceased firing and dropped down the river."* The attempt was renewed on the 3d of March by three of the enemy's monitors—the *Montauk* being one of them—and was kept up for more than seven hours, but without damaging our battery, which, upon inspection by Major Harris, after the engagement, was found "in good condition in every respect."† Alluding to this affair, General Beauregard, from Charleston, March 4th, 1863, forwarded the following telegram to General Cooper:

"Fort McAllister has again repulsed enemy's attack. Ironclads retired at 8 P. M. yesterday; mortar-boats shelled until 6 o'clock this morning. All damages repaired during night; 8-inch columbiads mounted, and fort good as ever. No casualties reported. Result is encouraging. Enemy's vessels still in sight.

Reduced as were General Beauregard's forces at that time, he was nevertheless called upon to reinforce other points of his Department. His letter of March 4th to Major H. C. Guerin, Chief

* See Captain G. W. Anderson's report, in Appendix.

† See also, in Appendix, Major Harris's report.

of Subsistence, through Captain John M. Otey, A. A. G., showed "that the aggregate, present and absent, of the troops in the State of South Carolina was 25,000." Major Guerin was directed to make his estimates accordingly, "adding fifty per cent. for emergencies, and 3000 negroes."* It was to guard against the apprehended result of such numerical weakness that General Beauregard had demanded additional State troops of Governor Bonham, who declined to accede to his request, on the ground that, should he do so, the planting interests of the State might be materially damaged. In his reply to the Governor, General Beauregard said he "was alive to the sacrifices and hardships which a call on the militia would entail," but considered that the occasion justified him in requiring the presence of "every arms-bearing man" the State could raise. His letter ended thus:

"In other words, my command is much smaller than the force under General Lee, a year ago, in this State, when the hostile force at Port Royal was not more than half the one now concentrated in that vicinity.

"With what resources I have I shall make the best battle I can, conscious that I have done all I could to enlarge those resources in all practicable ways."

In order to prevent night reconnoissances on Morris and Sullivan's islands, General Beauregard now ordered the Commander of the First Military District to patrol the beaches of those two islands with cavalry, to be sent for that purpose from the mainland, and to see to it that Morris Island, which he thought was the more exposed to hostile incursions, should be specially guarded in that way.† And, with the fixed determination to give no respite to the enemy, wherever he could be attacked with apparent hope of success, he assigned Lieutenant-Colonel Yates to the command of another expedition against Federal steamers which were attempting to do in Winyaw Bay what the *Isaac Smith* had previously done in the Stono. General Beauregard was also very anxious to try there the merit of Captain Lee's torpedo-boats, which he was having prepared for that purpose.

The more threatening the movements of the enemy appeared, the more active were General Beauregard's preparations to meet his attack. On the 23d he instructed the Commander of the First Military District, first, to confer with Commodore Ingraham in

* See letter, in Appendix.

† See Appendix.

relation to a proposed night-attack on the monitors by the small boat flotilla, now thoroughly manned and ready for effective work; second, to get a sufficient supply of wood and coal for the steamer *Stono*, should she be returned to the land-forces by the Navy Department; third, vigilantly to guard the "New Bridge" across the Ashley against accidental or intentional destruction by fire. On the same day Major Harris was directed to complete at once the obstructions on the Wappoo Cut; to visit Battery Wall, at White Point, and determine whether or not it was strong enough to resist such projectiles as the enemy might be provided with, should he attempt to push into Charleston Harbor. He was also requested to inspect the bridge over Rantowles Creek, and, if necessary, to repair it without loss of time.

Very shortly afterwards (on the 29th) General Beauregard ordered his Chief Quartermaster to have ready for use whatever rolling-stock might be required to transport rapidly to Charleston, by the Northeastern Railroad, say 6000 men, and, by the Savannah and Charleston Railroad, about 10,000. He was preparing all the means in his power to give the enemy as warm a reception as circumstances would allow. And, as usual with him, no detail, however insignificant in appearance, was neglected. He really saw to everything, and gave, himself, verbally or otherwise, all the instructions necessary to the full execution of his orders.

On the 31st the following instructions were forwarded to Brigadier-Generals Hagood and Walker:

"All heavy baggage must be removed to some secure place for storage.

"The troops must be held in light marching order, ready for any emergency and movements of the utmost celerity.

"The planters must be warned of the imminency of invasion, and advised to remove their negroes to some more secure localities."

And on the same day the following letter was addressed to General Mercer, commanding the District of Georgia:

"I am instructed to direct you to organize and hold ready, in light marching order, a command of at least 2500 men, including three light batteries, to move on this place (Charleston), *via* Augusta, if necessary, at a moment's notice.

"The cars need not be held in depot at present, but the presidents of railroads interested must be duly advised of the possible exigency.

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

CHAPTER XXX.

General Beauregard Orders the Cummings's Point Battery to be Strengthened.—Citadel Cadets Assigned to the New Bridge Defences.—The Ironclads Cross the Bar on the 5th.—Admiral Dupont Makes his Attack on the 7th.—Order in which the Ships came up.—Their Armament.—Admiral Dupont's Plan of Battle.—Fort Sumter the Chief Object of Attack.—Its Reduction Supposed to be Inevitable.—Commanders of Forts Sumter and Moultrie, and the various Batteries Engaged.—How they were Armed.—Number of Guns Employed by the Confederates.—Cautious Approach of the Monitors.—Fort Moultrie opens Fire on them.—Fort Sumter does likewise.—Description of the Fight.—Fort Sumter Cripples the *New Ironsides*.—The *Passaic* Withdraws from the Fight.—Two more Ironclads forced to Retire.—The *Keokuk* engages Fort Sumter.—She is badly Damaged.—Importance of the Defeat inflicted on the Enemy.—The *Keokuk* Sinks near Morris Island on the 8th.—On the 12th the Monitors steam, and are towed Southward.—Condition of Sumter after the Attack.—Exhibit of Shots fired on both Sides.—Fleet keeps Outside of Line of Torpedoes and Rope Obstructions.—General Beauregard's Efforts to Organize an Attack on the Monitors with Torpedo-boats.—His Letter to Lieutenant Webb, C. S. N.—His Plan Foiled by the Withdrawal of the Fleet.—Letter to General Cooper.—Failure to Complete Torpedo-rams and Gunboats.

BEING still apprehensive that the enemy's monitors might take a position in "main ship channel," as near the shore as prudence would admit, and attempt to batter down the southeast angle and gorge-wall of Fort Sumter—for that was its most vulnerable part—General Beauregard, on the 4th of April, ordered the Commander of the First Military District to add a 10-inch columbiad, or a 42-pounder rifled gun, to the Cummings's Point Battery, the object being to keep the Federal ironclads as far off as possible and, at the same time, increase the efficiency of that important work. The sequel proved the wisdom of this precaution.

The day following, the Commanders of the First District and of James Island were given specific instructions as to the reinforcements, and guns and mortars were called for and received from Georgia. The Citadel Cadets, of Charleston, were anxious to take part in their country's defence, and their services having been accepted, they were assigned to the works protecting the

"New Bridge," on the Ashley River. The 2500 men from Savannah had arrived, and the Chief of Subsistence was ordered to make proper provision for them.

The storm was evidently approaching. Its premonitory signs, as reported by the Signal Corps, were—first, the increase of the enemy's force in the Stono and the North Edisto; second, the unusual activity visible among the vessels composing the fleet. In fact, during the evening of the 5th, the ironclads, including the frigate *New Ironsides* and eight monitors, had actually crossed the bar, and anchored in the main ship channel. Though out of range as yet, they had not before approached so near. There was but one conclusion to draw: the long-delayed and anxiously expected attack was now about to take place.

At last, on the 7th of April, a little after 2 P.M., the monitors advanced for action. It was with a feeling akin to relief that officers and men stepped into their positions, at the different batteries and pieces assigned them. The long roll was beaten. There would have been loud cheering, had not discipline and strict orders prevented. By order of the Commandant at Sumter three flags, the garrison, regimental, and Palmetto flags, were hoisted; the band played "Dixie," and thirteen guns were fired, to salute the ensigns that floated high in the air, as if to say, "We are ready!"

Admiral Dupont's ships came up in the following order: four monitors—the *Weehawken*, the *Passaic*, the *Montauk*, the *Patapsco*; then the *New Ironsides*, as flag-ship; then the *Catskill*, the *Nantucket*, the *Nahant*, and, bringing up the rear, the double-turreted monitor *Keokuk*. They were commanded by experienced and gallant officers of the United States Navy. Their armament, including that of the *New Ironsides*, consisted of thirty-three guns "of the heaviest calibre ever used in war, to wit, 15 and 11 inch Dahlgren guns, and 8-inch rifled pieces." The steamers *Canandaigua*, *Housatonic*, *Unadilla*, *Wissahickon*, and *Huron* constituted the reserve, and were kept outside the bar.

It may be of interest to submit an extract from the plan of attack and order of battle, adopted by the Admiral and distributed to the various commandants who took part in the engagement:

"* * * The squadron will pass up the main ship channel without returning the fire of the batteries on Morris Island, unless signal should be made to commence action.

"The ships will open fire on Fort Sumter when within easy range, and will take up a position to the northward and westward of that fortification, engaging its left or northeast face at a distance of from one thousand to eight hundred yards, firing low, and aiming at the centre embrasures.

"The commanding officers will instruct their officers and men to carefully avoid wasting a shot, and will enjoin upon them the necessity of precision rather than rapidity of fire.

"Each ship will be prepared to render every assistance possible to vessels that may require it.

"The special code of signals prepared for the ironclad vessels will be used in action.

"*After the reduction of Fort Sumter** it is probable the next point of attack will be the batteries on Morris Island. * * *

"F. S. DUPONT, Rear-Admiral,
Comdg. South Atlantic Blockading Squadron."

From the order given above it is manifest that there was not only hope, but a feeling of certainty, on the part of Admiral Dupont that the fleet would succeed in reducing Fort Sumter, and against that work alone was to be hurled the combined fury of his attacking squadron. This Confederate stronghold was doomed. The Admiral was to attack it, necessarily reduce it, and then destroy or capture the other works around the harbor. How his turreted monitors went about the accomplishment of their object will be farther shown, as we proceed with the narrative of the engagement of the 7th, characterized at the time by a Northern correspondent who witnessed the scene as "sublimely terrific."

Let us now see what works we had with which to confront the formidable armada, so carefully and expensively prepared by the North, for the capture of Charleston. We mention only those that were engaged against the fleet.

First among them was Fort Sumter, under Colonel Alfred Rhett, with Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Yates, commanding the parapet guns, and Major Ormsby Blanding, in charge of the casemate batteries. The garrison consisted of seven companies of the First South Carolina Artillery (Regulars), under Captains D. G. Fleming, F. H. Harleston, J. C. King, J. C. Mitchel, J. R. Macbeth, W. H. Peronneau, and C. W. Parker. The guns brought into action were: two 7-inch Brookes, four 10-inch columbiads, two

* The italics are ours.

9-inch Dahlgrens, four 8-inch columbiads, four 8-inch navy guns, seven banded and rifled 42-pounders, one banded and rifled 32-pounder, thirteen smooth-bore 32-pounders, and seven 10-inch sea-coast mortars—in all, forty-four guns and mortars.

Next in importance was Fort Moultrie, under Colonel William Butler, assisted by Major T. M. Baker, with five companies of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (Regulars), commanded by Captains T. A. Huguenin, R. Press Smith, B. S. Burnett, C. H. Rivers, and Lieutenant E. A. Erwin. The guns engaged were: nine 8-inch columbiads, five rifled and banded 32-pounders, five smooth-bore 32-pounders, and two 10-inch mortars—in all, twenty-one guns and mortars.

Battery Bee, on Sullivan's Island, was under Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Simkins, with three companies of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (Regulars), Captains R. de Treville, Warren Adams, and W. Tabourn. The guns it used against the fleet were five 10-inch and one 8-inch columbiad—six guns.

Battery Beauregard was under Captain J. A. Sitgreaves, 1st South Carolina Artillery (Regulars), with two companies, one from Fort Sumter, the other from Fort Moultrie. The first was commanded by Lieutenant W. E. Erwin, the second by Captain J. H. Warley. The guns engaged were one 8-inch columbiad and two 32-pounders, rifled.

Battery Wagner was under Major C. K. Huger, with two companies belonging to the 1st South Carolina Artillery (Regulars). One gun was engaged—a 32-pounder, rifled.

At Cummings's Point Battery, Lieutenant H. R. Lesesne commanded, with a detachment of the 1st South Carolina Artillery (Regulars). The guns engaged were one 10-inch columbiad and one 8-inch Dahlgren—two guns.

Thus, it will appear that sixty-seven guns were actually used in the engagement, and not more than nine mortars, making an aggregate of seventy-six, instead of the three hundred, three hundred and fifty, or four hundred, erroneously reported by Northern correspondents and other writers concerning the events now occupying our attention. "There were not three hundred guns mounted in all the defences of Charleston, and the guns of the second and third circles of fire were not engaged." So states an ex-member of Admiral Dahlgren's staff in a work, well written and, as a whole, remarkably fair, entitled "Leaves from a Lawyer's Life,

Afloat and Ashore.”* And it is but fair to add that this statement is entirely correct.

Captain P. A. Mitchell, with a few companies from the 20th South Carolina Infantry, had been placed on Sullivan’s Island, to prevent an assault by land, should any be attempted; and Lieutenant-Colonel Dargan, of the 21st South Carolina, had been charged with the same duty on Morris Island.

General Beauregard had also requested Commodore Ingraham to join in the movement, with the two gunboat-rams *Palmetto State* and *Chicora*, should circumstances allow it. The Commodore and Commanders Tucker and Rutledge readily prepared to do so, and took up their position accordingly. Neither vessel, however, participated in the engagement.

Sullivan’s Island, constituting the second subdivision of the First Military District of South Carolina, was, at that time, under Brigadier-General J. H. Trapier, lately withdrawn from Georgetown for that purpose by order of General Beauregard. Colonel Lawrence M. Keitt was the Commandant of the post, and had stationed himself at Battery Bee, where he remained during the fight. Morris Island, the third subdivision, was under Colonel R. F. Graham. Brigadier-General Gist had charge of the first subdivision, composed of James Island and St. Andrew’s Parish. He was at Fort Johnson, with his staff, in order to be as near as possible to the scene of action, and take part in it, if necessary. Brigadier-General Ripley, whose command included the three subdivisions just referred to, had selected the recognized post of danger—Fort Sumter—for his headquarters during the engagement. He was in Charleston, however, at the beginning of the attack; and when, a few minutes later, he hurried off, with the declared intention of going to the fort, the concentration of fire against it was already such as to induce him to change his course and land at Battery Bee, on Sullivan’s Island, where he remained until the fight was over.

Steadily, but slowly and cautiously, did the monitors advance. Their commanders had been warned that rope obstructions, connected with torpedoes containing heavy charges of powder, were thrown across the channel into which they must steer their way.

* Charles Cowley, late Judge-Advocate of the South Atlantic blockading squadron.

It was said by Northern correspondents, and officially repeated by Mr. Seward, that the *Weehawken*, their leading vessel, at the outset "fell into these entanglements," and that the others, fearing a like mishap, sheered off at once, and did not occupy the position they had been originally ordered to take. This report is erroneous and needs correction, for, as will be seen, none of the ironclads ever reached the Confederate line of obstructions. Another cause must, therefore, be assigned for the slow advance of the *Weehawken*, and for the new and safer position selected on that day by the attacking fleet. The following communication, forwarded, six months later, by General Beauregard to General Cooper, relative to the reasons alleged at Washington for the failure of this grand expedition against Charleston, confirms the foregoing statement. The reader will, no doubt, read it with interest, as a part of the history of this period of the war:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 15th, 1863.

"General SAMUEL COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

"General,—In a published circular (No. 39) of the State Department at Washington, signed by Mr. William H. Seward, and addressed to the diplomatic agents of this Government abroad, I notice a statement relative to the defeat of the enemy's ironclad fleet in the attack on Fort Sumter, on the 7th of April last, so contrary to the facts of the case, that I feel called upon, as Commander of this Military Department, most emphatically to deny the truth of that version, which is as follows: 'An attack by the fleet, on the 7th of April last, upon the forts and batteries which defend the harbor (of Charleston) failed because the *rope obstructions* in the channel fouled the screws of the ironclads, and compelled them to return, after passing through the fire of the batteries. These vessels bore the fire of the forts, although some defects of construction were revealed by the injuries they received. The crews passed through an unexampled cannonade with singular impunity. Not a life was lost on board a monitor.'

"From the enclosed reports of Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, Colonel William Butler, and Colonel Alfred Rhett, who commanded at that period respectively this Military District, the batteries on Sullivan's Island and Fort Sumter, it will be seen that—

"1st. No ironclad came nearer than about six hundred yards of the rope obstructions except the disabled *Keokuk*, which dropped in, to about three hundred yards, before it could get again under way, but in a sinking condition; consequently, the propellers of the ironclads never could have become entangled in the rope obstructions.

"2d. The ironclads never passed through the fire of the batteries, for they never approached nearer than from eleven hundred to thirteen hundred yards

of the outer batteries, except the *Keokuk*, which came up to about nine hundred yards, and was sunk. None of the ironclads came within range of the heaviest batteries in Fort Sumter and on Sullivan's Island, which they would have been compelled to do in entering the harbor.

"3d. The fleet did not escape without material injury, for one of the number, the *Keokuk*, was sunk, and its armament is now in position for the defence of Charleston in our own batteries. Another monitor had to be sent to New York for extensive repairs, and several others were sent to Port Royal, also for repairs.

"4th. Not a life may have been lost in the ironclads, but, on examination of the wreck of the *Keokuk*, its hull was found penetrated, and the 11-inch round-shots and 7-inch rifled bolts had made clean holes through its turrets. Several U. S. flags, three officer's swords, pistols, etc., a quantity of bloody clothes and blankets, were found on board.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

At three o'clock P. M., and as soon as the leading ironclad had apparently come within range, the Commander at Moultrie, believing that the enemy's object was to run by Sumter, ordered fire to be opened. This explains how the first shot on the assaulting squadron came from Fort Moultrie. The vessel fired at kept on her course until she approached to within about fourteen hundred yards of Sumter, when she opened upon it with two guns, but without any result. Colonel Rhett, on the parapet, waited some two or three minutes, and then replied, firing by battery. Fort Moultrie and batteries Bee and Beauregard did likewise. The other monitors steamed up to their respective positions, and the action soon became general. Sumter was evidently the chief object of the attack. Five turreted ironclads, formed in line of battle, were now pouring a continuous fire upon it, and only sending an occasional shot at Fort Moultrie and batteries Bee and Beauregard. It was a grand, an impressive, and at the same time a terrible spectacle. There seemed to be a hail-storm of shot and shell, plunging up the waters of the bay, apparently submerging each monitor of the fleet, and shattering the massive walls of the grim fortress that stood sentry over the old city.

About three-quarters of an hour after the report of the first gun was heard the *New Ironsides* advanced to within some seven hundred yards of Fort Sumter and opened upon it. This immediately drew on that frigate (Admiral Dupont's flag-ship) the concentrated fire of Forts Sumter and Moultrie and of all the batteries. It was more than she could stand, as became evident

by the hurried manner in which she withdrew out of effective range. The *Passaic* had already left the contest, visibly crippled; and the other monitors, which had "slowly passed in front of the fort in an ellipse," one of them at a distance of a thousand yards, found themselves exposed to the crushing missiles aimed with deliberate accuracy by our well-trained and intrepid artillerymen. Two of these vessels were now compelled to retire, as the *Passaic* and the *Ironsides* had previously done.

At five minutes past four o'clock P. M. the double-turreted monitor *Keokuk* gallantly advanced, alone, within nine hundred yards of the batteries of Sumter, and one thousand of those of Moultrie. The fate of her consorts had not deterred her from this attempt, but she soon repented her defiant act; for the guns of our first circle of fire were now directed against her, and she soon abandoned the fight, worsted, and unable to endure the ordeal to which she had been subjected. Colonel Rhett thus refers to this incident in his official report:

"She received our undivided attention, and the effect of our fire was soon apparent. The wrought-iron bolts from a 7-inch Brooke gun were plainly seen to penetrate her turret and hull, and she retired in forty minutes, riddled and apparently almost disabled."

After being under the fire of our forts and batteries for two hours and twenty-five minutes, at distances varying from nine hundred to seventeen hundred yards, the whole ironclad fleet finally withdrew, and anchored beyond the range of our guns. The battle was fought. The day was ours.

In his report, already referred to, Colonel Rhett says:

"The enemy's fire was mostly ricochet, and not very accurate; most of their shot passed over the fort, and several to the right and left. The greater portion of their shots were from thirteen to fourteen hundred yards distant, which appeared to be the extent of their effective range; some shots were from a greater distance, and did not reach the fort at all. * * * With regard to the conduct of the garrison, it is impossible for me to draw any distinction. Officers and men were alike animated with the same spirit, and I cannot speak in too high terms of their coolness and gallantry throughout the action. All acted as though they were engaged in practice, and the minutest particulars of drill and military etiquette were preserved."

General Trapier, in his report, says:

"It is due to the garrison of Fort Moultrie and their soldierly and accomplished commander, Colonel Butler, that I should not close this report without

bearing testimony to the admirable skill, coolness, and deliberation with which they served their guns. They went—all, men as well as officers—to their work cheerfully and with alacrity, showing that their hearts were in it. There was enthusiasm, but no excitement. They lost no time in loading their guns, but never fired hastily or without aim."

Of the other works on Sullivan's Island engaged with the enemy on that memorable day he says:

"The reports of Colonel Keitt, Lieutenant-Colonel Simkins, and Captain Sitgreaves give me every reason to believe the garrisons of batteries Bee and Beauregard acquitted themselves equally well, and are equally entitled to the thanks and gratitude of their commander and their country."

General Ripley confirmed the above in the following words:

"The action was purely of artillery—forts and batteries against the ironclad vessels of the enemy—other means of defence, obstructions and torpedoes, not having come into play. Fort Sumter was the principal object of the attack, and to that garrison, under its gallant commander, Colonel Alfred Rhett, ably seconded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Yates and Major Ormsby Blanding, and all the officers and men, special credit is due for sustaining the shock, and, with their powerful armament, contributing principally to the repulse. The garrison of Fort Moultrie, under Colonel William Butler, seconded by Major Baker and the other officers and soldiers, upheld the historic reputation of that fort, and contributed their full share to the result. The powerful batteries of Battery Bee were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Simkins, and were served with great effect. Battery Wagner, under Major C. K. Huger; Cummings's Point Battery, under Lieutenant Lesesne; and Battery Beauregard, under Captain Sitgreaves, all did their duty with devotion and zeal.*

General Beauregard, in his official communication to the War Department, dated Charleston, May 24th, 1863, recapitulates as follows the salient features of Admiral Dupont's attack:

"The action lasted two hours and twenty-five minutes; but the chief damage is reported by the enemy to have been done in thirty minutes. The *Keokuk* did not come nearer than nine hundred yards of Fort Sumter. She was destroyed. The *New Ironsides* could not stand the fire at the range of a mile. Four of her consorts, monitors, were disabled at the distance of not less than thirteen hundred yards. They had only reached the gorge of the harbor, never within it, and were baffled and driven back before reaching our lines of torpedoes and obstructions, which had been constructed as an ultimate defensive resort, as far as they could be provided. The heaviest batteries had not been employed; therefore it may be accepted, as shown, that these vaunted

* From Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley's official report, dated April 13th, 1863, to be found in "Record of the Rebellion," vol. x. (Doc.), pp. 520-522.

monitor batteries, though formidable engines of war, after all, are not invulnerable or invincible, and may be destroyed or defeated by heavy ordnance, properly placed and skilfully handled; in reality they have not materially altered the military relations of forts and ships.

"On this occasion the monitors operated under the most favorable circumstances. The day was calm; and the water, consequently, was as stable as that of a river. Their guns were fired with deliberation, doubtless by trained artillerists. According to the enemy's statements the fleet fired one hundred and fifty-one shots, eight of which were ascribed to the *New Ironsides*, three to the *Keokuk*, and but nine to the *Passaic*, which was so badly damaged. Not more than thirty-four shots took effect on the walls of Fort Sumter—a broad mark—which, with the number of discharges, suggests that the monitor arrangement, as yet, is not convenient for accuracy or celerity of fire.

"Fort Moultrie and other batteries were not touched in a way to be considered, while in return they threw one thousand three hundred and ninety-nine shots. At the same time Fort Sumter discharged eight hundred and ten shots; making the total number of shots fired two thousand two hundred and nine, of which the enemy reports that five hundred and twenty struck the different vessels—a most satisfactory accuracy, when the smallness of the target is considered. This precision was due, not only to the discipline and practice of the garrisons engaged, but in no slight degree to an invention of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph A. Yates, 1st Regiment South Carolina Artillery, which had been applied to many of our best guns, and which shall, as fast as possible, be arranged for all the heavy ordnance in the Department. By this felicitous device our guns were easily held trained upon the monitors, although the latter were constantly in movement, and this with but five men at the heaviest pieces. The reports of the Engineers (herewith) will show the precise extent of the damage inflicted on Fort Sumter. It is sufficient for me to say, that at the time the enemy quit these waters the work was capable of resisting as formidable an attack as the one we had just foiled.

"For the casualties of the day (so slight) I must refer you to the reports herewith. Too much praise cannot be given to the officers and men, in all the works engaged, for their spirit, gallantry, and discipline, which, indeed, I had a right to expect, from the high soldierly condition into which those garrisons had been brought by their officers. My expectations were fully realized; and the country, as well as the State of South Carolina, may well be proud of the men who first met and vanquished the iron-mailed, terribly-armed armada, so confidently prepared, and sent forth by the enemy to certain and easy victory."

This was not the first defeat the enemy had suffered since the opening of the war, but it was undoubtedly one of the most significant, and produced a feeling of most profound depression at the North. The preparations for this naval attack, by means of supposed invulnerable and invincible engines of war, "such as the hands of man had never yet put afloat," had been made with

no less prodigality than care, and upon them centred the anxious attention of both sections of the country. It was the conviction of the North that no opposing force could resist such an expedition. Fort Sumter must inevitably fall, and Charleston likewise. Sharing in this belief, the Federal Government was convinced that the fears of Mr. Adams, United States Minister to England, to the effect that the current of opinion, in both Houses of Parliament, was then leaning towards "recognition of the insurgents," would be quieted by such a victory, and the power, authority, and resources of the United States clearly demonstrated to the world. Hence the disappointment at the repulse of Admiral Dupont's fleet. The Northern press was extremely bitter on the subject; so much so that efforts were made to conceal the extent of the defeat, by speaking of the movement in front of Charleston as having been a "simple *reconnaissance*," not an attack. But the facts of the case were soon spread abroad. It was known that, thirty minutes after the action commenced, Admiral Dupont became "convinced of the utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston with the force under his command," and that all his officers were of a like opinion. He had even declared that "a renewal of the attack on Charleston would be attended with disastrous results, involving the loss of this (the South Carolina) coast." * The revulsion of feeling in the North was complete, and exaggerated hope was changed into despondency, openly expressed. The New York *Herald* characterized the repulse of the monitors, "though almost bloodless, as one of our most discouraging disasters." The Baltimore *American* denounced it as "a shameful abandonment of the siege."

"When day dawned on the morning of the 8th," says General Ripley, in his report, "the enemy's fleet was discovered in the same position as noticed on the previous evening. About nine o'clock the *Keokuk*, which had been evidently the most damaged in the action, went down, about three and one-half miles from Fort Sumter and three-fourths of a mile from Morris Island. The remainder of the fleet were repairing damages. Preparations for repulsing a renewed attack were progressed with, in accordance with the instructions of the Commanding General, who visited Fort Sumter on that day. * * * Towards evening of the 9th a raft, apparently for removing torpedoes or

* The reports of Admiral Dupont and of his officers accompanying Secretary Welles's Report for the year 1863, appear, in substance, in the second volume of Boynton.

obstructions, was towed inside of the bar. Nothing of importance occurred during the 10th.

"On the 11th there were indications that the attacking fleet was about to withdraw; and on the 12th, at high-water, the *Ironsides* crossed the bar and took up her position with the blockading fleet; and the monitors steamed and were towed to the southward, leaving only the sunken *Keokuk* as a monument of their attack and discomfiture."

It appeared, on a close examination of Fort Sumter after the engagement, that the injuries inflicted on it were not of a character to impair its efficiency, though "fifty-five missiles—shot, shell, and fragments" *—as shown by the Engineers' reports, struck, at divers places, the walls and parapets of the work. "The effect of impact of the heavy shot sent by the enemy against the fort * * * was found to have been much less than had been anticipated." †

The following is an exhibit of the number of rounds fired by the enemy on the 7th of April, and the number of shots received by each ironclad, as copied from United States journals:

	R'ds Fired.		Shots Rec'd.
New Ironsides	8	New Ironsides	65
Catskill	25	Keokuk	90
Keokuk	3	Weehawken	60
Montauk	26	Montauk	20
Nantucket	15	Passaic	58
Passaic	9	Nantucket	51
Nahant	24	Catskill	51
Weekawken	26	Patapsco	45
Patapsco	18	Nahant	80
Total	154	Total	520

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

This was the real cause—there existed no other—of Admiral Dupont's failure to carry out his programme against Fort Sumter and the other defensive works in Charleston Harbor. The "torpedoes" and the "rope obstructions," so much spoken of, had nothing whatever to do with it; though we readily admit that "the enemy's evident and just dread of torpedoes, as evinced in his preparations for their explosion by the *Devil*, or torpedo-

* Major Echols's report. See Appendix.

† General Ripley's report, "Rebellion Record," vol. x., p. 520 (Doc.).

searcher,"* was no insignificant factor in his unwillingness to engage the Confederate batteries at closer quarters. It only remains to be said, however, that, had all the ironclad vessels of Admiral Dupont's attacking fleet adopted the course followed by the *Keokuk*, and steered nearer to the walls of Sumter, in all probability they would have shared the ill fate of Commander Rhinds's double-turreted monitor. All would have been not merely crippled but destroyed.

The presence of the monitors in the outer harbor after the action, without even a timber guard or fender around them, led General Beauregard to believe that a fine opportunity was now offered him to test the efficiency of the spar torpedo-boats he had held in readiness for some such purpose. On the 10th he had a conference on the subject with two of the naval officers then in Charleston. He found them perfectly willing, and even anxious, to carry out his plan. Accordingly, on the following day he addressed the subjunctive letter to Lieutenant Webb—one of the two officers above referred to—whose gallantry and daring were already established:

"*Dear Sir*,—Upon further reflection, after the discussion yesterday with Captain Tucker and yourself, I think it would be preferable to attack each of the enemy's seven ironclads (six monitors and the *Ironsides*), now inside of the outer bar, with at least two of your spar-torpedo row-boats, instead of the number (six in all) already agreed upon. I believe it to be as easy to surprise, at the same time, all the ironclads as a part of them.

"If you permit me I will give you here my general views upon the expedition.

"About dark, on the first calm night (the sooner the better), I would rendezvous all my boats at the mouth of the creek, in rear of Cummings's Point, Morris Island. There I would await the proper hours of the night, which should not be too late, in order to take advantage of the present condition of the moon. I would then coast quietly along the beach of Morris Island to a point nearest the enemy's present position, where General Ripley shall station a picket, to communicate with you, and to show proper lights immediately after your attack, to guide the return of your boats. Having arrived at the point of the beach designated, I would form line of attack, putting also my torpedoes in position, and would give orders that my boats should attack, by twos, any monitor or the *Ironsides* they should encounter on their way out, answering to the enemy's hail, 'Boats on secret expedition,' or merely 'Contrabands.'

"After the attack each boat should make for the nearest point of the

* Report of Major Harris, Chief-Engineer. See Appendix.

shore, where, if necessary, to save itself from pursuit, it can be stranded; otherwise, it will return to the rendezvous at Cummings's Point. Care should be taken to have a proper understanding with commanding officers of the batteries in that vicinity, so as not to be fired into.

"I feel convinced that, with nerve and proper precautions on the part of your boats' crews, and with the protection of a kind Providence, not one of the enemy's monitors, so much boasted of by them, would live to see the next morning's sun.

"Please submit this letter to Captain Tucker, and assure him that whatever assistance I can give for this expedition, the success of which must contribute so materially to the safety of this city, will be freely and heartily furnished.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

But, "as ill-luck would have it," says General Beauregard, the very night (April 12th) on which the attack was to have been made some of the monitors were sent to Port Royal for repairs, and the others to the North Edisto. The *Ironsides* was still with the blockaders, however, and, as General Beauregard looked upon her as "our most dangerous antagonist," he determined to strike her a blow—destroy her, if possible—and so raise the blockade, on that occasion, as to forbid all denial of the fact. Captain Tucker was again ready to execute General Beauregard's plan, which had assumed much larger proportions than heretofore, when, at the eleventh hour, as it were, a telegram was received from the Navy Department, at Richmond, ordering back to that city the officers and men of the "special expedition" who had been sent to aid in the defence of Charleston, and under whose charge—our own iron-clad boats joining in—was to have been placed that hazardous but, at the same time, very tempting enterprise. General Beauregard did all he could to retain their services, but without success.

He had also, and for the third or fourth time, appealed to the War Department for the completion of the "marine torpedo-ram" so often referred to in a preceding chapter. To General Cooper, on the 22d of April, he wrote as follows:

"* * * It will be remembered that the work was undertaken with the understanding that the sum of fifty thousand dollars would be supplied by the State of South Carolina, and such material as the Navy Department had available. The money has been received, and is exhausted. Some materials have been furnished by the Navy Department, but, thus far, the substantial assistance of iron-plating has been denied, and hence the progress in the work has been incommensurate with its importance, and very far behind what I was led to expect when I was induced to undertake the construction.

"Meantime the great value of the invention has been demonstrated so as to secure general conviction; and Captain Tucker, commanding Confederate States naval forces afloat on this station, declares, unhesitatingly, that this one machine of war, if finished, would be more effective as a means of defence and offence than nearly all the ironclads here afloat and building—a fact of which I am and have been fully assured. Had it been finished and afloat when the enemy's ironclads entered this outer harbor several weeks ago, but few of them, probably, would have escaped. Be that as it may, I trust the Department will have the matter inquired into—that is, the relative value, as war engines, of the 'Lee torpedo-ram,' and of the ironclad rams *Chicora* and *Palmetto State*, and others of the same class now building in this harbor, to the absorption of all the material and mechanical resources of this section of the country.

"I cannot express to the War Department in too strong terms my sense of the importance of the question involved, and of its intimate connection with the most effective defence of this position. I do not desire to impose my views, but feel it my duty to urge an immediate investigation, by a mixed board of competent officers, to determine whether it be best for the ends in view to continue to appropriate all the material, and employ all the mechanical labor of the country, in the construction of vessels that are forced to play so unimportant and passive a part as that which Captain Tucker, C. S. N., their commander, officially declares to me must be theirs in the future, as in the past. * * *

"The Engineer in charge estimates that it will take twenty thousand dollars to pay off existing obligations for workmanship and material, and to complete the vessel, with the exception of floating her.

"The plating can only be furnished by the naval authorities, who have control of the rolling-mills and all suitable iron; and unless they will agree to divert from the vessels of the class they are building enough plating for the completion of the ram, I may as well give up further hope.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

But all efforts were unavailing. The War Department, no less than the Navy Department, remained, in appearance, as incredulous as ever. No reasoning, no inducement, could awaken sufficient interest in either to disturb the "masterly inactivity" which was proverbially the bent of both, from the beginning to the end of the war.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Troops Withdrawn from General Beauregard and Sent to North Carolina and to General Johnston.—The Secretary of War orders 5000 more to Vicksburg.—General Beauregard's Letter to Mr. Seddon.—Plan of the Campaign to Redeem Tennessee and Kentucky Submitted to General Johnston, after the Battle of Chancellorsville, and after Richmond's Safety is Assured.—Enemy makes a Demonstration in Third Military District.—General Gillmore Assumes Command of Federal Forces.—General Beauregard Instructed by the War Department to Repair to Mobile with Part of his Troops.—His Letter to General Cooper.—Colonel Simonton Recommends a Battery at Grimball's.—General Beauregard's Reasons for Objecting to it.—Call for Additional Heavy Guns.—Remonstrance to General Gillmore as to Depredations of his Troops.—General Beauregard's Letter to the Mayor of Charleston.—The Enemy's Movements on Folly Island.—Preparations for the Attack.—Orders to that Effect.—The Assault takes Place on the 10th of July: is Renewed on the 11th and 18th.—Repulse of the Enemy.—General Beauregard Strengthens his Inner Circle of Fortifications.—His Letter to Governor Bonham.—Instructions to General Ripley and other Officers.—Letter to Captain Tucker.—Additional Orders Issued.—Mr. Seddon's Request for Information Concerning the Enemy's Descent on Morris Island.—General Beauregard's Reply.

No sooner had the enemy been foiled in his naval attack on Fort Sumter (April 7th) than the depletion of General Beauregard's active forces was begun. Cooke's and Clingman's commands were returned to North Carolina; and, early in May, two brigades of infantry, numbering more than 5000 men, with two batteries of light artillery, were sent, by order of the War Department, to reinforce General Joseph E. Johnston at Jackson, Mississippi. Again, on the 10th of May, a telegram was received from the Secretary of War, directing that 5000 more men should be hurried to the assistance of General Pemberton, at Vicksburg. This injudicious measure, the execution of which would have left General Beauregard with hardly any troops in his Department, stung him to an earnest remonstrance, as is shown by the following letter:

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *May 11th*, 1863.

“Hon. J. A. SEDDON, Secretary of War, Richmond:

“*Sir*,—This morning, as clearly as it could be done in the space of a telegram, I sought to lay before you the military condition in which this Department would be left, after the execution of your orders of yesterday, directing me to send another division of 5000 men out of it to Lieutenant-General Pemberton.

“In view, however, of the grave consequences that may follow, I deem it not only in place, but my duty, to lay before the War Department, in precise terms, my views touching the removal, at this juncture, of so large a force.

“As soon as the enemy had withdrawn his ironclad ships from before this harbor, and materially reduced his land-forces in this immediate vicinity, on the requisition of the Commanding General in North Carolina, I returned Cooke’s brigade of North Carolina troops to Wilmington, and sent Clingman’s brigade there, in exchange for Evans’s.

“A week ago, under your orders, I put in motion for Jackson, Miss., two brigades, under Brigadier-Generals Gist and W. H. T. Walker, the former commanding South Carolina, and the latter Georgia, regiments—somewhat over 5000 infantry in all, and two light batteries of the best class in the Department.

“Your orders have been based, apparently, on the conviction that the troops of the enemy, assembled in this Department for operations against Charleston, have been mainly withdrawn and diverted to other expeditions in North Carolina and the Valley of the Mississippi. This conviction I regret that I cannot share, as I am satisfied, from the reports of District Commanders, and from other reasons, that there has been really but little reduction of the command of Major-General Hunter.

“General Walker, commanding at Pocotaligo, reports that, on yesterday, the outposts of the enemy in his front had been much increased in strength. General Hagood reports them to be occupying Seabrook’s Island, with at least 2500 infantry. They are erecting fortifications at that point, as also on Folly Island, which is likewise still occupied in force.

“Five of the monitors remain in the North Edisto, with some twenty gunboats and transports. With these and the transports still in the waters of Port Royal, and the forces which I am unable to doubt are still at the disposition of the enemy, he may renew the attack by land and water on Charleston at any moment. Acting on the offensive, and commanding the time of attack, he could simultaneously call troops here from North Carolina, and sooner than my command could possibly be reinforced from any quarter out of the Department.

“To meet or resist any land attack there would be available, in the First Military District:

Infantry.....	1,547
Heavy and light artillery.....	2,905
Cavalry.....	903
Total effective force.....	5,355

Line of Savannah Railroad, Second and Third Military Districts.

Infantry	751
Heavy and light artillery.....	772
Cavalry	2,094
Total	3,617

In District of Georgia.

Infantry.....	1,631
Heavy and light artillery	2,539
Cavalry	1,821
Total.....	5,991

“That is—

Total of infantry.....	3,929
“ “ artillery.....	6,216
“ “ cavalry.....	4,878
Total effectives.....	15,023

“This force, if concentrated at either Charleston or Savannah for a certain period, could, doubtless, make a stout defence; but if kept distributed in occupation of the important points, districts, and positions now held from Georgetown, S. C., to Florida, would offer but feeble resistance to any serious attack of the enemy.

“If it be the irrevocable determination of the War Department that this command shall be thus reduced, I can but make such disposition of the remnant of my forces as may appear best calculated to conceal my weakness. With my cavalry I shall make a show of occupation of the Second and Third Military Districts, and the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad; but it must not be lost sight of that my communications with Savannah can be cut by the enemy, without the use of a large force, whenever he may choose to attempt it; and when that is done he will get possession of a large extent of rich rice lands and large stores of rice, not yet brought to market, which would be a heavy loss. Furthermore, it were then but a simple and easy military operation for a column—not a large one—to penetrate to Branchville, not more than thirty-five miles distant from Pocotaligo, and thus entirely interrupt my communications with the interior, as a glance at the map will show.

“The sickly season on this coast will begin in about six weeks; then a small reduction of the infantry might take place. It was so late as the 16th of June last year that the enemy made his attack at Secessionville, on James Island—so nearly successful—and which, with success, would have placed Charleston at his mercy, despite the harbor defences.

“It is proper to add here that the day before your order to detach the last division was received I had organized and put in motion an expedition against the enemy, on Seabrook Island, in support of a naval operation, the object of which is, to destroy the ironclads, with the torpedo-boat contrivance of Captain Lee. The naval expedition, under Lieutenant Parker, supported by some troops, will nevertheless be attempted; but I was reluctantly obliged to recall the infantry with which I hoped to effect the surprise and capture

of the enemy on land, in the confusion which, it was hoped, would result from the attack with torpedoes.

"I must respectfully ask your attention to the paper herewith, marked 'A,' exhibiting the force, of all arms, that will be left me after the execution of your orders, and that in the Department this time last year.

"You will perceive that I shall be left with 12,664 men, of all arms less than at the same period last year, when the force of the enemy was less threatening in his positions than now; that my infantry force for the same duty was 6462, leaving the lines on James Island virtually without infantry support, and open to seizure, and resulting in the inevitable fall of Charleston.

"In conclusion, I must observe that the troops in the works cannot be withdrawn from their guns and concentrated for defence of any threatened point. They are already at a minimum force for the proper service of the batteries, and to withdraw them, here or at Savannah, involves the surrender of the work so abandoned, and, in ultimate effect, the failure of the whole defence.

"Finally, it may as well be considered that the enemy will be speedily acquainted with the extent of these reductions, and that he will act accordingly.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdgr."

The War Department was thus fortunately checked in the suicidal course it was then about to follow; and the reduced force under General Beauregard, so evidently inadequate in view of the menacing attitude of the enemy at and around Charleston, was left to him.

General Beauregard's incessant labors did not prevent him from turning his attention to the military operations in other parts of the Confederacy, and notably in the West, where he thought that General Joseph E. Johnston, then at Jackson, Mississippi, by concentrating his own and other forces not actively engaged at the time, could inaugurate a vigorous and successful campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky. His views to that effect are contained in the following letter, which will, doubtless, be read with interest. The strategy preferred by the President was to send General Lee on his ruinous invasion of Pennsylvania.*

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., May 15th, 1863.

"General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, Comdg., etc., Jackson, Miss.:

"*Dear General*,—I am sure you will appreciate the motives which induce me to offer for your consideration the following general views on the coming

* At a Lee memorial meeting, held at Richmond, November 3d, 1870, Mr. Davis assumed the responsibility for that campaign and relieved General Lee.

summer campaign, which, if they coincide with your own, might be, if not already done, submitted by you to the War Department.

"Certainly the surest way to relieve the State of Mississippi and the Valley of the Mississippi from the presence of the enemy's army is suddenly and boldly to take the offensive in Tennessee and Kentucky, for which purpose all available forces (from other commands held strictly on the defensive) should be concentrated under you, and the forces now in Tennessee, being reinforced by 25,000 or 30,000 men, at the most favorable strategic point for the offensive, Rosecrans could be suddenly attacked, and would be either totally destroyed or the remnant of his forces would be speedily driven beyond the Ohio. A force of at least 10,000 men in Tennessee, and 20,000 in Kentucky, would, doubtless, then be raised, and, with about 20,000 of the reinforcements received from Virginia and elsewhere, could be left to hold those two States. The rest of the army, say about 60,000 or 70,000 men, should cross the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, to Columbus or Fort Pillow, so as to command the Mississippi River, and thus cut off Grant's communications with the North. The latter officer (should he have delayed thus long his retreat north of these two points) would then find himself in a very critical condition—that is, compelled to fight his way through a victorious army equal to his own in strength, on its own selected battle-field, in position to be reinforced for the occasion from the forces left in Kentucky—and the result could not be doubtful for an instant. As a matter of course, advantage would be taken of the low stage of water in the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers to obstruct thoroughly their navigation and fortify their banks strongly, at the point where they come close together, known as the 'Neck.' Immediately after the destruction of Grant's army, sufficient forces could be thrown from the army in Mississippi into Louisiana, in aid of Kirby Smith, and into Missouri to the assistance of Price, or from Kentucky into Virginia, to reinforce the troops left there, should they be hard-pressed; but that is not to be dreaded, considering the terrible lesson the enemy has just had at Chancellorsville, and that a large portion of his army is to be disbanded during the present month, to be replaced, if at all, by new Yankee recruits.

"Meanwhile a sufficient number of Captain F. D. Lee's torpedo-rams could be constructed in England, and the navigation of the Mississippi River resumed, thereby enabling us to retake New Orleans and capture Banks's army.

"Wishing you success in your Department, I remain,

"Yours very truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

Let this plan be contrasted with the disastrous strategy of the campaign into Pennsylvania, terminating in the fatal battle of Gettysburg. The battle of Chancellorsville had secured for some time the safety of Richmond. The people of the North were tired of the war, and, until this invasion, the Northern army could not be recruited. The Governors of some States, notably Governor Seymour, of New York, had refused more troops. Longstreet, with thirty thousand men of the Army of

Northern Virginia, sent to the West, might have successfully aided in recovering Tennessee, Kentucky, and the Mississippi River, and in saving the Confederacy.

On the 1st of June the Chief Quartermaster was informed that all the troops in South Carolina for whom estimates of provisions should be made—that is to say, all troops present, effectives and non-effectives—amounted to ten thousand. Thus was General Beauregard stripped of all his movable forces, and he had henceforth to strengthen one point by uncovering another, whenever he wished to reinforce any position in his Department.

At that time the enemy, no doubt aware of the weakened condition of General Beauregard's command, began making demonstrations in the Third Military District (General Walker's), towards "Green Pond." Immediate steps were taken to foil his purpose, as may be seen by the various orders and telegrams sent to General Ripley and to the Chief Quartermaster of the Department.* The timely and judicious dispositions made for the emergency, and the rapid transfer of troops from different parts of the First Military District to the endangered point, showed conclusively that, notwithstanding the many difficulties in his way, General Beauregard maintained serenity of mind. He knew he could count, not only upon the energy and efficiency of his subordinate commanders, but upon the discipline and indomitable spirit of the men under them; and they, too, knew how worthy he was of the confidence reposed in him.

The enemy advanced as far as the Combahee Ferry, burnt the pontoon bridge at that place and the houses on the river-side, and moved up, as if determined to march into the interior. The Federal forces employed on this expedition were mostly colored troops, drawn from General Saxton's command at Beaufort. After pillaging and burning, as they were wont to do, they carried off with them numbers of negro slaves from the adjoining plantations, but went no farther, and withdrew precipitately, without committing additional damage on their way back; nor did they interfere with or cut the line of communication between Charleston and Savannah, a little farther on.

A few days later, on the 12th of June, General Gillmore superseded General Hunter, and assumed command of "the Depart-

* See Appendix.

ment of the South." The Federal forces were then in possession of "Folly Island, north of the Stono; Seabrook Island, on the North Edisto; St. Helena Island, Port Royal Island, Hilton Head Island, Tybee Islands, Fort Pulaski, Ossabaw Island, Fort Clinch, and Amelia Island, and the city of St. Augustine." * It was fortunate that, shortly afterwards, the new Commanding General, in whose daring and engineering ability the North greatly relied, preferred making his attack by Morris Island, instead of on the broad and weak front of James Island, where he might have penetrated our long, attenuated lines, and taken Charleston in flank and rear. Nothing, then, could have prevented Sumter from falling, for there can be no doubt that General Gillmore would have immediately increased the armament at and around Fort Johnson, and have thus completely commanded the interior harbor. The possession of Charleston and of all the South Carolina sea-coast would have followed as a necessary sequence.

About the middle of June a full and comprehensive letter was forwarded to the War Department by General Beauregard, in answer to a communication from Richmond, dated the 10th, advising him that Northern papers reported the reduction of General Hunter's forces by sending part of them to the Gulf, in which event he was instructed to proceed to Mobile, with such troops as he could spare from his lines, and use his best endeavors to avert the threatened danger at that point. This was an additional cause of anxiety to General Beauregard, for there seemed to be no end to the determination of the Government to withdraw troops from his Department. Nay, more: just at that time General D. H. Hill, commanding in Southeastern Virginia and North Carolina, had also applied for assistance, to guard against an attack which he thought was then threatening him, *via* Newbern—assistance which, under the circumstances, it was necessary to deny him. We here give General Beauregard's letter. It presented the matter in so strong a light, that the War Department refrained from issuing any order to carry out its first intention:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *June 15th*, 1863.

"General SAMUEL COOPER, A. and I. Genl., Richmond, Va.:

"*General*,—Your letter of the 10th was duly received and partially answered

* "Engineer and Artillery Preparations against Charleston," by General Q. A. Gillmore, p. 18.

by my telegram of the 13th instant. It is now my place to reply by mail at some length.

"I am advised in the letter in question that 'Northern papers report the reduction of Hunter's forces by sending troops to the Gulf'—in which event I am instructed to proceed to Mobile, 'with such force as I can properly withdraw from my defensive line, to resist an attack, if one should be designed on that place;' but if the purpose of the enemy be to send his reinforcements to the Mississippi, I am to go on and 'co-operate with General Johnston in that quarter.'

"While I shall be glad to contribute my mite to the defence of any part of the Confederate States, and assuredly must be solicitous for the defence of Mobile and the Mississippi Valley, yet, with my view of the situation in this quarter, repeatedly expressed, I cannot now properly withdraw, without a direct order, more than a regiment of cavalry from this Department.

"The troops left in this Department at this time (see Field Return of 13th inst.) are 19,863—that is, 6488 nominal infantry, 7329 heavy and light artillery, and 6046 cavalry. This force is stationed as follows: for the garrisons of the works in Charleston Harbor and the defensive lines commanding the immediate approaches to the city, 2606 infantry—of which some four or six companies are actually necessarily doing heavy artillery service in batteries on Sullivan's Island and elsewhere—3767 heavy and light artillery, and 1171 cavalry.

"In the works and lines around Savannah are 1888 nominal infantry, 2295 heavy and light artillery, and 1738 cavalry, leaving 984 infantry, 847 light artillery, and 2244 cavalry to hold the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad; and 1010 infantry, 420 light artillery, and 893 cavalry in Florida—now so important for its supplies of subsistence.

"Thus, it will be seen, the force in the Department is already at the minimum necessary to hold the works around Charleston and Savannah, constantly menaced by the proximity of the enemy's ironclads. The garrison of no work in the harbor can be withdrawn or diminished, as they are all necessary links in the chain of defence. Reduce the command on James Island, and the enemy may readily penetrate, by such a *coup de main* as was attempted last year, at the weakened point. James Island would then fall, and, despite our harbor defences, the City of Charleston would be thrown open to bombardment. It is not safe to leave less than a regiment of infantry on Morris Island, which, if once carried by the enemy, would expose Fort Sumter to be taken in reverse and demolished.

"The defective lines of defence adopted and constructed on James Island, after the unfortunate abandonment, last year, of Cole's Island, have made a force of about 11,000 men essential to guard and hold that island against a serious land attack; whereas, had Cole's Island (at the mouth of the Stono) been held, 2500 men would not only have defended James Island, but the enemy would have been excluded from the Stono, and unable to occupy and fortify Folly Island and threaten Morris Island, as is now the case.

"Late Northern papers say Admiral Dupont has been relieved in command of the fleet on this coast by Admiral Foote, an officer whose operations in the West evinced much activity and an enterprising spirit. And, even were con-

siderable reductions made in the enemy's forces, the valuable coast districts would still be left a prey to such destructive raids as devastated the Combahee some days ago. Thus far, however, I can see no evidences of reduction. General Hunter was at Hilton Head on the 8th instant; his troops hold the same positions as heretofore, and apparently in the same force—a brigade on Folly, one on Seabrook's Island, and the balance on the islands about Port Royal. One of the monitors is at Hilton Head, and five are still in the North Edisto. Nor has the number of their gunboats or transports diminished, or at any time recently been increased, as must have been the case had a material removal of troops taken place.

"While, therefore, I would not on my own responsibility further deplete the force in this Department, of course I shall promptly carry out any orders which the War Department may deem proper to give. As for myself, my earnest desire is to be useful to the utmost extent of my capacities, in any position or command to which it may please the President to assign me; but if left to my own personal preferences, I would desire service in the field, for which I consider myself best fitted by my taste and studies.

"I shall observe closely the movements of the enemy at Hilton Head, with a view to ascertaining whether any material reduction of his force has taken or is taking place, which will be promptly reported for the information of the War Department.

"I shall also ask General Maury (at Mobile) to keep me advised of the movements of the enemy in his front, and of the means of defence at his disposition, and shall communicate with General Johnston.

"I beg to inquire whether, if I go to Mobile, it will form a part of my present Department, or will I be relieved from this command and fall under the orders of General Johnston?

"I repeat it, my chief desire is to be useful, and if desired by the War Department, I will cheerfully repair at once, temporarily, to Mobile, examine the works and means of defence there, and advise with General Maury touching them.

I have the honor to be, General, your obdt. servt.,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

To this no reply came from Richmond; but General Beauregard was not sent to Mobile, nor were additional troops withdrawn just then from his lines, to reinforce other parts of the Confederacy. The fact is, the apprehension of the Government as to a threatened movement on Mobile or on the Mississippi River (we refer to June 10th, 1863) was justified by no trustworthy information, and only exemplified once more the injudicious interference of the Administration with generals in the field or at the head of Departments upon matters about which it could have no positive knowledge. General Maury, who had been written to by General Beauregard concerning the fears entertained about his command, in his answer of the 20th said:

"I have taken the best means in my power to procure early information of the enemy's movements, with reinforcements, up the Mississippi. I cannot hear of any. I am satisfied none have gone in that river, unless within the past two or three days. I can perceive no indications of an attack from any forces near here.

"I believe that for two weeks New Orleans has been left entirely without means of defence, and is so now."

The defective lines of James Island had always been a matter of great concern to General Beauregard; especially was this the case now that his forces were so much reduced by the drafts made on him for the assistance of Generals Johnston and Pemberton, in Mississippi. It was about this time (June 23d) that a communication from Colonel Simonton, commanding part of the lines on James Island, recommending a ten-gun battery at Dr. Thomas Grimball's, on the Stono, was received at Department Headquarters. It had been approved and forwarded by the Commander of the First Military District. General Beauregard felt compelled, nevertheless, to decline acceding to the suggestion made, as will be shown by the official answer sent to General Ripley, and through him to Colonel Simonton:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *June 23d*, 1863.

"General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

"*General*,—I am instructed to communicate for your information the following indorsement of the Commanding General on the communication of Colonel Simonton of the 9th, and of Captain F. D. Blake of the 6th instant:

"The project of a small battery, armed with ten guns, at Grimball's, on the Stono, cannot be approved for these reasons:

"1st. It would not prevent the passage up the river of monitors by day, and of gunboats and even transports by night.

"2d. It would not prevent the landing of troops at Battery Island and at Legare's, *via* Folly River Creek, which could then take in rear the isolated battery at Grimball's.

"3d. It could then be silenced in a few hours by batteries on the opposite shore of the Stono, assisted by monitors and gunboats in the river.

"I have had for some time in contemplation a dispersive line from Legare's to Grimball's, with a strong work at the latter, a battery at the former, and a system of lines in rear of Battery Island. I would have, also, at the latter point an outwork for infantry, to prevent its occupation by the enemy; but the want of labor and the hope of regaining possession of Coles Island have delayed the execution of that project.

"When Coles Island was abandoned the work at Battery Island should

have been strengthened, and its armament increased in quantity and quality; obstructions should also have been put in the river under the guns of the work, and a battery at Legare's should have been located to guard the approach *via* Folly River Creek. This short line of works would have dispensed entirely with the long, weak, and expensive system adopted for the defence of James Island.'

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

On the 27th General Beauregard again called on the War Department for heavy guns, and asked leave to borrow two Brooke 32-pounders, intended for Vicksburg, and lying idle on the wharf at Mobile. From the fact that General Gillmore was then in command of the Federal troops around Charleston he inferred that another and a more serious attack would soon be made. A force of some six regiments, he stated, was in possession of Folly Island, under Brigadier-General Vogdes, an officer of the old service, of known ability, who had been stationed at Fort Moultrie before the war, and had already figured against General Bragg at Pensacola in its beginning.

On the 4th of July a long and elaborate communication, relative to the laws of civilized warfare, was addressed by General Beauregard to General Gillmore, with a view to prevent the useless destruction of the property of non-combatants, which had seemed to be the practice of his predecessor.

The paper we here refer to* produced very little effect on General Gillmore. He continued the system of depredations denounced by his adversary, which subsequently called from the latter a telegram to Colonel William Porcher Miles, Chairman of the Military Committee in the Lower House of Congress, suggesting that henceforth no quarter should be given to such depredators, erroneously called "prisoners of war." This telegram created a sensation when first published, after the war. Its real purport was evidently misunderstood. It contained no explanation of the reasons governing General Beauregard, nor did it show that, on more than one occasion previously, the subject had been thoroughly discussed between himself and Colonel Miles. And it is but just to remark, that General Beauregard's treatment of prisoners throughout the war showed how kindly disposed he was

* See Appendix.

towards them, especially as regards surgeons and ministers of the Gospel, whom he refused, both at Manassas and Shiloh, to keep as prisoners. We must say, however, that his views in that respect were never reciprocated by the Federal commanders opposed to him, and he was therefore compelled, though reluctantly, to treat Federal surgeons and Federal ministers as ours were treated by the enemy—in other words, to look upon them in the light of ordinary prisoners of war.

The following incidents corroborate what is here alleged of General Beauregard's feelings in regard to prisoners:

1. After the capture of part of the Federal naval party which attacked Fort Sumter on the night of September 8th, the officers and men who fell into our hands on that occasion—one hundred and seventeen—made petition to the Commanding General for clothing, blankets, and shoes. Their application was sent, under flag of truce,* to Admiral Dahlgren, with a message informing him and likewise General Gillmore (for some few of the latter's troops were also held as prisoners) that General Beauregard would gladly distribute to all of them any supplies that might be forwarded from the enemy's lines. Admiral Dahlgren took advantage at once of the privilege thus afforded him to help his men; but not so with General Gillmore, who abstained from even acknowledging the courtesy extended to him.

2. The other incident referred to is explained by the following letter of General Beauregard to Colonel Branch, dated Charleston, July 18th, 1863:

"Colonel,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 16th inst., proposing that the portion of Morris Island now occupied by the enemy, after it shall have been retaken, might be held and fortified by exposing our prisoners to the enemy's fire.

"In reply the Commanding General directs me to say, that it is not considered in accordance with the usages of war to use prisoners as a means of defence or protection.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

We now submit a letter to the Hon. Charles Macbeth, the Mayor of Charleston, dated July 9th, which needs no comment:

"Sir,—The papers herewith will show you that an attack is impending on the Morris Island outworks, so necessary to the defence of the city. An indis-

* See, in Appendix, extract from Major Elliott's journal at Fort Sumter.

pensable battery, in case of an attack by land on that island, remains unfinished, adequate labor not having been supplied by the State authorities. Can not labor be furnished in the emergency from the class of free negroes in this city, as on occasion in Virginia, and also from the slaves of the vicinage? Material results may be achieved, even at this late hour, by the application of a sufficient labor force, energetically handled.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

On the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th of July considerable activity prevailed among the Federal forces on Folly Island. The foregoing letter shows that General Beauregard was aware of it. Captain Charles Haskell, on the night of the 8th, had gone over to the island with a party of scouts, and had ascertained the presence, near the creeks leading to it, of a number of the enemy's barges which had been collected there. During that same night the chopping of wood on Folly Island had been distinctly heard by our men, and the next morning revealed to them the existence of several light works, heretofore screened by the trees and underbrush just cut in their immediate front. General Beauregard had full knowledge of the erection of these works. As early as May the 10th, in a telegram forwarded to the War Department, he said :

"Enemy in force on Folly Island, actively erecting batteries yesterday."*

These evidences of an immediate attack induced General Beauregard to have all the infantry forces on the south end of Morris Island kept under arms during the whole night of the 9th. He also caused the following orders to be issued :

1. "HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 9th*, 1863.

"Lieut.-Colonel D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc., etc. :

"*Colonel*,—The Commanding General directs me to call your attention to the urgent necessity for immediately obstructing this harbor, to every possible extent, with rope contrivances for that purpose, as already directed, both verbally and in writing. He wishes Major Echols and yourself to give your special attention to this work, and to the multiplication of this style of obstructions by every possible means.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

* See General Beauregard's Report of the Defence of Morris Island, which forms the subject of the next chapter.

2.

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *June 9th*, 1863.

"Major HUTSON LEE, Chief Quartermaster, etc., etc. :

"*Major*,—The Commanding General directs that you have held in readiness, at Pocotaligo and Adams Run, transportation to bring six hundred men from the former and five hundred from the latter place to this city at once. The trains will be furnished the Commanding Officers of the Second and Third Districts with as little delay as possible.

"I have the honor to be, Major, very respectfully, your obdt. servant,

"JNO. F. O'BRIEN, A. A. G."

3.

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 9th*, 1863.

"Colonel A. J. GONZALES, Chief of Artillery, etc., etc. :

"*Colonel*,—The Commanding General directs that you hold the siege-train in readiness to move at a moment's notice.

"I have the honor to be, Colonel, very respectfully, your obdt. servant,

"CLIFTON H. SMITH, A. A. G."

4.

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 10th*, 1863.

"Colonel A. J. GONZALES, Chief of Artillery, etc., etc. :

"*Colonel*,—You will repair forthwith to inspect the heavy batteries on James Island, commencing with Fort Pemberton, to determine, on consultation with their Commanding Officers, what are their most pressing wants; and if they can be supplied, you will inform these Headquarters by courier.

"You will determine, also, whether in any conflict of the enemy's gunboats with the works on James Island the siege-train, or any part thereof, can be used to advantage.

"Meanwhile, the siege-train should be sent to the most available position on James Island.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

5.

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 10th*, 1863.

"Major HUTSON LEE, Chief Quartermaster, etc., etc. :

"*Major*,—A brigade (Clingman's) is to be sent here from Wilmington. Make every possible exertion to provide for its rapid transportation. Leave nothing undone in your power to accelerate the movement, both from Wilmington to Florence, and thence here. Time is incalculably precious.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

6.

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 11th*, 1863.

"Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Commanding First Military Dist., etc., etc. :

"*General*,—I am instructed to inform you of the expected arrival of ten companies from Savannah and one brigade from Wilmington, N. C., and to

direct that the necessary arrangements shall be made for their reception and disposition. A despatch from General Mercer, just received, states that seventy-five artillerists and one 10-inch mortar, complete, left Savannah last night. The other four mortars, will soon follow. These five mortars should be distributed between Sumter, Batteries Gregg (Cummings's Point) and Wagner, as you may think best, informing these Headquarters of the disposition you may make of them.

"The Commanding General further directs the obstruction of the little creek on the flank of Battery Wagner, about one hundred yards above, to prevent boat expeditions from turning that point at night.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

The foregoing orders and instructions, and others of a similar nature, which it is unnecessary to mention here, show General Beauregard's continued preparations for the attack of the enemy, which took place on the 10th of July, on the south end of Morris Island. It was renewed the next day on Battery Wagner, and was signally repulsed, with a heavy loss to the Federals. They again advanced on the 18th, with ample preparations and a much greater force, but were once more terribly defeated, as will appear hereafter in General Beauregard's official report. Colonel Rhett, in accordance with instructions, had opened fire with all the available guns of Sumter, the shot and shell passing over Battery Wagner, and falling into the attacking column, especially the reserves; thus harassing their advance and preventing them from rendering any material assistance.

Encouraged by the failure of these repeated assaults upon Wagner, but fearing the eventual reduction of that work and the result which must ensue for Battery Gregg and Fort Sumter, General Beauregard determined to modify and increase his inner circle of fire on Sullivan's and James Islands, and to erect a work on Shell Point—James Island—wherewith to sweep the front of Battery Wagner, and assist in checking the further progress of the enemy on Morris Island.

To this end he gave specific instructions to General Ripley and to Colonel Harris, his Chief-Engineer,* and again applied to Governor Bonham for slave-labor to carry out his plans. His letter on the subject read as follows:

* See Appendix.

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 13th*, 1863.

"To his Excellency M. L. BONHAM, etc., etc.:

"*Sir*,—You are aware of the inability of the State authorities, under the operation of the law, to meet my requisitions for slave-labor, and you can readily trace some of the consequences in the events of the past week. However, is there no course by which the defects of the law can, to some extent, be repaired, even at this late day?

"Believing that there must be a remedy in the patriotism and intelligence of the planters of South Carolina, I shall invoke your executive proclamation to them, in this exigent hour, to send their negroes, with spades and shovels, to this city, without an instant of delay or hesitation, to the extent of three thousand effective laborers. This can be but an inappreciable subtraction from the labor resources of the people at this or any time. Each negro should be provided with at least three days' subsistence. The people of each district or neighborhood should select some overseer or manager for their negroes, who shall go and remain with them while they are employed.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

On the 14th General Ripley received the following instructions, which were carried out without delay. They show the extreme vigilance exercised by the General Commanding, and how careful he was to prepare against any new movement of the enemy:

"The General Commanding is of the belief that some of the mortars now in Fort Sumter may be transferred with advantage to Sullivan's Island, and wishes you to consider and give your views upon the matter.

"A covered way should be made between Fort Moultrie and Battery Bee, carefully secured from enfilade from the sand-hills on east end of Sullivan's Island.

"The gate-way in gorge of Fort Sumter must be closed, and an outlet arranged through one of the casemates in the southwest face.

"It should be determined whether the gorge-wall of Fort Sumter may not be materially strengthened, by means of bales of cotton, with sand packed in the intervals, and all kept wet and incombustible by means of tubes and hose from the *terre-plein*.

"Two 10-inch columbiads have been ordered here from Savannah.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

The reader is referred to the Appendix for other orders and instructions relating to this period of the defence of Charleston, which must be omitted from the text, notwithstanding their importance. Among them are—

1. The order reducing the force on Morris Island to one strictly sufficient "for the defence," so as not to expose, needlessly, too many of our men to the enemy's batteries, then in process of construction on the island; and also as to relieving the command at least once in forty-eight hours by fresh troops.

2. The order that rice-casks and other casks should be furnished the troops on Morris Island, for the construction of "rat-holes;" and that hulks, as well as other obstructions, should be sunk in the creeks west of the same island, and north of Sullivan's.

3. The order increasing the batteries on James Island and bearing on Black Island, by at least twenty guns, on siege-carriages. The work to be pushed forward, night and day, as also the work at Shell Point, "so soon as the force of negro labor may be sufficient."

4. The order requiring Colonel Rhett, at Sumter, to keep several of his guns loaded and carefully trained at night, so as to command the creeks near Battery Wagner, and Marsh and Shell Point Batteries. A part of this order was the following command addressed to the Commanders of Fort Sumter and Batteries Gregg and Wagner: "Should events oblige us to abandon these works, not one heavy gun must be left in serviceable condition, to be turned against our own works."

5. The order increasing the garrison on Sullivan's Island, to prevent the possibility of a night attack; relieving the troops at Battery Wagner every three days, instead of every forty-eight hours, as heretofore; sending an 8-inch columbiad or a rifled 32-pounder, to replace the gun exploded at Wagner; the injunction being to mount it that very night, "on account of its moral effect on the garrison."

We now ask attention to a communication sent by General Beauregard to Captain Tucker, commanding "Confederate States naval forces afloat," at Charleston, and asking his active co-operation in the defence of Fort Sumter and Morris Island. It bore date July 18th, and was in these terms:

"*Captain*,—I believe it my duty to acquaint you with the fact that I consider it of the utmost importance to the defence of the works at the entrance of the harbor that some effort should be made to sink either the *Ironsides* or one of the monitors now attacking the works on Morris Island, not only because of the diminution thus effected in the enemy's means of offence, but because of the great moral effect that would inevitably result from such an occurrence.

"The stake is manifestly a great one, worthy of a small risk. For its accomplishment, one vessel, such as the *Juno*, provided with the spar-torpedo, with two or three officers and a few men, it is believed, would be as effective, at night, for the end in view as a flotilla of vessels, so arranged, of the same class.

"If, however, the results of your experiments are sufficiently adverse to the prospect of success with the contrivance, I must beg to be advised of the fact, to the end that I may not permit the expectation of assistance to enter further into my plans of defence; but if, on the other hand, the experiments remain satisfactory, permit me to say, the time is rapidly passing away when that assistance can be of any avail or value.

"One monitor destroyed now will have greater moral and material effect, I believe, than two sunk at a later stage in our defence.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

This urgent appeal would have met with a ready response from the commander to whom it was made, for he was not only willing but anxious to take an active part in the contest about to be renewed with increased vigor by the two opposing forces. He was compelled to remain passive, however, and to admit his impotency to be of any assistance, owing to the excessive draught of his ironclads, their want of motive power, and consequently of speed, and the short range of their guns, which could not be sufficiently elevated, on account of the small size of the port-holes. This was the substance of Commander Tucker's answer. It left General Beauregard entirely powerless to contend against the enemy's turreted fleet, and led him to consider the possible necessity, ere long, of withdrawing our forces from Morris Island. He therefore instructed General Ripley to prepare suitable means of transportation, by boats, barges, and flats, to be collected with as little delay as possible, and held in readiness in the immediate vicinity of Fort Johnson.

The following orders to the Commander of the First Military District, and many others already produced, show the minuteness of the instructions given him by the Commanding General, who planned and caused to be erected most if not all the works adopted for the protection of the city and harbor of Charleston:

1. "HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 18th*, 1863.

"Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc., etc.:

"General,—The General Commanding desires that the Shell Point Battery shall be occupied to-night, and placed, as far as practicable, in condition for

work, with the exact range of Battery Wagner established for the emergency of an assault to-night, for which you must be prepared.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

2. "HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 19th*, 1863.

"Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc., etc. :

"*General*,—The Commanding General desires the following re-arrangement of certain guns on James Island, to provide for the armament of the new batteries in the direction of Secessionville from Legare's Point. Transfer to Legare's Point, with all their implements and ammunition, one 12-pounder rifled gun, and one 8-inch sea-coast howitzer, now at Royal's; one 20 and one 10 pounder Parrott gun of the Georgia Siege Train; one 12-pounder rifled bronze gun of Company A, S. C. Siege Train; one 24-pounder smooth-bore, now on eastern lines, and mounted on a siege-carriage; and one 24-pounder rifled siege gun, and one 4-inch Blakely, both of which are at present in the hands of the Chief of Ordnance.

"Captain Gregory, Corps of Engineers, after consultation with the Chief of Artillery, will designate the location of these guns.

"The 12-pounder rifle and 8-inch sea-coast howitzer at Royal's will be replaced by two 24-pounders (smooth-bore) siege guns, now in charge of Colonel Waddy.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

3. "HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 20th*, 1863.

"Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc., etc. :

"*General*,—The Commanding General has been advised that the enemy opened fire to-day from behind Black Island on the workmen engaged on the Legare Point batteries, and succeeded in interrupting the labor thereon.

"In view of this, it is his wish that the guns intended for those works should be placed in position immediately, and fire opened from the batteries as soon as practicable.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

4. "HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 20th*, 1863.

"Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc., etc. :

"*General*,—The batteries from Shell Point to Fort Johnson being nearly completed, and some of the guns in position, it becomes necessary to guard them strongly at night with infantry. The same must be done with regard to the new line of batteries from Legare's Point towards the extremity of the eastern lines on James Island. Everything must be put in readiness for all those batteries to open at a moment's notice.

"The accumulation last night of the enemy's barges, with armed men, among

the fleet would seem to indicate one of two things: either to reinforce his troops on Morris Island, for another attack, by landing a strong party between Battery Wagner and Gregg, or to make an attempt on Sullivan's Island. The renewal of the shelling to-day with such vigor would incline me to believe that the first will be attempted; but prudence commands that we should guard against both; hence, I beg that you should adopt all the necessary measures to further these designs.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

Meanwhile, the Secretary of War, the Hon. Mr. Seddon, through whose agency chiefly the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida had been so materially weakened by successive transfers of its troops to other points of the Confederacy, was now apparently in a state of great trepidation about the enemy's lodgment on the southern end of Morris Island. A letter of "searching inquiry" was forwarded by him to General Beauregard, about that time, requesting immediate information on the subject. Its tone was unfriendly. It exhibited a determination on the part of its author to blame, and even to condemn, before being officially informed of the facts of the case.

General Beauregard was too much absorbed by the occupations of the moment to write out a full statement of these stirring events; and, furthermore, none of his subordinate commanders had had time to send in their respective reports. He merely gave a brief account of the descent of the Federal forces on Morris Island, and of the reasons of its success. From his answer we quote the following passage:

"A full report will be made as soon as subordinate officers shall have placed these Headquarters in official possession of the facts connected with their operations, and until then I must ask the patience of the Department, especially since the service and thoughts of all here are really necessary for the effectual discharge of the momentous duties intrusted to us."*

We close the present chapter with General Beauregard's instructions to Colonel Harris, dated July 20th, 1863:

"Colonel,—The Commanding General directs me to inform you that he wishes the rope obstructions to go on, and desires that they be laid between Castle Pinckney and Fort Ripley.

"He also wishes you to make an inspection of Fort Moultrie, to see if the glacis does not require to be raised, for the better protection of the brick

* See Appendix.

scarp-wall. You will likewise see if Shell Point Battery does not require to be embrasured, and if it is necessary to make a covered way thence to Fort Johnson.

"The General wishes to know if mining wires cannot be established from Battery Gregg to Fort Sumter, and from the latter to Fort Moultrie, or if safety-fuses may not be prepared.

"Finally, he directs that you make a report on the Raine's torpedoes, which have been placed in front of Battery Wagner.

"I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major and A. A. G."

The nature of the subject, and the desire to do full justice to it, have induced repetitions of orders and telegrams in this and the following chapter. The interest of the narrative will not be impaired, however, by such a course. For those who are desirous of obtaining a correct knowledge of these events details of evidence are essential.

CHAPTER XXXII.

General Beauregard's Report of the Operations on Morris Island in July, August, and September.—Number of Effective Troops in the Department on the 7th of April, 1863.—Troops in the First Military District on the 10th of July.—War Department Advised of the Threatening Nature of the Enemy's Preparations.—Withdrawal of Troops from the Department.—Protest of General Beauregard.—Mr. Seddon's Telegram of the 9th of May.—He is Informed on the 10th of the Erection of the Enemy's Batteries on Folly Island.—General Beauregard's Letter of the 11th of May.—Insufficiency of his Forces to Resist the Enemy's Movements.—President Davis Asks Reinforcements for General Johnston.—General Beauregard's Answer.—Different Routes of Approach for Attacking Charleston.—Route by Morris Island the least Injurious.—Want of Labor and Transportation a Serious Drawback to the Defence.—Inadequate Number of Negroes Furnished.—Attack on the South End of Morris Island.—The Enemy Carries the Position.—Want of Labor to Fortify, and of Infantry Support, the Cause of Lodgment.—Strong Demonstration against James Island by Way of the Stono.—The Enemy Assaults Battery Wagner on the 11th.—Is Repulsed with Loss.—General Beauregard again Appeals for Negro Labor.—On the Morning of the 16th General Hagood Attacks the Enemy on James Island, and Drives him Back.—The Enemy's Concentration on Little Folly and Morris Islands.—Nine Hundred Shot and Shell Fired at Wagner on the 18th.—The Enemy again Assaults that Night.—His Repulse Disastrous.—Number of his Dead Buried in Front of Wagner.—Heroic Conduct of the Garrison.—General Beauregard Orders Morris Island to be Held at any Cost.—Gorge-wall of Sumter Strengthened.—Flag of Truce from General Gillmore.—James Island Batteries not to Open Fire until their Completion.—No Material Damage Done to Wagner up to the 24th.—General Beauregard Anxiously Waiting for Heavy Guns from Richmond.—Partial Disarmament of Sumter Carried on at Night.—Five Hundred and Ninety-nine Shot Fired at our Different Batteries, on the 30th, in less than Three Hours.—Works not Seriously Harmed.—Interior Harbor Defences Advancing Rapidly.—Enemy Advances his Trenches.—Is Annoyed by Fire from Sumter, Gregg, Wagner, and James Island Batteries.—General Beauregard on Morris Island.—Sand-bags in Sumter; Covered Way between Batteries Wagner and Gregg.—Effective Force on Morris Island.—The Enemy's Advanced Works on the 10th of August at Six Hundred Yards from Wagner.—The Armament of Sumter Reduced to Thirty-eight Guns and Two Mortars.—Terrific Bombardment.—Weight of Projectiles thrown against the Fort from Thirty to Three Hundred

Pounds.—All its Guns Rendered Unserviceable.—Gorge-wall and North-west Face greatly Damaged.—The First Bombardment Over.—The Fire on Sumter Slackens on the 24th.—Removal of Ammunition and Ordnance Stores.—Not a Gun in Working Order at Sumter.—The Enemy's Flag Abreast of South Angle of Wagner.—Preparations for Evacuation.—General Beauregard's Orders to that effect.—Troops Withdrawn on the Night of the 6th of September.—Colonel Keitt in Command at the Time.—Success of the Movement.—Correspondence between Generals Beauregard and Gillmore concerning the Exchange of Prisoners and the Demand of Surrender.—Defence of Sumter and Wagner.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD's official report of the defence of Morris Island, from July 10th to September 7th, 1863, contains so full a narrative of this memorable event that it is deemed advisable to insert it here, without alteration or curtailment. This remarkable paper will thus become the chief, if not the exclusive, subject of the present chapter. No pen could more truthfully describe the momentous incidents of that part of the siege of Charleston, and no authority could be of greater weight, in the eyes of the public, than General Beauregard's. All the more will this be the case, inasmuch as not one of his main averments will fail to be substantiated by undeniable proof :

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF N. C. AND SO. VA.,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR PETERSBURG, VA.,
September 18th, 1864.

“To General SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va. :

“*General*,—I have the honor to enclose herewith my report of operations on Morris Island, S. C., during the months of July, August, and September, 1863, which was commenced soon after the events referred to, but could not be finished, revised, and corrected until the present moment.

“The report has been made more in detail than otherwise would have been done in order to refute certain charges contained in a letter of the Hon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War, of August, 1863, to the Hon. Wm. Porcher Miles, M. C., from South Carolina, and volunteer aid on my staff. I doubt not that, after the perusal of this report, the Hon. the Secretary of War will admit that he did me unintentional injustice in the following paragraph of his letter, containing the charges alluded to; to wit:

“*** I have no disposition to criticise military operations or point out errors or omissions which cannot longer be avoided or remedied, but you compel me, in self-defence, to advert to the true cause of the lodgment made by the enemy on Morris Island. According to my conception, it was not the want of infantry force at the command of that Department, but, as I have before supposed was universally admitted, the want of adequate defence at the lower end of the island, known long to be the external gate of the city, and the establishment by the enemy, without the knowledge of the military authorities, of powerful land batteries on Folly Island,

screened and concealed, until fully prepared to open upon us with all the effect of surprise, by the woods which had been allowed to remain unfelled on that island. That these, and not the want of men, were the true causes of the possession effected by the enemy, is shown by their inability to improve their success by the capture of Forts Wagner and Gregg. It is no pleasure to me to refer to these causes of disaster, but, under the implications of your letter, I could not say less.'

"I remain, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

The report reads as follows:

"General,—I arrived in Charleston on the 13th of September, 1862, and assumed command on the 24th of that month.

"In the interval I was engaged in ascertaining the plans and measures taken by Major-General Pemberton, my predecessor, for the defence, particularly, of Charleston and Savannah, and in rapid inspections of the condition and defensive resources of the Department, the results of which were communicated to the War Department in two papers, dated, the one relative to Charleston, on the 3d, and the other, chiefly concerning Savannah, on the 10th of October, 1862.

"At the time the troops in that Department (as then arranged) consisted of—

In South Carolina.

Infantry.....	6,564	
Artillery in position.....	1,787	
Field artillery.....	1,379	
Cavalry.....	<u>2,817</u>	12,547

In Georgia.

Infantry.....	3,834	
Artillery in position.....	1,330	
Field artillery.....	445	
Cavalry.....	<u>1,580</u>	7,189

Total of all arms in Department..... 19,736

"Of this force, 1787 artillery in position, 727 light artillerists, 4139 infantry, and 410 cavalry, were assembled in the First Military District, for the defence of Charleston; and 1330 artillery in position, 445 light artillerists, 3834 infantry, and 1580 cavalry, for defence of Savannah.

"My predecessor, before being relieved, furnished me with his estimate of the smallest number of troops which he regarded as essential for the defence of Charleston and Savannah; to wit:

For Defence of Charleston.

Infantry.....	15,600	
Artillery in position.....	2,850	
Cavalry.....	<u>1,000</u>	19,450

And (9) nine light batteries.

Total of all arms required for defence of Charleston }
and Savannah Railroad and land approaches..... } 11,000

For Defence of Savannah.

Infantry.....	10,000	
Artillery in position.....	1,200	
Cavalry	2,000	
	<u> </u>	13,200
And (8) eight light batteries.		
Total of all arms in South Carolina and Georgia, exclusive of (17) seventeen light batteries.....		43,650

"Hence, the following additional troops were needed at the following points respectively, to meet the requirements of this estimate:

For Defence of Charleston.

Infantry.....	11,461	
Artillery in position.....	1,063	
Cavalry.....	590	
	<u> </u>	13,114

Light Batteries for Defence of Savannah.

Infantry.....	6,166	
Cavalry.....	420	
	<u> </u>	6,586

*Light Batteries for Defence of Charleston and Savannah
Railroad and Land Approaches.*

All arms.....	5,516	
Total deficiencies.....		25,216

"On the 7th of April, 1863, the day of the attack by the ironclad fleet, the troops at my disposal, in South Carolina and Georgia, gave an effective total of 30,040, distributed as follows:

	First Military District.	Second Military District.	Third Military District.	Georgia.
Infantry.....	6,807	1,819	3,655	5,661
Light artillery.....	1,067	288	496	546
Heavy artillery.....	2,238	2,038
Cavalry	1,117	742	1,686	1,880
Total	11,229	2,849	5,837	10,125

"But the withdrawal of Cook's brigade to North Carolina immediately after the repulse of the ironclad fleet on the 7th of April, of Brigadier-Generals S. R. Gist's and W. H. T. Walker's brigades and light batteries, about the 4th of May, reduced my force materially.

"The Department is aware of the circumstances under which this reduction of the troops took place, and, in this connection, I beg to refer to my letters to the Hon. Secretary of War of the 10th of May, and to General Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, of June 15th and 20th of July, 1863.

"The forces in the First Military District on the 10th of July, 1863, were as follows:

FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT.	Infantry.	Heavy and Light Artillery.	Cavalry.
James Island	1,184	1,569	153
Morris Island	612	289	26
Sullivan's Island	204	726	228
City of Charleston	462	235	153
Total	2,462	2,839	560

Infantry	2,462
Heavy and light artillery	2,839
Cavalry	560
Total of all arms, First Military District	5,860

Second Military District.

Infantry	441
Heavy and light artillery	281
Cavalry	676
Total of all arms, Second Military District	1,398

Third Military District.

Infantry	558
Heavy and light artillery	544
Cavalry	1,415
Total of all arms, Third Military District	2,517

District of Georgia.

Infantry	1,745
Heavy and light artillery	2,130
Cavalry	1,667
Total of all arms, District of Georgia	5,542

Recapitulation.

Infantry, First Military District	2,462
" Second " " "	441
" Third " " "	558
" District of Georgia	1,745
Total infantry	5,206

Artillery, First Military District	2,839
" Second " " "	281
" Third " " "	544
" District of Georgia	2,130
Total artillery	5,794

Cavalry, First Military District	560
" Second " " "	676
" Third " " "	1,415
" District of Georgia	1,667
Total cavalry	4,318

Grand total	15,318
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Being 28,000 less than the estimate of troops required in September, 1862.

Meanwhile, as in duty bound, by numerous telegrams and letters during the months of April, May, June, and July, I kept the War Department advised,

both through yourself and directly, of the threatening nature of the enemy's preparations upon the coast of my Department, and of my own fears concerning the imminence of an attack. On the 25th of April, however, in answer to my telegrams of the preceding day, asking for heavy guns for Morris Island and other points, the Secretary of War telegraphs:

"I regret to be unable to spare the guns now for the object mentioned; the claims of Wilmington and the Mississippi are now regarded as paramount."

"On the 1st of May I was directed to send a full brigade to North Carolina, to report to General Hill, and in compliance General Clingman's brigade was despatched.

"The following day the Secretary of War telegraphs:

"Advices show the enemy, abandoning the attack on the eastern coast, are concentrating great forces in the Mississippi River. Send, with the utmost despatch, eight or ten thousand men, including those ordered heretofore to Tullahoma, to General Pemberton's relief."

"My answer was:

"No orders sending troops to Tullahoma have reached here. Cook's and Clingman's brigades have been returned to North Carolina. Have ordered 5000 infantry and 2 batteries to report forthwith to General Pemberton, leaving only 10,000 infantry available for the whole of South Carolina and Georgia. Cannot send more without abandoning Savannah Railroad. Shall await further orders. Enemy still occupies in force Folly and Seabrook's islands, also Port Royal. To reduce this command further might become disastrous."

"On the 4th of May I sent this despatch to the Hon. the Secretary of War:

"Enemy's fleet, reported at Hilton Head and Port Royal yesterday, is 4 steam frigates, 5 wooden gunboats, 6 ships, 4 barks, 3 brigs, 87 transports, and 58 schooners: 183 in all. A very remarkable increase since last report."

"Hon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War, telegraphs, on the 9th of May, 1863:

"Foster, with his own and part of Hunter's forces, is believed to have returned to North Carolina. More reinforcements to General Pemberton are indispensable. If General Evans's brigade has returned to you, send 5000 men; if not with you, a number which, with that, would make 5000 men."

"On the following day I telegraphed, in reply to the Secretary of War:

"The order sending additional troops to General Pemberton will be executed, Evans's brigade included; leaving but 1000 infantry to support extensive lines and batteries at Savannah, but 750 infantry to hold line of railroad to Savannah, virtually yielding up that country and large stores of rice to the enemy, as well as opening even Charleston and Augusta and Columbia Railroad to attack at Branchville, leaving here 1500 infantry at most, all of which will be known to the enemy in a few days. Meantime, General W. S. Walker reports increased strength yesterday of enemy's outposts in his vicinity. Hagood reports 2500 infantry on Seabrook's Island fortifying; five monitors still there. Enemy in force on Folly Island, actively erecting batteries yesterday. Season favorable for enemy's operations for quite a month."

"On the 12th I telegraphed as follows to the Hon. the Secretary of War:

"Have ordered to General Pemberton (contrary to my opinion) Evans's brigade and one regiment, amounting to 2700 men, leaving only 6000 infantry available in whole South Carolina and Georgia; the other 1000 will await further orders of Department. General Evans reports two brigades of enemy on Folly Island yesterday. Please answer."

"A letter to the same address, on the 11th of May, exhibited certain conditions and explained more fully my views on the subject of an attack, with the object of showing to the War Department the actual menacing aspect of the enemy on the coast of my Department. I transcribe an extract from that letter:

"* * * A week ago, under your orders, I put in motion for Jackson, Mississippi, two brigades, under Brigadier-Generals Gist and W. H. T. Walker, the former commanding South Carolina and the latter Georgia regiments—somewhat over 5000 infantry in all, and two light batteries of the best class in the Department.

"Your orders have been based, apparently, on the conviction that the troops of the enemy assembled in this Department for operations against Charleston have been mainly withdrawn and directed to other expeditions in North Carolina and the Valley of the Mississippi. This conviction I regret that I cannot share, as I am satisfied, from the reports of district commanders and from other reasons, that there has been really but little reduction of the command of Major-General Hunter.

"General Walker, commanding at Pocotaligo, reports that on yesterday the outposts of the enemy in his front had been much increased in strength. General Hagood reports them to be occupying Seabrook's Island with at least 2500 infantry. They are erecting fortifications at that point, as also on Folly Island, which is likewise still occupied in force.

"Five of the monitors remain in the North Edisto, with some twenty gunboats and transports. With these and the transports still in the waters of Port Royal, and the forces which, I am unable to doubt, are still at the disposition of the enemy, he may renew the attack by land and water on Charleston at any moment. Acting on the offensive, and commanding the time of attack, he could simultaneously call troops here from North Carolina, and sooner than my command could possibly be reinforced from any quarter out of the Department."

"A letter to you of the 20th of May further calls attention to the fact that important changes are reported to be on foot in the armament of the monitors, and urges strenuously that Fort Sumter be armed, conformably to the original plan, with the heaviest guns, rifled or smooth-bore, which could be obtained, in anticipation of a renewal of the attack of the 7th of April.

"I was informed, however, through your letter of the 10th of June that—

"Northern papers report the reduction of Hunter's forces by sending troops to the Gulf. If this be true, you will, with such force as you can properly withdraw from your defensive line, proceed to Mobile to resist an attack, if one should be designated at that place; but if the purpose of the enemy be to send his reinforcements to the Mississippi, you will go on and co-operate with General Johnston in that quarter."

"This I answered by a telegram, on the 13th of same month, as follows:

"Enemy's ironclads and forces still as heretofore reported to Department, excepting a gunboat expedition reported in Altamaha, and one preparing for St. John's River, Florida. I will prepare as far as practicable for contingencies referred to in Department's letter, 10th inst. Please send me any positive information relative to movements or intentions of enemy."

"But, in order that the War Department should be thoroughly cognizant of the state of affairs in my Department, I further addressed to you a letter, on the 15th June, in which I pointed out how utterly insufficient were the forces at my command to resist those of the enemy, and that on my own responsibility I could not further deplete the force in the Department. I drew your attention, in this same letter, to the danger of an attack by the way of Morris Island—indeed, to the very route on which General Gillmore has since operated. I take the following extract from that letter:

"* * * Thus it will be seen that the force in the Department is already at the minimum necessary to hold the works around Charleston and Savannah, constantly menaced by the proximity of the enemy's ironclads.

"The garrison of no work in the harbor can be withdrawn or diminished, as they are all necessary links in the chain of defences. Reduce the command on James Island, and the enemy may readily penetrate by such a *coup de main* as was attempted last year at the weakened point. James Island would then fall, and, despite our harbor defences, the City of Charleston would be thrown open to bombardment. It is not safe to have less than a regiment of infantry on Morris Island, which, if once carried by the enemy, would expose Fort Sumter to be taken in reverse and demolished. * * *

"Late Northern papers say Admiral Dupont has been relieved in command of the fleet on this coast by Admiral Foote, an officer whose operations in the West evinced much activity and an enterprising spirit. And even were considerable reductions made in the enemy's forces, the valuable coast districts would still be left a prey to such destructive raids as devastated the Combahee some days ago. Thus far, however, I can see no evidence of reduction. General Hunter was at Hilton Head on the 8th instant; his troops hold the same positions as heretofore, and apparently in the same force—a brigade on Folly, one on Seabrook's Island, and the balance on the islands about Port Royal. One of the monitors is at Hilton Head, and five are still in the North Edisto. Nor has the number of their gunboats or transports diminished, or at any time recently been increased, as must have been the case had a material removal of troops taken place."

"On the 25th of June his Excellency President Davis telegraphed the following:

"From causes into which it is needless to enter the control of the Mississippi connection between the States east and west of it will be lost, unless Johnston is strongly and promptly reinforced within the next sixty days. Can you give him further aid without the probable loss of Charleston and Savannah? I need not state to you that the issue is vital to the Confederacy."

"My answer was:

"Telegram is received. No more troops can be sent away from this Department without losing railroad and country between here and Savannah; Georgetown District would have also to be abandoned. (See my letter of the 15th instant to General Cooper.)"

"Thus, on the 10th of July, 1863, I had but 5861 men, of all arms, in the First Military District, guarding the fortifications around Charleston, or more than one-third of the troops in my Department, with an enemy in my front whose base of operations threatened Savannah, the line of coast, and important railroad connecting the former city and Charleston, and the latter city as well, with such immense transportation resources as to be able to concentrate

and strike at will at any selected point before I could gather my troops to oppose.

"In attacking Charleston itself five different routes of approach present themselves to an enemy: first, by landing a large force to the northward, say at Bull's Bay, marching across the country, and seizing Mount Pleasant and the northern shores of the inner harbor.

"Secondly, by landing a large force to the southward, cutting the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, and taking the city of Charleston in the rear.

"Neither of these routes did I consider practicable, or likely to be adopted by the enemy, as his numerical force would not have allowed him to cope with us, unless under the shelter of his ironclads and gunboats, a fact which General Gillmore has always carefully recognized. Before he adopts the overland approaches he will require a large addition to his land-forces.

"The third, fourth, and fifth approaches, by James, Sullivan, and Morris Islands respectively, permitted, however, the co-operation of the navy; and I always believed, as experience has demonstrated, that of the three immediate routes to Charleston, the one by James Island was most dangerous to us, and the one which should be defended at all hazards—that by Sullivan's Island ranking next, and the one by Morris Island last, in point of importance—for the following reasons:

"An enemy who could gain a firm foothold on James Island and overpower its garrison, at that time having to defend a *long, defective, and irregular* line of works, could have erected batteries commanding the inner harbor at once, taking in rear our outer line of defences, and by a direct fire on the city compelled its evacuation in a short period; because in such a case it would become of no value as a strategic position, and prudence and humanity would alike revolt at the sacrifice of life necessary to enable us to retain possession of its ruins.

"The route by Sullivan's Island was also of great importance, for its occupation would not only have enabled the enemy to reduce Fort Sumter as an artillery fortress, but would also have given entire control of the entrance to the inner harbor to his ironclad fleet. At that time, owing to the want of labor and of heavy guns, the important works which now line the shores of the inner harbor had not been erected and armed, and the enemy's fleet would have been able to shell the city comparatively unmolested; and, by controlling and cutting off our communications with Fort Sumter and Morris Island, would soon have necessitated their surrender or evacuation.

"The remaining route by Morris Island was certainly the least injurious to us, for the occupation of the island by the enemy neither involved the evacuation of Fort Sumter, the destruction of the city by a direct fire, as from James Island, nor the command of movements in our inner harbor by the ironclad fleet.

"The Morris Island route I had long thought most likely to be attempted by the enemy, as its proximity to Folly Island, for many months back in their possession, gave them facilities for the execution of a *coup de main*; while the neighboring harbor of the Edisto gave their fleet convenient shelter from bad

weather, which they could not have enjoyed on the Long Island coast, had their attack been *via* Sullivan's Island. Moreover, the seizure of the island would afford the Federal Government opportunity for making capital with its people and with foreign powers.

"To counteract these very apparent advantages of the enemy, as soon as suitable guns could be procured I had ordered to be erected on the south end of Morris Island proper batteries.

"On Black Island, which lies between James and Morris islands, and from its position enfilades Light-house Inlet, between Folly and Morris islands, I had ordered to be built, several months previously, two batteries for two guns each. This island was, further, to have been connected with the mainland by a branch from the bridge planned to connect James and Morris islands, and nearly completed when the enemy made their attack in July.

"At Vincent's Creek a battery was commenced, and had it been completed would have played effectively upon the sand-hills on the south end of Morris Island.

"Battery Wagner was substantially strengthened and arranged for four heavy guns in the sea-face, but, owing to the scarcity of labor and the want of the necessary ordnance to put into the works at the south end of the island when completed, they were not, on the 10th of July, 1863, in that condition which would have characterized them had I had sufficient labor, transportation, and ordnance at my disposal.

"Want of labor and transportation has always been a serious drawback, not only to the defence of Charleston, but of the whole Department.

"In reference to labor, I may here state that no subject connected with the defence of this Department has engrossed more of my attention. Constant appeals were made to the Governors and Legislature of South Carolina, and to eminent citizens, since my first arrival. Few seemed to appreciate the vital necessity of securing a proper amount of slave labor for the fortifications around Charleston; and instead of the State providing 2500 negroes monthly, as desired by me, for Charleston, I received for the first six months of 1863 the following number of negroes from the State's authority: January, 196; February, 261; March, 864; April, 491; May, 107; June, 60—total, 1979; or an average of 330 monthly, when I ought to have received 2500. Hence it became a necessity that I should detain these hands longer than the thirty days, which was the original term of service required from each negro. This step caused considerable discontent among the owners of slaves; and in the month of July, 1863, the number of negro hands in the employ of the Engineer Department, provided under my call on the State, amounted to only 299, including a number of hired negroes.

"In the mean time the troops of the command, in addition to their regular duties, were employed in erecting fortifications, the whole of the works in the south end of Morris Island having been thrown up by its garrison.

"The Engineer Department used every exertion to hire labor, but their efforts were not crowned with any appreciable success.

"In the middle of June the batteries on the south end of Morris Island were engaged with the enemy on Little Folly Island, and undoubtedly re-

tarded considerably the progress of their operations, as the following extracts of reports from Brigadier-General Ripley will show :

“June 12th, 1863.

“* * * The enemy having advanced light guns to Little Folly Island yesterday, to shell the wreck of the steamer *Ruby*, now ashore at Light-house Inlet, in accordance with directions Captain Mitchell, commanding the batteries on the south of Morris Island, opened fire, silencing them at the second shot.

“This morning I gave directions for him to open fire in case he observed any indications of work on Little Folly on the part of the enemy; and this afternoon, about five o'clock, seeing parties apparently at work, he commenced shelling. About fifty men left Little Folly for the main island. The enemy replied from his batteries on Big Folly and his light guns.’

“Again, on the 14th of June, the same officer reports :

“* * * The enemy having appeared to be at work on Little Folly Island, Lieutenant-Colonel Yates opened fire upon them, shelling them for about three-quarters of an hour, putting a stop to their operations, which appeared to be erecting a shelter or batteries near the inlet.

“A close watch has been directed to be kept up, and their work to be stopped whenever attempted.’

“At the time of the attack on Charleston, in the beginning of April, the enemy occupied Big Folly and Seabrook's islands in force, estimated at one or two brigades, before the 10th of July a considerable number of troops landing on Cole's and James islands.

“During the latter part of June, and up to the first week in July, 1863, no extraordinary activity was manifested by the enemy. On Big Folly Island they were occupied, as usual, in fortifying the neck, strongly picketing Little Folly Island, and interfering with the wrecking-parties on the steamer *Ruby*.

“On the morning of the 7th of July four monitors appeared off the bar, but no other increase of the fleet in that direction was discernible.

“On the night of the 8th of July a scouting party, under the command of Captain Charles Haskell, visited Little Folly Island, and discovered the enemy's barges collected in the creeks approaching the island. Commencing on the 7th of July, and for the three succeeding days, working parties of the enemy were seen engaged at labor on Little Folly Island, supposed to be light works for guns. The wood on the island, but more especially the peculiar configuration of the ground, which consists of sand-hills, gave the enemy every facility for the concealment of his designs.

“On the night of the 8th of July considerable noise from chopping with axes was heard, and in the morning some works were discernible, the wood and brush having been cleared away from their front.

“On the night of the 9th of July an immediate attack being anticipated, the whole infantry force on the island was kept under arms at the south end.

“At five o'clock on the morning of the 10th of July the enemy's attack commenced by a heavy fire on our position, from a great number of light guns apparently placed during the preceding forty-eight hours in the works lately thrown up on Little Folly Island. Three monitors about the same time crossed the bar, and brought their formidable armaments to bear on the left flank of

our position, while several barges with howitzers in Light-house inlet flanked our right.

"For two hours the enemy kept up the fire from these three different points, our batteries replying vigorously.

"The barges of the enemy, filled with troops, having been seen in Light-house Inlet in the direction of Black Island, and Oyster Point being the nearest and most accessible spot for debarkation from them, it was justly considered the one most necessary to protect, and therefore the infantry, consisting of the 21st South Carolina Volunteers, about 350 effective men, were stationed by Colonel R. F. Graham, the immediate commander of the island, on the peninsula leading to that point.

"In this position the infantry were unavoidably exposed to the fire of the boat howitzers, but sheltered by the nature of the ground from that of the guns on Little Folly Island.

"About seven o'clock the enemy advanced on Oyster Point in a flotilla of boats containing between two and three thousand men, a considerable portion of whom endeavored to effect and hold a landing, in which they were opposed by the infantry until about eight o'clock, when another force of two or three regiments made good a landing in front of our batteries on the south end of Morris Island proper. These formed in line of battle on the beach, and advanced directly upon our works, throwing out on each flank numerous skirmishers, who very soon succeeded in flanking and taking the batteries in reverse. After an obstinate resistance our artillery had to abandon their pieces—three 8-inch navy shell guns, two 8-inch sea-coast howitzers, one rifled 24-pounder, one 30-pounder Parrott, one 12-pounder Whitworth, three 10-inch sea-coast mortars—eleven in all—and fall back.

"Two companies of the 7th South Carolina Battalion, which arrived about this time, were ordered to the support of the batteries; but they could not make head against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy.

"This success of the enemy threatened to cut off our infantry engaged at Oyster Point from their line of retreat; and consequently, about nine o'clock, Colonel Graham gave the order to fall back to Battery Wagner, which was accomplished under a severe flanking fire from the monitors.

"The enemy thus gained possession of the south end of Morris Island, by rapidly throwing a large number of troops across the inlet, which it was impossible for the available infantry on the spot, about 400 effective men, to resist.

"It was not the erection of works on Little Folly Island that caused the abandonment of our position; it was clearly the want on our side of infantry support, and the enemy's superior weight and number of guns, and the heavy supporting brigade of infantry, that swept away our feeble, stinted means of resistance.

"The woods that remained unfelled on Little Folly Island were of no material advantage to the enemy; for even had there been labor to remove them (which I never had), the formation of the island, covered with ridges of sand-hills, formed a screen which hid the enemy's movements completely from us, and afforded all the concealment he could desire.

"The attack was not a surprise, neither was the erection of the enemy's works on Little Folly Island unknown to the local commanders or to these Headquarters. The enemy, indeed, made little effort to conceal them.

"With a sufficient infantry force on Morris Island, the result of the attack of the 10th of July, I am confident, would have been different; but, as I have already explained, the threatening position of the enemy on James Island entirely precluded the withdrawal of a single soldier from its defence until the point of attack had been fully developed; and the only reinforcements that could be sent to Morris Island, some 300 men of the 7th South Carolina Battalion, arrived too late to render material assistance on the morning of the 10th of July.

"The long-protracted defence of Battery Wagner must not be compared with the evacuation of the south end of Morris Island, by way of throwing discredit on the latter movement. The two defences are not analogous. In the one a large extent of exposed ground had to be guarded with an entirely inadequate force; in the other a strong earthwork, with a narrow line of approach, could be held successfully against any attack by a body of men numerically quite insufficient to have opposed the landing of an enemy on the south end of Morris Island.

"While the enemy, on the 9th of July, was threatening Morris Island, he also made a strong demonstration against James Island by the Stono River.

"At 12 m. on that day Colonel Simonton, commanding at Secessionville, telegraphed:

"The enemy are landing on Battery Island; their advance pickets and ours are firing. Pickets from Grimbald's (on the Stono) report the enemy landing at that place.

"Three gunboats and a monitor proceeded up the Stono as far as the obstructions."

"On the morning of the 10th of July, while the attack was progressing on Morris Island, Colonel Simonton telegraphed that the main body of the enemy were moving in force from Battery Island to Legare's house, having a line of pickets extending from a point at Legare's in an oblique line up the Stono, cutting the Grimbald causeway about midway. Later in the day, however, the same officer telegraphed that the reported advance of the enemy was premature: 'They are in force on Battery Island.'

"Though the demonstration of the enemy in the Stono and on James Island was instituted to distract our attention from Morris Island, yet it was made in such strength that at any moment it could have been converted into a real attack of the most disastrous kind to us, had the garrison been weakened to support Morris Island.

"On the afternoon of the 10th of July detachments of 1st, 12th, 18th, and 63d Georgia (534 effectives) arrived from the District of Georgia, under the command of Colonel Olmstead, with the 21st South Carolina Volunteers; and Nelson's Battalion became the garrison of Battery Wagner.

"At daylight on the morning of the 11th of July the enemy assaulted Battery Wagner, and was repulsed with much loss; two (2) officers and ninety-five (95) rank and file being left dead in front of our works, and six (6) officers and one hundred and thirteen (113) rank and file taken prisoners; about

forty of the latter being wounded. Our loss was one (1) officer and five (5) privates killed, and one (1) officer and five (5) privates wounded. During the day three (3) monitors and three (3) wooden gunboats shelled Battery Wagner, and in the evening a fifth monitor crossed the bar.

"Colonel Simonton, on James Island, at 7 A. M. reported no forward movement in his front; two gunboats and several transports off Battery Island.

"At 9 P. M. he telegraphed that the enemy was advancing in force from Legare's house to Grimbald's, our pickets falling back on the reserves.

"On the 12th of July the Marion Artillery, four guns and 39 effectives, arrived from the Second Military District, and was placed on James Island, as well as the 11th South Carolina Regiment, from the Third Military District (400 effectives); but these last soon had to be returned, to guard our communications with Savannah.

"A portion of Brigadier-General Clingman's brigade, 550 men of the 51st North Carolina Volunteers, and 50 men of the 31st North Carolina Volunteers, arrived from Wilmington about the same time, in consequence of my urgent call for reinforcements.

"The enemy was occupied during the day in erecting works on the middle of Morris Island, while five monitors and three wooden gunboats shelled Batteries Wagner and Gregg. The armament of Battery Wagner was increased by four 12-pounder howitzers and two 32-pounder carronades, on siege-carriages.

"On the 13th of July the enemy was actively engaged in throwing up works on the middle of Morris Island, but were interrupted by our fire from Battery Gregg and Fort Sumter. During the day four monitors, three gunboats, and two mortar-vessels shelled Batteries Wagner and Gregg, but with little effect and slight casualties. Four monitors only were with the fleet; the fifth was seen going to the south, without a smoke-stack, on the evening of the 12th.

"Orders were issued on this day for the construction, at once, of a new battery on Shell Point—Battery Simkins—in advance of Fort Johnson, for one 10-inch columbiad, one 6.40 Brooke gun, and three 10-inch mortars. The armament of Fort Moultrie was ordered to be increased by guns taken from Fort Sumter.

"An appeal was made to his Excellency Governor Bonham for slave-labor for work on the fortifications.

"The arrival of Clingman's brigade and reinforcements from other quarters having increased to some extent my available force, the consideration arose whether or not the expulsion of the enemy from Morris Island yet was feasible. The number of men required for such an attempt would have been 4000, the surface of Morris Island not permitting the manœuvring of a large number.

"The only hope of the attempt being successful lay in the possibility of our troops carrying the enemy's works and position before daylight; otherwise the advance and attack would necessarily have been made under the fire of the enemy's fleet, in which case it must have ended disastrously for us.

"After a consultation with my general officers, the idea of this attack was abandoned when it became apparent that our means of transportation were so limited as to render it impossible to throw sufficient reinforcements on

Morris Island in one night, and in time to allow the advance of our troops to the south end before daylight.

"Two regiments under Brigadier-General Colquitt arrived on the 14th, and were sent to James Island. During the day the enemy's wooden gunboats and mortar-vessels shelled Battery Wagner at long range, doing, however, little damage. The enemy worked hard on his Morris Island batteries, making considerable progress. The fire, however, from Fort Sumter and Batteries Wagner and Gregg appeared to harass him considerably.

"The impossibility of expelling the enemy from Morris Island being fully recognized, I was obliged, reluctantly, to adopt the defensive. Orders were issued for closing the gate-way in the gorge of Fort Sumter, and removing a portion of the guns, also for the construction of a covered way from Fort Moultrie to Battery Bee.

"During the night Brigadier-General Taliaferro, commanding at Morris Island, sent out a party of one hundred and fifty men under Major Rion of the 7th South Carolina Battalion, who drove the enemy's pickets from his rifle-pits across the island some three-quarters ($\frac{3}{4}$) of a mile from Battery Wagner.

"On the 15th the enemy on Morris Island appeared to be largely reinforced; and during the night of the 14th the frigate *Ironsides* crossed the bar.

"The enemy was busy on his works—our men employed in repairing damages in Battery Wagner and answering the fire of the monitors and gunboats.

"The following instructions were given to the Engineer Department: To have Shell Point Battery constructed for three instead of two guns, the mortar-batteries at Fort Johnson to be converted into gun-batteries for one heavy rifled gun or 10-inch columbiad each. To strengthen the gorge-wall of Fort Sumter by means of wet cotton-bales, filled in between with sand, and kept moist by means of tubes or hose from the upper *terre-plein*.

"General Ripley was also instructed to reduce the forces on Morris Island to a command simply competent to hold the works against a *coup de main*, also to furnish the troops on that island with several hundred rice-casks for the construction of 'rat holes' in the sand-hills in rear of Battery Wagner.

"Instructions were given to the Chief of Subsistence to keep rations on Morris Island for 5000 men for thirty days, and on James Island rations for 5000 men for fifteen days, with a reserve supply in the city. On the same day the enemy's pickets along the Stono on John's Island were observed to be increased by the addition of negro troops. Brigadier-General Hagood made a reconnoissance of the enemy in his front on James Island.

"At daybreak, on the morning of the 16th of July, Brigadier-General Hagood, in accordance with instructions, attacked the enemy on James Island, driving them to the shelter of their gunboats and to Battery Island. The loss was small on both sides: 3 men killed, 12 wounded, and 3 missing on our side. The enemy lost 40 negroes killed, and 14 prisoners left in our hands.

"This retreat of the enemy was followed by the advance of our troops, who have occupied the ground ever since. In the engagement the gunboat *Pawnee* was forced to retire down the Stono River, under fire from our light artillery.

"During the day the monitors, gunboats, and mortar-vessels shelled Battery Wagner. The enemy worked diligently on their batteries. In the evening large bodies of infantry were landed on the south end of Morris Island.

"Colonel Harris, Chief-Engineer, was directed to increase the batteries on James Island bearing on Morris Island by at least twenty guns, on siege-carriages, so as to envelop the enemy with a circular fire whenever he might gain possession of the northeast end of Morris Island, all works to be pushed on day and night.

"On the morning of the 17th the enemy's fleet left the Stono River, after embarking his forces at Battery Island, and appeared to concentrate them on Little Folly and Morris islands.

"Both the fleet and land batteries of the enemy shelled Wagner throughout the day, answered vigorously by our guns. The construction of batteries on Morris Island by the enemy proceeded rapidly.

"In a telegraphic despatch forwarded on this date I pointed out that the contest had lapsed into one of engineering skill, where, with sufficient time, labor, and long-range guns, our success was very probable, owing to the plan of defence adopted; otherwise it was doubtful in proportion to the lack of these three elements of success.

"The fire from the enemy's batteries from this date prevented communication with Cummings's Point during daylight, and henceforth it had to be effected at night. The very limited transportation at my command added considerably to the difficulties of relieving the garrisons on Morris Island as frequently as I could have wished. The time of service was at first limited to forty-eight hours, but, owing to the difficulties in the way of transportation, I had to lengthen the period of duty on Morris Island to three days.

"On the morning of the 18th of July it became evident that the enemy was about to attempt serious operations against Wagner. The south end of Morris Island was crowded with troops, and in their batteries and advanced works great activity was apparent, large bodies of men being engaged in pushing them rapidly to completion. Troops were continually being landed on Morris from Folly Island. These advanced and took up position in line of battle behind their breastworks. At 8.10 A. M. Battery Wagner opened, five minutes afterwards Battery Gregg joined. At 10 A. M. four of the enemy's vessels were in action. At 11.30 A. M. Fort Sumter opened on the enemy's rifle-pits on Morris Island. The guns of Battery Wagner about this time got the range of the enemy's working parties, and seemed to harass them extremely.

"At 12.10 P. M. the frigate *Ironsides* and one monitor moved up abreast of Battery Wagner, and at 12.30 were joined by two other monitors, when they opened fire on the work. At 1 P. M. the *Ironsides*, five monitors, a large wooden frigate, six mortar-boats—these latter could get the range without exposing themselves—and the land batteries, mounting five guns, concentrated their fire on Battery Wagner, and continued it until dark.

"The enemy's firing throughout the day was very rapid, averaging fourteen shots per minute, and unparalleled until this epoch of the siege in the weight of projectiles thrown.

"Brigadier-General Taliaferro, commanding at Battery Wagner, estimated that nine hundred shot and shell were thrown in and against the battery during the eleven and a half ($11\frac{1}{2}$) hours that the bombardment lasted. During that time our casualties in the work were four killed and fourteen wounded. Throughout the day the garrison replied slowly to the terrific fire to which it was exposed, while Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg fired rapidly.

"The main body of the enemy, after vainly endeavoring to gain a position upon the parapet, retreated in disorder under a destructive fire from our guns, including those of Fort Sumter. The ditch and slope of the southeastern angle of the battery were then swept by a fire of grape and musketry, in order to prevent the escape of the enemy lodged there, who, after a brief resistance, surrendered themselves prisoners.

"The garrison of Battery Wagner consisted of the Charleston Battalion, the 51st North Carolina, and the 31st North Carolina; two companies of the 63d Georgia Heavy Artillery and two companies of the 1st South Carolina Infantry acting as artillery.

"During the bombardment the garrison were kept under the shelter of the bomb-proofs, with the exception of the Charleston Battalion, which was stationed along the parapet of the work, a position which they gallantly maintained throughout the day, exposed to a *feu d'enfer*. Providentially, the casualties did not exceed eight killed and twenty wounded.

"At a quarter to eight o'clock in the evening the assaulting lines of the enemy were seen advancing from their works, and the bombardment from the fleet and land batteries subsided. The garrison were quietly called to their allotted positions, and, with the exception of one regiment, responded manfully to the summons. The Charleston Battalion guarded the right of the work, and the 51st North Carolina Volunteers the centre. These two regiments drove back the enemy opposed to them with terrible slaughter, while our guns, discharging grape and canister into their shattered ranks, completed their discomfiture. On the left of the work, however, the 31st North Carolina disgracefully abandoned their position; and, no resistance being offered at this point, a portion of the enemy succeeded in crossing the ditch and in gaining a foothold upon the rampart.

"Brigadier-General Hagood, who, in anticipation of an assault, was relieved from the command of James Island, and, with Colonel Harrison's regiment—the 32d Georgia Volunteers—was ordered to the reinforcement of Morris Island, arrived in time to assist in the dislodgment of that portion of the enemy who had gained a footing in the southeastern salient, but not before the attack was made and the enemy repulsed.

"The assault was terribly disastrous to the enemy. His loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, must have been three thousand, as eight hundred bodies were interred in front of Battery Wagner on the following morning.

"The enemy's forces on this occasion consisted of troops from Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and New York, and the 54th Massachusetts Negro Regiment, the whole said to be under the command of Brigadier-General Strong, who died afterwards from the effects of wounds received on this occasion.

"Brigadier-General Taliaferro reported that the garrison, with the exception of the 31st North Carolina Volunteers, behaved throughout with the utmost gallantry. The heroic conduct of the 51st North Carolina Volunteers counterbalanced the unworthy behavior of the 31st and retrieved the honor of the State.

"Our own loss during the bombardment and assault was 174 killed and wounded.

"At 1 A.M. on the morning of the 19th of July, during the engagement, I telegraphed to Brigadier-General Ripley that Morris Island must be held at all cost for the present, and, with the reinforcements thrown there, to push every advantage possible before daylight.

"The day passed in comparative quiet. The enemy sent in a flag of truce in the morning to arrange for the burial of the dead. Brigadier-General Hagood reported that six hundred (600) of the enemy's dead in and around our works were buried by our troops, and at least two hundred (200) more by the enemy.

"The strengthening of the gorge-wall of Sumter by cotton-bales and sand proceeded rapidly.

"On the 20th the enemy opened fire from two new batteries. Throughout the day the fleet joined in the bombardment, and were answered by Fort Sumter and Batteries Gregg and Wagner. At 3 P.M. information was received that the 10-inch gun at Battery Wagner was dismounted. I impressed upon General Hagood, commanding the work, that I did not consider 10-inch columbiads essential to the defence of the position, for which siege-guns, musketry, stout arms and hearts, and the strength of sand parapets must be relied on. Orders were issued, however, for the remounting of the 10-inch gun, if practicable.

"The enemy's fleet this morning consisted of four monitors, the *Ironsides*, and seventeen vessels inside the bar, fourteen vessels outside, and thirty vessels in Folly River. One gunboat and four vessels in North Edisto, and one steam-frigate, one sloop-of-war, one gunboat, and thirty-four transports at Hilton Head.

"Brigadier-General Ripley was instructed this day to have the guns intended for the Legare Point Battery mounted immediately, and to open fire with them as soon as possible.

"Brigadier-General Mercer was telegraphed to send on, if practicable, another 10-inch columbiad from the Savannah works.

"At 2 P.M. a shell from the enemy's batteries struck Fort Sumter, and some eight or ten 30-pounder Parrott shots were fired at the fort from a distance of 3500 yards.

"Five casualties occurred in Battery Wagner on this date, and one in Fort Sumter.

"On the 21st the enemy sent in a flag of truce, with a communication from General Gillmore, requesting an interview between General Vogdes and the officer commanding Battery Wagner. The proposal was agreed to, and the flag of truce was met by an officer from that work. While the conference was proceeding the fleet opened a bombardment on Wagner. This gross

violation of the usages of war was responded to on the part of General Hagood by an abrupt termination of the interview.

"During the day the enemy's gunboats and land batteries shelled Battery Wagner. The enemy had apparently mounted eight new guns in their batteries.

"Colonel Rhett reported that from the want of proper appliances he had been unable to dismount the guns in Fort Sumter which I had ordered to be removed.

"The bombardment continued throughout the 22d from fleet and land batteries, with an interval, when General Vogdes, U. S. A., requested, under a flag of truce, another interview with Brigadier-General Hagood. This was refused until an apology should be made for the breach of truce the day before. This having been given and deemed satisfactory, General Vogdes verbally proposed an exchange of prisoners, mentioning that they had but few of ours, all except those recently captured having been sent North; that as we had the excess, of course we could select whom to exchange. He abstained from any reference to negroes, while intimating that a mutual parole of prisoners without regard to excess would be agreeable.

"The following instructions were given to Brigadier-General Ripley :

"Not to open fire from the new James Island batteries until their completion; then to carry on a vigorous fire with guns and mortars on the enemy's works. Sorties to be made at night whenever practicable.'

"In my telegraph to you [General Cooper] of this date I mentioned the continual reinforcement of the enemy, that I had to guard three important lines of approach—James, Morris, and Sullivan's islands—and requested the balance of General Colquitt's brigade, with more troops, as soon as possible.

"No gun was fired on either side during the 23d. Our men were engaged in repairing damages. The enemy was busy erecting batteries and throwing up traverses, to protect them from the fire of the James Island batteries.

"On the morning of the 24th a heavy bombardment was opened upon Battery Wagner from five monitors, two gunboats, two mortar-vessels, the *Iron-sides*, and land batteries, which continued until 9.30 A. M., when the steamer with the prisoners on board proceeded to the fleet, and the exchange was effected, as previously agreed on.

"Colonel Harris, Chief-Engineer, having inspected Battery Wagner, reported no material damage to the work. The guns on the sea face unserviceable, on the land front in good order. The enemy's stockade within seven hundred (700) yards of the fort.

"Brigadier-General Taliaferro, who had relieved Brigadier-General Hagood in the command of Battery Wagner, on the night of the 22d came to the city to confer personally with me regarding the condition of the garrison of Battery Wagner, the officers having reported their men as considerably dispirited. After a conference with him I communicated my views as follows :

"The position must be held if possible until the guns *en route* from Richmond shall be received and placed in position.

"No idea of evacuation must be entertained, if there is a chance at night to repair the damages of the day.

"Every night preparations will be on hand for removing troops from Morris Island in case of need.

"Battery Wagner must be held and fought to the last extremity. The garrison might rest assured that every preparation will be made for their withdrawal in case the work should become untenable.

"My telegram to you of this date was:

"The enemy's fleet and land batteries shelled Battery Wagner heavily this morning. Garrison lost only one killed and seven wounded—hope to repair damages during the night. Am anxiously waiting for heavy guns promised from Richmond.'

"On the 25th the enemy's fleet remained quiet, owing to the high sea, and his land batteries fired but little; Fort Sumter, Battery Gregg, and the James Island batteries answering. A 30-pounder Parrott was again brought to bear on Fort Sumter from the same battery as on the 20th. During the day I informed you by telegraph that several of my new batteries were ready for their armament.

"The strengthening of Fort Sumter proceeded day and night, and in anticipation of the damaging effect which the enemy's heavy rifled guns from stationary batteries would have on this work, a partial disarmament was carried on nightly.

"On Sunday, the 26th, the bombardment of the enemy slackened. During the night shelling of the enemy's works was carried on from Fort Sumter. Reinforcements were seen throughout the day disembarking on Morris Island.

"I telegraphed on that day:

"Have nine positions ready. Not one gun promised from Richmond has yet arrived. Cannot their transportation be expedited?"

"The weather on the 27th was too windy for the co-operation of the fleet, which had been increased by the addition of another monitor. During the day the bombardment from the land batteries slackened. Our defences were pushed on vigorously, while the strengthening of Fort Sumter and the withdrawal of guns from that work proceeded. The enemy showed great activity in advancing their work, though harassed from the fire of our batteries.

"On the 28th Battery Wagner sustained another very severe bombardment from the enemy's land and naval batteries, but no great damage was done. Two men were killed and five wounded.

"My telegraphic despatch on the evening of the 28th was:

"Many transports of the enemy are arriving with troops. At least 2500 more men are required at present for James Island; cannot they be ordered here immediately? Enemy's land and naval batteries are now playing on Wagner, which replies bravely with Gregg and Sumter.'

"On the 29th Battery Wagner was heavily bombarded throughout the day by the fleet and land batteries. In a telegram to you of this date I notified the arrival of some of the promised guns from Richmond:

"Have received four 10-inch columbiads and four 10-inch mortars. Regret to say, by order of Secretary of Navy, two Brooke guns have been taken from me, to be shut up in a new gunboat, so pierced as only to give a range of a mile and a half at most.'

"Throughout the 30th Batteries Wagner and Gregg were subjected to a furious fire from both land batteries and fleet. As an example of the rapid fire of the enemy, I may mention that between the hours of 10.30 A. M. and 1 P. M. five hundred and ninety-nine (599) shot were fired at our different batteries, principally Gregg and Wagner. During the same time one hundred and ten (110) shots were fired from our works. Our loss to-day was two killed and seven wounded in Battery Wagner; no damage of consequence done to the works.

"Brigadier-General Ripley was instructed to transport as early as possible one of the 10-inch columbiads lately arrived from Richmond to Battery Wagner, which was accomplished on the night of the 30th.

"The enemy fired heavily on Battery Wagner throughout the 31st. Our loss was seven wounded. Our new works progressed very satisfactorily, and the strengthening of Fort Sumter and removal of its guns went on rapidly.

"The enemy's fire on the 1st of August was slack, and did but little execution, save a slight injury to the front traverse of the 8-inch shell-gun in Battery Wagner, which did not, however, disable it. The casualties to-day were only two wounded. The enemy was industriously engaged in throwing up new batteries and advancing his trenches; every endeavor was made by firing from Sumter, Gregg, Wagner, and the James Island batteries to annoy and delay his approach.

"Throughout the morning of the 2d of August the enemy did not answer our fire, but about two o'clock they opened with vigor on Wagner. The damage done to the work was, however, comparatively small. In my telegram of that date I mentioned that—

"'Transports filled with troops are reported going south from Stono, probably intended to operate against Savannah. Cannot some of my troops sent to General Johnston be ordered back immediately for defence of this city?'

"Orders were given to the Chief Quartermaster to have trains in waiting sufficient to transport two regiments of infantry to Savannah. The difficulties attending the defence of Charleston were greatly increased by the celerity with which the enemy could remove his operations from one point to another, and, from the paucity of troops in my command, Savannah and the coast line were nearly denuded.

"Instructions were given for increasing the armament of Fort Johnson by two 6.40 Brooke guns turned over by the Navy Department, and to place floating torpedoes in certain localities.

"Brigadier-General Mercer was directed to forward a detachment of artillerymen to relieve those of the 63d Georgia Volunteers who had become reduced by casualties and sickness, and had been ordered to return to Savannah.

"The Ordnance Department in Richmond was applied to for Coehorn mortars.

"The fire of the enemy on the 3d was not heavy, but his sharp-shooters annoyed the garrison of Wagner considerably. No casualties occurred during the day.

"Brigadier-General Mercer, at Savannah, was informed that transports were reported moving south from here, and that two regiments were held in readiness to move at a moment's notice. I was informed that Evans's brigade was ordered to Savannah from Mississippi.

"In a personal visit paid to Morris Island that evening I found Battery Wagner in very serviceable condition. The work was more solidly constructed than when the first attack took place. The garrison appeared to be in fine spirits and ready to defend the work to the last. At Fort Sumter the filling of the officers' quarters and the casemates was rapidly approaching completion. An exterior sand-bag revetement to the gorge-wall was ordered, as well as a series of traverses in barbette on the east, south, and northeast faces, and many changes and removals in the armament.

"During the 4th of August but little firing occurred on either side. Orders were given to re-arrange certain guns in the batteries and lines on James Island.

"Major Trezevant, Commandant of the Charleston Arsenal, was requested to collect all the old iron in the burnt districts of the city, to be cast into projectiles.

"Orders were given to Brigadier-General Ripley to arrange with Captain Tucker of the navy for an attempt to capture the enemy's pickets in the Marsh Battery, near Vincent's Creek. On the 5th the guns in Battery Wagner were all in fighting order. Our sharp-shooters, armed with Whitworth rifles, seemed to annoy the enemy greatly, who endeavored to silence their fire with Coehorn mortars.

"About nine o'clock on that night a picket of the enemy which had taken possession of our unfinished battery in Vincent's Creek, and, by signalling the arrival at night of our steamers at Cummings's Point, interfered materially with our operations, was attacked by a party from the navy and from the 25th South Carolina Volunteers. The result was satisfactory. One captain and ten enlisted men of the enemy were captured; our loss was one man killed.

"Our defensive works at Fort Sumter and other points progressed rapidly.

"The telegram of this day's date was:

"'Enemy still being largely reinforced from northward. Cannot General Colquitt's other regiment be ordered here at once? More troops are absolutely required.'

"Throughout the 6th the enemy fired occasional shots from his land batteries and fleet, but without material result. One casualty occurred. Our batteries fired at intervals throughout the day. Brigadier-General Cobb was ordered by telegraph to send 500 infantry and one light battery to report to Brigadier-General Mercer, in Savannah.

"The enemy on Morris Island worked laboriously on his batteries and trenches, while strong reinforcements of troops were daily seen arriving.

"On the 7th I received a telegram from you informing me that the balance of Colquitt's brigade was ordered to Charleston.

"There was little firing throughout the day. Only two casualties occurred on Morris Island.

"On the 8th Brigadier-General Evans reported his arrival in Savannah. A

large increase was visible in the enemy's fleet in the Stono. During the day firing at intervals was carried on from our batteries, but the enemy remained quiet till the evening, when he opened on Battery Wagner, and continued the fire throughout the night.

"Instructions were given to the Chief-Engineer to expedite the putting up in Fort Sumter of the sand-bag 'chemise' to the gorge-wall, the interior traverses, merlons, embrasures, and a covered way to be erected between Batteries Wagner and Gregg.

"The fire of the enemy during the morning of the 9th was heavy and rapid from his land batteries. The officer in command of the advanced pickets reported that the enemy worked industriously in his trenches until 2 A. M.

"The fire of our sharp-shooters evidently seemed to annoy the enemy, as he occasionally fired with great spirit to dislodge them, but ineffectually. One casualty in Battery Wagner during the day.

"The effective force on Morris Island was 663 infantry, 248 artillery, and 11 cavalry—total, 922.

"During the day I received the following telegram from Brigadier-General M. Jenkins, dated Petersburg, Virginia :

" 'My scouts report shipment of troops, both infantry and cavalry, from Norfolk, supposed for Charleston. Large quantities of forage shipped. Cavalry left 6th inst.'

"The Chief-Engineer was instructed to lay out and erect a line of works on James Island from Secessionville to Dill's house, in lieu of the present defensive lines, to consist of lunettes with closed gorges disposed at one-half to three-quarters of a mile apart, and connected with *cremaillère* lines.

"Captain Tucker, C. S. N., was informed of the practice on the part of the enemy of putting out boat pickets at night to observe the movements of our transportation to Morris Island, and it was suggested to Captain Tucker that steps should be taken by the navy to break up these pickets.

"Upon the approach of one of our transportation steamers signals could be exchanged between the enemy's boats and their land batteries, and these latter opening immediately a heavy fire upon Cummings's Point, rendered our communications extremely difficult and hazardous. At times, also, the enemy illuminated the landing with a powerful calcium light, so as to prevent the approach of our steamers, forcing us to transport our supplies of men and munitions by means of small boats.

"During the 10th the enemy remained comparatively quiet, until about 8 P. M., when he opened briskly on Battery Wagner. On our side firing was kept up from Battery Simkins with columbiads, from 11 A. M. to 11 P. M., when mortar firing was resumed and continued until morning.

"The enemy on Morris Island were busy during the past night, and his advanced works were then about six hundred yards from Battery Wagner, though no guns were yet in position.

"My telegram to you of that date was :

" 'Nothing of importance has occurred since yesterday. Evans's brigade is arriving in Savannah, and Colquitt's regiments arriving here.'

"About seven o'clock on the morning of the 11th, the fleet and land batteries opened heavily on Battery Wagner, and were replied to by Fort Sumter and Batteries Simkins and Gregg.

"One casualty occurred during the day, the enemy as well as ourselves working persistently, in spite of the excessive heat.

"Our garrison on Morris Island consisted of 1245, of all arms.

"At 5.45 A.M., on the morning of the 12th, the enemy opened on Fort Sumter with an 8-inch Parrott gun, firing from a battery north and west of Craig's Hill, Morris Island—distance estimated to be at least forty-four hundred yards. Eleven shots, in all, were fired at the fort; four missed, three struck outside, and four within the fort. Again, at 5.30 P.M., the enemy opened on Fort Sumter from the same battery, firing at intervals of ten minutes till dark. Eleven 8-inch rifled shot struck the fort.

"Heavy firing was carried on throughout the day against Battery Wagner and Fort Sumter, and Batteries Gregg and Simkins directed their fire against the enemy's working parties on the left of his approach, and dispersed them, stopping the work they were throwing up.

"At dark Battery Wagner opened with eight guns on the enemy's advanced trenches, and, in conjunction with Fort Sumter and Battery Simkins, prevented any progress on the part of the enemy. His batteries in rear replied to the fire of Wagner, and interrupted our communications with Cummings's Point.

"On the 13th the enemy endeavored several times to repair the damages done to his advanced works during the preceding night, but well-directed shots from Battery Wagner as often drove him back. The batteries in rear and the fleet then opened fire on Wagner and Gregg, and were answered by Fort Sumter and Battery Simkins. At 5.30 A.M. the enemy opened with 8-inch Parrotts from the same battery as the day before, firing two or three times only. At 11 A.M. three or four wooden gunboats, armed with heavy rifled guns, approached within four and five thousand yards of Fort Sumter, and opened a slow fire; some fifteen shots were fired with great range; three only struck the fort. One shot passed over the fort at great elevation, and dropped a mile to the westward.

"At 5 P.M. the enemy opened again on the fort with the 8-inch Parrotts. No great damage was done; the farthest penetration into the brickwork was about four feet.

"On the 14th the land batteries opened on Fort Sumter, firing three shots; two struck about 11 A.M. The wooden gunboats shelled the fort at long range, and at 5.15 P.M. the land batteries again opened on the fort.

"Throughout the day the enemy remained quiet, firing occasionally, and replied to by our batteries. The sharp-shooters on both sides kept up a constant fire. During the night the fire from Battery Wagner put a stop to the enemy's operations in its front. The strengthening of Fort Sumter advanced rapidly, day and night.

"Brigadier-General Ripley was instructed as to the armament of certain portions of the new lines on James Island, and of a new battery thrown up near Fort Johnson.

"During the greater part of the 15th the enemy, both on land and sea, were unusually quiet, occasionally firing at Battery Wagner; later in the day they opened with some vigor on Battery Gregg.

"The enemy's fleet consisted this morning of the *Ironsides*, six monitors, eight gunboats, three mortar-hulks, and thirteen vessels inside the bar—outside, seven; at Hilton Head, fifty-two vessels, including gunboats and ironclads.

"My telegram of this date was:

"'No change worth recording since yesterday. Sand-bag revetement of gorge-wall of Sumter and traverses inside of fort progressing as rapidly as means of transportation will permit.'

"On the 16th the enemy's batteries fired but little on Batteries Wagner and Gregg, but during the afternoon the two 8-inch Parrotts opened on Fort Sumter, throwing forty-eight shells. Four passed over, four fell short, ten struck inside the parade, and thirty hit in various places, exterior and interior.

"At this date the armament of the fort consisted of thirty-eight guns and two mortars, at least twenty guns having been withdrawn since the landing of the enemy on Morris Island.

"Orders were given to Brigadier-General Ripley to remove to Battery Gregg the two mortars in Fort Sumter as soon as it should become impossible to use them with advantage in the latter work, and to transport to other points every gun in Sumter not actually required for its defence and by the new relations of that work to the defence of the harbor.

"The Chief-Engineer was instructed to strengthen Castle Pinckney with sand-bags. Fort Johnson to be arranged for two additional 10-inch guns, and positions to be prepared for three 10-inch guns, to be placed on the James Island shore of the harbor.

"Battery Wagner was bombarded heavily by the enemy about daylight on the 17th; at about 9 o'clock A.M. the *Ironsides* and six monitors joined in the action. Their guns were turned also on Battery Gregg and Fort Sumter, a heavy cannonade being directed against those three works, but principally against Wagner, which, having only two 10-inch columbiads and one 32-pounder, rifled, to reply to the enemy's fleet, maintained the unequal contest more than one hour, when Colonel Keitt, commanding on Morris Island, ordered the brave artillerists and their gallant officers to the cover of the bomb-proofs.

"During this terrible fire the Engineer Department lost the valuable services of a most promising officer, Captain J. M. Wampler, of Virginia, who was killed by the explosion of a 15-inch shell.

"During the engagement Captain Rodgers, commanding the monitor *Weehawken*, was killed in the pilot-house of his ship. In the twenty-four hours 948 shots were fired against Fort Sumter; 448 struck outside, 233 inside, and 270 passed over. The casualties in the fort amounted to fourteen.

"On the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d of August the fierce bombardment of Fort Sumter was continued by the enemy, both from his land batteries and, at intervals, from his fleet. From the 17th to the 23d inclusive he fired against the fort a total of 5643 shots, of which number 2643 struck inside,

1699 outside, and 1301 missed. These projectiles varied in weight from thirty to three hundred pounds, and were fired from Parrott and 15-inch smooth-bore guns. An average of one hundred and fifty pounds per shot would give a weight of nearly 385 tons discharged against the wall of Fort Sumter during this period of seven days. At the end of this time nearly all the guns remaining in the fort were unserviceable, and the damage to the gorge-wall and the northwest face by the reverse fire was great; but the sand that had been placed on the outside of the gorge-wall, in conjunction with the filling up of the barracks and casemates with cotton-bales, and, above all, the crumbling of the masonry under the enemy's fire, converted this portion of Fort Sumter into a mass of *débris* and rubbish, on which the enemy's powerful artillery could make but little impression. Throughout the siege the unremitting exertions of the Engineer Corps hourly increased the defensive power of the work.

"The following extract from the journal of the Engineer officer at Fort Sumter, from August 23d, will show the condition of the work on that date:

"The northwest front has now five arches with ramparts fallen in; northeast barbette battery unserviceable; east front scarp much scaled by slant fire, with large craters under traverses; principal injury at level of arches and terre-plein; two-thirds of southern wall of east magazine damaged, stone revetement unhurt and protected by rubbish, gorge not damaged since yesterday; another shot penetrated above sand filling of second-story rooms, making three since the attack began; east barbette battery parapet much loosened and undermined, though not displaced; one 10-inch and one 11-inch gun untouched; Brooke gun-carriage shattered, but can easily be mounted on 10-inch columbiad carriage."

"* * * During the seven days that the enemy so vigorously bombarded Fort Sumter his approaches to Battery Wagner were slowly pushed forward under the fire of our guns and sharp-shooters. On the 21st he made an unsuccessful attack on our rifle-pits directly in front of Battery Wagner. The same day, at 12 m., under flag of truce, General Gillmore sent a demand for the surrender of Fort Sumter and Morris Island, with the threat that in case of non-compliance he would open fire on the city. Four hours were allowed for a reply. This despatch was received at the Headquarters of the Department at 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ p. m. The enemy carried his threat into execution by throwing several shells into the city about 1.30 a. m. on the morning of the 22d.

"On the 24th the fire on Fort Sumter lessened considerably; not more than one hundred and fifty shots were thrown against it in the course of the day.

"Every endeavor was made to retard the approach of the besiegers to Battery Wagner; his working parties were fired on from the battery, but this had to be discontinued and the embrasures closed, in order to prevent our pieces from being dismounted.

"Until three o'clock in the afternoon of the 25th the enemy's fire was principally directed against Fort Sumter; after that time Battery Wagner was fiercely bombarded, as well as the space between our rifle-pits and the works; at dusk the enemy endeavored to carry the position held by our pickets, but were repulsed. Our loss was five killed and nineteen wounded.

"A very large amount of ammunition and ordnance-stores were removed from Fort Sumter during the night.

"On the 26th one hundred and thirty shots were fired at Sumter, Batteries Wagner and Gregg receiving the bulk of the fire. At five o'clock in the evening the enemy concentrated his fire on our rifle-pits in front of Battery Wagner. Between 7 and 8 p. m. the rifle-pits were carried by an overwhelming force, which also succeeded in capturing seventy-six out of eighty-nine men of the 61st North Carolina Volunteers, who formed the picket.

"The fire against Fort Sumter was limited, on the 27th, to four shots. In front of Battery Wagner the enemy had advanced his trenches to within three hundred yards of the work, while the number of the enemy's guns and the accuracy of his fire prevented the opening of the embrasures in Battery Wagner, except at night.

"The Hon. Secretary of War informed me by telegraph, in answer to a request that I had made for the services, as boatmen, of some of the sailors stationed in Savannah, that the Secretary of the Navy declined sending them, and urged detail of men. I replied by letter, setting forth the fact that the army in this Department was already depleted by details for the navy, and that no more men could be spared. The importance of keeping our water transportation to Morris Island in an efficient condition was represented, and that, without an additional force of boatmen, it could not be preserved; further, that the ironclads at Savannah are safely sheltered behind obstructions, and, were a portion of their crews sent to Charleston, they could be returned in the event of an emergency there.

"On the 28th the enemy was extremely quiet, firing only six shots at Sumter; but his approaches towards Battery Wagner advanced rapidly, notwithstanding the fire directed upon him from Gregg, the James Island batteries, and the sharpshooters in Battery Wagner.

"The enemy did not fire at Fort Sumter during the 29th, but worked industriously at his fortifications on Morris Island. His advanced works were shelled throughout the day by Battery Wagner, Fort Moultrie, and the James Island batteries.

"During the night the enemy's guns were silent in front of Battery Wagner, but they renewed the bombardment of Fort Sumter before daylight on the morning of the 30th, and during the day threw six hundred and thirty-four shot against it. They were also busily engaged in completing their advanced works, though greatly disturbed by the fire from Wagner and our James Island batteries, which compelled them to desist from the work of advancing a sap on the left of Battery Wagner. In the evening the enemy opened a brisk fire on Wagner with both mortars and Parrott guns; no serious damage was done to the work, but several casualties occurred. During the night Battery Wagner kept up a steady and effective fire on the enemy's advanced works. Early on the morning of the 31st, as the steamer *Sumter* was returning from Morris Island with troops on board, she was unfortunately fired into from the Sullivan Island batteries and sunk.* Four men were killed or drowned, and the greater portion of the arms were lost.

"Between 11 and 12 m. one of the monitors approached Fort Moultrie, and

* The officer in charge had failed to show the signal light.

when within range was opened on by the fort. The enemy replied with shrapnel, all of which fell short. After about an hour's engagement the monitor withdrew.* About 2 P.M. the enemy again approached with four monitors and engaged the fort for four hours; a steady fire was kept up on them from Fort Moultrie and other Sullivan's Island batteries. During the engagement the enemy fired about sixty shots, striking Fort Moultrie fifteen times, but doing no damage. The fort fired one hundred and thirty-two shots.

"The enemy's fire on Fort Sumter was slack throughout the day. Captain Leroy Hammond, 25th South Carolina Volunteers, reported during the day that, in obedience to instructions, he had made a reconnoissance of Light-house Inlet and the south side of Black Island; on the island he saw pickets and bivouac fires, but discovered no earthworks.

"During the night the enemy succeeded in advancing their sap a short distance towards Battery Wagner, notwithstanding the heavy fire that was kept up on them from that work. At daylight, on the 1st of September, the enemy opened on Wagner with mortars, and continued at intervals during the entire day. The two 8-inch howitzers on the salient and curtain of the work were disabled, and the two 6-inch shell-guns on the land face were also partially disabled. From early morning the Morris Island batteries kept up a heavy fire on Fort Sumter, firing throughout the day 382 shots, 166 striking outside, 95 inside, and 121 missing. The fire was very destructive, disabling the remaining guns in barbette, and damaging the fort considerably. An extract from the report of the Engineer in charge gave the following account of its condition:

"'Towards noon the effect of the fire was to carry away at one fall four rampart arches on northeast front, with terre-plein platforms and guns, thus leaving on this front only one arch and a half, which are adjacent to the east spiral stair. Some of the lower casemate piers of same front have been seriously damaged, rendering unsafe the service of two guns hitherto available in that quarter. On the exterior, the chief injury done is to be noticed at southeast *pass coupé* and two next upper casemates on east front. From these localities the scarp has fallen away completely, and left the arches exposed, as well as the sand filling half down to the floor of the second tier.'

"At 11.40 P.M. six monitors opened on Fort Sumter from distances of eight hundred to one thousand yards. They were joined, at 1 A.M., on the 2d, by the *Ironsides*, and together fired 185 shots, of which 116 struck outside, 35 inside, and 34 passed over. The projectiles used were 8-inch Parrotts, rifle-shell, and 11 and 15 inch smooth-bore shot and shell.

"Fort Sumter was unable to answer, not having a gun in working order, but a heavy fire was kept up on the fleet from Fort Moultrie with good effect, two of the monitors being apparently injured, and requiring assistance when they retired. The effect of this fire on Fort Sumter was thus described by the Engineer officer:

"'The chief external injury has been done upon the east scarp, which now has lost its integrity, and hangs upon the arches apparently in blocks and detached masses.'

* One 8-inch columbiad was opened, and struck the vessel eight times in succession before it got out of range.

"The remainder of the day was passed in comparative quiet. The fleet was occupied in placing sand-bags on the decks of the monitors, the enemy's land batteries firing but 148 shots; 38 of these were directed against Sumter. In the same period our batteries fired 66 times.

"During the night the enemy in front of Wagner was engaged in strengthening his advanced position, which was then within eighty or one hundred yards of the salient. Owing to the difficulty of transporting ammunition to Battery Wagner the fire from that work was slack.

"Early on the morning of the 3d the enemy opened on Battery Wagner with mortars, and continued it throughout the day. Fort Sumter was not fired at. In that work all hands were busily engaged in repairing damages. During the past night, as usual, large quantities of ordnance-stores and several guns were removed by that gallant and zealous Acting Engineer officer, Mr. J. Frazer Mathews, of Charleston, who persistently worked at this dangerous and laborious undertaking until every disabled gun which could be recovered from the *débris* had been transferred to its new position. The condition of the fort at this date was as follows:

"The northeast and northwest *terre-pleins* had fallen in, and the western wall had a crack entirely through from parapet to berme. The greater portion of the southern wall was down, the upper east magazine penetrated, and lower east magazine wall cracked; the eastern wall itself nearly shot away, and large portions down; ramparts gone, and nearly every casemate breached. The casemates on the eastern face were still filled with sand, and gave some protection to the garrison from shells. Not a single gun remained in bar-bette, and but a single smooth-bore 32-pounder in the west face that could be fired as the morning and evening gun.

"During the night of the 3d Battery Wagner fired steadily, and the James Island batteries occasionally. Throughout the 4th the enemy did not fire on Fort Sumter, but confined themselves to shelling Battery Wagner, and were answered by the James Island guns. During the night of the 4th the enemy's approach was pushed close to Battery Wagner. At 12 M., on the 5th, the Federal flag, which had been one hundred yards south of Wagner, was abreast of the south angle of the work. Throughout the day a very heavy fire was concentrated on Battery Wagner from the *New Ironsides*, monitors, and land batteries, which severely injured the work. Our casualties were also greatly increased, some forty occurring during the day.

"Large bodies of troops were transferred from Folly to Morris Island, and other indications pointed to an early assault. There is good reason to believe that the enemy's plan was to carry Battery Gregg by a boat attack on the night of the 5th, or early on the morning of the 6th; that the fleet should prevent the landing of reinforcements at Cummings's Point; that Battery Wagner should be shelled fiercely by the ironclads; and on the morning of the 6th, on a given signal, the assault on Battery Wagner was to take place.

"This plan was frustrated, however, by the repulse of the attacking party on Battery Gregg. About 1.30 A. M., on the morning of the 6th, they were seen approaching, in from fifteen to twenty barges, by the passages leading from Vincent and Schooner creeks that lie between James and Morris islands.

The garrison at Cummings's Point was on the alert, and received them with a brisk fire of grape and musketry. The enemy was evidently greatly disconcerted, and, after discharging their boat howitzers, retired.

"On the 4th of September, 1863, I had convened a meeting of General Officers and the Chief-Engineer of the Department to assist me in determining how much longer the Confederate forces should attempt to hold batteries Wagner and Gregg and the north end of Morris Island.

"The rapid advance of the enemy's trenches to Battery Wagner having made it evident that before many days that work must become untenable, the following questions were propounded at the council:

"1st. How long do you think Fort Wagner can be held, without regard to safety of garrison?

"2d. How long can the fort be held, with a fair prospect of saving its garrison, with the means of transportation at our command and circumstances relative thereto, as heretofore indicated by actual experience?

"3d. How long, after the loss or evacuation of Wagner, could Fort Gregg be held?

"4th. Can the heavy guns (two in Wagner and three in Gregg) in these two works be removed before their evacuation without endangering the safety of the works and their garrisons?

"5th. Can we take the offensive suddenly with a fair prospect of success by throwing, during the night, 3000 men on north end of Morris Island, making in all 4000 men available; bearing in mind that no reinforcements could be sent there until night, and perhaps none for several nights, according to the movements of the enemy's ironclads and the fire of the land batteries?

"These questions were thoroughly discussed, as well as the probable plan of attack by the enemy, our means of defence, of transportation, and reasons for prolonging our possession of the north end of Morris Island.

"It was agreed that the holding of Morris Island as long as possible was most important to the safety and free use of the harbor of Charleston, and our ability to keep up easy communication with the works on Sullivan's and James islands, in view of which I deemed it proper to renew application by telegraph to the Secretaries of War and Naval Department for some two hundred sailors for oarsmen.

"It was further decided that the five heavy guns on Morris Island were necessary, morally and physically, for the defence of the positions to the last extremity; and such were the difficulties, if not, indeed, the insurmountable obstacles, in the way of their removal at this time, that no effort should be made to save them, and consequently that they should be ultimately destroyed, with as much of the works as practicable, when further defence was abandoned.

"The result was, my determination to hold Morris Island as long as communication with it could be maintained at night, by means of row-boats, but for which purpose sailors or men able to handle boats and oars with efficiency were essential.

"On the 5th inst. Brigadier-General Ripley, commanding the First Military District, prepared, by my order, as per my instructions, a confidential letter

which was forwarded to the officer commanding Battery Wagner, pointing out that it might be necessary to evacuate Morris Island. The Brigadier-General in the letter gave full instructions, as directed by me, for destroying the magazine and rendering the guns useless in the event of abandoning the island.

"Early on the morning of the 6th of September a despatch was received from Colonel L. M. Keitt, commanding Battery Wagner, to the following effect:

"*** The parapet of salient is badly breached; the whole fort is much weakened; a repetition to-morrow of to-day's fire (alluding to the 5th inst.) will make the work almost a ruin. The mortar fire is still very heavy and fatal, and no important work can be done. Is it desirable to sacrifice the garrison? To continue to hold it is to do so. Captain Lee, the Engineer, has read this, and agrees.'

"The casualties in Battery Wagner on the 5th of September were about 100 out of 900.

"Another despatch was received from Colonel Keitt, dated 8.45 A. M.

"'Incessant fire from Yankee mortars and Parrott battery; can't work negroes; better look after them promptly. Had thirty or forty soldiers wounded in an attempt to work. Will do all I can, but fear the garrison will be destroyed, without injuring the enemy. The fleet is opening, but I hope that we may stand till to-night.'

"Again, at 10.30 A. M., Colonel Keitt signalled, 'Boats must be at Cummings's Point early to-night without fail.'

"During the day a letter was received from the same officer as follows:

"'The enemy will to-night advance their parallel to the moat of this battery (Wagner). The garrison must be taken away immediately after dark, or it will be destroyed or captured. It is idle to deny that the heavy Parrott shells have breached the walls and are knocking away the bomb-proofs. Pray have boats immediately after dark at Cummings's Point to take away the men. I say deliberately that this must be done, or the garrison will be sacrificed. I am sending the wounded and sick now to Cummings's Point, and will continue to do so, if possible, until all are gone. I have not in the garrison 400 effective men, excluding artillery. The Engineers agree in opinion with me, or rather shape my opinion. I shall say no more. * * *'

"Colonel Keitt's last telegram was as follows:

"'The enemy's sap has reached the moat, and his bombardment has shattered large parts of the parapet. The retention of the post after to-night involves the sacrifice of the garrison. If the necessities of the service make this advisable the men will cheerfully make it, and I will cheerfully lead them. I prefer to assault the enemy to awaiting an assault, and I will at four o'clock in the morning assail his works.'

"Things being in this condition, it became evident that an attempt still to retain possession of Batteries Wagner and Gregg must of necessity involve the loss of their garrisons.

"But before giving the final orders for the evacuation I directed Colonel D. B. Harris, my Chief-Engineer, to proceed to Morris Island and examine into and report on the condition of affairs. His opinion was as follows:

"**** I visited our works on Morris Island to-day, and, in consideration of their condition, of our inability to repair damages at Battery Wagner, as heretofore, of the dispirited state of the garrison, and of the progress of the enemy's sap, am reluctantly

constrained to recommend an immediate evacuation of both Batteries Wagner and Gregg. * * *

“In consequence of the accuracy of fire from his (enemy's) land batteries, which are now in close proximity to Battery Wagner, say from five to eight hundred yards, aided by reverse fire from his fleet, it is impossible, in the opinion of the officer of the fort, to keep up a fire of either artillery or small-arms, and the enemy is thus left free to work in the trenches, which he is pushing rapidly forward, the head of the sap being within forty yards of the salient, which is so severely damaged by a battery of Parrott guns kept constantly playing upon it as to render it untenable.

“The coverings to the bomb-proof and magazine also need repair. We have been thus far able, not only to repair damages at night, but to add from day to day to the strength of the battery; but now that the enemy's sap is in such close proximity to the battery, and he has contrived to throw a calcium-light upon the parapets at night, it is impossible to do so without a heavy loss of men. In the efforts last night to repair damages the Commanding Officer of the fort reports a loss, in killed and wounded, of sixty to eighty men of the working party alone.

“Without our ability to repair damage at night the battery would become, under the incessant fire of the enemy's land batteries and fleet, untenable, say in two days. It is in view of these facts that I have thought it my duty to make the recommendation at the commencement of this report.”

“The gradual approaches of the enemy” (I quote now from Colonel Keitt's report), “had passed the front of the battery, and the termination of their sap was not over fifty yards from the parapet of the sea-face, enabling them to throw a mass of troops upon this flank when our men were mostly in the bomb-proofs, where I was forced to keep them by the increasing fire of mortars and rifle guns on land, with an enfilading fire from the fleet during most of the day.

“The salient on the left of the battery had been swept by such a terrible cross-fire as to breach the parapet and throw it into irregular shapes, rendering the ascent from the moat easy, and, moreover, men could not be kept there during this cross-fire without the certainty of most of them being wounded or stunned.”

“Under these circumstances I concluded that the period had arrived when it would be judicious to evacuate Morris Island, and in the following special order detailed the manner in which I desired the movements to be accomplished: * * *

“Battery Wagner, Morris Island, being no longer tenable without undue loss of life, and the risk of final capture of its garrison, the position and Battery Gregg will be evacuated as soon as practicable, to which end the following arrangements will be made by the District Commander:

“1. Two of the Confederate States ironclads should take up positions near Fort Sumter, with their guns bearing on Cummings's Point, and to the eastward of it. At the same time all our land batteries will be held prepared to sweep all the water faces of Battery Gregg. Transport steamers will take positions within the harbor, but as near as practicable to Cummings's Point, to receive the men from the row-boats, by which the embarkation will be effected from Morris Island.

“As many row-boats as necessary, or which can be manned by efficient oarsmen, will be provided and kept in readiness at once to proceed to and reach Cummings's Point or that vicinity, as soon after dark as may be prudent. Having reached the beach of Morris Island, a courier or relay of foot men will be despatched by the naval officer in charge with notice of the fact to the officer in command of Battery Wagner, and of the exact transport capacity of the boats. A naval officer, with proper assistants, will have exclusive charge of the boats and of their movements.

“2. The Commanding Officer of Battery Wagner having made during the day all arrangements for the evacuation and destruction of the work and armament, when in-

formed of the arrival of the boats will direct, first, the removal and embarkation of all wounded men, and thereafter, according to the capacity of the boats at hand, will withdraw his command by companies with soldierly silence and deliberation. Two companies will remain, in any event, to preserve a show of occupation, and repair and defend from assault during the embarkation; and it is strictly enjoined that no more men shall be permitted to quit the work and go to the landing than can be safely embarked. The embarkation will be superintended by the field-officers or regimental and battalion commanders, who will halt and keep their respective commands about one hundred (100) yards from the boats, divide them into suitable squads for assignment to the boats, in exact conformity with the direction of the naval officers in charge of embarkation, and then superintend the disposition of the men accordingly, impressing on all the vital necessity of silence, obedience to orders, and the utmost coolness.

"3. The companies left to occupy Battery Wagner to the last will be under the charge of a firm and intelligent field-officer, who will not withdraw his command until assured there is sufficient transportation for the remaining garrison of the island, including that of Battery Gregg.

"4. The final evacuation will depend for success on the utmost coolness and quiet on the part of every man. At least two officers, previously selected, will be left to light the fuses, already arranged and timed to about fifteen minutes, to blow up the magazine and bomb-proof, and to destroy the armament, in the manner already indicated in special instructions from District Headquarters. But the fuses must not be set on fire until it is certain that there is transportation for the removal of all the garrison, or except the enemy become aware of the evacuation, and are evidently about to storm and enter the work. The men must be embarked with arms loaded, ready to repel an attack by the boat-parties of the enemy.

"5. The garrison of Battery Gregg will stand staunch and at their post until the last company from Battery Wagner shall be embarked; it will then take to the boats with silence and deliberation, provision having been duly made, as at Battery Wagner, for the destruction of the work and its ordnance. Both explosions shall be as nearly simultaneous as possible, and the complete success of the evacuation will probably be in the hands of those whose high duty will be to apply the fire to the fuses at Battery Wagner.

"The garrison of Battery Gregg will be embarked with the same precaution and regulations as prescribed for Battery Wagner.

"In case the enemy should carry Battery Wagner immediately after the garrison shall have evacuated, or in any way the explosion of the magazine should be prevented, a signal of three (3) rockets, discharged in rapid succession, should be made from Battery Gregg, when the naval vessels in position and our land batteries bearing on Battery Wagner will be opened with a steady fire on the site of that work, as will be done likewise immediately after an explosion shall take place; and this fire will be maintained slowly during the night.

"Brigadier-General Ripley will give such additional orders as will be calculated to secure the successful evacuation of Morris Island or to meet emergencies. He will confer with Flag-officer Tucker, and procure all necessary assistance.

"The operation is one of the most delicate ever attempted in war. Coolness, resolute courage, and judgment and inflexibility on the part of officers, obedience to orders and a constant sense of the necessity for silence on the part of the men, are essential for complete success, and the credit which must attach to those who achieve it. * * *

"The evacuation began at 9 h. p. m. on the night of the 6th of September. According to instructions, a guard of 35 men, under command of Captain T. A. Huguenin, had been left to bring up the extreme rear, and to fire the only magazine which contained powder. The necessary arrangements being com-

pleted, and Colonel Keitt having been informed that the transportation was ready, the embarkation commenced, and was continued with the utmost quietness and despatch. The wounded were first embarked, and were followed by the remnants of the infantry garrison. Captain Kanapaux, commanding light artillery, was then ordered to spike his three howitzers and embark his command. Captain Lesesne, commanding at Battery Gregg, spiked the guns of that battery and followed with his command; and the rear-guard from Wagner, coming up at this time, in pursuance of orders from Colonel Keitt, the safety-fuses communicating with the magazines were lighted—that at Wagner by Captain Huguenin, and that at Gregg by Major Holcombe, C. S.—and the remainder of the command was safely and expeditiously embarked. Owing to defects in the fuses themselves, they failed of accomplishing the purpose designed, though their lighting was superintended by careful and reliable officers. The magazines, therefore, were not destroyed. The guns in the batteries were spiked as far as their condition allowed, and the equipments generally destroyed, and equipments carried off.

“The evacuation was concluded at about 1½ h. A. M. of the 7th inst. The boats containing the portion of the garrison last embarked were fired upon by the enemy’s barges, but without effect. Only two of our boats, containing crews of about 19 men and 27 soldiers—or some 46 in all—were captured by the enemy’s armed barges between Cummings’s Point and Fort Sumter.

“Thus Morris Island was abandoned to the enemy on the morning of the 7th of September, 1863, with but little loss on the part of its garrison, either in men or material. The total loss in killed and wounded on Morris Island, from July 10th to September 7th, 1863, was only six hundred and forty-one men; and, deducting the killed and wounded due to the landing on the 10th of July, and to the assaults of the 11th and 18th of July, the killed and wounded by the terrible bombardment, which lasted almost uninterruptedly, night and day, during fifty-eight days, only amounted to two hundred and ninety-six men, many of whom were only slightly wounded. It is still more remarkable that, during the same period of time, when the enemy fired 6202 shots and shells at Fort Sumter, varying in weight from thirty to three hundred pounds, only three men were killed and forty-nine wounded.

“It is difficult to arrive at the loss of the enemy during these operations, but, judging from the slaughter made in their ranks on the 11th and 18th of July, it will be within the mark to say that his casualties were in a ratio of ten to one of ours.

“It may be well to remark that the capture of Morris Island resulted in but a barren victory to the enemy, if his only object was to gain a position from which he might hurl his missiles and Greek fire into the city of Charleston. A reference to the map will show that the possession of Cummings’s Point placed him no nearer the city than when he held part of James Island, prior to the battle of Secessionville, in June, 1862, and again in July, 1863, from whence he was driven on the morning of the 16th of the same month.

“In conclusion, I cannot express in too strong terms my admiration of the bravery, endurance, and patriotism displayed by the officers and men engaged in these operations, who, during so many days and nights, withstood unflinch-

ingly the extraordinary fire from the enemy's land and naval batteries, and repulsed with heroic gallantry every attempt to surprise or carry the works by storm.

"I have particularly to commend the gallantry, coolness, and zeal of Brigadier-General W. B. Taliaferro, Brigadier-General Johnson Hagood, Brigadier-General A. H. Colquitt, Colonel L. M. Keitt, and Colonel G. P. Harrison, who, at different periods, had immediate command of the defence of Morris Island. To particularize would be invidious—they, one and all, on every occasion, did their duty nobly.

"I have to express my acknowledgments of the valuable services rendered by Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, in command of the First Military District, which included the City of Charleston and its outworks; he was invariably active, industrious, and intelligent, and carried out his important duties to my entire satisfaction.

"Although Major-General J. F. Gilmer arrived at Charleston only a few days before the evacuation of Morris Island, he was, nevertheless, active, zealous, and of assistance to me in holding the island to the last moment.

"To Colonel D. B. Harris, Chief-Engineer of the Department, I have to return my most sincere thanks; he was ever cool, gallant, and indefatigable in the performance of his arduous duties during the whole period of the operations on Morris Island; always present in the hour of need, he exposed himself, when necessary, to the hottest fire and to the greatest dangers in the most reckless manner.

"I also take pleasure in recording the services of Colonel Alfred Rhett, who, during the siege of Battery Wagner, had command of Fort Sumter, and with his brave garrison endured a long and terrific bombardment from the enemy's batteries by land and sea. His conduct throughout gained my approval and satisfaction.

"I commend, also, to the attention of the War Department the indefatigable zeal of my personal and general staff, who, on all occasions, were found equal to the calls made on their energy, activity, and devotion to the service."

The foregoing report and careful narrative carries us through many of the most important incidents of the defence of Charleston, and not only presents with careful fidelity letters, orders, and telegrams of those high in authority at the time, but lays bare the causes that produced the events which so materially shaped that period of the war. It is corroborated, furthermore, in every respect, by the reports* of all the subordinate commanders who, in turn, from July 10th to September 7th, had charge of Battery Wagner.

Such facts only as are not mentioned by General Beauregard in

* Reports of Generals Ripley, Taliaferro, Hagood, and Colonel Keitt, "Rebellion Record," vol. x., p. 535, *et seq.*

his communication to the War Department, and some matters to which he could merely make incidental reference, will now be specially noticed.

Arrangements for the exchange of prisoners taken on both sides during the recent engagements were entered into in the early part of August, but certain points in their execution gave rise to much reproach from General Gillmore, who even charged General Beauregard with a "breach of faith." The Federal Commander wrote as follows:

"DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
MORRIS ISLAND, S. C., *August 5th*, 1863.

"Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg. Confederate Forces, Charleston, S. C.:

"*General*,—Your two letters of the 22d ultimo, one of them being in reply to mine of the 18th, have been received.

"You express yourself at a loss to perceive the necessity for my statement that I should expect full compliance on your part with the usages of war among civilized nations 'in their unrestricted application to all the forces under my command.' At that time I considered my remarks as pertinent and proper. Events that have since transpired show them to have been eminently so, for after having entered into a solemn agreement with me for mutually paroling and returning to their respective commanders the wounded prisoners in our hands, you declined to return the wounded officers and men belonging to my colored regiments, and your subordinate in charge of the exchange asserted that that question had been left for after-consideration. I can but regard this transaction as a palpable breach of faith on your part, and a flagrant violation of your pledges as an officer.

"In your second letter of the 22d ultimo you request me to return to you Private Thomas Green, of Company H, 1st Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, for the alleged reason that he left your lines on the 19th, during the suspension of hostilities under a flag of truce. I beg leave to state that you are laboring under a misapprehension. Private Green did not enter my lines during the existence of a flag of truce. It is true that under a flag of truce on the day referred to I requested permission of the officer in command of Fort Wagner to receive and bury my own dead, a request that was refused me, and there the truce ended.

"I refrained from opening my batteries on that day, because some of my own wounded were seen lying just outside the fort, in plain view, exposed to a burning sun throughout the entire day.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"Q. A. GILLMORE, Brig.-Genl. Comdg."

This necessitated the following letter, which further explains the point at issue between the two commanders, and reverses the

imputation of double-dealing thrown upon the officers who had acted under General Beauregard's instructions:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 18th, 1863.*

"Brig.-General Q. A. GILLMORE, Commanding U. S. Forces, etc., etc.:

"*General*,—Your letter of the 5th was not received at these Headquarters until the 8th instant.

"I cannot bandy allegations with you, and much less shall I emulate the temper and spirit in which your communication was conceived; but will simply confine myself to showing how groundless is your imputation of bad faith on my part, in connection with the return of wounded prisoners of war.

"You knew that there existed an order of the President of my Government, and, possibly, were aware of an Act of the Congress of the Confederate States, which expressly excluded armed negroes from recognition by Confederate States officers as legitimate means of war. You knew, moreover, that, in accordance with this position of the constituted authorities of my people, as in duty bound, I had uniformly refused to receive or communicate in this Department with flags of truce borne by officers or escorted by men of negro regiments of your service.

"You had thus due notice of my views and of my practice, and could have no right to expect me to deviate from either on such an occasion. Indeed, you must have felt assured of the fact that I could not assent to any course which, in effect, places negroes taken in arms in the State of South Carolina on the same footing with recognized soldiers. Therefore, if not prepared to yield your consent, or obliged to exact an acquiescence on your side in the pretension of the United States, but recently set up, after two years of war, to employ negro soldiers, you were surely bound to demand definitely that negroes should be included in the proposed arrangement; but you did not demand it. The fact is, you were well satisfied of what would be my course had you attempted to make such conditions; and bearing in mind that I had many more of your wounded than you had of mine, you chose, Sir, to ignore your negro ally, after having given him the right or head of your storming column on the 18th of July. This, Sir, will be the record of history, I dare to say, even as made up by your own countrymen.

"Certain papers herewith, I trust, will satisfy you that I had no idea of leading you to expect me to disregard the orders of my Government, and my usage in respect to armed negroes. Brigadier-General Hagood's report, marked 'B,' shows, I submit, the understanding of the officer who bore the flag on your part; to wit, Brigadier-General Vogdes, of your service."*

* From General Hagood's narrative of the defence of Morris Island, from July 10th to September 7th, 1863, we copy the following: " * * * General Vogdes stated his mission to be to ask for Colonel Putnam's body, and to return to us Lieutenant Bee's, with the sword of the latter. * * * His request was complied with; and he then verbally proposed an exchange of prisoners, mentioning that they had but few of ours, all except those recently captured

"While I may not descend to recriminations, I must submit for your consideration whether your course was legitimate in permitting men of my command to be retained and not returned under the cartel, on the grounds that they had declined to return, and had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States. I apprehend that, under no usage of war, were you warranted in permitting such an act, the aspect of which is by no means improved by the fact that, in this way, you increased the inequalities of the transaction to your own advantage, and were enabled to return but thirty-nine Confederate non-commissioned officers and privates in exchange for one hundred and four officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of your own service.

"You are, of course, aware that the men whom you have thus retained, on their taking the oath of allegiance, according to the laws of war are inconceivably deserters, subject to the punishment set by law for that crime.

"In connection with the deserter Green, I am led to infer that you rest your refusal to surrender him on a denial of the fact that a truce existed on the 19th of July, at such times as our respective subordinates (Generals Hagood and Vogdes) were not in direct communication, under flags of truce, between the two forces. Of course I cannot hope to change your views by argument, and shall not attempt it, but will refer you to the report of Brigadier-General Hagood, herewith, marked 'C,' which, I believe, will show that

having been sent North; that, 'as we had the excess, of course we could select whom to exchange;' while intimating that a general exchange, without regard to excess, would be acceptable. Pending the interview, General Hagood received a despatch from General Ripley's headquarters, in Charleston, where the interview and its object were known, directing him to agree to an exchange of wounded prisoners without regard to excess on our side, except the negro prisoners; not to introduce them into the negotiation; but if introduced by General Vogdes, to refuse, as they would not be given up; and that it was desirable, on the score of humanity, to get rid of the numerous white prisoners wounded in our hands, and for whom no adequate accommodation existed in our hospitals. The contents of the despatch are given in substance, and were not communicated to General Vogdes. He carefully avoided any direct mention of negro prisoners, and his remark quoted above, that having the excess we could choose whom to exchange, etc., was in allusion to them, and all that was made. The Confederate proclamation outlawing negro troops and white officers commanding them was well known to the enemy; and, anxious to effect the exchange, it was apparent that the Federal party did not desire to complicate matters. It was observed that neither General Vogdes, or either of the three or four officers accompanying him, inquired after Shaw, the colonel of the negro regiment engaged in the recent assault, although they asked after everybody else. * * * The negotiation was arranged, all in parol, by accepting the basis proposed by General Vogdes, the time to be the following Friday, at 10 A. M. * * * The exchange took place; and General Gillmore afterwards accused General Beauregard of bad-faith in not sending the negro prisoners for delivery."

there was a truce, *de facto*, and substantial, between the belligerent forces on Morris Island during the whole of the 19th of July, pending which my men were chiefly engaged in giving burial to six hundred officers and men of your troops, and removing the wounded of both forces. Further, it is confidently believed that, at the time Green entered your lines, Generals Hagood and Vogdes were in conference, and a white flag was actually flying. Be that as it may, there was an absolute truce or suspension of hostilities, which all soldiers observant of the usages of civilized war would acknowledge, without reference to any lack of a mere symbol, such as a white flag.

"In conclusion, I have further to say that no wounded officer of the 54th Massachusetts negro regiment was retained. If any of the officers of that regiment were captured, they have assumed false names and regiments.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

General Gillmore made no reply to the foregoing letter. On the 21st he wrote again, however, but, as already appears from General Beauregard's report, it was to forward the following demand:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
MORRIS ISLAND, S. C., *August 21st*, 1863.

"Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg. Confed. Forces about Charleston, S. C.:

"*General*,—I have the honor to demand of you the immediate evacuation of Morris Island and Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces.

"The present condition of Fort Sumter, and the rapid and progressive destruction which it is undergoing from my batteries, seem to render its complete demolition within a few hours a matter of certainty. All my heaviest guns have not yet opened. Should you refuse compliance with this demand, or should I receive no reply thereto within four hours after it is delivered into the hands of your subordinate at Fort Wagner for transmission, I shall open fire on the City of Charleston from batteries already established within easy and effective range of the heart of the city.

"I am, General, your obedient servant,

"Q. A. GILLMORE,* Brig.-Genl. Comdg."

General Beauregard's refusal to comply with the foregoing request was in these words:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 22d*, 1863.

"Brig.-General Q. A. GILLMORE, Comdg. U. S. Forces, Morris Island, etc.:

"*Sir*,—Last night, at fifteen minutes before eleven o'clock, during my absence on a reconnoissance of my fortifications, a communication was received at these Headquarters, dated Headquarters, Department of the South, Morris

* By a strange oversight no signature was attached to this letter when first received at Department Headquarters.

Island, South Carolina, August 21st, 1863, demanding the 'immediate evacuation of Morris Island and Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces,' on the alleged grounds that 'the present condition of Fort Sumter, and the rapid and progressive destruction which it is undergoing from my (your) batteries, seem to indicate complete demolition within a few hours a matter of certainty;' and that if this demand were not complied with, or no reply thereto received within four hours after it is delivered into the hands of your (my) subordinate commander at Fort Wagner, for transmission, 'a fire would be opened on the City of Charleston from batteries already established within easy and effective [range] of the heart of the city.' This communication, to my address, was without signature, and was, of course, returned.

"About half-past one this morning one of your batteries did actually open fire and throw a number of heavy rifle-shells into the city, the inhabitants of which, of course, were asleep and unwarned.

"About nine o'clock this morning the communication alluded to above was returned to these Headquarters bearing your recognized official signature, and it can now be noticed as your deliberate official act.

"Among nations not barbarous the usages of war prescribe that when a city is about to be attacked timely notice shall be given by the attacking commander, in order that non-combatants may have an opportunity for withdrawing beyond its limits. Generally the time allowed is from one to three days—that is, time for a withdrawal in good faith of at least the women and children. You, Sir, give only four hours, knowing that your notice, under existing circumstances, could not reach me in less than two hours, and that not less than the same time would be required for an answer to be conveyed from this city to Battery Wagner.

"With this knowledge you threaten to open fire on the city, not to oblige its surrender, but to force me to evacuate these works, which you, assisted by a great naval force, have been attacking in vain for more than forty days.

"Batteries Wagner and Gregg are nearly due north from your batteries on Morris Island, and in distance therefrom varying from half a mile to two and a quarter miles. This city, on the other hand, is to the northwest, and quite five miles distant from the battery opened against it this morning. It would appear, Sir, that, despairing of reducing these works, you now resort to the novel measure of turning your guns against the old men, the women and children, and the hospitals of a sleeping city—an act of inexcusable barbarity, from your own confessed point of sight, inasmuch as you allege that the complete demolition of Fort Sumter within a few hours by your guns seems to you 'a matter of certainty.'

"Your omission to attach your signature to such a grave paper must show the recklessness of the course upon which you have adventured, while the facts that you knowingly fixed a limit for receiving an answer to your demand which it made almost beyond the possibility of receiving any reply within that time, and that you actually did open fire and throw a number of the most destructive missiles ever used in war into the midst of a city taken unawares, and filled with sleeping women and children, will give you a bad eminence in history—even in the history of this war.

"I am only surprised, Sir, at the limits you have set to your demand. If, in order to obtain the abandonment of Morris Island and Fort Sumter, you felt authorized to fire on this city, why did you not also include the works on Sullivan's and James islands—nay, even the City of Charleston—in the same demand?

"Since you have felt warranted in inaugurating this method of reducing batteries in your immediate front, which were found otherwise impregnable, and a mode of warfare which I confidently declare to be atrocious and unworthy of any soldier, I now solemnly warn you that if you fire again on this city from your Morris Island batteries, without granting a somewhat more reasonable time to remove non-combatants, I shall feel impelled to employ such stringent means of retaliation as may be available during the continuance of this attack.

"Finally, I reply that neither the works on Morris Island or Fort Sumter will be evacuated on the demand you have been pleased to make. Already, however, I am taking measures to remove, with the utmost possible celerity, all non-combatants, who are now fully aware and alive to what they may expect at your hands.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

There was a rejoinder to General Beauregard's remonstrance, and an attempt was made by the Federal Commander to justify the course he had followed. He must have been doubtful of the correctness of his position, however, for we find the following concluding passage in his letter: " * * * But, upon your assurance that the city is still full of them " (meaning women and children), "I shall suspend the bombardment until eleven o'clock P. M. to-morrow, thus giving you two days from the time you acknowledge to have received my communication of the 21st instant." * General Gillmore did accordingly, but must have been disappointed at the result of his experiment. The 8-inch Parrott rifle with which he shelled the city of Charleston, from the work called "The Swamp Angel," fortunately burst at the thirty-sixth round. No other gun was placed in the Marsh Battery after this.†

From the 16th to the 23d of August, Sumter had been subjected to the most terrific bombardment on record. This renowned fortress was doomed to inevitable destruction. The journal kept at the time by its Commander‡ corroborates the

* General Gillmore's rejoinder is given in full in the Appendix.

† General Gillmore's book, "Engineer and Artillery Operations against Charleston," p. 62.

‡ See Appendix.

Engineers' reports quoted by General Beauregard. But though its walls, riddled by shot and shattered by shell, had crumbled into a mass of ruins; and though its enemies could now approach it, no longer fearing the thunder of its artillery, it still stood invincible, with its battle-flag floating to the breeze, defiant as ever. The battered inner faces of its magazines had ceased to afford security, and a single well-directed missile might at any moment, before the removal of the powder, have launched the entire garrison into eternity. That this was the enemy's object was known to every officer and man in the fort. Truly, it required fortitude and cool daring, as well as admirable spirit and discipline, to endure, undaunted, such an ordeal. And it is undoubted that the example thus given by Sumter, from the first attack of the turreted fleet, on the 7th of April, to the 23d of August, and later, contributed no little to the unparalleled resistance of Wagner, and of the other batteries around the harbor. So well had that example served to kindle the fire of emulation among the troops defending Charleston, that the same heroism prevailed everywhere; and it is matter of history to-day that the defence of Fort Sumter and that of Battery Wagner are looked upon as two of the most skilful, desperate, and glorious achievements of the war. They stand unsurpassed in ancient or modern times.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

General Beauregard Desires the Engineers' Reports of the Condition of Fort Sumter.—Conference between Colonel Rhett, the Engineer Officers, and Captain Harleston on the 24th of August.—Additional Report of Colonels Gilmer and Harris.—General Beauregard Resolves not to Evacuate the Fort, but to Withdraw the Artillery from it, and Make it, for the Time being, an Infantry Post.—His Instructions to General Ripley.—He Recommends Colonel Rhett for Promotion.—Work Done by the Garrison of Sumter.—Gradual Transformation of the Fort.—Colonel Rhett Withdrawn, with the Artillery Regulars, and Major Elliott Placed in Command, with Infantry Guard.—Instructions Given to General Ripley.—Knowledge of the Enemy's Purpose to Attack Cummings's Point.—How the "Key" to his Signals was Procured.—Enemy Foiled.—History of the Two Heavy Guns at Battery Wagner.—Admiral Dahlgren Demands the Surrender of Sumter.—General Beauregard's Answer.—Combined Federal Attack on Sumter.—Its Failure.—Major Elliott's Journal.—Important Letters and Instructions of General Beauregard.—President Davis Visits Savannah and Charleston.—Cordial Reception Tendered him in Charleston.—His Address.—His Omission to Mention or Praise the Officers in Command of the Works, of the Military Districts and of the Department.—Slight Reference made in his Book to the Defence of Charleston.—Errors in his Account of the Evacuation of Sumter.—Partial After-correction.

IN order to form a correct opinion of the precise condition of Fort Sumter after the bombardment (of which a description was given in the preceding chapter), based on Colonel Rhett's and the Engineers' reports, the following order, on the 24th of August, was forwarded to Colonel Harris:

"*Colonel*,—General Beauregard directs that you proceed immediately to Fort Sumter (together with Colonel Gilmer, if agreeable to him), to confer with Colonel Rhett, his Chief of Artillery, and Lieutenant Johnson, Engineers, to report upon the defences of the place and the advisability of abandoning the work. In attempting to reach the fort the General desires that a proper regard should be had to your own safety. You must not undertake the trip, if too dangerous.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"A. N. TOUTANT BEAUREGARD, A. D. C."

Colonels Gilmer and Harris complied with these instructions,

and, the next day, presented the following report to Department Headquarters:

"In compliance with the above letter, a council of officers, consisting of Colonel Gilmer, C. S. Corps of Engineers; Colonel Rhett, 1st S. C. Artillery; Colonel Harris, C. S. Corps of Engineers; Captain F. H. Harleston, 1st S. C. Artillery; and Lieutenant Johnson, Corps of Engineers, met at Fort Sumter on the afternoon of the 24th of August, 1863.

"Captain Harleston acted as recorder.

"The first proposition proposed for consideration was—'The present offensive condition of the fort.'

"Lieutenant Johnson, Engineer Corps: 'The present offensive condition of the fort is very limited: one very fine gun (11-inch), capable of being fired with advantage, two others (10-inch) at disadvantage, in consequence of shattered condition of parapet.'

"Captain Harleston: Of same opinion as Lieutenant Johnson.

"Major Blanding: 'The offensive condition of the fort is very nearly destroyed; only one gun (11-inch) that can be used with any advantage.'

"Colonel Harris: Endorses Lieutenant Johnson's opinion.

"Colonel Rhett: 'In action would be impracticable to use but one gun—the 11-inch—and that would soon be disabled.'

"Colonel Gilmer: Of the same opinion as Lieutenant Johnson.

"Second Proposition.

"'Can offensive power still be given to these guns by additional cover and change of location?'

"Lieutenant Johnson: 'Yes, by sand-bag epaulements and timber platforms.'

"Captain Harleston: Considers it impracticable, on account of present shattered condition of the fort, and that sufficient time will not be allowed.

"Major Blanding: Agrees with Captain Harleston.

"Colonel Harris: 'It can be done in present condition of fort, if time is allowed.'

"Colonel Rhett: Would like to see it carried out, but considers it impracticable.

"Colonel Gilmer: 'It is entirely within the capacity of the Engineer to accomplish the work in the manner suggested by Lieutenant Johnson, if not under fire, at night, when the fire ceases.'

"Third Proposition.

"'Capacity of the fort as a defensive position, in its present condition, against a barge attack, and the number of men needed.'

"Lieutenant Johnson: 'I think the capacity of the fort sufficient, and that it needs three hundred muskets.'

"Captain Harleston: 'I think the capacity of the fort sufficient, and that it needs from two hundred and fifty to three hundred muskets.'

"Major Blanding: 'Without outside assistance, in its present condition, five hundred muskets will be needed.'

"Colonel Harris: Agrees with Lieutenant Johnson.

"Colonel Rhett: 'The navy will not be able to assist in attack from barges; the fort can be held, in its present condition, with no less force than four hundred effective men; and a large part of these should be kept under arms during the night, as barges can come within fifty yards without being seen.'

"Colonel Gilmer: 'The defensive capacity of the fort is sufficient, if garrisoned with three hundred effective men, giving them the assistance of splinter-proof cover and sand-bag epaulements.'

"Fourth Proposition.

"'Power of the fort to preserve its present defensive condition against probable attacks.'

"Lieutenant Johnson: 'Against the probable combined attacks of the fleet Parrott guns and mortars—thirty-six hours.'

"Captain Harleston: Agrees with Lieutenant Johnson.

"Major Blanding: 'Against a combined vigorous attack—twelve hours.'

"Colonel Harris: Cannot undertake to answer as regards time.

"Colonel Rhett: 'The eastern wall is much shattered by fire of the 7th of April, and has never been repaired, except two casemates which have been rebuilt with new masonry; the wall has been reinforced in the casemates with sand-bags; it has also been seriously damaged by the fire from the land batteries on Morris Island. My opinion is that a fire from the iron fleet, from two to three hours, would destroy the integrity of the wall, if it did not bring it down.

"'A combined fire from land batteries on Morris Island, with a monitor attack, would most probably bring down a large part of the wall. The inner corner wall of eastern magazine is now cracked. The fort wall adjoining the pier of the upper magazine has been completely shot away; and I think a concentrated fire of two hours on the junction of the upper and lower magazines would render the magazines unsafe.

"'The north wall of the upper western magazine is unprotected, and is exposed to a reverse fire from the fleet, firing one or two points north of perpendicular to east face of fort. A few shots upon this wall, striking about the junction of upper and lower magazines, would render the magazines unsafe. This place is now being reinforced with eight feet of sand. The roof of the hospital is now only protected by brick arches that would be crushed through by a few shells.'

"Colonel Gilmer: 'From the examination I have been able to make, as to the effect of the bombardment up to this time, I think the fort will remain tenable against any probable attack for many days, if the Engineer officer be supplied with the labor and material necessary to reinforce points comparatively weak.'

"ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

"ORMSBY BLANDING, Major, 1st S. C. Art'y.

"F. H. HARLESTON, Capt., 1st S. C. Art'y.

"JOHN JOHNSON, 1st Lieut., Engr. Corps, P. A. C. S.

"The foregoing is a correct report of what occurred at the consultation of the officers named; but we do not consider it as embodying our opinion in full as to the advisability of abandoning the work, as called for by the Commanding General, in a letter a copy of which is embraced in the foregoing proceedings.

"J. F. GILMER, Col. and Chief-Engr. of Bureau,

"D. B. HARRIS, Lieut.-Col. and Chief-Engr. of Dept."

Accompanying the foregoing report was this additional paper :

"OFFICE OF CHIEF-ENGINEER, CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 25th, 1863.*

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD, etc., etc. :

"*General*,—We have the honor to report that in compliance with your instructions we visited Fort Sumter yesterday afternoon, made a careful examination of its condition, and held a consultation with a portion of its officers.

"In addition to our answers to certain questions propounded at that consultation we beg leave to state that, in our opinion, it is not advisable to abandon the fort at this time. On the contrary, we think it should be held to the last extremity. How long it may hold out is now only a matter of conjecture; but there are many elements of defence within the fort, in its present shattered condition, which, if properly used, may enable a resolute garrison to hold it for many days.

"The question of its abandonment, whenever it may arise, we respectfully suggest should be determined by the Commanding General, and not left to the discretion of the Commander of the fort.

"We have the honor to be, General, very respectfully yours,

"J. F. GILMER, Col. and Chief-Engr. of Bureau.

"D. B. HARRIS, Lieut.-Col. and Chief-Engr. of Dept."

Incomplete, though sufficient in many respects, as was this hurried examination of Sumter, it confirmed General Beauregard in his determination already taken, that the fort should not be evacuated. He therefore approved the conclusions arrived at by Colonels Gilmer and Harris, and began his arrangements accordingly. The Artillery Department, he considered, had accomplished its task in the defence of that post—the entrance-gate of Charleston Harbor—and it now devolved upon the infantry arm of the service, aided by labor, "the pick, spade, and shovel," to perform the part required of them, until, if possible, other heavy guns could be mounted, under cover, amid the ruins that still bade defiance to the combined attacks of the land and naval forces of the enemy. It was a grave responsibility to assume, but General Beauregard resolutely took it upon himself; and thus, through him and those who defended Sumter, does its record remain, from Rhett to Elliott, from Elliott to Mitchel and Hu-

guenin, and the men who fought under them, a grand story of engineering skill, soldierly daring, fortitude, and endurance. Thus, also, as was eloquently said by General B. H. Rutledge, in an address delivered in Charleston,* "While Greece has her Thermopylæ, England her Waterloo, the United States her Yorktown, South Carolina has her Fort Sumter."

As soon, therefore, as most of its heavy guns, including those which the enemy's land-batteries on Morris Island had disabled and those which were previously removed, to prevent further loss, had been transferred to the inner circle of fortifications, the following order was given to the Commander of the First Military District:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 27th*, 1863.

"Brigadier-General R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

"*General*,—The Commanding General instructs me to direct the reduction of the garrison of Fort Sumter to a force of one company of artillery and two full companies of infantry—that is, the command not to exceed three hundred or fall below two hundred men.†

"Of course you will select the companies, which must be of the best in your command of both arms; but it has been suggested that Captain Harleston's company of the First Regiment of Artillery would be suitable. The infantry should be carefully selected, and might be relieved once a week.

"As the garrison will thus be so much reduced, it may be that Colonel Rhett will prefer to remove the headquarters of his regiment; in which event he will be assigned to the important command of Fort Johnson and adjacent batteries. He has the option to do this, or retain the command of Fort Sumter. In the former event, Major Stephen Elliott will be assigned to the command of Fort Sumter.

"The Commanding General has witnessed with genuine pride and gratification the defence made of Fort Sumter by Colonel Rhett, his officers and men, of the 1st Regiment of South Carolina Regular Artillery—noble fruits of the discipline, the application to their duty, and the soldierly bearing of the officers and men, and of the organization of the regiment. In the annals of war no stouter defence was ever made, and no work ever before encountered as formidable a bombardment as that under which Fort Sumter has been successfully held.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,
"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

* November 30th, 1882, on the occasion of the unveiling of the Confederate monument in Charleston.

† One hundred and fifty men and four officers of Colquitt's brigade, of Georgians, were the first detail of infantry introduced into Sumter, under Captain Worthen.

This deserved tribute was read to the regiment at dress parade, amid the roar of shot and shell, and, coming as it did from one who could judge so well of true soldierly merit, produced a gratifying effect upon these valiant men, who had unflinchingly performed their duty. As further evidence of the estimation in which he held Colonel Rhett, General Beauregard, shortly after this occurrence, strongly recommended him for promotion; but, as was so often the case with applications of this kind, no action was taken in the matter by the Administration.

Colonel Rhett remained in command of Sumter as late as the 4th of September. When the last detachment of his artillery regiment was removed he retired, with his disciplined Regulars. From August 17th to that date his journal shows what havoc, both interior and exterior, the Federal breaching batteries and naval forces had made on the fort.* The following details, taken from his report of September 4th, forwarded, through General Ripley, to Department Headquarters, show the work which was done at the fort and its condition at that time:

“ * * * Engineers engaged in preparing bomb-proofs and in opening embrasures in second tier of casemates, for the purpose of throwing out two 42-pounder rifled guns. During the night the 11-inch gun and the 32-pounder rifled gun were thrown over the parapet without injury, both guns having been previously disabled. There is now not a single gun *en barbette*; and there is but one (smooth-bore 32-pounder, next the sally-port on western face) that can be fired. Mr. F. Mathews,† assisted by an officer and men of the Confederate States Navy, has done good service in removing disabled guns from the fort, having dismantled and removed one 10-inch gun and one 9-inch Dahlgren. He has also removed from the berme of the fort the Brooke gun, another 10-inch, an 8-inch, and one 32-pounder rifled gun. Lieutenant Rhett, with Company B, has dismantled the Brooke gun, two 10-inch, one 8-inch, one 42-pounder, rifled, the 11-inch, and one 32-pounder rifled gun, in the last fortnight.

“ The northeast and northwest *terre-pleins* have fallen in. The western wall has a crack in it, extending entirely through from parapet to berme. The greater portion of southern wall is down; the upper eastern magazine is penetrated; the lower eastern magazine wall is cracked. The east wall is very nearly shot away; a large portion of the wall is down, the ramparts gone, and nearly every casemate breached, and the remaining wall very thin.

* See Appendix.

† General Beauregard refers to this patriotic citizen in his Morris Island report. See preceding chapter.

The casemates, however, on eastern face are filled with sand, sufficient to protect the garrison from shells.


"I consider it impossible to either mount or use guns on any part of the parapet; and I deem the fort in its present condition unserviceable for offensive purposes. What the Engineers may effect by rebuilding or remodelling I am unable to say. Lot of ordnance stores shipped by *Etiwan* last night. Lieutenant Grimball, Company E, assigned to ordnance duty, has rendered efficient service in the collection and shipping of ordnance stores. Captain J. T. Champney's Engineer Corps has reported for duty at this post. Major-General Gilmer and Lieutenant-Colonel Harris visited the fort about half-past eleven o'clock last night. Brigadier-General Ripley also came over about ten o'clock this morning. The enemy opened fire from battery on Black Island last evening.

"ALFRED RHETT, Colonel Commanding."

Now began that singular metamorphosis—that undertaking unheard of before—by which, out of the crumbling walls of what had once been Fort Sumter, a new and powerful earthwork was slowly but unremittingly constructed. This was done often under fire. The *débris*, consisting of brick, mortar, shot, and shell, was supplemented by boat-loads of sand painfully brought, by night, from the adjoining islands, after the parade-ground of the fort had furnished all the earth that could be obtained from that source. The appendices to this and the preceding chapter show at whose main suggestion and under whose special guidance this novel work was carried out and, step by step, perfected. General Beauregard's orders and instructions, which are there given, exhibit once more his forethought and unequalled method of grouping together the details of his plans and neglecting nothing. He was now in his favorite sphere of action, with a problem almost exclusively of engineering skill to solve; fighting his enemy "with sand, pick, spade, and shovel," and showing, as Mr. Davis himself had said, about a year before, how "his qualifications peculiarly fitted him" for such a defence.*

But his attention was not confined to Fort Sumter. Battery Wagner, Fort Ripley, and Castle Pinckney, "the provisioning and ammunitioning of Morris, James, and Sullivan's islands," and of Christ Church Parish, also engrossed much of his time and thought. He again recurred, at this time, to the urgent

* Words used by Mr. Davis, September 13, 1862, in his interview with a committee of Congressmen, on the subject of General Beauregard's transfer to the Army of the West. See Chapter XXV.



FORT SUMTER BEFORE AND AFTER THE WAR.—1861 AND 1865.

necessity of increasing the limited number of negro laborers furnished by the planters of the State. He ordered torpedoes to be placed between Forts Sumter and Moultrie, in Hog Island Channel, towards Sullivan's Island Point, in Folly Island Channel, and in the Middle Channel, east of Pinckney. He likewise gave most stringent orders to battery commanders to put a stop to all useless waste of ammunition. These measures were taken in anticipation of a renewed naval attempt by Admiral Dahlgren to remove the obstructions in the Main Channel and, afterwards, to pass into the harbor.

At about that time General Beauregard had occasion to propound to Brigadier-General Ripley a number of important interrogatories, relative to the capture of the southern end of Morris Island, and as to the causes which brought about that result. He was preparing to write his report of that untoward event, which had given rise to criticism and censure on the part of the Secretary of War. These interrogatories, and General Ripley's answers thereto, will be found in full in the appendix to this chapter. They confirm what we have already said upon the subject.

On the 3d of September, Fort Sumter being ready for the transformation it was about to undergo, and the guns of James and Sullivan's islands being trained to protect it from assault by water, General Beauregard caused the following instructions to be forwarded to Brigadier-General Ripley:

"General,—In reply to your letter of this date, suggesting the reduction of the garrison in occupation of Fort Sumter, I am instructed to say that the artillery, for the reasons stated by you, will now be withdrawn and an infantry force substituted, of two hundred rifles or muskets. This will make it proper to relieve Colonel Rhett, and to place him in his proper position with his regiment and command, to which you will please assign him.

"Major Stephen Elliott will be directed to report to you for assignment to the command of Fort Sumter. Inasmuch as he is at present ignorant of the localities in the fort, it will be proper to request Colonel Rhett to remain for at least twelve hours, or until he can make Major Elliott properly acquainted with the means of shelter and defence left, and with all other details the knowledge of which (with Colonel Rhett's experience) he may deem it essential that Major Elliott should know.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

General Beauregard had taken more than ordinary pains in the selection of Colonel Rhett's successor. He was solicitous that

none but an officer of undoubted coolness and courage should take the place of the gallant commander, whose sphere of duty, now changed, called him and his artillerists to the land batteries, whither most of Sumter's heavy guns had already been transferred and mounted. Fifty days elapsed before the second bombardment of Fort Sumter commenced.

Major Stephen Elliott, from Beaufort, South Carolina, was a relative of the Hon. R. W. Barnwell, of Bishop Stephen Elliott, and of Colonel Alfred Rhett. He was a young officer of well-earned esteem, modest, thoroughly self-possessed, and dauntless, and his family connections were influential in the State. He was, therefore, worthy of the confidence reposed in him by the Commanding General. The incident of his interview with the latter, previous to his assignment to the command of Sumter, is worthy of record.

"You are to be sent to a fort," said General Beauregard, "deprived of all offensive capacity, and having now but one gun—a 32-pounder—with which to salute its flag, morning and evening. But that fort is Fort Sumter, the key to the entrance of this harbor. It must be held to the bitter end: not with artillery, as heretofore, but with infantry alone; and there can be no hope of reinforcements. Are you willing to take the command upon such terms?" And, without giving Major Elliott time to formulate an answer, General Beauregard added, "I desire that you shall take twenty-four hours to reflect, and that meanwhile you shall examine the fort, before taking a final decision."

A few hours later Major Elliott returned to Department Headquarters, and, being once more in the presence of the Commanding General, in his own simple, earnest manner, said,

"I visited Sumter, and conferred with Colonel Rhett. Issue the order, General; I will obey it."

The order was issued, and on the evening of the 4th of September Major Elliott assumed command of the ruins of Fort Sumter.

On the next day the following important communication was forwarded to the Commander of the First Military District:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 5th*, 1863.

"Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

"General,—Forewarned of the enemy's purpose to attack the battery at Cummings's Point, the Commanding General hopes we may be able to foil

and convert it into a signal disaster, to which end he wishes you to acquaint Flag-officer Tucker of the project, and request him to take such a position with his ships as may enable him to sweep with his fire the interior face of Morris Island and the mouth of Vincent's Creek. Battery Simpkins will fire likewise so as to sweep in front of the mouth of the same creek, and, later, to the left of Cummings's Point. Battery Bee will be specially enjoined to direct her fire between Fort Sumter and Cummings's Point, so as to assist the gunboats in sweeping the interior water face of Morris Island. Some of the guns of Fort Moultrie must also be brought to bear on the same face of the island, the rest of her armament giving attention to the monitors, but being employed in strict conformity with the views of the Commanding General, hitherto expressed, on the subject of the fire of the Sullivan's Island batteries at the monitors, at ranges which can promise no material results. This, of course, is not to be construed to prevent a fire when the monitors are seeking to run past, which it is believed may be determined in time by the exercise of judgment when such an effort is really being made.

"Should the attempt on Battery Gregg be discovered in time at that point, rockets should be used there to give warning to our batteries and the navy, and small fires on Cummings's Point might be carefully located so as to assist to indicate it to our batteries without giving material advantage to the enemy.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

The knowledge of the enemy's purpose had been obtained by reading a signal despatch from General Gillmore to Admiral Dahlgren, which ran thus:

"MORRIS ISLAND, *Sept. 5th*, 1863: 1.50 P. M.

"I shall try Cummings's Point to-night, and want the sailors again early. Will you please send in two or three monitors just before dark, to open on Moultrie as a diversion? The last time they were in they stopped reinforcements, and may do so to-night.

"I don't want any fire in the rear. Please answer immediately."

The "key" by which we were enabled to decipher the enemy's messages had been in our possession for several weeks. It had been obtained as follows: General Beauregard, in his anxiety to understand the enemy's movements, requested his chief signal officer, Captain Manigault, to endeavor to make out the meaning of the signals exchanged between the Federal land and naval forces. This, however, Captain Manigault was unable to do; then, at the suggestion of General Beauregard, another expedient was resorted to—namely, the capture of one of the enemy's advanced signal-pickets, in the Third Military District. This picket was brought to Charleston, and from him, through the devices of

Captain Pliny Bryan,* A. A. G., the much-desired "key" was finally secured. This important discovery was of incalculable advantage, and enabled the Commanding General to be ever prepared against a surprise.

The next morning (September 6th) Admiral Dahlgren asked, "Did you succeed last night?" and General Gillmore answered, "We found the enemy prepared at Cummings's Point, and failed."†

Being apprised in the same manner of the day and hour fixed for the final assault on Wagner (September 6th, at 9 P. M.), General Beauregard was able to perfect his plans for the prearranged evacuation of that work, and not only saved the garrison, but deprived the enemy of nearly—if not quite—all the fruits of his victory, as appears by the following signal despatch:

"MORRIS ISLAND, *Sept. 7th*, 1863: 5.10 A. M.

"Admiral DAHLGREN:

"The whole island is ours, but the enemy have escaped us.

"GENERAL GILLMORE."

While, in the course of this narrative, we have been led to refer again to Battery Wagner, whose illustrious record so fully appears in General Beauregard's report of the defence of Morris Island,‡ it is also appropriate, we think, to give here the remarkable history of the only two heavy guns of that work (10-inch columbiads) bearing on the outer harbor of Charleston. They had been cast at the Tredegar Works, in Richmond. Both were surrounded with massive traverses and merlons, forming a perfect "well," or chamber, for each, and an open embrasure, which was filled up with sand-bags (always kept close at hand) whenever—and this was of frequent occurrence—the fire of the fleet was concentrated on these guns.

These two guns were repeatedly dismounted by the enemy's

* Captain Pliny Bryan, of Maryland, was a member of the Legislature of that State at the beginning of the war. He reported to General Beauregard, at Manassas, and was, shortly afterwards, appointed in the Adjutant-General's Department. He was active, intelligent, zealous, and did good service during the siege of Charleston. He died in the summer of 1864, from exposure to the sun while in the performance of his duties.

† "Engineer and Artillery Operations against Charleston," by General Gillmore, p. 335. See also p. 337.

‡ See preceding chapter.

heavy shells falling into their chambers. One of them was soon disabled, but the other remained uninjured to the last, though its chassis and carriage had, more than once, to be renewed. It had become necessary also to "rebush" it, or, in other words, change and repair its vent, which had been much enlarged by the heavy charges used in firing it, a fact which materially affected its accuracy and range.

The artillerists serving at the two pieces were occasionally compelled to take shelter in the bomb-proofs, after temporarily filling up the embrasures with sand-bags, as already explained. Hence the smallness of our loss. "In the history of no siege, except that of Fort Sumter," writes General Beauregard, "do we find such coolness, perseverance, and bravery as shown by these gallant officers and men, who belonged to the 1st South Carolina Regulars, forming the garrison of Fort Sumter. All honor to that regiment, whose heroism will forever stand pre-eminent in the annals of this war."

It was the opinion of General Beauregard—and he had so expressed himself on the night of the evacuation of Morris Island—that Admiral Dahlgren would soon attempt some movement of his own, if only to keep pace with the success of the land-forces under General Gillmore; and that in such an event Fort Sumter, now apparently harmless, would probably be the object of his attack. This had become much the more likely because the Admiral—emboldened, no doubt, by his coadjutor's recent achievement—had, as early as 6.35 A. M., on the morning of the 7th, demanded, by flag of truce, the surrender of Fort Sumter. "If not complied with," he telegraphed to General Gillmore, "I will move up with all the ironclads and engage it." * Major Elliott had declined the request; and having referred the matter to Department Headquarters, immediately received this significant reply: "Tell Admiral Dahlgren to come and take it." †

Previous to this, and in view of a probable assault on the ruins of Sumter, General Beauregard had ordered the nearest harbor batteries bearing on the fort to practise daily on the foot of its outside *débris*, to obtain the exact range and length of fuses required, marking the carriages, chassis, and traverse circles, so that

* General Gillmore's book, p. 335.

† General Hagood's narrative of the defence of Morris Island.

the firing of each piece might be almost as accurate at night as in the daytime. He had also arranged a system of signals for opening fire, in case of need, and for its cessation at the proper moment. The Commander of Fort Sumter had been specially enjoined to be vigilant, and the commanders of the batteries to have detachments all night at each trained gun, so as to be able, instantly, to open fire on the water approach, whenever the signal to do so should be given from Fort Sumter.

Admiral Dahlgren did not carry out his threat of attacking with all his ironclads, but fixed upon the night of the 8th to make an assault on Sumter, and so informed General Gillmore, who, by a singular coincidence, had also organized an assaulting party for the same night, composed of "two small regiments," while the Admiral, it seems, had "assembled five hundred men" for the purpose.* But there was, evidently, no concert of action between them. Both claimed the right of conducting the expedition, and neither would yield to the wish of the other. General Gillmore thought that "an operation of this kind" should "be under command of the senior officer"—meaning the officer to be sent with the land forces—and Admiral Dahlgren would not "consent to let the commander be other than a naval officer."†

The result was the complete failure of the assault, as appears by the following extract from Major Elliott's journal, dated Sumter, September 9th:

"* * * At 1 A. M. this morning I saw a fleet of barges approaching from the eastward. I ordered the fire to be reserved until they should arrive within a few yards of the fort. The enemy attempted to land on the southeastern and southern faces; he was received by a well-directed fire of musketry and by hand-grenades, which were very effective in demoralizing him; fragments of the epaulement were also thrown down upon him. The crews near the shore sought refuge in the recesses of the foot of scarp, those further off in flight. The repulse was decided, and the assault was not renewed. His force is reported to have been four hundred men, but it is believed to have been much larger.† His loss is four men killed, two officers and ninety-two men

* See, in General Gillmore's book, pp. 338, 339, signal despatches between Admiral Dahlgren and General Gillmore. † Ibid., p. 339.

† In his despatch of September 8th to General Gillmore, Admiral Dahlgren spoke of his assaulting party as being composed of 500 men. In a subsequent paper, referred to by Mr. Charles Cowley in "Leaves from a Lawyer's Life, Afloat and Ashore," p. 108, Admiral Dahlgren alludes to the same party as being "a fine naval column of 450 picked men."

captured. We secured five stand of colors and five barges; others were disabled and drifted off. One gunboat and Fort Johnson and the Sullivan's Island batteries enfiladed our faces, and contributed to prevent the renewal of the assault. Many of the shots struck the fort. The garrison, consisting of the Charleston Battalion, behaved admirably; all praise is due to Major Blake, his officers and men, for the promptness and gallantry displayed in the defence.

"September 9th, 4.20 A. M.—Additional two officers captured are First Lieutenant Charles H. Bradford, U. S. Marines, wounded; E. G. Dayton, executive officer, *Wissahickon*.

"One of our gunboats assisted during the fight—unable to communicate with it afterwards.

"4.45.—Enemy attacked me in barges. We have captured thirteen officers, one hundred and two (102) men, four boats, and three colors. Not one of my men hurt."

The fire of our guns from James and Sullivan's islands had surprised and demoralized the assaulting forces. Many of the boats at once put back. The troops in those that were foremost sought refuge on the berme of the fort, and held up their hands in token of surrender. Had our batteries remained silent until the whole Federal detachment had left the barges, it is probable that the 500 or 450 "picked men" alluded to by Admiral Dahlgren would have fallen into our hands. But though our success could have been more complete, it was, nevertheless, highly satisfactory, and brought forth the following congratulatory letter from General Beauregard:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 9th*, 1863.

"Major STEPHEN ELLIOTT, Comdg. Fort Sumter, etc., etc.:

"*Major*,—The Commanding General directs me to compliment you and your garrison on the brilliant success of this morning. He hopes that all future attempts of the enemy to take Sumter will meet with the same result. The General will endeavor to have the prisoners removed in the course of the day or to-night. Should, meanwhile, the enemy bombard Sumter, and you have not enough cover for your command, you will expose the prisoners, instead of your troops, to the enemy's fire.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"A. N. T. BEAUREGARD, A. D. C."

The events succeeding those we have just related—but which are, relatively, of minor importance—are sufficiently explained by the following letters and instructions of General Beauregard to his subordinate officers, to the War Department, and to generals and citizens of note in South Carolina and elsewhere:

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 10th, 1863.*

“Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

“*General*,—I am instructed to inform you of the arrival from Richmond of a party of one hundred and thirty officers and men, under the command of Lieutenant Rochelle, C. S. N. These men were ordered here for harbor service, and have been directed to report to Captain Tucker.

“The Commanding General desires you to confer with Captain Tucker, and determine what arrangement may be best to carry on and protect our communications with Sumter and Sullivan’s Island. He thinks that two or more launches, with howitzers, the torpedo-ram, and *Juno*, should be used exclusively for that purpose.

“Captain Haskell’s launch, the one captured by the *Juno*, and others, might be fitted up at once for the police of the harbor, and to protect Captain Gray in putting down torpedoes in the outside channel.

“You will please give your immediate attention to the organization of the water transportation and harbor police, and ascertain from Captain Tucker how far he may be able to assist, or whether he would prefer superintending the organization himself. Of course the two—transportation and harbor police—should be under the control of the same head.

“Respectfully, your obedient servant,

“THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.”

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 14th, 1863.*

“Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

“*General*,—I am instructed by the Commanding General to ask you the following questions, and direct the execution of the following orders:

“1st. Are the roads and bridges from Fort Pemberton, along the Stono, to the upper batteries near the ‘Overflow’ in good condition? If not, they should at once be so made. All those batteries and those in rear of the ‘Overflow’ must be connected, as soon as practicable, by a good wagon-road, passing not far in their rear along the shortest lines.

“2d. Have you yet made arrangements about employing those officers and sailors from Richmond for guarding the harbor at night, and for communicating with Sullivan’s Island, in case of necessity?

“3d. Has that picket been maintained or re-established at Marsh Battery, north of Vincent’s Creek? It was doubtless through that creek that the boats of the enemy passed which captured ours at Cummings’s Point. You will please explain why the orders relative to said picket were neglected.

“4th. It is reported by Major Elliott that the ordnance artificer sent to Fort Sumter to collect old iron, etc., remained there but one day. You will please have another sent, with orders to remain as long as necessary.

“5th. Can the 10-inch columbiad still remaining in Fort Sumter be removed to the city? If practicable, request Mr. Lacoste to do so at once.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“JNO. F. O’BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G.”

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 15th, 1863.*

"Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

"*General*,—I am instructed to communicate to you the following orders of the Commanding General:

"1st. That the treble-banded Brooke gun which burst on Sullivan's Island be brought to the city as soon as practicable.

"2d. That, if not already done, the other Brooke gun which arrived from Richmond be forthwith sent to Sullivan's Island. This was ordered several days ago.

"3d. That you will please inform these Headquarters whether the order in reference to the picket at Monk's Corner has yet been complied with, and any deserters arrested.

"4th. That you turn over, temporarily, to Lieutenant Rochelle, C. S. N., for army transportation and guard purposes in the harbor, all row-boats, barges, etc., not required for your current wants, taking proper receipts.

"5th. That, as soon as possible, you have removed from Fort Sumter all the lead, copper, good carriages, and chassis, etc., especially the carriage and chassis of the 11-inch gun now required in the city.

"6th. That you have reconstructed the observatory at Secessionville, and also erect one near Battery Cheves or Haskell.

"7th. That the commanding officer at Fort Johnson be directed to employ actively the troops there in constructing bomb-proofs and rifle-pits.

"8th. That Colonel Butler, at Moultrie, be directed to employ actively as many of his regiment as practicable in removing the *débris* from the interior, to throw over the parapet into the ditch of the water-face, under the direction of the Engineer Department, to form a chemise to the scarp.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major and A. A. G."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 19th, 1863.*

"Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

"*General*,—The Commanding General instructs me to communicate the following orders:

"1st. That the batteries about Redoubt No. 1 fire occasionally on vessels in Light-house Creek, if their guns can reach that far without too great danger of bursting.

"2d. That Sumter and the surrounding batteries be supplied with a sure and well-understood signal for opening fire in case of another attack by barges.

"3d. That Fort Sumter be kept always fully supplied with at least one month's provisions for the garrison. You will please, in this connection, report the supply now on hand in that fort.

"I am also directed to inform you that the enemy is constructing a battery in rear of the middle of Black Island.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major and A. A. G."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 23d, 1863.*

"Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc. :

"*General*,—The Commanding General instructs me to inquire if Fort Sumter is amply provided with water.

"He also directs that, in the daytime, our batteries only fire on Morris Island and when they see the enemy actively at work, and at night they should fire only at irregular intervals. We must economize our ammunition and guns as much as possible for a long siege.

"It is the wish of the Commanding General that Fort Sumter be furnished with disinfectants, and that one company of the garrison be changed weekly.

"He further directs that you send a detachment of Earle's battery, under Captain Earle, with the larger Foote gun, to Buckingham Ferry, for the purpose of annoying the enemy's communication between Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOHN F. O'BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 23d, 1863.*

"Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc. :

"*General*,—It is the wish of the Commanding General that you call on Generals Hagood, Colquitt, and Taliaferro, and Colonels Keitt and Harrison, to furnish the names of such officers and men who have specially distinguished themselves for zeal and gallantry in the discharge of their duties on Morris Island during the turns of duty of those commanding officers on that island; also on Colonel Rhett and Major Elliott for the same in reference to the defence of Fort Sumter.

"You will also please carry out the following orders :

"Moultrie House, Sullivan's Island, not to be destroyed by our troops unless too close to our batteries. It serves as a good object to draw the enemy's fire.

"The 8-inch rifled and banded gun heretofore ordered to the foot of Laurens Street (where a 10-inch gun has been put) will be sent to Fort Moultrie; Colonels Butler and Harris to determine its position.

"The 11-inch gun on Sullivan's Island will have to be transferred to the eastern chamber of Battery Bee, designated by Commanding General to Engineer officer, to a position east of an 8-inch columbiad.

"The old 32-pounder rifled gun (No. 27) in Moultrie should be sent to the city for re-rifling, and a proper mechanic to Moultrie, to bush another 32-pounder, rifled, in position there.

"The sand-bags of embrasures to be kept wet during action. The Yates traversing arrangements in Moultrie and the outside batteries appear to be all out of order, which was not the case in Fort Sumter. Order an ordnance officer to see to this at once. If Colonel Yates be available, order him to make an investigation forthwith.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"H. W. FIELDEN, Capt. and A. A. G."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 25th*, 1863.

"Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc., etc. :

"*Colonel*,—I am instructed to say in this way what has already been communicated to you verbally by the Commanding General—that he approves of every measure practicable to give Fort Sumter means for contributing to the general defence of the entrance of the harbor; and, therefore, he desires certain casemates in northeast face, which Major-General Gilmer* has designated in his communication of the 23d instant, to be put in condition to receive two 10-inch columbiads, one 42-pounder, and one 32-pounder, rifled and banded; these pieces to be thoroughly protected from a rear and vertical fire of the enemy's batteries.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 29th*, 1863.

"Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc. :

"*General*,—The Commanding General instructs me to inquire whether the traversing arrangements of the guns on Sullivan's Island have been put in order. They needed repairs last week. He desires also that you will send an artificer to Fort Ripley to remedy the defects in the traversing arrangements of the guns at that point, as they are represented as being out of order.

"The General also directs that Fort Ripley be supplied with one hundred and fifty to two hundred rounds of shot to the gun. There are now only one hundred and twenty-eight. Finally, the General directs me to say that there is too much powder at Fort Ripley. The surplus will be removed to Castle Pinckney, if required there for its three guns, one of which will be added to its present arrangement.

Very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"CLIFTON H. SMITH, Asst. Adjt.-Genl."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 30th*, 1863.

"General SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-General, Richmond, Va. :

"*General*,—The published report of Brigadier-General Gillmore, of the 7th instant, to his government, relative to his acquisition of Batteries Wagner and Gregg, contains several errors, which I feel called upon to correct.

"1st. Seventy-five men were not taken on Morris Island, for only two boats' crews—about 19 men and 27 sailors, or about 46 men in all—were captured by the enemy's armed barges between Cummings's Point and Fort Sumter.

"2d. Colonel Keitt's captured despatches could not have shown that the garrison of Wagner and Gregg amounted to 'between 1500 and 1600 effective men on the day of the evacuation (6th inst.),' for Colonel Keitt reported that morning 900 men, all told, only about two-thirds of whom could be considered 'effectives;' the others being wounded, or more or less disabled from exposure for so long a period to the weather and the incessant fire, day and

* Promoted, about the 15th of September, 1863.

night, of the enemy's land and naval batteries. The forces holding these works and the north end of Morris Island, during the fifty-eight days' siege, varied from 1000 to 1200 men, seldom exceeding the latter number when it could be avoided.

"3d. Battery Wagner was not 'a work of the most formidable kind,' but an ordinary field-work, with thick parapets, but with ditches of little depth. The sand thrown up by the enemy's shells and drifted by the wind, during so long a siege, had nearly filled up the ditches in many places, and had partially covered up the explosive shells, spiked planks, and pikes placed in the ditch for its defence.*

"4th. The bomb-proof of Wagner could not contain 1800 men, or more than 600; the garrison of the work being about 800 men.

"5th. 'Nineteen pieces of artillery and a large supply of excellent ammunition were captured.' The pieces of heavy and light artillery left in Wagner and Gregg were more or less damaged, and all with their vents not too much enlarged were spiked. The carriages, châssis, etc., were more or less disabled by the enemy's shots and shells. Only 1800 pounds of ammunition (200 in Wagner and 1000 in Gregg) were left to explode the magazines and bomb-proofs; but, unfortunately, through some accident, the fuses left burning did not ignite the powder.

"6th. The city of Charleston may be completely covered by General Gillmore's guns on Morris Island, but at the distance of four miles from his advanced battery to the nearest point of the city.

"I will conclude by stating that, strange as it may appear, the total loss in killed and wounded on Morris Island, from July 10th to September 7th, 1863, was only 641 men; and, deducting the killed and wounded due to the landing on the 10th of July, and to the assaults of the 11th and 18th of July, the killed and wounded due to the terrible bombardment, which lasted almost uninterruptedly, night and day, during fifty-eight days, only amounted to 296 men, many of whom were only slightly wounded. It is still more remarkable that during the same period of time, when the enemy fired 6202 shots and shells at Fort Sumter, varying in weight from 30 pounds to 300 pounds, only 3 men were killed and 14 wounded. Indeed, the hand of the Almighty would seem to have protected the heroic garrison of that historic work.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 7th, 1863.

"General BRAXTON BRAGG, Commanding near Chattanooga, Tenn.:

"Dear General,—I have just been informed from Richmond that the Army of Virginia is about to take the offensive again, to prevent Meade from reinforcing Rosecrans, thus repeating, to a certain extent, the campaign of last

* See also General Gillmore's book, p. 74, § 168, where the same incorrect statements are made.

July into Pennsylvania, which *did not* save Middle Tennessee and the Mississippi Valley. You must, no doubt, recollect what I wrote on the subject to General Johnston, on the 15th of May* last, to endeavor to prevent that offensive campaign, which, I thought, would not effect the object in view.

"I now address you my views on the reported intentions of General Lee or the War Department, to see if our small available means cannot be used to a better purpose.

"It is evident to my mind that, admitting Lee's movement can prevent Meade from reinforcing Rosecrans and drive the former across the Potomac, Lee cannot prevent Rosecrans from being reinforced by about 40,000 or 50,000 men from Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Missouri, and the Mississippi Valley, in about one month's time; hence, admitting that Rosecrans has now about your own supposed effective force—say 60,000 men of all arms—he will then have about 110,000 men against 60,000.

"War being a contest of 'masses against fractions,' all other things being equal, you would certainly be defeated; then, either you must be reinforced from Johnston's or Lee's army, or Middle Georgia would be lost, and the Confederacy, now cut in two, would then be cut in three. Meanwhile, Meade, having been reinforced by the new levies of the enemy, and taking his time to organize and discipline them, would retake the offensive, and Lee would be driven back towards Richmond, admitting that his supplies would enable him to maintain his army that long on the south side of the Potomac; or a large army might be concentrated here, and, having taken this place and marched into the interior, towards Augusta, the Confederacy would again be subdivided; or, should the enemy find it impossible or too tedious to take Charleston, he might concentrate again his forces on the coast of North Carolina, and, marching to Raleigh or Weldon, would cut off all our present communications with Virginia.

"The question now arises, can these calamities be avoided, and in what way? If my opinion for once could be listened to, I would say again, act entirely on the defensive in Virginia, send you immediately 25,000 men from Lee's army, 5000 or 10,000 more from Johnston's forces, to enable you to take the offensive forthwith, and cross the Tennessee to crush Rosecrans before he can be reinforced to any large extent from any quarter. Then you could attack and defeat the enemy's reinforcements in detail, before they could be concentrated into a strong army.

"In the mean time, Lee, if necessary, could fall back within the lines around Richmond until a part of your army could be sent to his relief. I fear any other plan will, sooner or later, end in our final destruction in detail.

"Should you approve of this plan, can you not address it as your own to the War Department, in the hope of its being adopted? What I desire is our success. I care not who gets the credit for it. Our resources are fast getting exhausted; our people, I fear, are getting disheartened; for they can see no bright spot in the horizon to revive their drooping hopes after the patriotic sacrifices they have made in this terrible contest. Let us, then, unite

* See Chapter XXXI.

all our efforts in a last deadly struggle, and, with God's help, we shall yet triumph.

"I regret I have not time to pay you a short visit, to present you my views more fully, and to discuss with you our future operations.

"Wishing you ample success, I remain, sincerely your friend,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 8th, 1863.

"Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc. :

"*General*,—It is the wish of the Commanding General that you should at once have inquiries made where the fault lies in Evans's brigade not being properly supplied with ammunition.

"With the exception of the 22d South Carolina Volunteers, now on Sullivan's Island, none of the regiments are completely supplied with the regulation number of forty rounds.

"The 23d Regiment, stationed some seven miles from Brigade Headquarters, is extremely deficient, and has no immediate means of replacing any necessary consumption, as all ordnance wagons and ordnance sergeants are attached to Brigade Headquarters, and not with their respective regiments.

"Those regiments that are armed with rifles of 54 calibre say that the ordnance officer of the brigade cannot supply the required ammunition.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"H. W. FIELDEN, Capt., and Asst. Adjt.-General."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 28th, 1863.

"Major-General J. F. GILMER, Second in Command, etc., Savannah, Ga. :

"*General*,—On examination I find that General Mercer has now thirty-four companies in his command, on duty as heavy artillery, while the number of companies here, for manning all the batteries around Charleston, does not exceed thirty-eight. Of course, to man all his batteries on the most efficient footing, he has not too many—indeed, not as many as it would be desirable for him to have—but, relatively, it would appear that his force of heavy artillery is too large, and may be reduced without material detriment, when we consider the demands of the service elsewhere in the Department, and the chances for operations, or the risk of any serious movement for the reduction of Savannah, at least without some notice. Accordingly, Company E, 12th Battalion Georgia Volunteers, has been ordered here to join the rest of the battalion, and it will be well to see that it is replaced by a company of Olmstead's regiment (1st Georgia Volunteers), as there is one company of that regiment already there, and it is desirable to have homogeneity in the composition of these garrisons.

"There are, moreover, three companies (F, H, and I) of the 54th Regiment (Way's) Georgia Volunteers in the District of Georgia—two at Rosedew, and one at Beaulieu—on heavy artillery duty, which, I have suggested to the General, ought to be brought here for James Island and consolidated with the

other six companies for infantry service. Therefore the General Commanding instructs me to lay the matter before you, to investigate whether these companies may not be replaced either from Gordon's or Olmstead's regiment, and ordered here, without material risk of exposing Savannah to fall by a *coup de main*.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,
"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 29th, 1863.

"Colonel D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc. :

"Colonel,—The Commanding General directs that you will repair tonight to Fort Sumter, and give the necessary instructions for repairs to that fort.

"You will also determine, upon consultation with the commanding officer and local Engineer, what is the minimum garrison and force of laborers that should be kept at that post.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"CLIFTON H. SMITH, Asst. Adjt.-Genl."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 30th, 1863.

"Colonel ALFRED RHETT, Comdg. Fifth Mil. Dist., etc., etc. :

"Colonel,—Major Elliott must arrange, through you, with Generals Ripley and Hagood and Flag-officer Tucker, of the navy, some definite signal, upon the giving of which by him the batteries on Sullivan's and James islands, and the ironclads of our navy bearing on the several faces of that work, shall open fire so as to sweep every point of approach.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,
"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 30th, 1863.

"Brig.-Genl. JOHNSON HAGOOD, Comdg., etc., James Island, S. C. :

"General,—In reply to your letter of the 29th instant I am directed by the Commanding General to inform you that the Engineer Department has been ordered to alter the embrasure of one of the guns at Battery Simkins, so as to allow it to be brought to bear upon and against Fort Sumter if necessary.

"The right-hand gun of this battery cannot be thus altered without exposing it too much to the fire of the enemy from Gregg and Wagner.

"I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,
"CLIFTON H. SMITH, A. A. G."

"P. S.—The Commanding General further directs that you instruct the Engineer to close the embrasure at Battery Simkins every morning before daylight, as otherwise the gun may be dismounted by a fire from Battery Gregg.

Respectfully, C. H. S., A. A. G."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 30th, 1863.

"Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc. :

"*General*,—As a boat attack may be anticipated on Fort Sumter, after the heavy bombardment which that work has been undergoing for some days, the Commanding General directs that all the batteries bearing on it shall be held ready at night to sweep its exterior faces, at a concerted signal from Major Elliott, or whensoever the approach of hostile boats shall be evident. Concert of action, however, is most desirable.*

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 1st, 1863.

"His Excellency M. L. BONHAM, Governor of South Carolina, etc., etc. :

"*Governor*,—Your letter of the 24th inst. enclosing one from Colonel Waddy Thompson, and another from Messrs. Pullian and Patten, has been received. I have ordered a light battery to report at once to Colonel Williams, at Greenville, S. C. I regret as much as you do my inability to send mounted troops for the defence of that part of the State.

"It is not prudent to withdraw, at this critical moment, from my already too small forces a regiment of old troops from the defence of Charleston. So soon as it can be done with safety I will gladly send all the assistance in my power to Governor Vance.

"I remain, very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 4th, 1863.

"Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc. :

"*General*,—Enclosed is a telegram† received from Major Norris, Chief of Signal Corps, Richmond.

"The Commanding General wishes you to make all necessary arrangements for the contingency, and with a view to the rapid reinforcement of the command on Sullivan's Island from the troops in Christ Church, which portion of your district, however, should not be left uncovered until the decisive moment.

"He suggests, also, that the 20th Regiment S. C. V. (Keitt's), alternating with some other good regiment, should take post for the present on Sullivan's Island at night, returning to their encampments just before daylight, to escape observation.

Very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

* This order was also sent to Brigadier-General Hagood.

† This telegram, like many others from the same source, proved to be erroneous.

A copy of the telegram referred to was, on the same day, forwarded to General Taliaferro, commanding the Seventh Military District. He was directed "to hold his troops prepared at night for the emergency," and "to look particularly to the east lines exposed to approach from Morris Island, giving due regard, however, to the proper protection of the new lines." Brigadier-General Wise, commanding Sixth Military District, St. Andrew's Parish, was also instructed as to what course to follow, should he be called to the assistance of General Taliaferro.

The incident now about to be related is deserving of note. It produced a feeling of disappointment among some of the warmest friends of Mr. Davis.

About the middle of October, 1863, President Davis visited General Bragg at his headquarters near Dalton, to settle a difficulty then existing between that officer and his subordinate commanders, and to suggest Longstreet's assault on Knoxville. While returning to Richmond he stopped a day or two in Savannah and Charleston, and made it a point to inspect some of their defensive works and the gallant troops manning them.

Unable to go in person to welcome the President upon his arrival in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, General Beauregard sent several members of his staff—among whom were Colonel Roman and Lieutenant Chisolm—to perform that duty and accompany the distinguished visitor to Charleston. He reached there on the 2d of November, at about 1 P. M., and found General Beauregard awaiting him at the depot, or what served as such, with an imposing military escort. There was also a deputation of citizens, appointed by the civil authorities, to offer him the hospitalities of the city. But he declined their invitation, having already promised a personal friend—ex-Governor Aiken—to repair to his residence and make of it his headquarters during his short sojourn in Charleston.

The President was escorted with all due honor to the City Hall, where he gave a public reception, after delivering an eloquent and patriotic address. He spoke of almost every topic of the war, except one. The defence of Charleston at that time had lasted more than seven months, and, in face of the dreadful reverses of Gettysburg and Vicksburg and the general gloom resulting from them, it alone kept up the hope and spirits of the South. The officers and men had signally distinguished themselves during that

desperate and glorious siege. Several of them had been justly recommended for promotion. Yet he found but a single one to praise—Major Stephen D. Elliott, the recently chosen commander of Sumter, placed there after the first bombardment was over and the regular artillery withdrawn. Not one word of General Beauregard, who stood at his elbow while he spoke; not one word of Generals Taliaferro, Hagood, Colquitt, and Ripley, of Colonels Rhett, Butler, Harris, Keitt, and Harrison, or of the brave men who fought with and under them, was said by Mr. Davis, the Commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces of the Confederate States. The President was speaking to Carolinians, in the heart of their devoted city. Such was his justice to those whose genius, courage, and unsurpassed fortitude had attracted the admiration of Europe and the respect of their enemies.

When the reception was over Governor Aiken invited the Mayor, some of the leading citizens, and the ranking officers present, to dine at his house with the President. Some accepted; General Beauregard did not. He thought that, after the singular manner in which he and his subordinate commanders had just been treated, he could without impropriety free himself from all but official courtesies towards Mr. Davis. He therefore contented himself with accompanying the latter on his tour of inspection around James and Sullivan's islands, and with explaining to him all that had been done, since the destruction of Sumter, to perfect the interior harbor defences and lines in and about Charleston.

From General Hagood's narrative of the defence of James and Morris islands, from July, 1863, to the early part of 1864, we take the following passage:

"In November, President Davis visited James Island. General Taliaferro was absent on leave, and General Hagood in command. Mr. Davis inspected the works closely, going at a rapid gallop, with his cortege, from battery to battery, and stopping long enough to receive a salute and ride around the regiments which were drawn up along his route, each at its post. He seemed in good spirits. The troops betrayed much enthusiasm, but he acknowledged their cheers for 'Mr. President' by simply raising his hat. General Hagood rode with him, as commander of the island, and necessarily had much conversation with him. This, and on the field of battle at Drury's Bluff, when General Beauregard was pleased to present him again, with a compliment, to the President, were the only times when he was ever in conversation with this distinguished man."

When the President left Charleston, General Beauregard escorted him once more, and was among the last to take leave of him at the Northeastern Railroad Depot.

In the "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government"—unless we are mistaken—Mr. Davis makes no mention of his visit to Charleston. If there is any reference to it in that work it is in such an incidental manner that we have not been able to discover the passage. And again, in that book, as in his address of the 2d of November, 1863, already referred to, he gives the merest passing notice to a period including fully nineteen months of the war; thus omitting to enlighten the student of history, and compelling him to look elsewhere for the evidence of facts which Mr. Davis apparently considered too insignificant to deserve particular mention. He says:

"The brave and invincible defence of Fort Sumter gave to the City of Charleston, South Carolina, additional lustre. For four years that fort, located in its harbor, defied the army and navy of the United States."*

Who commanded the Department? Who planned that "invincible defence?" Who executed it? What troops were there, and under what officers did they fight? These are questions as to which complete silence is preserved; and from what follows the reader is led to believe that the Commanding General was General Hardee, and that Fort Sumter was never under any officer except Colonel Stephen D. Elliott. We quote:

"When the city was about to be abandoned to the army of General Sherman the forts defending the harbor were embraced in General Hardee's plan of evacuation. The gallant commander of Fort Sumter, Colonel Stephen Elliott, Jr., with unyielding fortitude refused to be relieved, after being under incessant bombardment, day and night, for weeks. It was supposed he must be exhausted, and he was invited to withdraw for rest; but, on receiving the general order of retreat, he assembled his brave force on the rugged and shell-crushed parade-ground, read his instructions, and, in a voice that trembled with emotion, addressed his men in the glowing language of patriotism and unswerving devotion to the Confederate cause. The cheers which responded to the utterances of their colonel came from manly and chivalric throats. Yielding to the inevitable, they claimed for the Stars and Bars a salute of one hundred guns. As it was fired from Sumter it was re-echoed by all the Confederate batteries, and startled the outside blockaders with the idea that a great victory had been won by the Confederacy."†

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 204, first edition.

† Ibid.

That such a statement should have been inserted in a work purporting to be a true exposition of Confederate history is beyond comprehension. The facts are these:

Colonel Elliott, who had been promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General, was relieved, on the 4th of May, 1864, from the command of Fort Sumter, and sent to Virginia, to take charge of Walker's brigade, of South Carolina. The successor of General Elliott at the fort was Captain John C. Mitchel, of the 1st South Carolina Artillery (Regulars). He remained in command until the 20th of July, 1864, when, during the third regular bombardment of Sumter, he was killed by a mortar-shell. Captain Mitchel was a son of the distinguished Irish patriot, and a highly accomplished and daring officer. On his death Captain T. A. Huguenin, of the South Carolina Infantry (Regulars), was appointed in his place, and held command of Sumter until its evacuation, on the 17th of February, 1865—nearly eight months after General Elliott had been relieved. The evacuation of Sumter was effected at night, in silence, without a speech from any one, without a cheer from the garrison, without the firing of a gun. In order to keep the enemy in ignorance of the movement then in course of execution, the withdrawal was proceeded with as secretly and noiselessly as possible. And yet the ex-President of the Confederate States and ex-Commander-in-chief of its armies published to the world in his work (seventeen years in preparation) this extravagant fiction. The enormity being pointed out to him by friends, he has, in a second publication of the first edition of his book, resorted to another and different version, but one which is also erroneous in several particulars. We shall again refer to this matter when treating of the evacuation of Charleston.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

General Beauregard Prepares for an Attack upon Charleston.—Instructions Given to General Gilmer.—Attack of the 19th of November upon Fort Sumter.—Orders and Instructions Given by General Beauregard.—Gradual Cessation of Aggressive Operations by the Federal Commanders.—Plan of Campaign Drawn up by General Beauregard, to be Submitted to the President through the Hon. Pierre Soulé.—War Department does not Take it into Consideration.—Report from Richmond of an Impending Movement on the Carolina Coast.—General Beauregard's Letter to General Whiting.—How Lieutenant Glassel Damaged the *New Ironsides*.—Lieutenant Dixon's Attack with the Torpedo-boat upon the *Housatonic*.—Loss of the Boat and Crew.—Construction of the Submarine Torpedo-boat.—Its History.—Boats Destroyed by Torpedoes in Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.—Landing of a Federal Force at Jacksonville.—General Finegan Concentrates his Forces.—Arrival of Reinforcements.—Battle of Ocean Pond.—General Finegan's Report.—What General Beauregard Says of the Battle.—His Difficulties in Sending Troops to Florida.—He Leaves for "Camp Milton."—His Despatches to the War Department.—Cavalry Withdrawn from South Carolina and Georgia.—General Beauregard Returns to Charleston.—His Instructions Left with General Anderson.—He Demands Leave of Absence.—Telegram from War Department Desiring his Co-operation with General Lee.—He Accepts.—He Turns over the Command of the Department to General Samuel Jones.—His Parting Address to the Troops.

WITHOUT placing implicit faith in the telegram received from Richmond, through Major Norris, Chief of the Signal Corps, wherein an immediate heavy attack upon Charleston was predicted, General Beauregard took every precaution to be prepared for such a contingency. He had a force of two hundred infantry held in readiness, nightly, at Fort Johnson, to be thrown as a reinforcement into Fort Sumter, and had secured, for that purpose, from Flag-officer Tucker, the services of the steamer *Juno*, Lieutenant Porcher commanding. As an additional means of defeating any attempt of the enemy, either to assail Sumter or to carry Battery Simkins, he suggested that one or two of our ironclads should take such a position, at night, as would enable them to sweep the space between Cummings's Point and Fort Johnson and between the latter and Battery Simkins. He also advised

Commander Tucker that, in case the enemy's ironclads should endeavor to remove the obstructions between Sumter and Moultrie, while attacking the Sullivan's Island batteries, his gunboats should be placed in the vicinity of Fort Sumter, out of the direct fire of our works, and in such a manner as to foil the enemy's object; that should an effort be made by the Federal fleet, or any part of it, to pass by our obstructions, without stopping to remove them or fight the batteries, then Commander Tucker's ironclads should so change their position as to be somewhat in rear of our second line of defence—that is to say, James Island, Fort Ripley, and Castle Pinckney, according to the channel through which the enemy's vessels might attempt to force their passage. In order to complete these precautionary arrangements the following instructions were forwarded to Major-General Gilmer on the 7th of November:

“General,—Should the enemy's ironclads enter the harbor, the Commanding General thinks it probable they will endeavor to take the Fort Johnson lines facing towards Morris Island in flank and reverse, to favor an infantry attack upon Battery Simkins, and, possibly at the same time, make a similar front attack from Fort Johnson to the Martello Tower.

“It becomes important, then, to guard against the first by traverses wherever required, and against the second by a line of rifle-pits or infantry parapets, connecting the batteries near the Martello Tower with the one at Fort Johnson.

“The Commanding General, therefore, desires you, assisted by Colonel Harris, to make a proper examination to determine whether these rifle-pits should be prolonged to the creek below Battery Wampler, or turned back near the Martello Tower towards the marshes facing Morris Island, wherever the ground is most favorable for such a defensive line; or whether the detached redoubts, ordered some time ago, should be at once commenced, suspending meanwhile further labor on the ‘new lines,’ which are now deemed quite defensible.

“Respectfully, your obedient servant,

“THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.”

Nothing of much importance occurred between the 7th and the 19th of November. On the latter date another boat attack was made by General Gillmore's force against Fort Sumter, resulting in utter failure, as had been the case with the former attempt. The following is an extract from Mr. Charles Cowley's book, from which we have already had occasion to quote some passages:

“On the night of November 19th, 1863, General Gillmore made an attempt to surprise and capture Fort Sumter. He asked no aid from the navy; but

Admiral Dahlgren, hearing of it, and anxiously desiring its success, ordered his pickets to cover the assaulting party. * * * The thoughtful care of the Admiral for the army column on this occasion shines, by contrast, with the failure of Gillmore to support the navy column on September 6th.”*

We copy the following extract from Colonel Elliott's journal, dated November 20th, 1863:

“* * * At three o'clock a detachment of the enemy's barges, variously estimated at from four to nine in number, approached within three hundred yards of the fort, and opened fire with musketry. Most of the troops got into position very rapidly, but, in spite of all instructions, commenced a random fire: into the air on the part of many, at the distant boats on the part of others. The troops stationed in the centre bomb-proof for the most part refused to ascend the parapet, though encouraged by the example of Lieutenant Mironell and a few other brave men.

“I have sent a despatch to General Taliaferro, asking him to relieve two lieutenants who did not behave well. I have not evidence enough to convict them, but do not want them here longer. I have taken measures which, I trust, may insure better conduct in the future.

“No rockets were sent up, because positive attacks were not made. The ricochet practice from Sullivan's Island was very handsome. The fire from Johnson was very bad, the balls passing directly over the fort.

“Private T. Whester, Company D, 1st S. C. Artillery, was wounded slightly in the head yesterday by a brick.

“I respectfully request that, if practicable, Captain Harleston be retained here until the dark nights have entirely passed by. His removal just at this time will be a great misfortune to me, as I am greatly dependent on his watchfulness and ability.”†

The orders and instructions now submitted to the reader will show the untiring vigilance of the Commanding General, and how extremely careful he was to prepare against every possible emergency. The first is a circular addressed to Generals Walker, Wise, Robertson, and Mercer, commanding respectively the Third, Sixth, and Second Military Districts of South Carolina and the District of Georgia. It read thus:

* “Leaves from a Lawyer's Life, Afloat and Ashore,” p. 115. The date given should be “September 9th,” and not “6th.”

† Captain Harleston remained as desired by Colonel Elliott. On the 24th of November, at 4.30 A. M., while examining obstructions reported as being washed by the tide, that gallant and meritorious young officer was mortally wounded by a Parrott shell, and died a few hours later, lamented by all.

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 25th, 1863.

“*General*,—The following views of the Commanding General are communicated for your information :

“1st. Further depletion of the already too weak forces left for the defence of Charleston is improper, and, therefore, you must depend solely upon the troops of your command to repel any attack of the enemy by moving rapidly your cavalry and light batteries to any point in your district which may be threatened. Should you be compelled to abandon the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, you will retire fighting obstinately, so as to protect, as much and as far as practicable, the country in your rear, especially the line of the South Carolina Railroad, for which latter object the best defensive line would be the ‘Overflows,’ the Ashley River, from Bee’s Ferry to the Little Lakes; thence across to Givham’s Ferry, on the Edisto River, and along that river to the South Carolina Railroad bridge, above Branchville; and thence along and as near the southern boundary-line of Barnwell District as shall be determined by a close reconnoissance by General Walker’s Engineer officer.

“2d. The line of the ‘Overflows’ and the works in advance of it along the Stono will be defended by the troops under Brigadier-General Wise, commanding Sixth Military District, together with such additional troops as he may receive from Brigadier-General Taliaferro’s command, in the Seventh Military District.

“3d. The line in rear of the Ashley River, from Bee’s Ferry inclusive, to Bossua Creek, near Dorchester, will be held by troops from the Fifth and the First Military Districts.

“4th. The forces under Brigadier-General Robertson are intrusted with the defence of the line from Bossua Creek to Little Lakes, thence across to Givham’s Ferry, on the Edisto, and the Four Hole Creek. Colonel Harris, Chief-Engineer, has been directed to throw up certain defensive works across the country, from the Ashley to the Edisto.

“5th. The line in rear of the Edisto, from Four Hole Creek to the South Carolina Railroad bridge, above Branchville, will be defended by Colonel Williams’s regiment of State troops already there, reinforced by a portion of Brigadier-General Walker’s command, until they can be relieved by other troops in the Department.

“6th. From the Edisto to the Savannah River, near the southern boundary of Barnwell District, will be defended or guarded, as far as practicable, by the remainder of Brigadier-General Walker’s command. That officer will construct such field-works, rifle-pits, abatis, and make such overflows, as the means at his disposal and the nature of the country will permit.

“7th. Brigadier-Generals Robertson and Walker will resort to such expedients as the beating of drums, firing of salutes and rockets, as will deceive the enemy. A temporary concentration of cavalry at various points near the enemy’s pickets, and lighting numerous camp-fires at night, must also be resorted to as frequently as possible. In other words, we must make up for our deficiency in numbers, as far as practicable, by ingenuity and activity. A thorough knowledge of the country should give us an advantage over our adversary,

which must be improved and made available to the utmost; and each district commander will be expected to provide himself with an ample number of tried and reliable guides.

"The Commanding General desires particularly to impress upon you his inability to reinforce your command at present. It is an axiom of war that no work is sufficiently strong to resist a 'determined attack unless properly garrisoned.' The defences of this city require a force of 18,500 infantry, and at least ten light batteries; in lieu of that force only 12,695 infantry (of which a portion are unreliable troops) and eight light batteries compose its present garrison.

"If one portion of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad is worth guarding, the rest has the same claim. Hence, if 1000 men are sent to the Third District, nearly a like number should also be sent to the Second District, and thus, weakening the already too small force absolutely required for the defence of Charleston, invite an attack from the enemy before these troops from those districts could possibly be recalled.

"The question then arises, whether it is better to risk the safety of Charleston or that of the country lying between it and Savannah? The Commanding General cannot hesitate in the selection.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

"P. S.—*November 28th*, 1863.—Since the date of this circular Clingman's brigade, 1810 effectives, has been ordered back to North Carolina. T. J."

To General Hagood, to whom a copy of the foregoing circular had not been forwarded, the following communication was subsequently sent:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 5th*, 1863.

"*General*,—I am instructed to say to you that, while the movements of the enemy appear to indicate an attempt to operate within the limits of the Second and Third Military Districts, rather than any effort to effect a lodgment within your district, nevertheless your troops should be held constantly on the alert and ready for any effort to surprise you.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

General Gillmore admits that "with the second bombardment of Sumter ended all aggressive operations for the season against the defences of Charleston."* The truth is, that the taking of Battery Wagner, on the 7th of September, was the enemy's last step forward; and though, from such a result, high expectations

* "Engineer and Artillery Operations against the Defences of Charleston Harbor," pp. 79, 80.

had arisen, not only on the part of the Federal commander in front of Charleston, but also throughout the Northern States, nothing more had been accomplished. Wagner and the whole of Morris Island were in the possession of the enemy; Sumter had been silenced and reduced to a heap of ruins, but bomb-proofs had been speedily erected, and the Confederate flag still floated over it, and its capacity for resistance was daily increasing.

The harbor, too, remained as impenetrable as it was when the Federal fleet first attempted to enter it; and Charleston, encompassed now and surrounded by a new line of inner defences, was as ready as ever to cope with the combined military and naval attack prepared against it. Fort Sumter had gradually become a new work; Fort Johnson had greatly gained in strength and importance; so had almost every battery on James and Sullivan's islands; and General Beauregard, as was justly said in Pollard's "Lost Cause,"* "had given another illustration of the new system of defence practised at Comorn and Sebastopol, where, instead of there being any one key to a plan of fortification, there was the necessity of a siege for every battery, in which the besiegers were always exposed to the fire of the others."

From Cummings's Point and the other works of Morris Island the bombardment was maintained during the whole of the month of November and up to the 19th or 20th of December. It did not entirely cease even after that time, but decreased in intensity from day to day, until only a few occasional shots were fired: as usual, mostly at Fort Sumter.

General Beauregard, taking advantage of this relative lull in the enemy's operations in his front, and believing that there was then no threat of immediate danger, began to consider other and more distant points of the Confederacy; and, while contemplating the military situation in Virginia and the West, drew up, at the request of the Hon. Pierre Soulé, of Louisiana, a comprehensive plan of campaign, which the latter desired, if it were possible, to submit to the authorities at Richmond. Mr. Soulé was a man of high capacity. He had been a Senator in the United States Congress, Ambassador to Spain under President Pierce's Administration, and, owing to his firm and unyielding attitude after the fall of New Orleans, in April, 1862, had been

sent, by General B. F. Butler, as a prisoner to Fort Lafayette. At the time we speak of he had but lately been released from captivity, and had run the blockade to Charleston, whence he had left for Richmond, with a view to offer his services to the Confederate Government. The plan referred to was as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 8th*, 1863.

“Hon. PIERRE SOULÉ, Richmond, Va.:

“*My dear Sir*,—In compliance with your request, made on the eve of your departure for Richmond, I have prepared for you a sketch of certain operations by which we may yet retrieve our late losses, and possibly baffle the immense resources of men and warlike material of our enemy.

“1st. The system hitherto followed of keeping in the field separate armies, acting without concert, on distant and divergent lines of operation, and thus enabling our adversary to concentrate at convenience his masses against our fractions, must be discontinued, as radically contrary to the principles of the art of war, and attended with inevitable results, such as our disasters in Mississippi, Tennessee, and North Georgia.

“2d. We must arrange for a sudden and rapid concentration, upon some selected, decisive strategic point of the theatre of war, of enough troops to crush the forces of the enemy embodied in that quarter. This must necessarily be done at the expense or hazard, for the time, of other points less important, or offering less advantages for striking the enemy. A blow thus struck will necessarily disorganize his combinations and give us the choice of the field of operations.

“I am sensibly aware of our limited means, our want of men, the material and appliances of war and of transportation, and hence the difficulties which will embarrass us in the execution of this plan of concentration. But I see no way to success except through and by it, and nothing but ultimate disaster without it. A different course may, indeed, protract the contest, which will become, day by day, more unequal. We may fight stoutly, as hitherto, many bloody and indecisive battles, but will never win a signal, conclusive victory, until we can manage to throw a heavy and overwhelming mass of our forces upon the fractions of the enemy, and at the same time successfully strike at his communications, without exposing our own.

“I believe this may yet be done. Not knowing, however, our present available forces, and their exact locations, I am unable to make a definite or detailed plan of operations. But I believe I am warranted in assuming that we have under arms 210,000 effective men, distributed nearly as follows:

In the Trans-Mississippi Department, say.....	40,000
In the Department of Alabama and Mississippi, say.....	15,000
Under Hardee, including Longstreet, say.....	60,000
In the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, say..	28,000
In the Department of North Carolina, say.....	7,000
In the Department of Virginia, say.....	60,000
Total.....	210,000

"Looking at a map of the Confederate States it will be seen that the most injurious blow which the enemy could strike, at present, would be to take possession of Atlanta, thus isolating still more completely the Trans-Mississippi States, and detaching, in a great measure, the States of Mississippi and Alabama from the eastern portion of the Confederacy. It would also be a deplorable injury to the energetic, populous State of Georgia, and cripple the great resources of that people.

"We should, therefore, regard Atlanta as the actual objective point of the large force which the enemy has concentrated about Chattanooga, and the one which we must, at all cost, prevent him from obtaining. In this state of affairs, throwing aside all other considerations, subordinating all other operations to this one vital campaign, at a concerted moment we must withdraw from other points a portion of their forces—all, indeed, not absolutely essential for keeping up a show of defence, or safety against a *coup de main*—and concentrate in this way every soldier possible for operations against General Grant.

"Such strategic points as Richmond, Weldon, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and Meridian—or Jackson, Mississippi, at the same time—should be fortified, garrisoned, and provisioned, according to their relative present value to the Confederate States, sufficiently to prolong their defence, if attacked or besieged, until troops for their relief could be detached as required from the army in Northwestern Georgia.

"I will now state approximately what troops may, in my belief, be withdrawn from the following quarters and added to the army at or about Dalton, namely:

From Alabama and Mississippi.....	10,000
From South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.....	8,000
From North Carolina.....	2,000
From Virginia.....	20,000
Total.....	40,000

"These 40,000 men, added with celerity to the force now under Hardee, and including that with Longstreet and other detachments, would make an army of 100,000 men. Let this army take the offensive at once, and, properly handled, it should crush any force that Grant could assemble in time and oppose, scattered as he evidently is, and unprepared as he would be for such an event.

"To insure the success of such a plan of operations the Press must be led to preserve complete silence touching all military movements. Depots of subsistence, munitions of war, ambulances, wagons, horses, etc., should be established at certain points, not too far from Atlanta, for rapid concentration at the proper time. Meanwhile, whatsoever troops could be safely withdrawn from the Department already indicated, should be quickly, quietly concentrated at suitable central points, thence to be thrown forward, with all possible despatch, to Dalton, with all the means of transportation available of all sorts.

"At the same time the officer appointed to command this army should

make all his preparations for such a trust, and the sudden accumulation of troops of all arms, so that he may be able to mould it into a homogeneous mass as early as practicable, and to inaugurate offensive operations without loss of one moment of time that may be obviated. And, further, he must be invested with an unrestricted, unembarrassed selection of staff-officers, and thoroughly emancipated from the least subordination to the views and control of the heads of bureaus at Richmond, a reproduction in this war of that fatal Austrian system with which no eminently successful commander ever had to contend; a pernicious plan of administration which will clog and hamper the highest military genius, whether a Napoleon or a Cæsar.

"I believe the success of the plan of campaign thus sketched, and the utter defeat of the enemy, would be almost certain.

"The question would next be: whether to pursue the routed enemy with vigor to the banks of the Ohio and the Mississippi, or to return to the several sources whence the army was gathered their respective detachments or quotas for the campaign? This should be left, however, to be determined by the nature of the enemy's operations at the time.

"I must finally remark that were it possible to concentrate with sufficient expedition, at or about Knoxville, such an army as I have indicated, that would be the better point whence to take the offensive into Middle Tennessee than Dalton—that is, according to the principles of war—and would promise more decisive results; for it is evident we should thus threaten the enemy's communications, without exposing our own. (Principle II.) '*Le secret de la guerre est dans la sûreté des communications*' (Napoleon). By a movement from Knoxville we should be doing what is taught in connection with the third maxim ('Art of War'), to wit: 'That part of the base of operations is the most advantageous to break out from into the theatre of war which conducts the most directly on the enemy's flanks or rear.' There may be, however, such practical difficulties in the way of the execution of such a movement on that line as may not make it advisable to adopt it.

"The whole science of war,' it has been well said, 'may be briefly defined as the art of placing in the right position, at the right time, a mass of troops greater than your enemy can there oppose to you.'

"Those conditions, I sincerely believe, may all be filled by very much such a plan as the one which I have hurriedly placed before you. Of course my views must be subject to such modifications as my want of precise information relative to the number and location of our troops may render necessary. The hour is critical and grave. I am filled with intense anxiety lest golden opportunities shall be lost—lost forever. It is concentration and immediate mobility that are indispensable to preserve us.

"Yours sincerely,

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

Mr. Soulé communicated the foregoing paper to the War Department, but no action was taken in the matter. The War Department was, no doubt, too much engrossed in other business to pass upon the merits of this or any other plan of battle. When,

about eleven months later, Atlanta fell and was destroyed, and most of the disastrous consequences predicted by General Beauregard ensued, the War Department must have seen—though too late, as usual—that the plan had been a good one, and that if it had been adopted a very different result might have been obtained.

Some further information had been received from Richmond, disclosing a probable movement of the enemy on the South Carolina coast, and warning General Beauregard to be prepared for it. He acted accordingly, in his accustomed prompt and energetic way; but, knowing how prone the War Department was to credit such reports, and having heard nothing of the kind from his own signal-service corps, he felt sure this news would prove false, as had been the case on many previous occasions. The following letter refers to this subject, and explains General Beauregard's views and opinions upon the future operations of the enemy in Tennessee and farther South:

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 25th, 1863.

“Major-Genl. W. H. C. WHITING, Comdg. Dept., Wilmington, N. C.:

“*My dear General*,—A merry and lucky Christmas to you! Your letter of the 23d instant has just been received. I got a copy of the same telegram sent you; but *I* have been deceived every time that ‘same scout,’ or some other coming from Baltimore, has furnished news of enemy’s movements in my Department. Hence I am very cautious to believe his reports now, although, of course, I make my preparations all around, so as not to be caught napping. I sent, in return, pretty much your answer—that I could not defend with success here Savannah and the railroad without additional troops. Defensive works are next to useless if not garrisoned properly. I have therefore applied for the temporary return of Walker’s brigade, which is now doing nothing, at or near Dalton. It is evident that the enemy, having taken Chattanooga for their spring campaign, are now returning Meade’s corps as fast as possible, for fear of being forestalled by Longstreet joining Lee, and the two together crushing Meade, which should have been done by this time; for Longstreet would move on ‘interior lines,’ while Meade’s three corps have to go around the circumference of the circle.

“It is probable, however, that when the roads in Virginia shall have become perfectly impracticable a part of Meade’s reinforcements may be sent South for a winter campaign against Charleston, Savannah, or Wilmington; hence Johnston or Lee must be prepared to reinforce us. Halleck is just finding out what can be done with sudden and rapid concentration of troops. Our side, meanwhile, is still trying the reverse: see Chattanooga and Knoxville. I suppose that by the time we shall have no more troops to concentrate we will learn better.

"By-the-bye the President does not seem to place more reliance in that scout's statement than I do: see the conclusion of Colonel Brown's communication, *i. e.*, 'Wilmington is believed to be the point threatened, instead of Savannah.' I am happy to hear, though, that the Yankees have given up all hope of taking Charleston; for I am tired of this useless burning of powder which might be saved for a better purpose. My batteries, however, fire very little—as little as possible. Sumter is stronger, as a defensive work, than it ever was before the late accident to one of the small magazines. Those damages will soon be repaired, and I am going to add two 10-inch columbiads to its present armament.

"Hoping that you will be equally successful in case of an attack on Wilmington, I remain, Yours, very truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

"P. S.—Troops are still reported passing here from the North, going to Hilton Head. General Walker reports about 6000 men encamped on that island alone.

G. T. B."

In October, 1863, Lieutenant Glassel performed a daring feat against the *New Ironsides*. In spite of the enemy's equivocal statement to the contrary, that vessel, the Admiral's flag-ship at the time, was so seriously crippled as to be unable, thereafter, to perform any service in conjunction with the hostile fleet in front of Charleston. The following account is transcribed from General Beauregard's article on the "Torpedo Service in the Harbor and Water Defences of Charleston," published in the "Southern Historical Society Papers" of April, 1878: *

"* * * The *David* reached the *New Ironsides* about 10 o'clock P. M., striking her with a torpedo about six feet under water; but, fortunately for that steamer, she received the shock against one of her inner bulkheads, which saved her from destruction. The water, however, being thrown up in large volume, half filled her little assailant and extinguished its fires. It then drifted out to sea with the current, under a heavy grape and musketry fire from the much alarmed crew of the *New Ironsides*. Supposing the *David* disabled, Glassel and his men jumped into the sea to swim ashore; but, after remaining in the water about one hour, he was picked up by the boat of a Federal transport schooner, whence he was transferred to the guardship *Ottawa*, lying outside of the rest of the fleet. He was ordered at first by Admiral Dahlgren to be ironed, and, in case of resistance, to be double ironed; but, through the intercession of his friend, Captain W. D. Whiting, commanding the *Ottawa*, he was released on giving his parole not to attempt to escape from the ship. The fireman, Sullivan, had taken refuge on the rudder of the *New Ironsides*, where he was discovered, put in irons, and kept in a dark cell

* Vol. v., No. 4, p. 145, *et seq.* The article was also published in the "Annals of the War," p. 513.

until sent with Glassel to New York, to be tried and hung, as reported by Northern newspapers, for using an engine of war not recognized by civilized nations. But the Government of the United States has now a torpedo corps, intended specially to study and develop that important branch of the military service. After a captivity of many months in Forts Lafayette and Warren, Glassel and Sullivan were finally exchanged for the captain and a sailor of the Federal steamer *Isaac Smith*, a heavily-armed gunboat, which was captured in the Stono River, with its entire crew of one hundred and thirty officers and men. * * * Captain Glassel's two other companions, Engineer Tomb and Pilot Cannon, after swimming about for a while, espied the *David*, still afloat, drifting with the current. They betook themselves to it, relit the fires from its bull's-eye lantern, got up steam, and started back for the city. They had to repass through the fleet, and they received the fire of several of its monitors and gunboats, fortunately without injury. With the assistance of the flood-tide they returned to their point of departure, at the Atlantic wharf, about midnight, after having performed one of the most daring feats of the war. The *New Ironsides* never fired another shot (on the coast of South Carolina) after this attack upon her. She remained some time at her anchorage off Morris Island, evidently undergoing repairs; she was then towed to Port Royal, probably to fit her for her voyage to Philadelphia, where she remained until destroyed by fire after the war."

On the 17th of February, 1864, an expedition, in every respect as hazardous and fully as bold, was prepared and carried out, under Lieutenant Dixon, of Mobile, Alabama, with the submarine torpedo-boat, as it was called,* against the United States steamer *Housatonic*. She was struck before realizing her danger, and sank almost instantaneously; but the torpedo-boat went to the bottom with her; and though, as it seems, most of the officers and crew of the *Housatonic* were saved, neither Lieutenant Dixon nor any of his associates were ever seen afterwards. They all perished together, for none were reported as being captured by the enemy. They, no doubt, knew how perilous was the attempt they were undertaking. There are principles and there are causes that men hold sufficiently dear to inspire and justify heroic sacrifices. Lieutenant Dixon and the few who were with him evidently looked upon the Southern cause as one of these. We quote again from General Beauregard's article referred to above:

"Nearly about the time of the attack upon the *New Ironsides* by the *David*,† Mr. Horace L. Hunley, formerly of New Orleans, but then living in Mobile, offered me another torpedo-boat, of a different description, which had

* Also called the "fish torpedo-boat."

† It was four months later.

been built with his private means. It was shaped like a fish, made of galvanized iron, was twenty feet long, and at the middle three and a half feet wide by five deep. From its shape it came to be known as the 'fish torpedo-boat.' Propelled by a screw worked from the inside by seven or eight men, it was so contrived that it could be submerged and worked under water for several hours, and to this end was provided with a fin on each side, worked also from the interior. By depressing the points of these fins the boat, when in motion, was made to descend, and by elevating them it was made to rise. Light was afforded through the means of bull's-eyes placed in the man-holes. Lieutenant Payne, C. S. N., having volunteered, with a crew from the Confederate navy, to man the fish-boat for another attack upon the *New Ironsides*, it was given into their hands for that purpose. While tied to the wharf at Fort Johnson, whence it was to start under cover of night to make the attack, a steamer passing close by capsized and sunk it. Lieutenant Payne, who at the time was standing in one of the man-holes, jumped out into the water, which, rushing into the two openings, drowned two men then within the body of the boat. After the recovery of the sunken boat Mr. Hunley came from Mobile, bringing with him Lieutenant Dixon, of the Alabama Volunteers, who had successfully experimented with the boat in the harbor of Mobile, and under him another naval crew volunteered to work it. As originally designed the torpedo was to be dragged astern upon the surface of the water; the boat, approaching the broadside of the vessel to be attacked, was to dive beneath it, and, rising to the surface beyond, continue its course, thus bringing the floating torpedo against the vessel's side, when it would be discharged by a trigger contrived to go off by the contact. Lieutenant Dixon made repeated descents in the harbor of Charleston, diving under the naval receiving-ship, which lay at anchor there. But one day, when he was absent from the city, Mr. Hunley, unfortunately, wishing to handle the boat himself, made the attempt. It was readily submerged, but did not rise again to the surface, and all on board perished from asphyxiation. When the boat was discovered, raised, and opened the spectacle was indescribably ghastly: the unfortunate men were contorted into all kinds of horrible attitudes, some clutching candles, evidently endeavoring to force open the man-holes; others lying in the bottom, tightly grappled together, and the blackened faces of all presented the expression of their despair and agony. After this tragedy I refused to permit the boat to be used again; but Lieutenant Dixon, a brave and determined man, having returned to Charleston, applied to me for authority to use it against the Federal steam sloop-of-war *Housatonic*, a powerful, new vessel, carrying eleven guns of the largest calibre, which lay at the time in the North Channel, opposite Beach Inlet, materially obstructing the passage of our blockade-runners in and out. At the suggestion of my Chief of Staff, General Jordan, I consented to its use for this purpose, not as a submarine machine, but in the same manner as the *David*. As the *Housatonic* was easily approached through interior channels from behind Sullivan's Island, and Lieutenant Dixon readily procured a volunteer crew, his little vessel was fitted with a Lee spar-torpedo, and the expedition was undertaken. Lieutenant Dixon, acting with characteristic

coolness and resolution, struck and sunk the *Housatonic* on the night of February 17th, 1864; but, unhappily, from some unknown cause, the torpedo-boat was also sunk, and all with it lost. Several years since, a 'diver,' examining the wreck of the *Housatonic*, discovered the fish-boat lying alongside of its victim."

Other Federal steamers and transports, in other portions of the Department, were also struck, and often greatly damaged, by torpedoes planted, by General Beauregard's orders, in several streams, in Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Thus were destroyed, in April, 1864, on the St. John's River, Florida, first, the *Maple Leaf*, and, afterwards, the *General Hunter*; and in the Ossabaw Sound the *Columbine* and the *Water Witch*. Both the latter were captured by boarding parties, in May and June, 1864.

The main incident of this particular period of the war, in General Beauregard's Department, was the battle of Ocean Pond, in Eastern Florida, which took place on the 20th of February, 1864, and shed lustre on the Confederate troops engaged.

At Jacksonville, Florida, on the 7th of February, the enemy landed a considerable force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, which was increased by further arrivals on the 8th. General Finegan, with his well-known energy, immediately issued all necessary orders for the concentration of his scattered troops, and lost no time in notifying General Beauregard of the emergency. From Jacksonville the enemy, unhindered, pressed on to Baldwin; then to Barber's; then to Sanderson, and was, on the 11th, within three miles of Lake City. There his progress was checked by a force composed of about 450 infantry, 100 cavalry, and two pieces of artillery. He fell back to Sanderson, and thence to Barber's, on the east bank of the St. Mary's, where he evidently intended to concentrate before moving on Lake City.

In the mean time General Finegan, with all the reinforcements he had thus far been able to procure, had marched to Ocean Pond, on the Olustee River, and, on the 13th, with not more than 2000 men of all arms, resolutely awaited the enemy's advance.

Several days of anxious suspense were thus passed, during which, to the great relief of all, the following troops arrived, namely: the 6th, 19th, 23d, 27th, and 28th Georgia Regiments, and the 6th Florida Battalion, with four guns of the Chatham Artillery. They were placed under Brigadier-General Colquitt, and formed what General Finegan termed his First Brigade. The

32d and 64th Georgia Volunteers, the 1st Georgia Regulars, the 1st Florida Battalion, and Bonaud's Battalion, with Guerard's Light Battery, all under Colonel G. P. Harrison, constituted the Second Brigade. The cavalry was organized into a Third Brigade, under Colonel C. Smith: thus making a total effective force of about 4600 infantry, 600 cavalry, and three batteries of light artillery.

The rapidity with which our forces were concentrated from different points, and especially from Charleston and Savannah, is worthy of all praise; the more since between the Georgia and Florida lines of railroad there then existed a gap of some twenty-six miles, over which the Carolina and Georgia troops had to march before reaching their destination. And here it is proper to remark that, shortly after the eastern part of Florida had been added to General Beauregard's command,* he had called the attention of the War Department to that obstacle in the way of rapid concentration, in case of urgency, and had recommended that the iron on the Key West Railroad, which was not used at the time, be taken for the purpose of closing up this gap. Nothing was done in the matter, however, owing, it was said, to the opposition of ex-Senator Yulee, of Florida, the President and principal owner of the Key West road.

On the 20th the enemy moved forward, in three columns, numbering together about 8000 infantry, with corresponding artillery, and some 1400 cavalry. At 12 m. of that day he was within three miles of General Finegan's position. Our cavalry, supported by the 64th Georgia and two companies of the 32d, was ordered to advance and skirmish with the front line of the enemy, and, if possible, to draw it to our works. General Colquitt, with three regiments of his own brigade and a section of Gamble's artillery, now marched to that point, and, by orders, assumed command of the cavalry and infantry forces already sent to feel the strength of the enemy. He found the latter advancing rapidly, and our cavalry retreating before him. Without the loss of a moment his skirmishers were pushed forward, and his line of battle formed, with the 19th Georgia on the right, the 28th on the left, and Gamble's section of artillery in the centre. The 64th Georgia and the two companies of the 32d were moved to the left

* On the 7th of October, 1862. See Chapter XXVII.

of the 28th; and, to guard against an attack in flank, the 6th Georgia was extended farther still, in the same direction. Colonel Smith, with the cavalry, was instructed to take a position on the extreme flank, so as to check any movement of the enemy from either side. After these preliminaries, the advance began with true Confederate dash; the opposing forces gradually giving way, though fighting hard to hold their ground.

Seeing at a glance that, with the handful of men under him, his success could only be temporary, General Colquitt now called for reinforcements. General Finegan, in anticipation of his desire, had already ordered them forward. The 6th Florida soon arrived, and with it the 23d Georgia. They were sent, the former on the right of the 19th Georgia, the latter on the left of the 64th; and the 32d Georgia and the 1st Georgia Regulars, under Colonel Harrison, having also come up, were placed between the 23d and 6th Georgia, with instructions to guard the left of the line. The engagement had now become general. The enemy, in heavy force, under General Seymour, fought stubbornly, broke and re-formed his lines several times during the battle; but, after a resistance of more than four hours, finally gave way in confusion, and was closely pressed for three miles, until night compelled the pursuers to halt. In his report General Finegan said:

"Their loss in killed, both officers and men, was large. Four hundred and eighteen of their wounded were removed by us from the field, and four hundred, or near that number, of their killed were buried by us; also nearly two hundred prisoners were captured; several officers of high rank were killed, and others severely wounded. Their loss cannot be less than two thousand or two thousand five hundred men. Five superior guns, one set of colors captured, and sixteen hundred stand of arms; also one hundred and thirty thousand rounds cartridges (damaged by being thrown into water), as appears by the report of the ordnance officer herewith enclosed. The victory was complete, and the enemy retired in rapid retreat, evacuating in quick succession Barber's and Baldwin, and falling back on Jacksonville. * * * Our loss in the engagement was ninety-three killed and eight hundred and forty-one wounded, a large proportion very slightly." *

It may be of interest to revert to the difficulties encountered in forwarding reinforcements from Charleston and Savannah to the assistance of General Finegan. We quote from General Beaure-

* See General Finegan's report, given in full in the Appendix.

gard's report to General Cooper, dated Charleston, South Carolina, March 25th, 1864.*

“* * * On the 7th of February (received 8th) Brigadier-General Finegan reported by telegraph that five gunboats and two transports of the enemy had made their appearance in the St. John's, within five miles of Jacksonville, and on the next day announced the arrival at Jacksonville of eighteen vessels—gunboats and transports—the landing of the enemy, presumed in large force, and an immediate advance on the night of the 7th of February. General Gilmer was at once ordered to put in motion, to report to General Finegan, all the troops he had been previously ordered to hold in readiness for such an emergency. General Gardner, commanding in Middle Florida, was telegraphed to send to the imperilled quarter, with all possible celerity, every soldier he could spare. Colquitt's brigade was ordered from James Island to Savannah, with a light battery. General Finegan was advised of what was done, and instructed to do what he could with his means to hold the enemy at bay, and to prevent the capture of slaves; and at the same time I reported to you this hostile movement, and my intention to repel it, as far as practicable, with infantry to be drawn from Charleston and Savannah, but requested, in consequence of the very recent discharge of some five thousand South Carolina militia, that other troops should be sent to take their places and avoid danger to Charleston and Savannah. Scarcely had Colquitt's brigade begun to move, when the enemy, in anticipation, doubtless, of my attempt to reinforce Finegan, made a strong demonstration on John's Island. Though assured of the purpose of this movement, it assumed, however, so serious a form as to compel me to divert, temporarily, General Colquitt and three and a half regiments of his brigade, to reinforce General Wise, then confronted by at least two brigades of the enemy (about four thousand five hundred strong), pushed forward in advance of the Haulover, or bridge-way between John's and Seabrook's islands, and in addition several regiments of infantry were detached from Sullivan's and James islands, to be in readiness for the development of the enemy's purposes.

“On the night of the 11th ultimo I ordered all our batteries bearing on Morris Island to open a heavy simultaneous fire on that portion, as if a cover for an assault, and with the hope of forcing the enemy to withdraw from John's Island to the protection of his own works. This stratagem seems to have produced the desired effect, or assisted to make him abandon the movement on John's Island, and withdraw hastily before daybreak, thus releasing and enabling Colquitt's command to reach General Finegan in time to meet and defeat the enemy at Ocean Pond, some thirteen miles in advance of Lake City.

“In the meanwhile other troops, fast as the means of railroad transportation would enable me, had been despatched to the theatre of war from the works around Charleston and Savannah, and the positions covering the Sa-

* The whole report, less such portions of it as are given in the text, will be found in the Appendix.

vannah Railroad. This was done, indeed, to a hazardous degree; but, as I informed the Hon. Secretary of War by telegraph, on the 9th ultimo, I regarded it as imperative to attempt to secure the subsistence resources of Florida.

"General Finegan was also apprised of these reinforcements on the 11th of February, and instructed to manœuvre meantime to check or delay the enemy, but to avoid close quarters and unnecessary loss of men.

"While these reinforcements were *en route* the enemy again attempted to delay them by a movement with show of force against Whitemarsh Island, near Savannah, and it became a measure of proper precaution to halt at Savannah two of the regiments on the way to General Finegan, for the development of the enemy's plans, one of which regiments, indeed, I felt it but prudent to detain there for the present. The want of adequate rolling-stock on the Georgia and Florida Railroads, and the existence of the gap of some twenty-six miles between the two roads, subjected the concentration of my forces to a delay, which deprived my efforts to that end of full effect. The absence of General Hill making it injudicious for me to leave this State, I directed Brigadier-General Taliaferro to proceed to Florida and assume command, he being an officer in whose ability, field experience, and judgment I had high confidence, not knowing at the time that Brigadier-General William M. Gardner, commanding in Middle Florida, his senior, had returned from sick leave, and was fit for field service, and had gone to General Finegan's headquarters with the troops of his district. Apprised of this, I directed General Gardner, on the 21st ultimo, to assume command, and organize for a vigorous offensive movement preliminary to the arrival of General Taliaferro; but subsequently the victory of Ocean Pond having taken place, in which it was supposed General Gardner, though not in immediate command, had taken an active part, I directed that officer to assume the chief command, and, dividing his forces into divisions, to assign General Taliaferro to one of them. Soon after which, however, I was advised by the War Department of the assignment of Major-General J. Patton Anderson to the command of the forces in the State of Florida."

General Beauregard had done all in his power to obtain from the War Department the appointment of three major-generals, to take command of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, with a view of thus converting these States into three military districts; and, to that end, he had repeatedly recommended for promotion several of the brigadier-generals then doing service under him. They were officers of tried merit, already familiar with the localities, and enjoyed the full confidence of their men. Had his suggestion been carried out, General Beauregard could have moved, freely and at will, from one district to another, whenever, in his opinion, circumstances required it, without in any way jeopardizing the interests or safety of any one of them. But, from all appearances,

the Secretary of War had always opposed the adoption of such a system, and was only induced to take a step in the matter on or about the day of the battle of Ocean Pond. At that time Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill was ordered to Charleston, where he arrived on the 28th of February, eight days after the battle; and Major-General J. Patton Anderson was sent to Florida, but did not reach Camp Milton until the 3d of March—in other words, fourteen days after the battle. General Gilmer, who had been in the Department for several months, but whose services, when he arrived, had not been requested (General Beauregard needed no additional chief-engineer at the time), had been assigned to the District of Georgia, where the Commanding General thought he might be useful, and was already there when the battle of Ocean Pond was fought. The consequence of this tardy action of the War Department was, that General Beauregard, who would have gone to Florida with the first troops sent thither to the assistance of General Finegan, could only do so after the arrival of General Hill; for the enemy, who had made serious demonstrations in General Wise's sub-district, might at any time renew them at other points, then necessarily denuded of troops for the relief of Florida. He reached Camp Milton on the 2d of March, after travelling two days and nights, with hardly any rest. General Anderson had not yet assumed command.

Immediately after his arrival General Beauregard carefully reconnoitred the locality and its vicinity, and soon obtained all necessary information as to our resources and those of the enemy. The next day (3d) he telegraphed to the War Department the conclusion he had reached, stating, in substance, that he would endeavor by strategy to bring the enemy out of his stronghold—Jacksonville—and would then give him battle, notwithstanding his superior numbers, reported to be 12,000, whereas ours amounted to but 8000. He stated that he had selected a good defensive line, a few miles in rear of the position our troops then occupied, where he hoped to be able to defeat the enemy, without much loss on our side. In answer came a despatch from Richmond, dated March 4th (received on the 5th), telling General Beauregard that he had been misinformed as to the strength of the enemy and of Jacksonville, and that he should attack at once. The reply sent was courteous but firm, and to the following effect: "Have been

here since the 2d, inquiring into condition of affairs and status of enemy. Am positive in my statement to the Department, and shall not attack. Am willing to transfer the command to next officer in rank—General Anderson—who will attack under the orders of the Department. Will give him all the assistance in my power.” This seems to have satisfied the War Department, as no further direction was sent from Richmond.

A few days later, and while he was still busily engaged in reorganizing the forces at Camp Milton, and preparing the defensive line referred to above, General Beauregard received by telegraph from New Orleans, *via* Mobile and Charleston, the sad intelligence of the death of Mrs. Beauregard, whom he had not seen since his departure from Louisiana, on February 23d, 1861: more than three years before. Soldiers and patriots are often compelled to silence the voice of nature, to suppress the longings of a loving heart, to sacrifice all that man so fondly cherishes to duty and to country. Grateful should be the land that inspires such high virtue, and all honor to those who can practise it.

On or about the 18th of March orders from Richmond, withdrawing most of the cavalry from his Department, induced General Beauregard to return at once to Savannah and Charleston, after leaving definite instructions with General Anderson as to his future conduct to meet impending events in his district. They read as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
CAMP MILTON, FLA., *March 20th, 1864.*

“Major-Genl. J. PATTON ANDERSON, Comdg. Dist. of Florida, etc., etc.:

“*General*,—Having to return temporarily to Charleston sooner than I had intended, I desire giving you herewith my general views as to future probable operations against the enemy, now occupying Jacksonville with about 12,000 or 15,000 men, and Palatka with about 1500, as reported by scouts, deserters, etc.

“Your present available forces (less than 8000 men) are not sufficient to enable you to drive the enemy out of Jacksonville, fortified and supported by four or five gunboats, as the place is at present. The task with regard to Palatka would be less difficult, if you could detach on such an expedition, to insure its success, a sufficient force from the troops at McGirt’s Creek. But this might be attended with more danger than the object in view would warrant.

“Your present defensive line, in rear of McGirt’s Creek, for a temporary purpose—that is, until the work around Baldwin (twenty miles from Jacksonville) shall be sufficiently completed to enable you to give battle at that point with all the chances of success in your favor, notwithstanding the disparity in numbers. I have ordered Colonel Harris to prepare positions on those

works for the guns of the siege-train and the 32-pounder, rifled, intended for the new battery ordered on Fleming's Island.

"Should the enemy advance upon you from Jacksonville you should retire on Baldwin slowly, drawing him after you. About one brigade will take position in the lines there, with some cavalry on the left; the other two brigades and main body of cavalry will take positions on the right, ready to take the enemy in flank and rear, by advancing between the Little and Big Cypress Swamps, should he attack the lines in front. In the event of his again being defeated he should be pushed vigorously by the cavalry on his flanks, and the infantry on his rear.

"Should the enemy divide his forces by reinforcing strongly those already at Palatka, the proposed battery at Fleming's Island, on the St. John's, should be constructed at once, and torpedoes put in the river, so as to prevent its navigation.

"Should the enemy, after fortifying strongly Jacksonville and Palatka, leave those two places, with only a strong garrison in each, a battery should be put up at once near the mouth of Trout Creek, a few miles below Jacksonville, to cut off its communication with the mouth of the river. This would insure the fall or evacuation of both places.

"Colonel D. B. Harris, Chief-Engineer of the Department, will remain with you for the present, and has received my general instructions relative to the works referred to. As soon as you shall be able to dispense with his services you will send him to make the necessary examinations about St. Mark's and Tallahassee, to guard those important points from any attack from the Gulf.

"Captain Pliny Bryan, A. A.-Genl., is in charge of the torpedoes to be put in the St. John's River. He must consult Colonel Harris as to their location. Captain Bryan is also a very good signal officer; capable of reading the enemy's signals, he would be a good inspector of that branch of the service.

"You will please keep me well advised, at Charleston, of all movements of the enemy in your district. A telegram should be sent at least every other day. I will endeavor to rejoin you as soon as practicable, especially should the enemy intend any offensive movement in your front.*

"Look well to your means of transportation and commissary supplies.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

On the 23d, from Charleston, he telegraphed as follows to the War Department:

"Have returned here to make best disposition practicable incident to the departure of the cavalry ordered to Virginia. It has become more urgent

* General Beauregard verbally advised General Anderson, should the enemy advance, to give him battle; and should the high grass covering the country be sufficiently dry and the wind favorable, to set that grass (some distance in his own front) on fire just before engaging the enemy; then to charge him, while in confusion, with vigor, making as great use of his own artillery and cavalry as possible.

than ever to have an efficient officer of higher rank than brigadier-general to command in South Carolina. General Hill has not entered on duty; he is awaiting an answer to his communication to you from this place.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

About a week later the following telegram was sent to General Anderson:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 30th*, 1864.

"Be prepared to return, soon as enemy's movements shall permit, Colquitt's brigade, then the Virginia regiments, then Harrison's brigade. Meanwhile, if you can safely strike at Palatka, you should do so. How are General Gardner's operations against deserters progressing?

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On or about the 9th of April, finding that the enemy had nearly ceased his operations against Charleston and the coast, and believing he could, under such circumstances, absent himself from his command, without inconvenience to the service, General Beauregard notified the War Department that he would soon apply for a short leave of absence; intending, as he had done in June, 1862, to repair to Bladon Springs, Alabama, to seek that quietude of mind and relief from the incessant routine of duty which, on a former occasion, had produced the most beneficial effect upon him. His despatch read as follows:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 9th*, 1864.

"General SAMUEL COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

"*** My health requires I should apply for a leave, dependent, however, on operations of enemy. But I cannot make application without a competent major-general.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The next day he wrote as follows to General Gilmer:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 10th*, 1864.

"Major-Genl. J. F. GILMER, Comdg. Savannah, Ga.:

"*My dear General*,—Your favor of the 8th inst. has been received. I fully appreciate the views therein expressed, which are correct, but of difficult execution under present circumstances.

"With regard to General M., I am aware of the objections to him, but my fear was to fare worse. You are, no doubt, aware that not those officers who stand the highest in the estimation of the War Department are sent here permanently. In fact, this has been called 'the Department of Refuge.' Moreover, my recommendations of and applications for officers are seldom, if ever, heeded. With the exception of Brigadier-General Walker, Colonels Elliott and Harris, and Captain Johnson (the last two engineers), not one of my officers has been promoted since the beginning of the memorable siege of Charleston, although I have recommended several. This is encouraging neither to myself nor to those under my orders.

"Since your other letter Major-General J. has been ordered to this Department to relieve you. I hope he will do, but from what I hear I fear not.

"I have to request that you will give him, as far as practicable, the benefit of your experience and observation, especially to keep him out of any *faux pas* or errors. Give him as full and detailed advice as possible, providing for such contingencies as may happen. I will, on my part, give him such general instructions as ought to suffice.

"Regretting to lose your services, and with my kind regards to Mrs. G., I remain,

Yours, very truly,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

General Beauregard was preparing to leave about the middle of April, when a telegram from the War Department was received during the night of the 13th, inquiring if his health would permit him to come and assist General Lee in the defence of Richmond. His answer was:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 14th*, 1864.

"Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Commander-in-Chief, Richmond, Va.:

"Am ready to obey any order for the good of the service. * * *

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The order was therefore issued. It was as follows:

"RICHMOND, *April 15th*, 1864.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"Repair with least delay practicable to Weldon, N. C., where instructions will be sent to you.

S. COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl."

On the 16th no general officer had yet been sent to relieve him. This made him uneasy, and all the more so that troops were again being withdrawn from his Department as rapidly as they could be forwarded. His telegram to General Cooper, of that date, read thus:

"Owing to reduction of forces, I shall leave this Department with great concern, which would be much diminished if General Hill were ordered to relieve me; for since his arrival here he has been making himself acquainted with the forces and localities. My Chief of Staff is still quite sick, and cannot be, at present, of much assistance to General Jones. I am confident a positive order from War Department would be obeyed with alacrity by General Hill.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the 17th he sent the following telegram to General Whiting:

"Am ordered to Weldon for present, but am desirous to see you as I pass through Wilmington, on Wednesday, about 10 o'clock.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the 18th General Cooper received the following despatch :

"General Jones has not yet arrived. Have telegraphed Gilmer to come forthwith. I will leave to-morrow. I have recalled all South Carolina and Georgia troops from Florida, except one battalion infantry and one and a half regiments cavalry.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

General Jones finally arrived on the 19th. The next day General Beauregard telegraphed General Cooper in these words :

"CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 20th*, 1864.

"I have turned over command, temporarily, to General Jones to-day. I will leave for point of destination in one hour.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

Before doing so, however, and in order to take official leave of the gallant troops of his Department, he issued to them this address :

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 20th*, 1864.

"*Officers and Soldiers*,—By an order of his Excellency the President I am relieved temporarily from the command of this Department by Major-General Sam Jones, to be assigned to another important command.

"I leave with the assurance that you will transfer to my successor, a meritorious officer of the Armies of Virginia and Tennessee, that confidence and spirit of prompt obedience to orders which have contributed so much to your success heretofore.

"Should you ever become discouraged, remember that a people from whom have sprung such soldiers as those who defended Wagner and Sumter can never be subjugated in a war of independence.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

CHAPTER XXXV.

Arrival of General Beauregard at Weldon, April 22d.—He Disapproves Operations against Plymouth and Newbern.—Predicts Burnside's Attack upon Petersburg, and Advises Concentration of Forces.—Letter of General Bragg.—Alarm of the Authorities in Richmond.—General Butler Beaten off on the 6th and 7th of May.—Recall of Troops.—General Hoke's Junction with General Ransom.—General Beauregard Reaches Drury's Bluff.—His Plan to Destroy Butler's and Grant's Forces.—He Submits it to General Bragg.—The Latter Approves, but will not Consent without the President's Ratification.—President Davis Visits Drury's Bluff.—Refuses his Consent.—General Beauregard's Command is Extended.—He Forms a Plan of Attack.—Narrative of the Battle of Drury's Bluff.—Failure of General Whiting to Arrive in Time.—General Wise's Comments upon him.—He Resigns his Command.—Errors of Mr. Davis.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD reached Weldon, North Carolina, on the 22d of April, 1864; but, contrary to the assurances given him by the War Department, found no orders awaiting him there. He immediately called General Bragg's attention to the fact, and the next day was officially assigned to the command of what was called the Department of North Carolina and Cape Fear, including Virginia south of the James and Appomattox, and all that portion of North Carolina east of the mountains. On the 23d he assumed command of his new Department, which he henceforth designated as the "Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia," and applied for those officers of his former staff whose services he deemed indispensable.

While at Weldon, watching and aiding certain operations specially ordered by the War Department against Plymouth and Newbern, but of which he did not approve, he carefully studied on the maps then in his possession the field around Petersburg, between that city and the James, and along the lines of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, then about to become the theatre of a hostile movement against the Confederate capital under Major-General B. F. Butler.

This expedition General Beauregard had anticipated for several weeks, and he had instructed his Chief-Engineer, Colonel Harris,

to reconnoitre, for the purpose of occupation and defence, the position at Bermuda Hundreds, which afterwards became the base of General Butler's operations. He had also instructed Colonel Harris to inspect closely old Fort Powhatan, a few miles below City Point, on the James, which he desired to strengthen and re-arm with heavy guns, besides blocking up the river—there narrower than elsewhere—with torpedoes and other obstructions. But before this could be done General Butler had landed at Bermuda Hundreds an army of about 30,000 men, composed of two corps, under Generals Gillmore and W. F. Smith.

On the 25th of April General Beauregard sent the following telegrams to General Bragg, who was then acting as military adviser of the President and General Chief of Staff of the Confederate Armies:

"1. Every indication is that Burnside will attack Richmond *via* Petersburg. Are we prepared to resist him in that direction? Can the forces of this Department be concentrated in time? are questions worthy of immediate consideration by the War Department.

"2. Burnside's point of attack being still uncertain, and our ironclad in the Neuse having grounded firmly, is it prudent to leave longer the forces in Department so scattered? Is object in view worth the great risk incurred? I know not yet what troops are about Petersburg. Here there is only one State regiment, and in Wilmington two regiments, infantry, movable troops."

He also wrote a letter to General Bragg on the same subject,* condemning the existing state of affairs, and pointing out the danger to be apprehended in case of a sudden attack by the enemy upon Petersburg or Weldon. He advised the division of his Department into three military districts, under three major-generals, with a view to insure a successful defence with the smallest available force. But the Newbern expedition was yet looked upon by the Administration as the true initiatory step to future and more important concentration. General Bragg, therefore, answered evasively, as follows:

1.

"RICHMOND, VA., *April 25th*, 1864.

"General BEAUREGARD:

"Reports of yesterday represent Burnside landing in force at Yorktown. Evans's whole brigade was ordered to Wilmington. Has it arrived? Which brigade can best be spared from South Carolina—Colquitt's or Wise's? The Navy Department has taken action to relieve the grounded gunboat.

"BRAXTON BRAGG, General."

* See Appendix.

2.

"RICHMOND, *April 26th*, 1864.

"To General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"The movement under Major-General Hoke, if prompt and successful, will enable us to concentrate a formidable force to meet Burnside. If not made, or unsuccessful, a large portion of your force must be held in North Carolina, to guard the railroad. Knowing his energy and activity, the President has promoted him (General Hoke), to avoid any difficulty about commands. Urge him to action.

BRAXTON BRAGG, General."

Still more, however, than the two foregoing telegrams does the following letter show what undue importance was attached to the Newbern expedition:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES CONFEDERATE STATES,
RICHMOND, VA., *April 28th*, 1864.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Weldon, North Carolina:

"*General*,—Your written communication of the 25th inst. received, and has been submitted to the President, with this endorsement, viz.: 'Respectfully submitted to his Excellency the President. Gracie's brigade from Southwest Virginia and Colquitt's from South Carolina are now under orders, and it is proposed to draw others from South Carolina as soon as transportation will allow.' The paper was returned to me with the following endorsement by the President, viz.:

"'Returned to General Bragg. With due energy it is hoped the gunboat in the Neuse may be put afloat. The capture of Newbern, and possession of the Sound by our vessels, increased as they may be by the addition of others, will relieve the necessity for guarding the whole line of railroad as proposed. The attempt should be made with all vigor to improve our condition in the manner indicated, and in the plan adopted for the campaign of General Hoke. Then we may spare troops for other service, either in West Virginia or east of Richmond.'

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"BRAXTON BRAGG, General."

It being evident that the President would persevere in carrying out this divergent movement, General Beauregard a few days later—on the 1st of May—forwarded a communication to General Hoke, in answer to the latter's request that he should take personal command of the Newbern expedition. He declined interfering in the matter, but counselled him, however, and carefully developed his views as to the means to be employed and the best method of attack.*

The movements of the enemy in the direction of Petersburg, and the pressing despatches of General Pickett, commanding there, at last opened the eyes of the War Department to the im-

* See communication in Appendix.

minent peril of the moment. It now realized the difficulty of concentrating the forces so injudiciously scattered by its improvident orders. The immediate danger to Richmond, apart from that to which Petersburg was subjected, aroused the apprehensions of the President to such an extent that, in spite of General Pickett's urgent demand for reinforcements, Hagood's brigade, from South Carolina—which General Beauregard desired to have halted at Petersburg—was ordered to be pushed straight through to Richmond, and not to stop at all on the way.* General Beauregard insisted, however, that the order should be revoked, and thus were Petersburg and Richmond barely saved by the opportune presence and gallant conduct of Hagood's command. It was upon that occasion that General Butler's forces were baffled and beaten off, on the 6th and 7th of May, in their attempt to seize the Richmond Railroad above Petersburg. Much praise is also due to the prompt action of General Bushrod Johnson and his Tennesseans, 1168 in number, whom General Hagood found at the junction when he arrived in person with the remaining companies of the 25th South Carolina Regiment. General Johnson had marched from Drury's Bluff, in the direction of Colonel Graham's firing, with the purpose of giving him assistance. Owing to the position assigned to his forces, the part he and his men took in this sharp encounter, which overturned Butler's plans, was not so conspicuous as it would otherwise have been, though it neutralized the action of the Federal force confronting his line, and thereby contributed to the successful repulse of the enemy. The loss of the latter was estimated at 1000 men, though General Hagood is of opinion that it was probably not so great. The entire population of Petersburg loudly applauded the timely intervention of the South Carolina brigade. It was presented with a flag by the ladies. From the pulpit thanks were offered to the 1500 brave men composing it; and the merchants of the city, in acknowledgment of what they had done, would receive no pay from them for their divers small purchases at the time.†

Meanwhile troops were hastily called for from all quarters; and so great was the trepidation of the Administration, that their arrival was expected before they had had time to get fairly under

* See telegrams, in Appendix.

† See, in Appendix, extract from General Hagood's memoirs.

way. Thus was General Hoke abruptly ordered back from the Newbern campaign* and sent to Petersburg, where he arrived, as did also General Beauregard, on May 10th.

Among the various telegrams sent to Richmond on that day by General Beauregard was the following to General Bragg:

"PETERSBURG, *May 10th*, 1864.

"Am organizing rapidly brigades already here and those arriving into two divisions, under Pickett and Hoke, with battalion of artillery to each division. Many batteries are still *en route*. Hope to be in position for offensive to-morrow night. Will inform you in time for co-operation with General Ramsom.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

And on the next day this telegram was forwarded:

"PETERSBURG, *May 11th*, 1864.

"General BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

"My forces are being united as soon as practicable. You may then rely on my hearty co-operation in defence of Richmond. Appearances here this morning are that the enemy is about withdrawing from this point to reinforce elsewhere. I will try to strike him a severe blow before he leaves.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The authorities at Richmond were now in a state of great excitement. The enemy had been repulsed on the Richmond Railroad, and, to all appearance, had abandoned his original intention of investing Petersburg; but where he would next attempt to strike was the all-absorbing question. Richmond was his only immediate objective, thought Mr. Davis. Mr. Seddon and General Bragg were of the same opinion. Many telegrams were now sent from Richmond to Petersburg, showing more nervousness than wisdom on the part of the Administration, and seriously interfering with General Beauregard's plans. No one could doubt that the Confederate capital was in imminent peril at that hour; but that Mr. Davis, and Mr. Seddon, and even General Bragg, from within the works of Richmond, should imagine that they

* General Hoke had already taken the outworks at Newbern, and demanded its surrender; when, in obedience to instructions from Richmond, General Beauregard sent him a special messenger (Lieutenant Chisolm, A. D. C.) with orders to repair forthwith to Petersburg, no matter how far his operations might have advanced against Newbern. General Beauregard had had trains collected at Kinston to facilitate the transport of his troops *via* Weldon. No time was lost in carrying out the order.

could better appreciate the situation than General Beauregard—who for weeks had warned them of the very danger they had persistently neglected to avert—was indeed more than strange. It is easily seen what the result would have been if General Beauregard had not resisted the vexatious intermeddling of persons having none of his opportunities to judge of the real state of affairs around him. Fortunately, he finally wrested from the War Department full authority to follow his own course and handle his troops as he thought best.

By his orders General Hoke led the advance column from Petersburg, with six brigades of infantry and eight batteries, for the purpose of forming a junction with General Ransom, at or about Drury's Bluff, and began moving on the morning of the 11th. General Beauregard remained to await the arrival of the last two brigades, hourly expected from Weldon, and also to see General Whiting, then just arriving to take command of the forces in Petersburg and relieve General Pickett, who on the day before had reported himself ill.

Butler's army now seriously menaced the position of Drury's Bluff, on the James, which was not originally included within the limits of the Department assigned to General Beauregard. The latter left Petersburg on May 13th with an escort of about 1200 men of Colquitt's brigade and Baker's small regiment of cavalry, after leaving specific instructions, oral and written, with General Whiting, as to the co-operation he was to give, in the impending battle, with the forces expected at Petersburg from the South. From information received on the way General Beauregard's march was deflected from the straight route he was pursuing to the left, by way of Chesterfield Court-house; and, as the Federals during the day had carried the outer line of works at Drury's Bluff, he was barely enabled to slip between their extreme left and the river, reaching his point of destination at three o'clock in the morning. Late as it was, he called in council Colonel Harris, his Chief-Engineer, and Colonel Stevens, the Engineer of that post and of Richmond. They explained to him the main features of the Federal attack, its result, and the consequent dejection of our troops. Colonel Stevens also gave him an account of the battles of the Wilderness and of Spottsylvania Court-house up to the 12th, and described the position occupied since that time by the respective forces of Generals Lee and Grant. He spoke,

likewise, of a reserve of 5000 men, held for the defence of Richmond, and stationed in or near that city.

After a rapid survey of that theatre of the war, on a topographical map furnished him by Colonel Stevens, General Beauregard saw that, as both General Lee and himself occupied the interior lines, it was possible, by a bold, combined effort on our part, to destroy not only General Butler's forces but also those under General Grant. His plan was instantly conceived and communicated to Colonels Harris and Stevens. He then despatched the latter to Richmond, to present his views to the President; or, if unable to see him, to General Bragg.

Colonel Stevens could not see the President. He explained his mission to General Bragg, who, previous to taking any action, preferred to consult in person with General Beauregard. He arrived at the latter's headquarters at half-past five o'clock that morning, accompanied by Colonel Stevens.

The plan, now repeated by General Beauregard to General Bragg, was as follows: that General Lee should fall back from his position, near Guinea Station, to the defensive lines of the Chickahominy, or even to the intermediate lines of Richmond; that 10,000 of his men should meanwhile be swiftly transferred to General Beauregard, together with the 5000 reserves, in Richmond, under General Ransom; that upon the arrival of this reinforcement, which would give him an effective of about 25,000 men, General Beauregard, at day-break on the 15th, should attack Butler on his right flank, so as to cut him off from communication with his base at Bermuda Hundreds; while General Whiting, with some 4000 men, moving simultaneously from Port Walthall Junction, should strike Butler's right rear, press him back upon the James River above Drury's Bluff, and force him to surrender by noon of that day, leaving his depot at Bermuda Hundreds a prey to the Confederates; that General Beauregard should then throw his victorious force across the James, and, by a concerted movement, strike General Grant on his left flank, while General Lee should attack him in front.

General Bragg expressed his approval of the plan, but also his inability to direct its execution without the consent of the President, to whom he would immediately submit it. Deprecating the loss of time that would thus ensue, General Beauregard

strongly urged General Bragg to take the responsibility upon himself and issue the necessary orders at once. He feared Mr. Davis might procrastinate and even oppose his views. But General Bragg could not be induced so to act, and left to seek the approval of the President.

Within about two hours after the conference between Generals Beauregard and Bragg the President himself reached Drury's Bluff; and General Beauregard, with more minuteness than before, again detailed his plan of operations. The President objected that the proposed retrograde movement of General Lee's army towards Richmond, and the withdrawal from it of 10,000 men, were altogether out of the question; and that he could only add to General Beauregard's force the 5000 reserves of Ransom's division.

In urging the advantages of his plan General Beauregard insisted that General Lee's withdrawal behind the Chickahominy, where McClellan had been so effectually held at bay in 1862, or even — which would be still better — behind the defences of Richmond, for a few hours, would render General Grant's left flank more exposed, and bring it within easier reach of his proposed attack.* Among the arguments used by General Beauregard in pressing his views upon Mr. Davis was that, if successful, the stroke would in all probability terminate the war; while, if it should not be successful, the end to which the Confederate cause was helplessly drifting, unless redeemed by some early, bold, and decisive success, would only come sooner. Mr. Davis persisted in his refusal. He would only consent to the transfer of Ransom's division from Richmond, and that not until the next day (15th), expressing his desire that the attack should be made on Butler's army, and his confidence that the latter would be beaten and driven back to his base at Bermuda Hundreds. To this General Beauregard replied that the defeat of Butler alone would be but a barren victory, as had been so many former operations of the war, and was not the ultimate object to be obtained. What he proposed accomplishing was, the extended decisive result which all the circumstances of the moment favored. But, to General Beauregard's chagrin, all his representations were unavailing: Mr. Davis could not be convinced.

* This was substantially the line in assaulting which, on the 3d of June, at Cold Harbor, General Grant was so bloodily repulsed.

The same day (May 14th) General Beauregard was officially notified from Richmond by General Bragg that his command was enlarged so as to include all territory south of the James; and that he was also expected to protect the city of Richmond from any sudden movement against it from the north side.

Ransom's division was sent on the afternoon of the 15th, making General Beauregard's force about 15,000 strong, which he hastily organized into three divisions, under Hoke, Ransom, and Colquitt—officers who, except the latter, were then unknown to him.

With that promptness of execution which always characterized his movements on the field, and produced such confidence in those who came in close contact with him, General Beauregard, late as it was, perfected his plan of operations and order of battle; saw, conferred with, and counselled each of his division and some of his brigade commanders; forgot nothing, except his own comfort, and stood ready to meet the impending events of the next day.

Some of General Hagood's remarks in his memoirs referring to these events are so appropriate, that they are now placed before the reader. He says:

"That evening (15th of May) Beauregard, passing along the lines, asked some of his soldiers if they were not tired of this sort of fighting, and said he 'would change it for them.'

"At 10 o'clock at night, on the 15th, Hoke's brigade commanders were summoned to his headquarters, informed that the offensive would be taken in the morning, and instructed in the plan of battle. Beauregard's plans showed the instinct of genius. They could not, under the circumstances, notwithstanding the difficulty of handling rapidly and effectively an army so recently organized, have failed substantially to have annihilated his antagonist, had not two of his division commanders failed him. The shortcomings of General Ransom and General Whiting are indicated in the official report."

Before 11 A. M., on the 15th, General Beauregard had sent instructions to General Whiting, then at Petersburg, and had fully informed him of his intended movement against Butler. His despatch to that effect was as follows:

"DRURY'S BLUFF, *May 15th, 1864, 10.45 A. M.*

"Major-General W. H. C. WHITING, Petersburg, Va.:

"I shall attack enemy to-morrow at daylight, by river road, to cut him off from his Bermuda base. You will take up your position to-night on Swift Creek, with Wise's, Martin's, Dearing's, and two regiments of Colquitt's brigades, with about twenty pieces, under Colonel Jones. At daybreak you will march to Port Walthall Junction; and when you hear an engagement in

your front you will advance boldly and rapidly, by the shortest road in direction of heaviest firing, to attack enemy in rear or flank. You will protect your advance and flanks with Dearing's cavalry, taking necessary precautions to distinguish friends from foes. Please communicate this to General Hill. This revokes all former orders of movements.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

"P.S.—I have just received a telegram from General Bragg informing me that he has sent you orders to join me at this place; you need not do so, but follow to the letter the above instructions. G. T. B."

He had also delivered to each of his three division commanders the following circular, adding to it such oral advice as the occasion required:

"HEADQUARTERS, ETC., DRURY'S FARM, *May 15th*, 1864.

"To ——— :

"General,—The following instructions for battle to-morrow are communicated for your information and action.

"The purpose of the movement is to cut off the enemy from his base of operations at Bermuda Hundreds, and capture or destroy him in his present position. To this end we shall attack and turn, by the river road, his right flank, now resting on James River, while his centre and left flank are kept engaged, to prevent him from reinforcing his right flank.

"Major-General Ransom's division will, to-night, take position the most favorable for attack on the enemy's right flank, to be made by him at day-break to-morrow morning. His skirmishers will drive back vigorously those of the enemy in his front, and will be followed closely by his line of battle, which will, at the proper time, pivot on its right flank, so as to take the enemy in flank and rear. He will form in two lines of battle, and will use his battalion of artillery to the best advantage.

"Colonel Dunnoyant's regiment of cavalry will move with this division, under the direction of General Ransom.

"Major-General Hoke's division, now in the trenches, on the right of the position herein assigned to General Ransom, will, at daylight, engage the enemy with a heavy line of skirmishers, and will hold the rest of his forces in hand, ready to attack with vigor the enemy's line in his front as soon as he shall find it wavering before his skirmishers, or so soon as Ransom's line of battle shall have become fairly engaged with the enemy. General Hoke will form in two lines of battle, four hundred yards apart, in front of his trenches, at the proper time, and in such manner as not to delay his forward movement. He will use his battalion of artillery to the best advantage.

"Colonel Boyken's regiment of cavalry will move in conjunction with Hoke's division, so as to protect his left flank. He will receive more definite instructions from Major-General Hoke. Colonel Shingler's regiment of cavalry will move with the reserve division.

"The division commanded by Brigadier-General Colquitt will constitute the reserve, and will to-night form in column, by brigades, in rear of Hoke's

present position, the centre of each brigade resting on the turnpike. The division will be massed under cover of the hills now occupied by Hoke's troops, so as to be sheltered at the outset from the enemy's fire in front. During the movement the head of the reserve column will be kept at a distance of about five hundred yards from Hoke's second line of battle. As soon as practicable the intervals between the brigades of the reserve division will be maintained at from two to three hundred yards.

"The reserve artillery, under General Colquitt, will follow along the turnpike, about three hundred yards in rear of the last brigade. He will use it to the best advantage. Simultaneously with these movements Major-General Whiting will move with his division from Petersburg, along the Petersburg and Richmond Turnpike, and attack the enemy, flank and rear.

"The movements above indicated must be made with all possible vigor and celerity.

"The Generals commanding divisions, and Colonels Baker and Shingler, commanding cavalry, will report at these headquarters at 6 h. p. m. to-day. In the mean time they will give all necessary instructions for providing their respective commands with sixty rounds of ammunition issued to each man, and at least twenty rounds for each in reserve. They will cause their commands to be supplied with two days' cooked rations.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

Nothing could be more explicit and nothing clearer. Each division commander knew exactly what he was expected to do. He knew also, and so did each brigade commander, what movements would be executed on other portions of the field. To acquaint his subordinates with the general outlines of his plans when about to put them into execution, and thus insure unity of action, was one of the methods habitually used by General Beauregard during the war. The wisdom of this course was never more clearly exhibited than upon this occasion.

General Beauregard's narrative of the battle of Drury's Bluff, and the divers incidents connected with it, will be found in the following passages, taken from his report to the War Department:

"Ransom moved at 4.45 A. M., being somewhat delayed by a dense fog, which lasted several hours after dawn and occasioned some embarrassment. His division consisted of the following brigades, in the order mentioned, commencing from the left: Gracie's, Kemper's (commanded by Colonel Terry), Burton's (under Colonel Fry), and Colonel Lewis's (Hoke's old brigade).

"He was soon engaged, carrying, at 6 A. M., with some loss, the enemy's line of breastworks in his front, his troops moving splendidly forward to the assault, and capturing five stands of colors and some five hundred prisoners. The brigades most heavily engaged were Gracie's and Kemper's, opposed to the enemy's right, the former turning his flank. He then halted to form, reported his loss heavy and troops scattered by the fog, his ammunition short,

and asked for a brigade from the reserve. Colquitt's brigade was sent him at 6.30 A.M., with orders for its return when it ceased to be indispensable.

"Before either ammunition or the reserve brigade had arrived he reported the enemy driving Hoke's left, and sent the right regiment of Lewis's brigade forward at double-quick towards the point of supposed danger. This held the enemy long enough for the reserve brigade to arrive, charge, and drive him back from the front of our left centre, where the affair occurred, over and along the works, to the turnpike.

"It will be seen, in a subsequent part of this report, that one of Hagood's advance regiments had unexpectedly come in contact with the enemy and been ordered back, it not being contemplated to press at this point until Ransom should swing round his left, as directed in the battle order. This possibly originated Ransom's impression as to the situation of Hoke's left, which had, in fact, steadily maintained its proper position.

"At 7.15 A.M. Colquitt's brigade, of the reserve, was recalled from Ransom, and a slight modification of the original movement was made to relieve Hoke, on whose front the enemy had been allowed to mass his forces by the inaction of the left.

"Ransom was ordered to flank the enemy's right by changing the front of his right brigade, to support it by another in *echelon*, to advance a third towards Proctor's Creek, and to hold a fourth in reserve. This modification was intended to be temporary, and the original plan was to be fully carried out on the seizure of the river and Proctor's Creek crossing.

"In proceeding to execute this order Ransom found the reserve brigade engaged and his own troops moving by the right flank towards the firing at the centre. He therefore sent Burton's brigade back instead of Colquitt's, and reported a necessity to straighten the lines he had stormed. Here his infantry rested during the greater part of the day. Dunnivant's cavalry, dismounted, being thrown forward, as skirmishers, towards a small force which occupied a ridge in the edge of George Gregory's woods, north of Proctor's Creek. This force, with an insignificant body of cavalry, believed to be negroes, and a report of threatening gunboats (which came some hours earlier, as since ascertained), were the only menace to our left.

"At 10 A.M. I withheld an order for Ransom to move until further arrangements should be made, for the following reasons:

"The right was heavily engaged; all of the reserve had been detached, right and left, at different times; the silence of Whiting's guns, which had been heard a short time about 8 A.M., gave reasonable hope that he had met no resistance and would soon be on; a despatch had been sent to Whiting at 9 A.M., which was repeated at 9.30 A.M., to 'press on and press over everything in your front, and the day will be complete;' and Ransom not only reported the enemy in strong force in his front, but expressed the opinion that the safety of his command would be compromised by an advance.

"On the right Hoke had early advanced his skirmishers and opened with his artillery. The fog and other causes temporarily delayed the advance of his line of battle. When he finally moved forward he soon became hotly engaged, and handled his command with judgment and energy.

"Hagood and Johnson were thrown forward, with a section of Eschelman's Washington Artillery, and found a heavy force of the enemy, with six or eight pieces of artillery, occupying the salient of the outer line of works on the turnpike and his own defensive lines.

"Our artillery engaged at very short range, disabling some of the enemy's guns and blowing up two limbers. Another section of the same command opened from the right of the turnpike. They both held their positions, though with heavy loss, until their ammunition was spent, when they were relieved by an equal number of pieces from the reserve artillery under Major Owen.

"Hagood, with great vigor and dash, drove the enemy from the outer lines in his front, capturing a number of prisoners, and, in conjunction with Johnson, five pieces of artillery—three 20-pounder Parrotts and two fine Napoleons. He then took position in the works, his left regiment being thrown forward by Hoke to connect with Ransom's right. In advancing this regiment encountered the enemy behind a second line of works in the woods, with abatis interlaced with wire. Attack at that point not being contemplated, it was ordered back to the line of battle, but not before its intrepid advance had brought on it considerable loss. This circumstance has been referred to before, as the occasion of a mistake by Ransom.

"Johnson, meanwhile, had been heavily engaged. The line of the enemy bent around his right flank, subjecting his brigade, for a time, to fire in flank and front. With admirable firmness he repulsed frequent assaults of the enemy, moving in masses against his right and rear. Leader, officers, and men alike displayed their fitness for the trial to which they were subjected. I cannot forbear to mention that Lieutenant Waggoner, of the 17th Tennessee Regiment, went, alone, through a storm of fire and pulled down a white flag which a small, isolated body of our men had raised, receiving a wound in the act. The brigade, holding its ground nobly, lost more than a fourth of its entire number.

"Two regiments of the reserve were sent up to its support, but were less effective than they should have been, through a mistake of the officer posting them. Hoke also sent two regiments from Clingman, to protect Johnson's flank. These partially partook of the same mistake, being posted in the woods, where the moral and material effect of their presence was lost.

"I now ordered Hoke to press forward his right for the relief of his right-centre, and he advanced Clingman with his remaining regiments, and Corse with his brigade.

"He drove the enemy with spirit, suffering some loss; but the gap between Clingman and the troops on his left induced him to retire his command, to prevent being flanked, and re-form it in the intermediate lines. Thus Corse became isolated; and, learning from his officers that masses were forming against his right flank, he withdrew some distance back, but not quite so far as his original position.

"These two brigades were not afterwards engaged, though they went to the front; Corse, about one hour after he fell back, and Clingman at about 2.15 P. M. The enemy did not re-occupy the ground from which they drove him before they retired.

"In front of Hagood and Johnson the fighting was stubborn and prolonged. The enemy, slowly retiring from Johnson's right, took strong position on the ridge in front of Proctor's Creek, massing near the turnpike, and occupying advantageous ground at the house and grove of Charles Friend.

"At length Johnson, having brushed the enemy from his right flank in the woods, with some assistance from the Washington Artillery, cleared his front, and rested his troops in the shelter of the outer works.

"One of the captured pieces having opened on the enemy's masses, he finally fell back behind the woods and ridge at Proctor's Creek, though his skirmish line continued the engagement some hours longer.

"Further movements were here suspended, to wait communication from Whiting, or the sound of his approach, and to reorganize the troops, which had become more or less disorganized. Brief firing at about 1.45 P. M. gave some hope of his proximity.

"I waited in vain. The firing heard was probably an encounter between Dearing and the enemy's rear-guard. Dearing had been ordered by Whiting to communicate with me; but, unsupported as he was by infantry or artillery, he was unable to do so, except by sending a detachment by a circuitous route, which reached me after the work of the day was closed.

"At 4 P. M. all hope of Whiting's approach was gone, and I reluctantly abandoned so much of my plan as contemplated more than a vigorous pursuit of Butler and driving him to his fortified base.

"To effect this, I resumed my original formation, and directed General Hoke to send two brigades forward along the Court-house Road, to take the enemy in flank and establish enfilading batteries in front of the heights west of the railroad.

"The formation of our line was checked by a heavy and prolonged storm of rain. Meanwhile, the enemy opened a severe fire, which was soon silenced by our artillery.

"Before we were ready to advance darkness approached, and, upon consultation with several of my subordinate commanders, it was deemed imprudent to attack, considering the probability of serious obstacles and the proximity of Butler's intrenched camp. I therefore put the army in position for the night, and sent instructions to Whiting to join our right at the railroad in the morning.

"During the night the enemy retired to the fortified line of his present camp, leaving in our hands some fourteen hundred prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and five stand of colors.

"He now rests there, hemmed by our lines, which have since, from time to time, been advanced with every skirmish, and now completely cover the southern communication of the capital, thus securing one of the principal objects of the attack.

"The more glorious results anticipated were lost by the hesitation of the left wing and the premature halt of the Petersburg column before obstacles in neither case sufficient to have deterred from the execution of the movements prescribed.

"Too much praise cannot be bestowed on the officers and men who fought

the battle of Drury's Bluff, for the ardor and intrepidity displayed by them whenever called upon to meet the foe, regardless of his advantage in numbers and position. I shall take pleasure in presenting the names of those who most distinguished themselves as soon as the detailed reports of subordinate commanders shall have been received at these headquarters.

"The same opportunity will be taken to mention the names and services of those members of my personal and general staff who were present during that battle, and of those officers who, belonging to other commands, kindly volunteered their services on that occasion. The intelligent zeal and activity of all these officers, in transmitting orders and conveying information from one portion of the field to the other, contributed largely to the success of the day."

The day was ours. Butler's army was driven back, hemmed in, and reduced to comparative impotency, though not captured. The danger threatening Richmond was, for the time being, averted. Our success, however, was incomplete in this, that General Beauregard's entire plan, one of the ablest he had conceived during the war, was not carried out. The blame rests, not only upon "the hesitation of the left wing," but chiefly upon General Whiting, whose failure to execute the order which had been distinctly and repeatedly given him prevented the decisive result so nearly accomplished.

We are loath to comment upon the lamentable remissness of an officer, possessing undoubted capacity, whose subsequent death, in the hands of the enemy, from wounds received in his gallant defence of Fort Fisher, pleads for indulgence on the part of the historian. General Wise—who, with General Martin, was under his command at the time of the Drury's Bluff affair—wrote (besides his official report) a full and clear narrative of what then took place. He was severe upon General Whiting's course and the cause that produced it, but his criticism is not the less true and well-deserved. He used the following language:

"My report fully detailed all these particulars to General Beauregard, who referred it back to General Whiting. And here I take heartfelt pleasure in stating my judgment upon the latter. * * * He was an able and brave officer, and failed only from his too long indulged habit of inebriety. Had he been sober that day General Beauregard would have achieved the most decisive victory of the war. His success was signal and brilliant as it was; but what would have been the effect upon the war if Whiting had obeyed his orders, and he had crushed, as he undoubtedly would, the army of Butler, and had then rapidly crossed to Chaffin's Bluff, and thence to Bottom's Bridge, with his victorious 20,000? Lee would have had his 45,000 in Grant's front, with Beauregard's 20,000 on his left flank and rear, and Grant would never have

reached Harrison's Landing—if, indeed, his army too had not been conquered. Yet Beauregard received for his victory at Drury's Bluff rather more of censure than of commendation."

The last telegram sent by General Beauregard to General Whiting on the day of the battle read as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT, *May 16th*, 1864: 11.30 P. M.

"Major-General WHITING:

"Your despatch of 7.30 P. M. (sent by the guide Archer), replying to mine of 4.15 P. M., is received. *I rely and insist that you shall effect a junction* with my right to-morrow morning, as indicated in my despatch of 6.45 P. M., herewith repeated in duplicate.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The foregoing despatch had been sent to General Whiting upon receipt of the following telegram:

"General BEAUREGARD, Drury's Bluff:

"I am here for the night near Walthall's Junction. Didn't get your despatch until near night. Had driven the enemy all the way from Swift Creek, his pickets and outposts being very stubborn and provided with artillery. Enemy retired slowly before me all day. Could inflict no great loss on him owing to country. Owing to lateness of hour of receiving despatches and enemy's position could not press him further to-day. Concluded to try again in the morning, if you do. Could hear but very little firing. His line faces me and rests on his works across the Neck and beyond the railroad. Send reply. Two regiments of cavalry are moving from City Point. Makes me uneasy, as I have to detach cavalry.

"7 $\frac{1}{2}$ P. M., *May 16th*, '64.

"W. H. C. WHITING, Major-General.

"Don't let him press me to-night; position very bad."

"Received 10.15 P. M.

"G. W. LAY, Lieut.-Colonel."

The grief expressed by General Whiting when he met General Beauregard on the following day, was most sincere. He accepted the blame laid upon him, admitted his irremediable error, and asked to be relieved from his command. This was immediately done, as is shown by the telegram we here append, forwarded by General Beauregard to President Davis:

"HANCOCK'S HOUSE, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ MILES N. WALTHALL JUNCTION,
May 17th, 1864.

"Whiting's forces joined me at mid-day. He expressed a desire to be relieved from command of his temporary division, and has accordingly returned to the temporary command of the Department. In accordance with your permission I have assigned General Hill to command this division tem-

porarily, with the understanding that he will apply for orders in the field. I trust this will fully meet your approval.

"The enemy has retired to his lines across the Neck. I have telegraphed General Bragg as to my position and intentions.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

Following this recital, we are again compelled to refer to the errors contained in Mr. Davis's book. The passages to be found in Vol. II., pp. 511-515, wherein is described his interview with General Beauregard, at Drury's Bluff, and its results, are here alluded to:

"In the afternoon of the 14th I rode down to visit General Beauregard at his headquarters in the field. Supposing his troops to be on the line of intrenchment, I passed Major Drury's house to go thither, when some one by the roadside called to me and told me that the troops were not on the line of intrenchment, and that General Beauregard was at the house behind me.

"My first question on meeting him was to learn why the intrenchments were abandoned. He answered that he thought it better to concentrate his troops. Upon my stating to him that there was nothing then to prevent Butler from turning his position, he said he would desire nothing more, as he would then fall upon him, cut him off from his base, etc."

What else General Beauregard is supposed to have then said is not given by Mr. Davis, whose memory, no doubt, failed him at this point. Or was it that General Beauregard only began, and never ended, his explanation? Be this as it may, Mr. Davis affords the reader neither satisfaction nor enlightenment.

The impossibility of any such occurrence, or of any such conversation, will now be demonstrated.

It was between the hours of eight and nine in the morning of the 14th, and not in the afternoon of that day, that Mr. Davis first saw General Beauregard at the Drury house; the object of his coming thither being to confer concerning the plan laid before him, through General Bragg, the tenor of which is already known. General Beauregard had no "headquarters," at that time, "in the field," or elsewhere. The Drury house was the first he had entered on his arrival at Drury's Bluff that morning, and he had not yet left it when the President was ushered in. The "line of intrenchments" spoken of by Mr. Davis, and for the abandonment of which he called General Beauregard to account, had been taken by the enemy on the evening before; that is to say, before General Beauregard's arrival at Drury's Bluff. And it must be borne in mind that, at the time of Mr. Davis's visit there, General Beaure-

gard had not yet seen the commanding officer of the post—General Hoke—who, expecting a renewed attack, was then near his lines; nor had he even assumed command of our forces. The fact is that, as late as 8 o'clock A. M., on the 14th, Drury's Bluff had not been made a part of General Beauregard's Department, as appears from the following telegram forwarded to him on that day:

"RICHMOND, VA., *May 14th*, 1864.

"To General BEAUREGARD:

"Your command is extended so as to include all that portion of Virginia lying south of the James River, including Drury's Bluff and its defences. Order will be sent by courier.

"S. COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl."

The order was sent, and with it a communication from General Bragg, of the same date, confirming the despatch.* President Davis, therefore, might, with equal logic, have taken General Beauregard to task for not having prevented Butler's landing at City Point and Bermuda Hundreds.

Mr. Davis goes on as follows:

"We then passed to the consideration of the operations to be undertaken against Butler, who had already advanced from his base at Bermuda Hundreds. I offered, for the purpose of attacking Butler, to send Major-General Ransom with the field force he had for the protection of Richmond."

This is an indirect acknowledgment that the object of his visit on the 14th was to listen to General Beauregard's plan of operations: first, against Butler, and afterwards, in conjunction with General Lee, against Grant; for that was the only plan then submitted and under consideration, and it included the sending of Ransom's force from Richmond to Drury's Bluff. Mr. Davis, therefore, is in error when he says that he "offered" Ransom's division. He made no such offer, but merely consented—apparently with reluctance—to the removal of that force, which he ordered down twenty-four hours later than General Beauregard had wished him to do, and after positively refusing the 10,000 men from Lee's army, which General Beauregard, in his plan and orally during that interview, had entreated him to send, in order that he might carry out his plans.

Mr. Davis, who fails to give the details of the plan, says that

* See Appendix.

such a proposition was made to him several days later—namely, after the battle of the 16th. He says:

"Soon after the affair at Drury's Bluff, General Beauregard addressed to me a communication proposing that he should be heavily reinforced from General Lee's army, so as to enable him to crush Butler in his intrenchments, and then, with the main body of his force, together with a detachment from General Lee's army, that he should join General Lee, overwhelm Grant, and march to Washington. I knew that General Lee was then confronting an army vastly superior to his in numbers, * * * but, as a matter of courteous consideration, his letter [General Beauregard's letter] was forwarded, with the usual formal indorsement. General Lee's opinion on the case was shown by the instructions he gave directing General Beauregard to straighten his line, so as to reduce the requisite number of men to hold it, and send the balance to join the army north of the James."

The confusion in Mr. Davis's mind concerning these events is wholly incomprehensible. Two communications had been presented by General Beauregard to the War Department during that period. The first—in other words, the very one about which Mr. Davis's conference was held, on the morning of the 14th—had been addressed, not to Mr. Davis directly, as he asserts, but to General Bragg, and bore date May 14th, 1864. It read as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,
DRURY'S BLUFF, *May 14th*, 1864.

"General BRAXTON BRAGG, Comdg.:

"*General*,—Considering the vital importance of the question involved, and resting upon the success of the plan I suggested to you this morning, I have deemed it desirable and appropriate that their substance should be briefly communicated in writing. General Lee's army, at Guinea Station, and my command, at this place, are on nearly a right line passing through Richmond. Grant's army is on the left flank, and Butler on the right. Our lines are thus interior. Butler's aim is unquestionably to invest and turn Drury's Bluff, threatening and holding the Petersburg and Danville Railroads, opening the obstructions in the river at Fort Drury for the passage of war vessels, necessitating then the return of General Lee to the lines about Richmond. With the railroad held by the enemy, Grant in front, and Butler in rear of the works around Richmond, the capital would be practically invested, and the issue may well be dreaded. The plan suggested is, that General Lee should fall back to the defensive lines of the Chickahominy, even to the intermediate lines of Richmond, sending temporarily to this place 15,000 men* of his troops. Immediately upon the accession of my present force I would take

* Inclusive of Ransom's forces, at Richmond.

the offensive and attack Butler vigorously. Such a move would throw me directly upon Butler's communications; and as he now stands, with his right flank well towards the rear, General Whiting should also move simultaneously. Butler must necessarily be crushed or captured, and all the stores of that army would then fall in our hands—an amount, probably, that would make an interruption in our communications, for a period of a few days, a matter of no serious inconvenience. The proposed attack should be accomplished in two days, at furthest, after receiving my reinforcements. This done, I would move with 10,000 more men to the assistance of General Lee than I drew from him, and then Grant's fate would not long remain doubtful. The destruction of Grant's forces would open the way for the recovery of most of our lost territory, as already submitted to you in general terms.

“Respectfully, G. T. BEAUREGARD.”

The other communication referred to is dated May 18th, and was sent to Richmond in the form of a memorandum. It was intended to meet the entirely changed circumstances existing after the rout of Drury's Bluff, and had very little—if anything—to do with the plan submitted to General Bragg and to Mr. Davis on the morning of the 14th, and re-affirmed, in writing, on the same day. This second communication ran thus:

“HEADQUARTERS, N. C. AND SO. VA., *May 18th, 1864: 9 P. M.*,
HANCOCK'S HOUSE, VA., 2½ miles of Walthall Station.

“*Memorandum.*—The crisis demands prompt and decisive action. The two armies are now too far apart to secure success, unless we consent to give up Petersburg and place the capital in jeopardy. If General Lee will fall back behind the Chickahominy, engaging the enemy so as to draw him on, General Beauregard can bring up 15,000 men to unite with Breckinridge and fall upon the enemy's flank with over 20,000 men effective, thus rendering Grant's defeat certain and decisive, and in time to enable General Beauregard to return with a reinforcement from General Lee to drive Butler from Petersburg and from his present position. For three days, perhaps four at most, Petersburg and Richmond would be held by the forces left there for that purpose. Without such concentration nothing decisive can be effected, and the picture presented is one of starvation. Without concentration General Lee must eventually fall back before Grant's heavy reinforcements, and the view presented merely anticipates this movement for offensive purposes. Meantime, it is impossible to effectually protect our lines of communication with North Carolina, and impossible to hold our present line in front of Butler, with a much more reduced force. At present 3000 men can be spared from these with safety, day after to-morrow 2000 more, perhaps; for our lines will probably be stronger, if, as we expect, the forward line can be occupied to-morrow.

“G. T. BEAUREGARD.”

An attentive consideration of the features of these two plans of operations, and of the respective times and situations to which

they refer, will cause the reader to wonder at the incorrectness of Mr. Davis's narrative. The military situations before and after the victory of Drury's Bluff were very different, and the respective plans of operations proposed were in essential features the reverse of each other. The first proposed that Beauregard should be reinforced from Lee, so as to crush Butler, and then move to Lee's support, to take the offensive against Grant; the second proposed that Beauregard should move first to Lee's support, to attack and defeat Grant, and thence return, reinforced by Lee, to finish Butler. Yet Mr. Davis applies to the latter phase of events the plan proposed by General Beauregard to meet the former.

We must assume that Mr. Davis comprehended these proposed plans of action when they were submitted, and we are forced to the conclusion, therefore, that his present sources of historical information are not sufficiently accurate and trustworthy to entitle his work to recognition as one of authority.

It will suffice, then, to add that General Lee sent no order to General Beauregard to straighten his line! Apart from the fact that he did not, he could have had no authority for so doing, since General Beauregard's Department was entirely separate and distinct from his, and General Lee was not in the habit of openly violating the rules of military courtesy and etiquette. Moreover, there could have been no occasion for such an order from any quarter, inasmuch as General Beauregard had already informed the War Department that he intended to occupy a shorter line on the next day (May 19th).

As to "the balance" (to use Mr. Davis's expression) of General Beauregard's forces being sent "to join the army north of the James," the telegrams inserted in the Appendix to the next chapter of this work, wherein this subject is exhaustively treated, conclusively show that General Lee did not make such a request (it was not an order) until May 30th and June 1st; at the same time he expressed the desire that General Beauregard himself should, if possible, cross with his troops and take command of the right wing of the Army of Virginia.

Another error on the part of Mr. Davis is noticeable in the second volume of his work, page 512, where he says:

"General Whiting, with some force, was holding a defensive position at Petersburg. General Beauregard proposed that the main part of it should

advance, and unite with him in an attack upon Butler, wherever he should be found between Drury's and Petersburg. To this I offered distinct objection, because of the hazard during a battle of attempting to make a junction of troops moving from opposite sides of the enemy; and proposed that Whiting's command should move at night by the Chesterfield road, where they would not probably be observed by Butler's advance."

This, in the main, is correct. Mr. Davis, as he says, did strenuously oppose the junction spoken of by General Beauregard, though "*his universal practice*," as he asserts, "*was never to do more than to make a suggestion to a general commanding in the field*;"* and General Beauregard, as was his duty to do, yielded to the will of the Commander-in-chief. Mr. Davis continues:

"General Beauregard, thereupon, spoke of some difficulty in getting a courier who knew the route and could certainly deliver the order to General Whiting. Opportunely, a courier arrived from General Whiting, who had come up the Chesterfield road. He then said the order would have to be drawn with a good deal of care, and that he would prepare it as soon as possible. I arose to take leave, when General Beauregard courteously walked down the stairs with me, remarking as we went that he was embarrassed for the want of a good cavalry commander. I saw in the yard Colonel Chilton, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General, and said, 'There is an old cavalry officer, who was trained in my old regiment, the First Dragoons, and who, I think, will answer your requirements.' Upon his expressing the pleasure it would give him to have Colonel Chilton, I told him of General Beauregard's want, and asked him if the service would be agreeable to him. He readily accepted it, and I left, supposing all the preliminaries settled. In the next forenoon Colonel Samuel Melton, of the Adjutant and Inspector-General's Department, called at my residence, and delivered a message from General Beauregard to the effect that he had decided to order Whiting to move by the direct road from Petersburg, instead of by the Chesterfield route; and when I replied that I had stated my objections to General Beauregard to a movement which gave the enemy the advantage of being between our forces, he said General Beauregard had directed him to explain to me that, upon a further examination, he found his force sufficient; that his operations, therefore, did not depend upon making a junction with Whiting."

For the elucidation of the facts of the case it has been necessary to quote thus extensively from Mr. Davis's book. He drifts away so completely from the true version of the incidents he describes that, in re-establishing the facts, our statement becomes directly contradictory to his. The fault is not ours.

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 511. The italics are ours.

Mr. Davis is mistaken in saying that General Beauregard was compelled to employ General Whiting's messenger to carry the first order sent him on that day, after the modification of the plan so much insisted upon by the President. Messengers familiar with the road just gone over by General Beauregard and his escort were not wanting for the purpose. The proof of this is, that three of them—not one only, as Mr. Davis supposes—were sent, on the 14th of May, to Petersburg, each bearing a copy of the triplicate message to General Whiting. It may be that the courier referred to by Mr. Davis was one of these; but it is not true that General Beauregard could have found no other. The following is the message in question:

“DRURY'S BLUFF, *May 14th, 1864.*

“To Major-General W. H. C. WHITING, Petersburg, Va.:

“Proceed to this place Monday morning at daybreak, with Wise's and Martin's brigades and two regiments of Colquitt's, with five days' provisions and sixty rounds of ammunition per man, and all available baggage, wagons, and ambulances, and as large a supply-train as possible, *via* Newby's Bridge, on Swift Creek (20 miles), thence to Cogshall's, Punkett's, Taber's, Watkins's (14 miles), and *be here Tuesday afternoon at latest.* Order Walker and his brigade from Kinston to Petersburg; also regiments of Hoke's and Kemper's brigade now at Hicksford and Weldon. If they cannot come with you, order Dearing's cavalry to guard Petersburg until arrival of Walker. Baker's regiment will be sent to meet you at Newby's Bridge. Butler has his whole force in front of this place.

“(Sent in triplicate.)

G. T. BEAUREGARD.”

The next day, early in the morning, the following additional telegram was sent to General Whiting:

“DRURY'S BLUFF, *May 15th, 1864: 7 A.M.*

“To be more expeditious, leave as soon as practicable on Sunday. Guides will be at crossing of creek. Communicate only in cipher.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.”

But, knowing now that General Ransom could not join him until the afternoon of the 15th, and for other important reasons, fully explained to President Davis in a letter which is about to be submitted, General Beauregard concluded to order General Whiting to march directly on the road to Drury's Bluff, according to his original idea before leaving Petersburg. Hence, on the 15th, at 10.45 A.M., Colonel (afterwards General) Logan, formerly of the Hampton Legion, was sent to General Whiting

with a telegram of that date,* together with a copy of General Beauregard's order of battle, both of which had been committed to memory by the messenger, so that no accident might prevent their safe delivery. A few hours later a duplicate of this telegram was also forwarded to, and duly received by, General Whiting.

The following is the letter referred to:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,
DRURY'S BLUFF, May 15th, 1864.

"His Excellency President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

"Sir,—Upon further inquiry as to the shortest and safest route (*via* Newby's Bridge) by which Major-General Whiting could travel, with his small force, to this point, it was found he would require two days to reach here, the distance being at least thirty-four miles, with roads in a bad condition, owing to the prevailing rains. In a telegram of this morning he expresses his fears of an immediate attack upon him by the enemy. At the same time Captain Davidson, of the navy, informs me that a large fleet of gunboats and transports of the enemy are about four miles below Chaffin's Bluff, probably to reinforce Butler and make a combined attack by land and water.

"Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the enemy is diligently employed in erecting batteries and rifle-pits around this place, further delay might be fatal to success; and I have determined to attack him to-morrow morning with the forces at present available here, increased by Barton's brigade, as authorized by you.

"I have ordered Major-General Whiting to co-operate with all his forces by attacking the enemy in rear from Swift Creek. A copy of my instructions to him and of my order of battle will be forwarded as soon as practicable to the Department.

"I have availed myself of the services of Major-General Ransom to command one of the two divisions of this army.

"I hope, under the protection of a kind Providence, that our efforts to-morrow will be successful.

"I remain, very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl."

This is the only official communication made by General Beauregard to President Davis on the forenoon of the 15th of May (the date mentioned by Mr. Davis) relative to the order for the advance of General Whiting and his force, to co-operate with our army at Drury's Bluff. The "message," as Mr. Davis calls the preceding letter, may have been borne by Colonel Samuel Melton,

* The telegram alluded to is given at page 203 of the present chapter. See, also, General Logan's letter, in Appendix.

though General Beauregard has no recollection of the fact; but, by whomsoever delivered to the President, it certainly is the only trustworthy evidence bearing upon the subject. What Colonel Melton is alleged to have verbally added to General Beauregard's letter—namely, “that upon further examination he found his forces sufficient, and that his operations, therefore, did not depend upon making a junction with Whiting”—is in such direct contradiction to all of General Beauregard's views and efforts at the time, to his report of the battle, and to the whole contents of the letter itself, as to be unworthy of serious attention. General Beauregard's reasons for modifying his order to General Whiting were given in that letter to the President; and therein alone—not in any outside gossip—should General Beauregard's views, opinions, and intentions be looked for, and there only does their expression really exist. In corroboration of the foregoing statement are the telegrams, ten or twelve in number, sent by General Beauregard to General Whiting, between the 14th and 17th of May, showing conclusively that the former never wavered in his desire to secure the latter's co-operation before the expected attack upon Butler. But we have additional proof in the telegram from General Beauregard to General Bragg, dated May 15th, 1864 (the day referred to by Mr. Davis), which reads as follows:

“I have already sent General Whiting his instructions to co-operate with me. Please telegraph him to follow them as delivered by Colonel Logan. Yours may conflict with mine.”

The fact of General Beauregard's insisting so much upon the co-operation of General Whiting's forces, and the fear that orders from Richmond might clash with his own, leave no doubt as to his opinion that Whiting's presence was necessary to the success of his plan.

As General (then Colonel) Logan's name has been mentioned in connection with this incident, we quote a passage from a letter written by him to General Beauregard, dated Richmond, Va., January, 2d, 1882:*

“During the day of May 15th Colonel Samuel Melton, acting A. A. G., notified me that you desired me to take your written and verbal instructions to General Whiting, at his headquarters, near Petersburg, as you intended

* The whole of General Logan's letter is given in the Appendix.

attacking the enemy on the morning of the 16th, and felt anxious that there should, by no possibility, be any miscarriage of your instructions, or any misunderstanding as to their import. * * * Just before starting on my mission I was sent for by you, and in the presence of Colonel Melton the written despatches were given to me, and their contents carefully explained to me by you."

The written despatches to General Whiting were intrusted to Colonel Logan, "in the presence" of Colonel Melton, and carefully explained by General Beauregard. It is evident, therefore, that Colonel Melton knew the object of Colonel Logan's mission to General Whiting. How, then, on that very day, and while handing to Mr. Davis a letter from General Beauregard, explaining the reasons for his last orders to General Whiting, could Colonel Melton have said, "Upon further examination General Beauregard found his forces sufficient, and thought his operations did not depend upon making a junction with Whiting?"

It should be added, that the co-operation so persistently enjoined upon General Whiting would have been judicious and of material importance, even had the President granted, and not denied, the reinforcements sought from the Army of Northern Virginia. But, without such assistance from General Lee, the junction of General Whiting's forces from Petersburg became absolutely necessary, in order to insure success over the Federal army threatening Richmond from the south of the James.

Reference will now be made to Mr. Davis's account of his offer of Colonel Chilton to General Beauregard, as a cavalry commander.

What General Beauregard needed at that time, and what he asked for was, not a cavalry commander, but cavalry and infantry, with which to crush Butler, and afterward cross the James, so as to co-operate with General Lee against General Grant. This was the essential feature of General Beauregard's plan. Having never desired the services of Colonel Chilton—who, from the opening of the war, had been a staff officer only—General Beauregard neither asked for nor accepted him—granting that he was offered by Mr. Davis. He had with him cavalry officers of undeniable merit, namely, Colonel Dunnivant and Colonel Baker (already at Drury's Bluff), and General Dearing, who was to come up with Whiting's forces, and of whose ability and dash General Beauregard had the highest opinion. There was, therefore, no vacancy

which Colonel Chilton could have filled, unless he were made to supersede one of these three cavalry commanders—a thought which never occurred to General Beauregard's mind.

It is noticeable, also, that Mr. Davis, when writing of these events, lays great stress upon General Ransom's "unpublished" report of the battle of Drury's Bluff, while, on the other hand, he makes not even a passing allusion to the report of General Beauregard, the chief and unquestionably the most trustworthy source of information concerning that battle. That report has been given in this chapter, and the reader should examine it with attention. Every material statement it contains is corroborated and supported by the reports of Generals Hoke, Johnson, Colquitt, and Hagood. As to General Ransom's report, which Mr. Davis quotes as authority in contradiction to General Beauregard's, it is incorrect in many important particulars; so much so that it received General Beauregard's censure at the time, not only because of its inaccuracy with regard to some of the events of the battle, but also because of General Ransom's shortcomings on that occasion, and because of the unauthorized and unofficial manner in which the paper was published in Richmond, before General Beauregard's own report had been forwarded to the War Department.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Withdrawal of Troops from General Beauregard.—Repulse of the Enemy on May 17th.—Construction of Howlett Line Fortifications.—Military Situation.—The War Department withdraws more Troops from General Beauregard to Reinforce General Lee.—Attack of Gillmore's Corps.—General Wise's Account of it.—General Beauregard's Telegram to General Bragg (June 7th).—His Letter to the Same (June 9th).—Predicts General Grant's Movements, and Proposes a Plan of Attack and Defence to the War Department.—His Proposals not Heeded.—General Grant's Army Crossing the James.—General Beauregard Telegraphs Generals Lee and Bragg to that Effect.—His Force at Petersburg.—Attack by Smith's Corps on the 15th.—Arrival of Hagood's Brigade, of Hoke's Division.—General Beauregard Notifies the War Department and General Lee of the Necessity of Calling Bushrod Johnson from the Bermuda Hundred Lines.—War Department Declines the Responsibility, but Blames General Beauregard.—Johnson's Arrival.—Three Federal Corps Assault Petersburg on the 16th.—Repulse of the Enemy.—How General Gracie Arrived and Saved the Line from Destruction.—General Beauregard's Telegrams and Messages to General Lee.—A New Defensive Line.—How General Beauregard Fell Back upon it, at 12.30 A. M., on the 18th.—The Enemy's Surprise thereat.—Mr. Swinton, Mr. McCabe, and Mr. J. E. Cooke.—Their Errors as to the Time of the Arrival of General Lee's Army at Petersburg.—General Lee's Telegrams.—Kershaw's Division of the Army of Northern Virginia Reaches Petersburg on the Morning of the 18th.—The Enemy's Assault on that Day.—His Repulse.—General Lee's Arrival.—General Beauregard Proposes an Attack on General Grant's Left and Rear.—General Lee Objects.—The War Department's Disregard of General Beauregard's Requisitions and Warnings.

AT 1 o'clock P. M., on May 17th, while General Beauregard was still pursuing Butler's army, Ransom's division was withdrawn from him to Richmond, notwithstanding his request that the order should be suspended. General Whiting's forces had just come up, and were not yet assigned to position.

Thus left with about 12,000 men to operate against an enemy not less than 25,000 strong, General Beauregard, after another severe engagement on that day, drove the Federals back behind their intrenchments at Bermuda Hundreds Neck. A number of gunboats and transports, lying near the bend above Dutch Gap,

were repelled by a battery of two 20-pounder Parrotts, just captured from the defeated foe. Across this Neck, from the James to the Appomattox, General Beauregard now constructed a strong line of works (known thereafter as the "Howlett line"). Its left, at the Howlett House Bluff, commanded the part of the Dutch Gap facing that position. Thus it was that Butler and his army—in words attributed to General Grant—were so effectually "bottled up."

It remains to be said that all the circumstances of the moment singularly favored the proposed plan of General Beauregard. General Grant, having lost fully 40,000 men from the outset of his campaign down to the battle of May 12th, near Spottsylvania Court-house, was, from that date to the 21st, awaiting reinforcements, without attempting any serious offensive movement. At this favorable period General Beauregard was denied a temporary reinforcement of 10,000 men from the Army of Northern Virginia, which he would have made stronger within forty-eight hours by 23,000 men,* yet, scarcely three weeks afterwards, on the 13th of June, after General Grant had been reinforced by 51,000 men, and General Lee by only 14,400, General Early was detached from the Army of Northern Virginia to the Shenandoah Valley with the entire 2d Corps.† As an unfortunate consequence of the failure of the Confederate authorities to comply with General Beauregard's plan of operations, Butler, though badly beaten, was able to effect his retreat upon his strong base at Bermuda Hundreds, and could safely (as he did) detach from that point Smith's corps of 16,000 men, to aid General Grant in the effort made, on June 3d, at Cold Harbor, to break through General Lee's defensive lines, on that side of the James. Meanwhile, Butler, still 13,000 strong, continued to be a threat to the safety of Richmond, on the south side of the James. This rendered it unwise to detach any material part of General Beauregard's force to aid General Lee. So urgent, however, did the Confederate authorities regard the necessity, that they gradually withdrew from General Beauregard most of the troops that had been directly engaged under him in the battle of Drury's Bluff.

It is to be remembered that Butler's base at Bermuda Hundreds

* Including the 10,000 to be taken from General Lee's army, and leaving about 4000 to hold the Bermuda Hundreds line.

† Over 8000 men, increased shortly after to 12,000 men.

was also a constant menace to General Lee's communications, *via* Richmond and Petersburg, with his main sources of supply—namely, the States and open ports south of Virginia. Wilmington was the only Atlantic harbor through which we could then receive ammunition and clothing from Europe. Communication with South Carolina and Georgia, by way of the Weldon and Danville Railroads, was also endangered by Butler's presence. This produced almost daily conflicts, and severe ones at times, showing that Butler's object was to seize or destroy the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, at the point nearest to Bermuda Hundreds. In consequence of this fully one-third of the Confederate force had to be used on picket service. This force now consisted only of part of Bushrod Johnson's division, about 3200 strong, holding the Bermuda Hundreds lines, and Wise's brigade, together with the local militia of Petersburg,* in all about 2200 men, guarding that city.

On the 9th of June, Gillmore's corps was thrown across the Appomattox, by a pontoon-bridge at Point of Rocks, in a movement against Petersburg. The attack itself was made by a body about 5000 strong, chiefly of Kautz's mounted infantry, and was successfully repulsed. Had Gillmore's large force been handled with more vigor, Petersburg, with the handful of men then available for its defence (so completely had General Beauregard been deprived of troops for the support of General Lee), would have inevitably fallen into the hands of the enemy.

General Wise, in his narrative, gives a correct and graphic description of this affair. The following passage is copied from it:

"They pressed hard upon the left for three or four hours, and then suddenly attacked the militia on my extreme right with a detachment numbering 1000, which were handsomely received by Archer; but they broke through his line, one-half of them taking the road into Petersburg, and the other the road leading to Blandford. Graham's battery, accidentally at the City Water Works, met the first, and a curious force drove back the latter. I had detailed all who could possibly do momentary duty out of the hospitals, calling them the 'Patients;' and from the jail and guard-houses all the prisoners, calling them the 'Penitents;' and the two companies of 'Patients' and 'Penitents' moved out on the Blandford road, while I advanced with three com-

* That militia, composed of old men and boys, had brought forth the remark from the Northern Press, that it was made up of men snatched from the grave, and youths taken from the cradle.

panies of the 46th from our left; and the enemy on that road, seeing the head of the column of 'P.P.'s' advancing in their front, and my three companies bearing on their right flank, they wheeled to the right-about at once and retired; and Graham's battery repulsed the other party advancing on the city. This was done with the loss of thirteen killed and a few wounded of the militia. Petersburg was thus barely saved on the 9th; and the defence was so critical, that I demanded additional forces, and General Beauregard at once reinforced my command with my 26th Virginia, and nine companies of the 34th."

It is proper to add here that, before these reinforcements were forwarded, General Beauregard had sent General Dearing and most of his cavalry, from the right of the Bermuda lines—where he had yet no works—to General Wise's assistance. He arrived in time to aid in the repulse of the enemy.

Previous to this, forecasting the strategy of General Lee's adversary, and believing that, persevering in his movement leftward around Richmond, he would pass to the south side of the James, General Beauregard, as early as the 7th of June, forwarded the following telegram to General Bragg:

"DUNLAP'S FARM, *June 7th, 1864: 3.30 P. M.*

"General B. BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

"Should Grant have left Lee's front, he doubtless intends operating against Richmond along James River, probably on south side. Petersburg being nearly defenceless, would be captured before it could be reinforced. Ransom's brigade and Hoke's division should, then, be returned at once.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The following was General Bragg's answer:

"RICHMOND, *June 8th, 1864.*

"To General BEAUREGARD:

"My acquaintance with the state of affairs in General Lee's front is not sufficient to enable me to form an accurate opinion on your suggestions of yesterday, as to return of Hoke and Ransom. Have therefore forwarded your despatch to General Lee.

BRAXTON BRAGG."

Two days later, with that strategic discernment which characterized both himself and Jackson, General Beauregard forwarded the following written communication to Richmond:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,

SWIFT CREEK, VA., *June 9th, 1864, 7 A. M.*

"General BRAXTON BRAGG, Comdg. C. S. Armies, Richmond, Va.:

"*General*,—The present movements of Grant's army have a signifi-
cancy which cannot have escaped your observation. He clearly seeks to move

around Lee's forces by an advance upon his left flank, in the direction of the James River, with a view to operate between that river and the Chickahominy, and, in case of his meeting with no adequate resistance, to plant himself on both sides of the former, throwing across it a pontoon-bridge, as close to Chaffin's Bluff as circumstances may permit; and, failing in this scheme, he may continue his rotary motion around Richmond, and attack it by concentrating the whole of his army on the south side of the James, using the fortified position at Bermuda Hundreds Neck as a base for his operations.

"In that hypothesis our first object would seem to be to throw him off, as far as practicable, from his objective point (Richmond), unless the Government were to adopt the bold and, perhaps, safer policy of giving him battle, and decide at once the fate of that city, while we remain with a comparatively compact, well-disciplined, and enthusiastic army in the field.

"To accomplish this object the river battery at Howlett's should be completed without delay, and thoroughly armed; the river should be obstructed by rope works and torpedoes, so distributed as to leave passage for only one ironclad at a time, which, in the meanwhile, should prevent the crossing of the river between that battery and Chaffin's Bluff. My defensive line, now nearly completed, and extending from the river battery at Howlett's to Mrs. Dunn's house, would be held by Johnson's division.

"The comparatively level and open country between these two points might be defended by a line of redoubts from Dunn's house to Swift Creek. The short line west of Fort Clifton, between Swift Creek and the Appomattox, would be a barrier against any approach from the intersection of those two streams.

"The defensive line from Mrs. Dunn's to the Appomattox could be defended by a part of Hoke's division, while the rest, taking position in Petersburg, might hold it until reinforcements from Lee's army were obtained.

"Two divisions of about 15,000 men in all would thus prevent any force of the enemy from penetrating between Drury's Bluff and Petersburg, and compel him to take the latter before he could venture a real advance on Richmond.

"With these views hastily thrown on paper I send you a statement of the strength and organization of the forces at the lines around Petersburg, at Drury's Bluff, and in front of Bermuda Hundreds Neck, that you may judge of my resources and ability to face the impending contingencies for which I may from moment to moment have to provide.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

It is apparent, upon a careful examination of the foregoing letter, and of the reasons there given in explanation of General Grant's predicted movement, that, had the latter looked over the whole field with the same clearness as did General Beauregard, and effected his passage at Bermuda Hundreds, instead of south of the Appomattox, while he might still have attacked Peters-

burg—as he did, on the 15th, with Smith's corps, now increased to 22,000 men—the main body of the Federal army must have irresistibly planted itself upon the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. It would have been able, immediately thereafter, to stretch its left across the Richmond and Danville Railroad, cutting off General Beauregard from General Lee; cutting off General Lee and Richmond from the South; insuring the fall of Richmond; leaving no route of retreat for the army of Northern Virginia; and virtually ending the war by the 1st of July, 1864.

Anticipating this extreme danger, General Beauregard recommended the bold and—in his opinion—"safer" plan of concentration of all our available forces, to give General Grant battle, and thus decide, at once, the fate of the Confederate capital, while we still had in the field "a compact, well-disciplined, and enthusiastic army." As an alternative he proposed "to throw General Grant off as far as practicable from Richmond," by the proper defence and obstruction of the James and of the line from Drury's Bluff to Petersburg, so that he should be compelled, "under the greatest disadvantages, to attempt the capture of the latter place before venturing a real and serious advance on Richmond."

Neither proposition met with consideration at Richmond, nor, it seems, from General Lee; for, when General Grant, instead of crossing at Bermuda Hundreds at a time when he could have done so almost without impediment, preferred the point of passage that made Petersburg his immediate objective, General Beauregard was left, with about 5400 men, gradually increased to about 11,000, to bear the pressure of a hostile force increasing, by successive reinforcements, from 22,000 to at least 90,000 men (exclusive of two divisions of Wright's corps)—substantially the mass of General Grant's army.

With such fearful and almost incredible odds against him, General Beauregard, from the 15th to the 18th of June, maintained a successful barrier to the Federal advance—a feat of war almost without a precedent in which the courage and the endurance of the troops, no less than the skill with which the commander used his small resources, were fully as conspicuous as the good-fortune that lent itself to such a result. During these few but, apparently, never-ending days of unremitting anxiety, General Beauregard, by repeated telegrams and messages, informed the

War Department and General Lee of the movement of the Federal army to the south side of the James, and against his lines in front of Petersburg. In support of this assertion we offer the following telegrams:

1. "SWIFT CREEK, VA., *June 14th*, 1864: 7.15 A. M.
"General BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

"Movement of Grant's across Chickahominy and increase of Butler's force render my position here critical. With my present forces I cannot answer for consequences. Cannot my troops sent to General Lee be returned at once? Please submit my letter of 9th instant to President.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

2. "SWIFT CREEK, VA., *June 14th*, 1864: 8.10 P. M.
"General R. E. LEE, Army N. Va.:

"A deserter from the enemy reports that Butler has been reinforced by the 18th and a part of the 10th Army Corps.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

Apart from the increasing strenuousness and weight with which the attack at Petersburg was made, and the unusual boldness with which Butler ventured out of his intrenchments, in aggressive demonstrations upon the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, the noticeable activity in the movement of the Federal transports on the James, the capture, south of the river, of prisoners from General Grant's several army corps, and the result of their carefully-sifted testimony, were pressingly urged as corroborative of General Beauregard's opinion.*

Had one of General Lee's corps reached the scene in time to enable General Beauregard to take the offensive, General Grant's forces, sent up in detail, as they were, might have been beaten in detail; and this was the object desired and urged by General Beauregard as soon as he saw that General Grant was passing to the south side of the James, which he had anticipated and predicted as the probable projected movement of the enemy. Indeed, it afterwards appeared that General Grant's purpose, in fighting the battle of Cold Harbor (June 3d) was that, if unsuccessful in breaking through General Lee's lines, he might thus prepare the way for such a movement.

General Grant's arrangements having been made for this last change of base, his several corps were put in motion for James

* See Appendix.

River in the afternoon and night of the 12th of June.* Smith's corps (the 18th) was transported by way of the White House back to Bermuda Landing; Burnside's corps (the 9th) and Wright's (the 6th), by way of Jones's Bridge (Chickahominy) and Charles City Court-house Road; Hancock's (the 2d) and Warren's (the 5th) corps, by way of Long Bridge (Chickahominy) to Wilcox Landing, on the James,† where General Grant's headquarters had been established on the 13th, and whence he telegraphed to Washington that the passage of the river would begin the next day. At 3 o'clock P. M., on the 14th, General Grant was at Bermuda Hundreds.

Smith's corps, brought around from the White House, was landed at Bermuda Hundreds in the afternoon of the 14th, and marched to Point of Rocks, on the Appomattox, where there was a pontoon-bridge already established, by which he crossed during that night and moved at once upon Petersburg,‡ having been reinforced with Kautz's cavalry and Hink's division of colored troops, making his force, as already said, 22,000 strong.

At this critical juncture General Beauregard had, for the immediate defence of Petersburg, north and south of the Appomattox, Wise's brigade, not more than 1200 strong; some light artillery, with 22 pieces, besides a few men manning the three or four heavy guns in position; two small regiments of cavalry, under Brigadier-General Dearing, and the local militia already mentioned; in other words, an aggregate not exceeding 2200 men of all arms. These troops occupied, from the Appomattox to the Jerusalem plank-road, about three miles of the Petersburg lines, which were some seven miles and a half in length, leaving fully four miles undefended. True, on his extreme right, in the woods, outside of the lines of works, General Beauregard had thrown Dearing's command, whose duty was to guard that flank and give timely warning of any heavy body of the enemy approaching in that direction. But these were mere precautionary measures to prevent surprise. No hope of serious resistance, by so small a force, could be entertained. At the same time the lines across Bermuda Hundreds Neck, the object of which was to hold Butler

* See "Army of the Potomac," by Swinton, p. 498. See, also, General Meade's report.

† Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 499.

‡ Ibid., p. 500.

in check, were occupied only by Bushrod Johnson's division (less Ransom's and Gracie's brigades, still absent with General Lee), about 3200 men. That is to say, the total force under General Beauregard's orders was but 5425 strong. Hoke's division, the return of which he had been urging since the 7th of June, was still retained on the north side of the James. The defensive line of Petersburg, from the lower to the upper Appomattox, constructed by the Engineer Department some time before the arrival of the Federals, was so extensive* as to require a force of not less than 25,000 men, instead of the 2200 then available.

At ten o'clock in the morning of the 15th of June W. F. Smith, after a hot engagement of several hours with Dearing's cavalry, in advance, moved upon the Confederate works by the Baxter road, in front of Batteries 6 and 7. He was met, with unsurpassed stubbornness, by General Wise's forces, and repeatedly repulsed; but he succeeded at last, at 7.30 P. M., in carrying the Confederate batteries, from No. 5 to No. 9, inclusive. Hancock's corps—which had crossed the James on the morning of the 15th, and, by some neglect or omission, was not immediately ordered to march upon Petersburg—came up to the support of General Smith only in the afternoon, too late to participate in the assault of that day.†

Hoke's division, of General Beauregard's force, withdrawn from it on the 30th of May to reinforce General Lee,‡ had been ordered, at last, to hold itself in waiting at Drury's Bluff, and, in response to General Beauregard's continued urgent calls, had been allowed to march to Petersburg at 11.30 A. M. on the 15th.§ Haggood's brigade, forming part of that division, and for which railroad transportation had been sent to Chester, reached Petersburg about dusk, just after the batteries had fallen. It was followed by the two other brigades within a few hours. These reinforcements, as they arrived, were disposed upon a new line, a short distance in rear of the captured works, upon which a small epaulement was thrown up during the night.

* It measured seven miles and a half. A portion of it, especially in the quarter of Batteries 5, 6, and 7, was bad in location, and very vulnerable. General Beauregard, when first inspecting it, on his arrival at Petersburg (May 10th), had openly condemned its injudicious extension.

† Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 505. See, also, Hancock's report.

‡ See Appendix.

§ See Appendix.

General Beauregard, seeing the immense gravity of the attack, and that a heavy mass of the Federal army was now present and pressing against Petersburg, at 9.11 p.m. on the 15th, notified General Bragg of the situation. He informed him that he would order Johnson down from Bermuda Hundreds, and that General Lee must look to the defence both of those lines and of Drury's Bluff.* He also telegraphed General Lee to the same effect.† The War Department had already been advised of the probable necessity of such a movement, and had been asked to elect between Petersburg and the Bermuda Hundreds line, as it grew more and more evident that both could not be held.‡ For reasons of its own the War Department would make no decision in the matter. But, as immediate action was imperative, General Beauregard assumed the responsibility, and, knowing that the safety of Richmond depended upon the protection to be given to Petersburg, at 10.20 p.m. ordered the abandonment of the Bermuda Hundreds line. Johnson's division was accordingly transferred to Petersburg, moving at dawn on the 16th, and arriving at or about 10 o'clock a.m. on the same day. The thin skirmish line and few cavalry pickets which, in obedience to orders, he had left upon his withdrawal were driven off by Butler early on that morning.

The battery at Howlett's house had just been completed and armed with a few heavy guns received from Richmond when General Beauregard determined to evacuate those lines. He ordered Colonel Harris, his Chief-Engineer, to dismount the guns and bury them, with their carriages and châssis, in the most favorable locality in the vicinity of the battery, and to carefully cover the spot with sod, leaves, and bushes, so as to conceal them from the enemy. These instructions were carried out to the letter; and when, on the 18th, Pickett's division drove off the Federals from the Howlett Battery and the Bermuda Hundreds line, these guns and their appurtenances, being unearthed and found uninjured, were placed again in position, and used with telling effect on the Federal ironclads and other vessels lying in the long reach of Dutch Gap, facing the battery.

Thus reinforced, General Beauregard had under him a total effective force of about 10,000 men, of all arms, confronting

* See Appendix.

† See Appendix.

‡ See Appendix.

Hancock's corps (the 2d) and Smith's (the 18th), with an aggregate of not less than 44,000 men.

Burnside's corps (the 9th) came up at about noon on the 16th,* and General Hancock, who, by instructions of General Meade, had refrained from attacking until these reinforcements arrived, ordered an assault, with all the available forces, to be made at or about 5.30 P.M.† Three Federal corps (about 66,000 men) now united in an unrelaxing effort of three hours to break the Confederate line, and Birney's division, of Hancock's corps, finally succeeded in effecting a lodgment. The contest continued into the night, then gradually slackened and ceased. Warren's corps (the 5th), which had only reached Petersburg at dusk‡ on that day, took no part in the action of the 16th.

No further offensive movement was attempted by the enemy until about noon of the next day (17th). With the addition of Warren's corps, composed of four divisions, the Federal force now assailing Petersburg consisted of not less than 90,000 men, of all arms, while the troops under General Beauregard only numbered 10,000 effectives, most of whom were unprotected by field-works.

With this fearful disparity, the battle opened on the 17th. Three times were the Federals driven back, but they as often resumed the offensive and held their ground. About dusk a portion of the Confederate lines was wholly broken, and the troops in that quarter were about to be thrown into a panic, which might have ended in irreparable disaster, when, happily, as General Beauregard, with his staff, was endeavoring to rally and re-form the troops, Gracie's brigade, of Johnson's division, consisting of about 1200 men—the return of which to his command General Beauregard had been urgently asking—came up from Chaffin's Bluff, whence, at last, the War Department had ordered it to move. It was promptly and opportunely thrown into the gap on the lines, and drove back the Federals, capturing

* Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 509. General Burnside, in his report, says he reached the position occupied by their troops at "about 10 A.M. on the 16th."

† In Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 509, the hour is given as "about 4 P.M." General Hancock, in his report, says: "I was ordered to be prepared to commence the attack at 6 P.M."

‡ Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 509.

about 2000 prisoners. The conflict raged with great fury until after eleven at night.

Foreseeing the inevitable rupture of his lines, General Beauregard had selected during the day, with his Chief-Engineer, Colonel Harris, a new and shorter defensive line along a ravine (Taylor's Creek) in the rear, which he caused to be clearly marked out with white stakes, so that it might be occupied at night without confusion, when the troops should be directed to retire upon it. Generals Hoke and Johnson were instructed to see that their staff-officers and those of the several brigades under them should examine and learn the new positions to be taken by their commands. This they did with their usual care and precision while the fight was still going on.

Shortly after 11 P. M., and just as the firing on both sides had almost entirely ceased, General Beauregard ordered all the camp-fires to be brightly lighted, with sentinels well thrown forward, and as near as possible to the enemy's.* Then, at about 12.30 A. M. on the 18th, began this retrograde movement, which, notwithstanding the exhaustion of our troops and their sore disappointment at receiving no further reinforcements, was safely and silently executed, with uncommonly good order and precision, though the greatest caution had to be used in order to retire unnoticed from so close a contact with so strong an adversary. Without a moment's rest the digging of trenches was begun, with such utensils as had been hastily collected at Petersburg, many of the men using their bayonets, their knives, and even their tin cans, to assist in the rapid execution of the work. Thus it was that, before daylight, and in spite of nearly insurmountable difficulties, our new defences were partially constructed, and our weary troops again placed under cover. It was one of the boldest ma-

* At 10 P. M., or about that time, on the 17th, while General Beauregard was anxiously waiting for the firing to cease, in order to take up his new position, a messenger from General Burnside to General Meade rode into our lines and was captured. He bore a despatch, which appeared to be an answer to Meade by Burnside, representing that two of his divisions were badly cut up, and the third so scattered at the time that it would be impossible to gather it up so as to go on with the attack before daybreak, and that his command was very much exhausted. General Beauregard, being aware that the other Federal commands were in no better condition, felt convinced that the fighting would soon come to a stop, and thus enable him to begin his retrograde movement.

nœuvres attempted during the war—one that General Beauregard had already twice resorted to with equal success, as the reader, no doubt, remembers; first, upon his retreat from Corinth, on the 30th of May, 1862, and afterwards, on the 6th of September, 1863, upon the evacuation of Battery Wagner, pending the siege of Charleston. But here the movement was much more hazardous, for it was undertaken and executed by troops who were contending against not less than nine times their number, who were exhausted by three days of almost incessant fighting, and in whose hearts hope itself must have been almost extinct. This was the line held by the Confederates until the end of the war. It was subsequently strengthened and materially improved; but its location, as then established by General Beauregard, remained unchanged. General Meade, in his report of the campaign of 1864 (made in November of that year), speaks as follows of this new line:

“On advancing (on the 18th) it was found that the enemy, during the night, had retired to a line about a mile nearer the city—the one he now occupies.”

During these eventful days—beginning as early as the 15th—General Beauregard had kept Mr. Davis, General Bragg, and General Lee constantly informed, by telegraph and messages borne by his staff, of the immense odds against which he was contending, a fact then placed beyond all question by the capture of prisoners from at least three corps of General Grant's army. A strange scepticism, unexplained—unexplainable—was persisted in by those whom he so urgently addressed.

General Beauregard, however, no longer doubting, from the character of the attack and the accumulated proofs of every kind then before him, that, on the evening of the 17th, most of General Grant's forces had been brought against Petersburg, and knowing that the reinforcement of one division would be to no purpose, at 6.40 P. M. on the 17th telegraphed General Lee as follows:

“PETERSBURG, *June 17th*, 1864: 6.40 P. M.

“General R. E. LEE, Clay's House* (also to Chester, Va.):

“The increasing number of the enemy in my front, and inadequacy of my force to defend the already much too extended lines, will compel me to fall

* On south side of James River.

within a shorter one, which I will attempt to effect to-night. This I shall hold as long as practicable, but, without reinforcements, I may have to evacuate the city very shortly. In that event I shall retire in the direction of Drury's Bluff, defending the crossing at Appomattox River and Swift Creek.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

He also despatched three of his staff (Chisolm, Roman, and Cooke) successively, at different hours of the day, evening, and night, the last of whom (Major Cooke) reached General Lee's headquarters at about 3 A. M., on the 18th, and, more fortunate than the two who had preceded him, was allowed to see General Lee, and "accomplished, in part, his object in seeking him."*

Half an hour after Major Cooke's arrival at Drury's Bluff the following telegram was sent from General Lee's headquarters:

"DRURY'S BLUFF, *June 18th, 1864: 3.30 A. M.*

"SUPERINTENDENT RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD, Richmond:

"Can trains run to Petersburg? If so, send all cars available to Rice's Turnout. If they cannot run through, can any be sent from Petersburg to the point where the road is broken? It is important to get troops to Petersburg without delay.

R. E. LEE, General.

"Official.

"W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G."

On the same day General Lee transmitted the following telegram to General Early:

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY N. VA., *June 18th, 1864.*

"General J. A. EARLY, Lynchburg, Va.:

"Grant is in front of Petersburg. Will be opposed there. Strike as quick as you can, and, if circumstances authorize, carry out the original plan, or move upon Petersburg without delay.

R. E. LEE, General."

Mr. Swinton, in his "Army of the Potomac," is, therefore, twice mistaken when he asserts (p. 506) that "during the night of the 15th the van of Lee's army reached the town (Petersburg), and men of a very different mettle from the crude soldiers to whom its defence had been intrusted silently deployed in line of battle."

It must not be forgotten that, on and prior to the 15th, General Beauregard had been earnestly calling for reinforcements, including his own troops sent to General Lee; but that none

* See, in Appendix, reports of Colonel Roman and of Major Cooke on this subject.

had been forwarded, at that time, from the Army of Northern Virginia is shown by the following despatch:

"To General BEAUREGARD: "DRURY'S BLUFF, *June 16th, 1864: 10.30 A. M.*

"Your despatch of 9.45 received. It is the first that has come to hand.* I do not know the position of Grant's army. Cannot strip north bank of James River. Have you not force sufficient? R. E. LEE, General."

Kershaw's division of Anderson's corps, the first of General Lee's forces that arrived at Petersburg, only reached that place on the morning of the 18th of June, as is established by the following telegrams, to which is also added a letter of General Kershaw himself:

1. "HEADQUARTERS, DRURY'S BLUFF, *June 17th, 1864: 10 P. M.*

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Petersburg, Va.:

"General Kershaw's division, which will camp to-night on Redwater Creek, is ordered to continue its march to-morrow to Petersburg.

R. E. LEE, General.

"Official.

"W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G."

2. "HEADQUARTERS, PETERSBURG, *June 18th, 1864: 11.30 A. M.*

"General BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

"Occupied last night my new lines without impediment. Kershaw's division arrived about half-past seven, and Field's at about half-past nine o'clock. They are being placed in position. All comparatively quiet this morning. General Lee has just arrived. G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

Extract from a Letter of General Kershaw to General Beauregard.

3. "CAMDEN, S. C., *July 22d, 1876.*

"My dear General,—* * * I have been induced to think over the matter more carefully, and am now reminded that my position, when first in line of battle at Petersburg, was, as you remember, with my right on or near the Jerusalem plank-road, extending across the open field, and bending back towards the front of the Cemetery. * * * The first of my division that arrived took the cars sent for them, and marched through the city while I was at your quarters. The sun was just up when I arrived there. I was at your headquarters not more than an hour. I think within another hour my troops were in position. * * * I am quite sure that the battle commenced within an hour after my troops were in position. * * *

"I am, dear General, sincerely your friend and admirer,

"J. B. KERSHAW.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD, New Orleans, La."

* General Lee evidently meant the first despatch received that day; otherwise his statement would have been altogether erroneous. See the telegrams already submitted to the reader, and Colonel Sam. Paul's report, to be found in Appendix.

4. "CLAY'S HOUSE, *June 17th*, 1864: 3.30 P. M.
 "Major-Genl. W. H. F. LEE, Malvern Hill, *via* Meaden Station:
 "Push after the enemy, and endeavor to ascertain what has become of Grant's army. Inform General Hill. R. E. LEE."

5. "CLAY'S HOUSE, *June 17th*, 1864: 4.30 P. M.
 "Lieut.-Genl. A. P. HILL, Riddle's Shop, *via* Meaden Station:
 "General Beauregard reports large number of Grant's troops crossed James River, above Fort Powhatan, yesterday. If you have nothing contradictory of this, move to Chaffin's Bluff. R. E. LEE."

"Official.
 "W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G."

6. "CLAY'S HOUSE, *June 17th*, 1864: 12 M.
 "General G. T. BEAUREGARD:
 "Telegram of 9 A. M. received. Until I can get more definite information of Grant's movements, I do not think it prudent to draw more troops to this side of river. R. E. LEE."

7. "CLAY'S HOUSE, *June 17th*, 1864: 4.30 P. M.
 "General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Petersburg, Va.:
 "Have no information of Grant's crossing James River, but upon your report have ordered troops up to Chaffin's Bluff. R. E. LEE."

No further proof is necessary to show how impossible it is that "*the van of Lee's army*" could have reached Petersburg during the night of the 15th, when, from evidence furnished by General Lee himself, the first division of his forces only came up on the morning of the 18th.

This settles the point as to Mr. Swinton's first error. The second, referring to the "mettle" of the troops defending Petersburg, although of less importance, is still deserving of comment.

The only difference between the "*crude soldiers*" Mr. Swinton speaks of and those belonging to the army of General Lee was, that some of them, numbering two hundred local militia, were less inured to the hardships of war, and were mostly old men and boys. But the other part consisted of Wise's brigade, which few commands in the service equalled, and of two small regiments of cavalry, under Dearing, who had infused into his men the dash and spirit that so eminently characterized him. The proof, however, that the "mettle" of the forces at and around Petersburg on the 15th was identically the same as that of all the Southern troops is that, although they numbered but 2200 effectives,* they

* See, in Appendix, synopsis of General Wise's report of the operations around Petersburg on the 15th of June, 1864.

so gallantly manned and fought the extensive works on the south side of the city that three columns of Federals, amounting to not less than 22,000 veteran troops, were kept at bay during the whole day, and only succeeded, towards nightfall, in carrying a portion of the works, "*without the possession either of Petersburg or of the line of the Appomattox.*"* The enemy had been informed that these fortifications were such that "cavalry could ride over them"—a representation, says Mr. Swinton ("Army of the Potomac," p. 502), "that did not turn out to be justified by experience; for Kautz, who, with his mounted division, essayed to work his way round on the left, found himself completely estopped by a heavy fire; and in front the approaches were discovered to be so covered by the play of artillery from the works, that from every point on which Smith attempted to place batteries to silence the enemy's fire the guns were speedily driven off."

The reinforcements that first reached Petersburg formed part of General Beauregard's own troops, detached on the 30th of May and on or about the 3d of June, by order of the War Department, to co-operate with General Lee.† They were: Hoke's division, the first brigade of which (Hagood's) arrived at nightfall on the 15th of June; part of Bushrod Johnson's division—which had been so seasonably withdrawn from Bermuda Hundreds, by order of General Beauregard—arriving a little before noon on the 16th; and Gracie's brigade, of Johnson's division, the opportune arrival of which, in the afternoon of the 17th, saved the Confederate lines from utter destruction. None of these troops belonged to the Army of Northern Virginia. Part of them had been borrowed and were returned to their original command, though with evident reluctance. The others had not left the limits of their Department. And here it may be said that, had General Beauregard's protests, made as early as May 29th,‡ been heeded at Richmond, not a brigade, not even a regiment of his command, would have been taken away. But the War Department was ever willing to accede to any call made by General Lee on General Beauregard, while the latter was denied all assistance from the former, and could hardly obtain the return of his own troops when he

* Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 503. The italics are ours.

† See Appendix.

‡ See General Beauregard's letter to Mr. Davis, and his telegrams to General Bragg, in Appendix.

needed them most, during the days of the disproportionate conflict with General Grant's army, when General Lee had but few of the enemy in his front. Telegrams, to be found in the Appendix to the present chapter (to which the reader's attention is invited), will show that not only were General Lee and the War Department most anxious at that time to draw troops from General Beauregard, but that they had actually requested his presence and personal co-operation on the north side of the James. Butler, they thought, had sent the greater part of his army to reinforce General Grant, and had left only a nominal force to guard his position. General Beauregard, however, was too far-seeing, too well-informed as to the enemy's movements in his front, to partake of these delusions. He expressed his readiness to obey any order given him by the authorities at Richmond, but warned them that at least 8000 men, under Gillmore, still confronted his lines, and most strongly advised that no more troops should be withdrawn from his Department.

Like Mr. Swinton, who, in most instances, is a careful and impartial examiner of the events he chronicles, Mr. J. D. McCabe, in his work entitled "Life and Campaigns of General Robert E. Lee," falls into error with regard to the date of the arrival of General Lee's forces at Petersburg.

We quote from pages 507 and 508 :

"General Lee hurried forward as soon as he learned of the attack on Petersburg; but, as he was full forty miles from the Appomattox, his advanced forces did not reach the city until the night of the 15th."

The reader is already aware that, on the 15th of June, General Lee had not the least idea of "hurrying forward" to the support of General Beauregard. His own telegrams exist to bear witness to this. Not only were none of his forces at or around Petersburg on "the night of the 15th," but as late as June 17th he did not believe that General Grant had left his front. He was endeavoring on that day to find out "what had become of Grant's army." Very clearly, Mr. McCabe had no such evidence, derived from General Lee himself, among "the valuable collection of materials for a history of the war" from which, he says, his book was written.

This, however, is not the only error concerning the siege of Petersburg into which Mr. McCabe has fallen.

We again quote from page 508 of his book :

"General Lee had ordered General Beauregard not to evacuate his line until Anderson's corps, then moving from Richmond, should relieve him; but, as the demand for troops at Petersburg was so urgent, and there was no prospect that Anderson would get up in time, General Beauregard assumed the responsibility of withdrawing his command to Petersburg."

It has already been shown that General Lee never gave—and, in fact, could not have given—such an order to General Beauregard, for the simple reason that General Beauregard was at that time in command of his own Department, and not in any way under the orders of General Lee. When he was advised by General Beauregard of the necessity of Johnson's withdrawal from the Bermuda Hundreds line, and asked to fill up the gap with his own troops, he answered :

"BOTTOM'S BRIDGE, *June 16th, 1864* : 2 A. M.

"GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD :

"A division has been ordered to move to lines on Bermuda Neck. It will be important for it to march there by daylight. The pickets and skirmishers on the lines should be retained there until troops arrive, if practicable. Please send an officer to meet the troops and conduct them.

"R. E. LEE, General.

"Official.

"W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G."

This was evidently no order. It was received by General Beauregard at 4.30 A. M. on the 17th, not only after the withdrawal of Johnson from the Bermuda Hundreds line, but after his arrival at Petersburg, where he had so effectually assisted the evening before in repulsing the enemy. Had General Bushrod Johnson's fractional division been left at Bermuda Hundreds Neck, and not been ordered by General Beauregard to Petersburg, at that supreme moment Petersburg—and Richmond also—would have been captured before General Lee discovered whether or not General Grant's army had actually crossed the James. Both General Lee and the War Department had been previously informed by General Beauregard of the absolute necessity for that movement. General Lee readily complied with the hurried call then made upon him, and did his best to replace Johnson's division with troops drawn from the Army of Northern Virginia. No one blames him for the delay which ensued. But the War Department obstinately refused to say which, Petersburg or the Bermuda Hundreds line, should be abandoned ; though it must have

been evident, even to the War Department, that both could not be held with the troops then at General Beauregard's disposal. Instead of an answer to the questions asked, a series of inquiries came, the next day, from the War Department: "At what hour, during the night of the 15th, did you evacuate the line across Bermuda Hundreds Neck?" asked General Bragg in his official capacity, as Chief of Staff and military adviser of the President. "At what hour during the night did General Johnson make the movement? Did you inform General Lee of that movement? If so, at what hour and through what channel?" Such was, in substance, the strange and querulous communication forwarded from Richmond to General Beauregard.

Here was one of the three leading generals of the Southern armies straining every nerve to guard the "entrance-gate" to the Confederate capital, with no reliance but his own tenacity of purpose and the intrepidity of the handful of men he had under him; with an attacking foe becoming hourly bolder and hourly increasing in number; and because, after repeatedly pointing out the precariousness of his condition, and asking for advice which was persistently denied him, he finally determined to act with promptness and vigor, he was called upon, amid his anxieties and multitudinous duties, to suspend his weighty task and respond to this inquisitorial investigation of his conduct.*

Another very serious error we find at page 510 of Mr. McCabe's book.

We quote as follows:

"Grant's whole army was now before Petersburg; and, still holding to his original resolve to capture the city, he ordered a general assault for the morning of the 18th. In the mean time, however, General Lee had been engaged in constructing a formidable line of works immediately around the city, and on the morning of the 18th he withdrew from the temporary line he had held in advance, and occupied that which was destined to become memorable for the siege it sustained."

Here Mr. McCabe evidently drew from his imagination, and not from the reliable sources from which he claims to have derived his knowledge of the events he deals with. This new line has already been specially referred to in another part of this chapter. General Lee had had nothing to do with it. General Beauregard

* See, in Appendix, General Beauregard's answer to General Bragg.

had not only located and staked it out, without even consulting General Lee, but the line was already occupied by our troops, and had been so occupied for more than ten hours, when General Lee in person arrived at Petersburg.

Many inaccuracies concerning the Petersburg campaign are also to be found in Mr. John Esten Cooke's "Life of General Robert E. Lee." It is well to refer to some of them.

Speaking of the arrival of the Army of Northern Virginia at Petersburg, Mr. Cooke says :

"General Lee had moved with his accustomed celerity, and, as usual, without that loss of time which results from doubt of an adversary's intentions."*

This eulogy is the more surprising, because General Lee himself, in several of his telegrams, already given to the reader, admitted how little he knew of General Grant's movements at that time; and it is now made clear how long he hesitated before he finally determined to come to General Beauregard's assistance. The truth is, he could not have waited longer.

Mr. Cooke proceeds as follows :

"On the 16th he" [General Lee] "was in face of his adversary there" [at Petersburg]. "General Grant had adopted the plan of campaign which Lee expected him to adopt."

This would be ludicrous, were it not so poor a compliment to General Lee's ability as a commander. If General Lee expected General Grant to do what he actually did, why did he not foil his purpose? The entire Federal army did not cross the James in a single day, nor did it march at once and together upon Petersburg. If General Lee foresaw Grant's movements, either he should have joined General Beauregard and annihilated the separate Federal corps as they came up, one after the other; or, he should have thrown his whole force upon what remained of Grant's army, on the north side of the James, after his first corps had effected a crossing. Mr. Cooke would have been correct had he made this assertion, with reference not to General Lee but to General Beauregard, whose letters and telegrams to the War Department, as early as June 7th, show how correctly he had interpreted General Grant's intentions.

* "Life of General Robert E. Lee," p. 44.

"General Lee had scarcely gotten his forces in position on the 16th," says Mr. Cooke, "when he was furiously attacked; and such was the weight of this assault that Lee was forced from his advanced position, east of the city, behind his second line of works, by this time well forward in process of construction."

Whatever of truth is contained in the foregoing sentence is found in the reference to the fact that "the second line of works," occupied by General Lee's forces when they reached Petersburg, on the 18th and 19th of June, "were well forward in process of construction;" so much so, it may be added, that General Lee's forces, on their arrival, had only to file into that "second line of works," already located and already constructed — though not finally completed — by General Beauregard.

While commenting upon these erroneous statements, so strikingly alike in their false conclusions, we might also object to Mr. Pollard's account, in "The Lost Cause," of the various events relative to the attack upon Petersburg, from the 15th to the 18th of June. His recital is, in the main, accurate, but his purpose seems to be to leave the reader under the impression that it was General Lee who instigated and executed all the movements of the Southern forces operating, just then, in that part of the country. He will not admit that by General Beauregard's energy and farsightedness alone the Federal attempt was frustrated and the salvation of both Petersburg and Richmond was effected; thus prolonging the struggle for nearly another year.

It has always been a matter of surprise to many who were eye-witnesses of those great events that more credit was not accorded at the time, throughout the South, to General Beauregard and his small and exhausted force. Those who are supposed to have correctly chronicled the events of that campaign have erred grossly, even as to dates, and have unjustly ascribed to General Lee alone the almost incredible repulse of the Federal army in front of Petersburg. Mr. Davis is one of these writers. With the original knowledge of the facts and with the facilities at his disposal, during and since the war, it is hard to believe that the errors found in his book,* concerning these events, were not the result of a biassed mind. To him, to General Bragg,

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 638.

and to General Lee was sent every telegram necessary for the full and complete knowledge of the important movements of the Federal army; and the "Southern Historical Papers," to which Mr. Davis often refers, had already published, months before the appearance of his book, most of the field telegrams reproduced by us.* These show when and how General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia first reached the City of Petersburg. And yet Mr. Davis says:

"Lee crossed the James River on the 15th, and, by a night march, his advance was in the intrenchments of Petersburg before the morning for which the enemy was waiting. The artillery now had other support than the old men and boys of the town."

And further on he adds:

"On the 17th an assault was made with such spirit and force as to gain a part of our line, in which, however, the assailants suffered severely. Lee had now constructed a line in rear of the one first occupied, having such advantages as gave to our army much greater power to resist."

Whether Mr. Davis derived his information from Swinton, McCabe, or Cooke, he has certainly ignored the clear and significant telegrams cited above, several of which are signed by General Lee himself.

The present writer well remembers the harassed and almost despairing look that gradually grew upon General Beauregard's bronzed and martial features, as each laborious day and sleepless night passed away without bringing the long-expected and often prayed-for reinforcements.

And here may be explained how General Beauregard became acquainted with every incident that occurred around him, and acquired such correct knowledge, not only of the enemy's positions, but even of his intended movements.

He established along the James River, below Fort Powhatan, a well-organized system of couriers, by means of which communications with his headquarters, from various divergent points, far and near, were regularly kept up. Indeed, these communications continued, from the date of the battle of Drury's Bluff until long after the enemy's landing at City Point, and even during the siege of Petersburg. This was no new experiment, for he had reduced the system almost to a science, and had

* "Southern Historical Papers" (vols. iii. and iv.) for 1877.

fully tested its efficacy along the Tennessee River, while at Jackson, in 1862; and also, in 1862-63, along the Atlantic coast, in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. "In war"—he was wont to say—"it is as important to know where your enemy is, and what he intends doing, as it is to have men, arms, and ammunition." This maxim, or aphorism, is worthy of a place among those of Jomini.

The enemy's force at Petersburg on the 18th embraced Hancock's, Burnside's, and Warren's corps, with a portion—the stronger portion—of Smith's corps, under General Martindale, and Neill's division of Wright's corps, with all its artillery.*

At about noon on that day the attack was renewed by the Federals.† Partial assaults, however, had been made on some parts of the line before that hour, but with no decided result, as they were mostly engagements between skirmishers. The withdrawal of our troops, during the night, from their former positions to the new line of intrenchments selected by General Beauregard had surprised the enemy to such an extent as to cause a halt in his operations; and this explains the delay of the general attack, which should have begun early in the morning, but was in fact begun in the afternoon. General Burnside, in his report, says:

"A grand attack was ordered by the Major-General commanding the Army of the Potomac for 4 A. M. on the 18th, and General Wilcox was directed to take the advance of this corps (the 18th), supported by General Potter. On pushing out the skirmishers in advance of the attacking column it was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn from the line of the open ground in front of the Shade House, but their skirmishers were found in the woods that intervened between it and the Taylor House. * * * At 3.30 P. M. a general at-

* General Meade, in his report, says: "During the night of the 16th Neill's division, 6th Corps, arrived, relieving Brooks's division of the 18th, who, accompanied by Major-General Smith, returned to Bermuda Hundreds, leaving General Martindale in command of Smith's troops." In a preceding part of his report General Meade also says: "Early on the morning of the 16th I proceeded to City Point, and from thence to Petersburg, meeting, when about half-way to the latter place, the Lieutenant-General Commanding, by whom I was instructed to take command of the troops then in front of Petersburg, and, if practicable, push the enemy across the Appomattox. At the same time orders were sent to Wright to move up his artillery and one division of his infantry to Petersburg, and to take the two others by water to City Point."

† In another part of his report General Meade says: "An unsuccessful assault by Gibbon's division was made about noon on that day."

tack was ordered by the Major-General Commanding (General Meade), which resulted, on the part of this corps, in driving the enemy entirely out of the cut and ravine, and establishing our extreme advance within about one hundred yards of the enemy's main line, beyond the railroad. * * * The troops of General Hancock, on our right, and Warren, on our left, fully co-operated with us in this engagement."

General Meade also says that—

"Major-General Birney, temporarily commanding the 2d Corps (Hancock's), then organized a formidable column, and, about 4 P. M., made an attack, but without success. Later in the day attacks were made by the 5th and 9th Corps, with no better results."

General Beauregard's extreme right confronted Warren's corps, but was merely a thin skirmish line of infantry behind the defences. It was here that he placed Kershaw's division, as soon as it arrived on the field, barely in time to resist one of the assaults of the enemy in that quarter. This reinforcement gave General Beauregard at that time about 15,000 men, against not less than 90,000 Federals; for Field's division, which had arrived two hours after Kershaw's, was not yet in position.

Four entire Federal army corps were there. One division (Brooks's) of Smith's corps was absent, but its place had been filled by a division (Neill's) of Wright's corps; and the whole of Wright's artillery had also been moved up. The fight went on with determined vigor on the one side, with indomitable resistance on the other, and, despite the overwhelming odds against us, closed, before dark, by the total repulse of all the assaulting columns. "When made, it" (the assault) "was a complete repulse at every point, and was attended with another mournful loss of life."*

General Lee reached Petersburg at 11.30 A. M. on the 18th, and his forces (except Kershaw's and Field's divisions) were brought up afterwards. General Beauregard's telegram to General Bragg, already given in a preceding portion of the present chapter, fully settles that point. By Sunday afternoon (the next day) the two corps then constituting the Army of Northern Virginia were within the defences of the city.†

* Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 511.

† Less the forces left on the north side of James River, to protect Richmond from that direction.

Upon General Lee's arrival, General Beauregard, after riding with him towards the right of our line, on an elevation somewhat in advance of the City Reservoir, from whence a very good view was had of the whole field, proposed to him that, as soon as Hill's and Anderson's corps should arrive, an attack should be made upon General Grant's left flank and rear. General Lee refused his assent, on the ground that his troops needed rest, and that the defensive having been thus far so advantageous to him against Grant's offensive, north of the James, and to Beauregard, at Petersburg, he preferred continuing the same mode of warfare.

The Federals, with their ample resources, were so speedily and strongly intrenched against attack—as was foreseen by General Beauregard in his conference with General Lee—that, at any later date, the offensive became impracticable.

Had General Beauregard's warning of the situation and his urgent requisitions been heeded in season, or as late as mid-day of the 16th (that is, twenty-four hours after Grant's whole army had crossed the river), even if no offensive operation had been undertaken by the Confederates, the repulse of the Federals, that afternoon, must have been so severe as to change entirely the face and fortune of the campaign: a repulse far more important than that inflicted at Cold Harbor might then have been given. Or, if General Lee, when informed by General Beauregard that he had taken prisoners from three of the Federal corps, had boldly moved forward, with his whole force, or even with two-thirds of it, he might have crushed one-half of General Grant's army. The failure to attempt such a movement is the more justly subject to criticism, because it could have been effected without in any way uncovering Richmond.

General Beauregard's reports and demands, at that period, were discredited and neglected, even by General Lee. Yet it is known that, on June 14th, the latter was aware, from his own sources of information—and he reported the fact to the authorities at Richmond—that General Grant's whole army was massed at Wilcox Landing and Westover—the very point of its passage from the north to the south side of the James—and that its depot, at the White House, had been broken up, and all its material and stores removed, even including the railroad stock. What else could these facts have been supposed to indicate than an entire change of base on the part of the enemy?

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Unconquerable Spirit of our Troops around Petersburg.—Tribute to the Ladies of that City.—Southern Women.—Quietude of the Federal Army after June 18th.—General Meade Intrenches.—What General Badeau Says of the Failure to Capture Petersburg.—His Comments upon the Late Arrival of General Lee's Army.—How General Beauregard Saved the City.—Inaction of General Meade's Army.—Erroneous Explanation of it by General Badeau.—General Beauregard's Comprehension of the Depression of the Enemy.—He Proposes an Immediate Attack.—General Grant's Words.—The Siege of Petersburg.—Criticism of the Confederate Line of Intrenchments.—Denial that General Lee Consulted General Mahone Concerning the Location of the Line.—Details of General Beauregard's Proposed Attack upon the Federal Army.—General Lee Fears that the Topography of the Country will Interfere with the Movements of the Troops.—Consults General Mahone with Reference to the Position of "Second Swamp" and the Railroad Cuts.—General Lee Refuses to Make the Attack.—Reasons for Holding to the Jerusalem Plank Road Line.—That Line Maintained until the Close of the War.—Untrustworthiness of Southern Historians on this Point.

BEFORE entering upon the events which followed the arrival of General Lee's forces at Petersburg it is but fair to pay a passing tribute to the handful of heroes who unflinchingly bore "the heat and burden" of the four days of unparalleled fighting which we have just described. The beautiful devotion and patriotism of the women of the beleaguered city, during the whole period of the siege, claim also an honored place in these pages. Equal praise should be meted out to those who never wavered before the overwhelming odds confronting them, and to those who nobly encouraged their valor and attended to their needs. It will also be our object, in this chapter, again to direct the reader's attention to the location of the new Confederate lines, so successfully occupied by our troops on the eventful night of the 17th of June.

Throughout the Confederate war no epoch was more trying to our troops in the field, or more clearly demonstrated their powers of endurance and their unconquerable spirit, than the Petersburg campaign. Reference is here made particularly to the struggle of the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th of June. The exhausting work per-

formed, the fatigue endured, night and day, by officers and men, and the knowledge that they were outnumbered seven to one, make the courage and stubborn resolution there displayed truly sublime. It was a great feat in military annals. On the 15th 2200 men defending Petersburg prevented 22,000 from effecting its capture. On the evening of the 16th 10,000 men stood a successful barrier to 66,000. The same 10,000 men, on the 17th, confronted 90,000, and were not defeated. On the 18th our troops, reinforced, first by Kershaw's, then by Field's division, of General Lee's army—making an aggregate of 15,000 in the forenoon, and about 20,000 in the afternoon—not only withstood, but bloodily repulsed, the combined attack of these 90,000 men. The loss of the enemy exceeded ours in more than the proportion of his strength to ours—it was nine times greater. Indeed, it amounted to more than the number of men we had in action.

“In these preliminary operations against Petersburg, which may be brought together under the definition of ‘the period of assaults,’ though no large action had taken place, the rolls of the army showed a loss of 15,000 men.*

If we cannot here inscribe the names of all those who figured in that bloody drama, we may at least make mention of their commanders and of those whose untiring efforts aided them successfully to maintain their ground. Hoke, Johnson, Wise, Hagood, Colquitt, Gracie, Martin, Dearing, are names that should be remembered. To the men who fought under them the highest praise is due; and whatever of glory belongs to the former belongs also to those whose strong arms and stout hearts so effectually carried out their orders. Nor should the name of Harris, the able Engineer and fearless officer, be omitted from that list of heroes.

When the war-cloud settled upon that part of Virginia, and the fate of Petersburg hung in the balance, the noble women of the besieged city and its environs could be seen, night and day, thronging forth, as far as they were permitted to go, rendering invaluable assistance to the wounded, and breathing words of solace and peace in the ears of the dying. The work performed by them was efficient and intelligent, and not the well-meant but fitful efforts of the favored daughters of fashion. Personal comfort was put aside by them; and many a Confederate soldier, now in

* Swinton, “Army of the Potomac,” p. 515.

the enjoyment of full health and strength, may attribute his recovery from illness, from wounds, or from physical exhaustion, to the unremitting attention given him by these patriotic women. During the whole war, and in all parts of the Confederacy, the women of the South were up to this high standard. They never, to our knowledge, in any single instance failed. Their conviction of the justice of the cause was profound, and truly has it been said of them—"their hearts were in the war."

After the total repulse of the Federal army on the evening of the 18th no further effort was made by the enemy to renew the assault upon Petersburg. The musket was replaced by the spade in the hands of the Union soldiers, and nothing of moment occurred between the two armies then confronting each other until the memorable event so appropriately termed by Mr. Swinton "the mine fiasco."* "Being satisfied," says General Meade, in his report, "that Lee's army was before me, and nothing further to be gained by direct attacks, offensive operations ceased, and the work of intrenching a line commenced, which line is part of that at present held."†

In his "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant" (vol. ii., p. 372) General Badeau uses the following language:

"The General-in-chief was greatly chagrined at the failure of Smith to capture Petersburg. The plan of the movement had been to take that place by surprise; and when, on the 15th, Grant ascertained that Lee was still on the northern side of the James, while Smith and Hancock were combined, with nearly forty thousand men, in front of Petersburg,‡ he looked upon victory as assured. Even after the early success of Smith had been left unimproved, it was still possible, by further attacks, to secure the capture of the place before Lee's entire army could arrive. The assaults of the 16th, 17th, and 18th were all made with this idea; for if the rebels were not at once dislodged, it was apparent that a long and tedious siege must follow; in fact, a new series of combinations would become necessary, and a chilling disappointment fall upon the spirit of the North. Every effort was therefore made south of the Appomattox; and when an unexpected opportunity was offered in front of Bermuda Hundreds, Butler was urged again and again to hold what he had acquired, and even to retake the position, after it had slipped from his grasp. He seemed, indeed, to appreciate the importance of his prize, but did not succeed in retaining it, and, at the end of three days, the rebels again held the railway between Petersburg and Richmond, and all

* "Army of the Potomac," p. 518.

† General Meade's report bears date November 1st, 1864.

‡ A fact which even President Davis appears not to have known.

the great avenues connecting the Confederacy and its capital were in their control.

"But, if the well-laid plans of the National commander had thus been doubly and trebly foiled, Lee had by no means displayed consummate generalship. He made at the outset the grave mistake, which came so near being fatal, of remaining north of the James till Grant had arrived in front of Petersburg; and, even after starting from Cold Harbor, his alacrity was not conspicuous. It was not until the morning of the 18th that his principal columns again confronted the Army of the Potomac; and he himself only arrived in Petersburg on that day.* It was Beauregard who saved the town. It was he who foresaw the intention of Grant, and brought the troops from Bermuda Hundreds without orders, neglecting or, rather, risking the lesser place, to secure that which was all-important; massing and strengthening the inner works on the night of the 15th, and, afterwards, holding Meade and Smith at bay, until Lee arrived in force. Then the combined rebel army, amounting to sixty thousand men, again on the defensive, and again behind earthworks, was able to withstand the attacks of the wearied veterans who were brought up, after their march of fifty miles, to still renewed assaults."

While noticing the general correctness of this account, so strikingly in contrast with what is said upon this subject by many a Southern writer, including Mr. Davis himself, we deem it necessary to point out a palpable omission on the part of General Badeau.

On the 20th of June, after the arrival of General Lee's forces at Petersburg, the Confederate army was still inferior in number to the Federal army to the extent of 30,000 men; and the "wearied veterans" alluded to by General Badeau had undergone no such fatigue as General Beauregard's troops had borne from the 15th to the 18th, inclusive; nor had they been subjected to more marching than General Lee's two army corps; nor were the breastworks they would have assaulted so "formidable" as they are represented to be; for, though begun by General Beauregard during the night of the 17th, they were not completed until days and weeks after General Lee's arrival. Some other reason must be assigned for the inertness and comparative inactivity of the Federal army after the 18th of June, and that reason General Badeau himself finally gives in the following language:

* General Badeau quotes General Beauregard's telegram to General Bragg, dated June 18th, wherein it appears that General Lee, in person, reached Petersburg on that day, at 11.30 A. M.

“*** Hancock and Burnside crossed the river, and then moved and manœuvred with alacrity and skill; and the men themselves never flagged nor failed. Every one was earnest, every one did his best, till the fatal moment that lost the result which all had been striving for, which had, indeed, been absolutely attained, all but secured; when Smith, having won Petersburg, hesitated to grasp his prize. Then, indeed, when all their exertions had proved fruitless, when, having out-marched and out-manœuvred Lee, the soldiers found themselves again obliged to assault intrenched positions—*then they seemed in some degree to lose heart, and for the first time since the campaign began their attacks were lacking in vigor*; when they found the Army of Northern Virginia again in their front, sheltered by formidable breastworks, their zeal was lessened, and their ardor cooled. Had the assaults in front of Petersburg been made with the same spirit as in the Wilderness, Petersburg would even then have fallen. But it was not in human endurance to hold out in this incessant effort, and the limit had for a time been reached.”

And Mr. Swinton says:

“Indeed, the Union army, terribly shaken, as well in spirit as in material substance, by the repeated attacks on intrenched positions it had been called on to make, was in a very unfit moral condition to undertake any new enterprise of that character.”

Here is again illustrated General Beauregard's military foresight. When, about mid-day on the 18th, he took General Lee to the elevated site of the Petersburg Reservoir, and, showing him the field, urged upon him to order an attack on the next day by all the Confederate forces, he based his advice upon his intuitive apprehension of that wide-spread feeling among General Grant's forces. Weighing the discouragement of the Federals against the revived spirits of our troops, then united and reinforced, General Beauregard knew that the chances of victory, notwithstanding the exhausted condition of our men, would be all in our favor; and General Badeau's and Mr. Swinton's admissions now show the correctness of his judgment. Had General Lee attacked General Grant at that moment, the war would probably have had a different termination.

General Badeau reports General Grant as having said, at ten o'clock, on the evening of the 18th:

“I am perfectly satisfied that all has been done that could be done, and that the assaults to-day were called for by all the appearance and information that could be obtained. Now we will rest the men, and use the spade for their protection till a new vein can be struck.”*

* “Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,” vol. ii., p. 374.

The regular siege of Petersburg had now begun; and the Confederate forces, including General Lee's army, occupied the new defensive lines to which General Beauregard had withdrawn his troops, during the night of the 17th, unobserved by his vigilant adversary. These lines were necessarily taken under the pressure of circumstances, as most lines are on the field of battle, but had, nevertheless, been selected after due reflection and with great care. General Beauregard's object—and he accomplished it—was to hold the overpowering forces of the enemy at bay until the arrival of the long-delayed reinforcements of General Lee.

The location and retention of these lines have met with more than passing criticism. It has even been asserted that—

“General Lee's first expression on his arrival at the front was that of dissatisfaction touching the general features of the new line; and, with the view of rectifying this important element of his defence, he called to his assistance Major-General William Mahone, an officer in whom he reposed great confidence, and who, besides being an engineer by profession, was familiar with the topography of the country around Petersburg.”*

General Beauregard is clear and positive on this point. He says:

“General Lee was too good a soldier and engineer, and had recently had too much practice in hastily selecting new positions to hold his enemy in check, to ‘express dissatisfaction’ with the lines in rear of Taylor's Creek, which were just begun, when he first visited them, after his arrival at Petersburg. He was, on the contrary, thankful, and well might he be, for the shelter they then offered, and only feared that the remainder of his troops would not get up in time to save the town.”

General Lee did not at any time consult General Mahone with reference to the Taylor's Creek and Jerusalem plank road lines. He knew that he himself, and General Beauregard, and their two able Engineers, Colonels Harris and Stevens, were fully competent to select between those two defensive lines, when their sites were so plainly visible. General Mahone may have been a good and experienced civil engineer, but no one then knew that he laid claim to skill as a military engineer. Civil and

* See criticism by Captain John D. Young, late a commander of sharpshooters, 3d Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, as published, June 22d, 1878, in the *Philadelphia Weekly Times*.

military engineering are as distinct from each other as geometry and algebra. Both require special studies; but efficiency as a military engineer demands above all things great practice in the field under trying circumstances. Where had General Mahone acquired skill by such practice?

General Lee consulted him concerning the topographical features of the country outside of the Dimmock lines,* but for another purpose, and not with reference to the location of our defensive works, as will now be explained. General Beauregard, on the day of General Lee's arrival—the 18th of June—at about 1 P. M., urged upon him, as has been stated, the advantage of taking the offensive before the enemy could have time to know the country and protect himself by abatis, rifle-pits, or trenches. He proposed an attack upon General Grant's left flank, so as to double him up on his right and centre, while his rear should be assailed by all the cavalry that could be massed against it. General Lee at first appeared to favor the idea, but expressed some fear that the Norfolk Railroad cuts and the "Second Swamp" would prove too great obstacles in our way for the offensive. It was upon this point that he consulted General Mahone, who had been the civil engineer and builder of the Norfolk road, and was necessarily familiar with the country over which our forces would have to operate. General Mahone was of General Lee's opinion, and the suggested plan was not carried out. Meanwhile, and after a thorough examination of the new lines—of the Jerusalem plank road and of the Blandford ridge—General Beauregard expressed the opinion that we had better hold on, for the time being, to the line we then occupied, for the following reasons:

1st. That it kept the enemy's batteries at a greater distance from the besieged town.

2d. That it would act as a covered way (as the phrase is, in regular fortification), should we deem it advisable to construct better works on the higher ground in the rear. In the mean time we could construct a series of batteries to protect our front line by flanking and over-shooting fires; and we could throw up infantry parapets for our reserves, whenever we should have additional troops.

* The name given to the original defensive lines of Petersburg.

3d. That the new line gave a close infantry and artillery fire on the reverse slope of Taylor's Creek and ravine, which would prevent the construction of *boyaus* of approaches and parallels for a regular attack.

General Lee concurred in General Beauregard's opinion, and approved his selection. The mine explosion, which occurred a few weeks later, showed how judicious this opinion had been; for it was the terrible fire of infantry and artillery on that reverse slope which prevented reinforcements being sent forward rapidly and continuously to the Federal columns which had already gained a footing in the Confederate works. Thus, it became possible to bring our troops from the extreme right for the recovery of our lines. If the movements of the enemy could not be distinctly seen from these lines, they could be readily observed from the batteries referred to, giving ample time to us for offensive operations.

The best proof that General Beauregard's new lines were properly located is, that they were held till the end of the war, at times by mere handfuls of jaded troops against vastly superior numbers, and without the necessity of building a second system of works on the more elevated grounds in the rear.

If, on the 17th of June, as Mr. Davis has it, "Lee had constructed a line in rear of the one first occupied, having such advantages as gave to our army much greater power to resist,"* it is evident that he never "expressed dissatisfaction" as to a position he had himself selected. If, on the other hand, he did condemn the location of that new line (for which we have only the unsupported testimony of Captain Young), then Mr. Davis, who, in that respect, disagreed with General Lee, unconsciously lauds General Beauregard for the skill he there displayed; and Messrs. McCabe and Cooke lead their readers into error when they assert that the line spoken of was the selection of General Lee, and not of General Beauregard.

The inconsistencies of the authors of these fugitive histories and essays are so evidently self-destroying that no further effort is required to show how untrustworthy they are, and how unfair in their estimates of the events connected with this period of the war.

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 638.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

After the 18th of June General Beauregard is no longer in Command of the Army around Petersburg.—Enemy's Raids to Interrupt our Communications.—No Material Advantage Gained.—Completion of Confederate Lines.—General Beauregard's Forces Occupy Works in Front of Petersburg.—Rumors Concerning the Mine.—The Salients upon General Beauregard's Lines.—He Orders Countermines, and Establishes Batteries Commanding Exposed Points.—His Instructions to the Officers there Posted.—Elliott's Salient the Point Selected by the Enemy.—Mining Commenced on the 25th of June, and Completed on the 23d of July.—When the Explosion took Place.—The Federal Column of Assault: how Composed.—Denudement of Confederate Lines in Consequence of the Threatened Movement of the Enemy North of the James.—Bushrod Johnson's Division.—Its Position along the Works.—Elliott's Brigade.—General Elliott Wounded.—Colonel McMaster.—General Beauregard in Front.—His Orders Carried out.—Is Present with General Lee, pending the Action.—Prompt and Accurate Firing of the Confederate Troops.—Raking Fire of their Batteries.—The Enemy Demoralized.—Is Unable to Advance.—His Critical Position.—General Grant Acknowledges the Impossibility of Success.—Suggests the Order to Withdraw.—General Meade Issues it.—Arrival of General Mahone with Part of his Division.—Throws Forward his Brigade.—North Carolina and South Carolina Regiments Join in the Movement.—Separate Action of Wright's Brigade.—Its Repulse.—Combined Attack under Generals Mahone and Johnson.—Slight Resistance on the Part of the Enemy.—Crater and Lines Abandoned by the Federals.—Ours and the Enemy's Loss.—General Badeau's Opinion of this Affair.

FROM the hour of 12 m., on the 18th of June, General Beauregard ceased to be first in command of our forces at and around Petersburg; and, though he continued on that day to direct, to some extent, the movements of the troops, he did so only because General Lee had not yet become sufficiently familiar with the position of our various commands on the new line occupied.

Comparative quiet now prevailed in both armies, and Federals as well as Confederates were actively engaged in strengthening their defensive works.

On the 21st, however, the 2d and 6th Federal Corps were withdrawn from the lines and sent on a flanking movement to the

left, with a view to encircle the besieged city farther towards the west, and, if possible, to seize the Weldon road. The 2d Corps (Hancock's), now temporarily under General Birney, had the lead. It established itself west of the Jerusalem plank road, and soon formed a junction with a division (Griffin's) of the 5th Corps, which had been posted on the east side. The other corps (the 6th) came up during the night, taking position on the left and rear of the 2d; and Wilson's and Kantz's cavalry were then sent to cut the Weldon and Southside railroads.

General Lee divined the intention of the enemy, and counter-movements were immediately ordered to thwart his purpose. By some misunderstanding between the Federal officers commanding this expedition, the 2d Corps became separated from the 6th, thereby leaving a wide gap between them, which exactly served the purpose of the Confederate movement; for part of A. P. Hill's corps, rapidly marching in columns by brigades, came up with its usual alacrity and occupied this interval. The attack on the left of the 2d Corps was so vigorous that Barlow's division gave way in disorder; so did Mott's, soon afterwards. The Confederate troops now struck Gibbon on the flank and rear, carried his intrenchments, and captured a battery and several entire regiments of his command. Barlow and Mott also lost several hundred prisoners. Gibbon's intrenchments were held by us until the captured guns were removed, when the Confederate column withdrew, carrying with it many standards and nearly 3000 prisoners, including several hundred from the 6th Corps. General Badeau* says the Federal loss on this occasion was "four guns and about 1600 prisoners." He rebukes those who give a higher number, and accuses them of always exaggerating "the National losses." Mr. Swinton, whose account of this expedition agrees with ours, puts the Federal loss at 2500, exclusive of several hundred from the 6th Corps.† The result of this movement to attempt interruption of our communications was in nowise beneficial to the enemy, and merely extended his line to the left, with no further advantage to him.

During the several weeks that followed the regular investment of Petersburg cavalry raids were organized to cut and destroy the

* "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. ii., p. 384.

† Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," pp. 512, 513.

various railroads by which supplies were brought to our army. Wilson and Kautz, acting separately, succeeded in tearing up and otherwise damaging many miles of very important roads, including the Weldon, at Reams's Station, the Southside and the Danville roads. The raiding columns then formed a junction at Meherrin Station, but, upon reaching the Roanoke bridge, were checked in their further advance by a force of Confederates. The return of Wilson's column became, at that time, a difficult problem. At the crossing of Stony Creek, on the 28th, a severe engagement took place, forcing Wilson to make a considerable detour to the left. His effort was to reach Reams's Station, which he believed to be still in possession of the Federals; but he was attacked by both cavalry and infantry, under General Hampton, and now fell back, "with the loss of his trains and artillery and a considerable number of prisoners."* Wilson barely succeeded in bringing his shattered forces within the Federal lines. These raids, though damaging and harassing to us, proved so unsatisfactory to the enemy that further efforts of the kind were finally abandoned.

During this period of relative inactivity Generals Lee and Beauregard had so completed their lines of defence that assault upon them "had been pronounced impracticable by the [Federal] chiefs of artillery and engineers."† Beginning south of the Appomattox, these lines encircled the city of Petersburg, east and south, and extended, in a westerly direction, towards and beyond the left flank of the Federal army. A similar system of defence extended north of the Appomattox, guarding Petersburg and the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, against the Federal forces under Butler, at Bermuda Hundreds. Notwithstanding the reports of the Chief of Artillery and the Chief-Engineer of the Federal army, the Confederate lines, running from the southwest of Petersburg to the north-east of Richmond, and extending over a length of fully thirty-five miles, were vulnerable at more than one point. It must not be forgotten that the Appomattox was fordable a little above the permanent bridge, and it is very doubtful whether we could have prevented a vigorous and well-directed

* Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 513. The statement is confirmed by General Meade's report.

† Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 515.

movement of the enemy from breaking through that part of our lines. General Grant, or General Meade, could also have ordered a powerful attack on the salient formed by the junction of our new lines with the old ones, east of the Jerusalem plank road, the ground in that locality being very favorable for such a movement. It is easy to understand how a success at that point would have enabled the Commander of the Federal army, strong as it then was (for it numbered at that time not less than 115,000 men, exclusive of cavalry), to take in reverse and thus command both of our lines, which we would have had to evacuate at once. Or, General Grant could have occupied his lines with about 50,000 of his forces, and used the remainder—60,000 men, and perhaps more—as a column of active operations which would have been fully strong enough to meet any emergency.

General Badeau asserts that most of these operations were “conducted exclusively by Meade, to whom Grant now intended to allow a more absolute control of the movements of his own army than he had hitherto enjoyed.”* It is none the less a fact that, whoever the Federal commander then was, and though General Lee may have been “outmanœuvred” previous to the arrival of his army in front of Petersburg, since that time, or, rather, from the 15th of June to the 30th of July, and even later, the Federal Commander—whether Grant or Meade—never proved himself a match for either General Beauregard or General Lee.

During the 18th and 19th of June, General Lee's troops, as they arrived, were extended on the right of General Beauregard's, which were now contracted somewhat from their attenuated development. General Beauregard remained in immediate charge of the Petersburg lines already held by his troops; that is to say, from the Appomattox to about half-way between the Baxter road and the Jerusalem plank road. The small portion of the Army of Northern Virginia not within the lines was held as a general reserve.

About the beginning of July it became apparent, from the Northern newspapers and from accounts of deserters and prisoners, that the Federals had undertaken to direct a mine against some point of the Confederate works at Petersburg. General Beauregard, believing that the operation was aimed at his lines—

* “Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,” vol. ii., p. 386.

for upon them were three salients (Colquitt's, Gracie's, and Elliott's), the ground in front of which was favorable for such an enterprise—directed countermines to be sunk from each of them. This work, however, did not reach an efficient state; the troops had no experience in that special service; they lacked the proper tools, and, besides, were so exhausted from heavy duty in the trenches, that the work was not carried on with the necessary activity.

In all other respects ample preparations for the event of the explosion of the mine were carefully made by General Beauregard. Batteries of 12-pounder Napoleons, 8 and 10 inch and Coehorn mortars, were erected on well-selected elevations in rear of and commanding the exposed points, assuring both a cross and front fire. Gorge-lines were also constructed in rear of these salients, for the troops to retire into in the event of a breach in the exterior line by the springing of the mine. Finally, and as the probable period approached, minute instructions were given by him to the officers in the menaced quarters, so as to prevent confusion or a panic from the explosion, and to insure a prompt, vigorous concentration of the troops and of the fire of the batteries for the repulse of any assaulting column that might attempt to enter the breach.

The salient actually selected by the Federals proved to be that occupied by Elliott's brigade, with Pegram's battery; and the mine, commenced on the 25th of June,* was ready to receive its charge on the 23d of July. The work was executed by the 48th Pennsylvania Volunteers, 400 strong, mostly composed of Schuylkill coal-miners, and whose colonel, Pleasants, was himself an accomplished mining engineer.

The mine, starting from the interior of Burnside's line of rifle-pits, immediately across Taylor's Creek, terminated beneath Elliott's salient, at a distance of one hundred and seventy yards, with lateral galleries beginning at that point, extending on the left thirty-seven feet, and on the right thirty-eight feet, and together forming the segment of a circle concave to the Confederate lines. In both of these lateral galleries were four magazines, one at the extreme end of each, and the remainder at equal distances along the segment of circle, containing in all eight thousand pounds

* Colonel Pleasants's testimony, in "Conduct of the War" (1865), vol. i., p. 112.

of powder, equally distributed, when charged on the 27th of July.*

The Federal column of assault consisted of the four divisions of Burnside's corps—Ledlie's, Potter's, Wilcox's, and Ferrero's, the latter composed of negro troops—directly supported by Turner's division of the 10th Corps and Ames's division of the 18th, under General Ord—in the aggregate at least 23,000 men. At the same time 10,000 men of Warren's corps, concentrated on its own right—that is, on the left of Burnside—and the 18th, concentrated in the immediate rear of Burnside, were actively to support the movement. Hancock's corps was likewise concentrated as a support, for the same purpose, on the lines temporarily vacated by the 18th; and Sheridan, with all the cavalry assembled in the quarter of Deep Bottom, was to move strenuously against the Confederate right by the roads leading into Petersburg from the south and west. Even the pontoon train was held in readiness, under the Chief-Engineer, Major Duane, to accompany the movement, and Engineer officers were assigned to each corps for the operation. The artillery of all kinds was to open upon those points of the Confederate works covering the ground of movement of the Federal troops.† The whole force thus made disposable for the operation consisted, according to General Meade's testimony, of nearly 50,000 men,‡ exclusive of the cavalry.

The orders were to spring the mine at 3.30 A. M. on the 30th of July;§ but, from some defect in the fuse, its fire died out, and a lieutenant and sergeant of the 48th Pennsylvania boldly volunteered to descend into the mine and ascertain the cause. They relit the extinguished fuse, and at 4.44 the explosion took place.||

In consequence of the withdrawal of troops to meet a threatened movement north of the James the Confederate lines from

* General Burnside's report, dated "Before Petersburg, Va., August 18th, 1864," to be found in "Conduct of the War" (1865), vol. i., p. 20.

† See General Meade's orders, July 29th, 1864, to be found in "Conduct of the War" (1865), vol. i., pp. 32, 33.

‡ General Meade's testimony, in same work, p. 37.

§ General Meade's orders of July 30th, 1864, in "Conduct of the War" (1865), vol. i., p. 33.

|| Colonel Pleasants's testimony, in "Conduct of the War," p. 114. He says, "exploded at sixteen minutes to five."

the Appomattox to Rives's salient (that is, to a point about half-way between the Baxter and Jerusalem roads) were held only by Bushrod R. Johnson's division, less two brigades (Gracie's and Johnson's), which had been detached for the same service. General Beauregard at the time considered this as a most dangerous denudement and extension; and General Johnson, alluding to the same subject, in his detailed statement of the facts relative to this important incident of the siege of Petersburg, uses the following language: "General Field's division, which had been holding the part of our line of defences on the right of my division, was taken out of the trenches, and Colquitt's brigade, of Hoke's division, was temporarily transferred to my command in exchange for Gracie's brigade, and I was left to hold, with less forces, defences double the length, or more, of that which I had previously defended. Indeed, my understanding is, that my command was all the troops in our trenches when the mine was exploded, all of the rest of the army having been moved or held ready to meet any demonstration the enemy might make on the north of the James River."

Elliott's salient was occupied by his own brigade, of Johnson's division, consisting of the 26th, 17th, 18th, 22d, and 23d South Carolina Volunteers, in the order given, the left of the 26th resting on the right of Ransom's brigade,* near the intersection of the lines with the Norfolk Railroad. Wise's brigade followed on the right of Elliott and connected with Colquitt's brigade.† The explosion threw up the *terre-plein* of the salient, burying two guns of Pegram's battery and a part of the 18th and 22d South Carolina regiments, most of the former being in the midst of the upheaval; but the greater portion of the parapets of the main and gorge lines remained standing, the part destroyed being near the angle of their junction on the right.

The rupture of the earth divided the brigade—the remainder of the 22d and the 23d on the right, and the remainder of the 18th, the 17th, and the 26th on the left. A momentary panic seized the men nearest the point of explosion. Thus suddenly

* Colonel F. W. McMaster's statement. See Appendix.

† General B. R. Johnson's statement. See Appendix.

aroused from their sleep, they rushed in different directions along the trenches; but soon rallied around their officers, and opened, from their parapets, a rapid and effective fire upon the advancing enemy; while the batteries, so happily provided for this contingency by General Beauregard, also opened with telling effect. Colonel McMaster, who, after General Elliott fell, commanded his brigade during this action, thus describes the firing of our batteries at the time:

“*** In less than five minutes' time our men recovered from their panic the men of the 18th falling in indiscriminately with mine, and we shot with great rapidity and execution. About the same time the battery on the left of the ravine, a short distance in rear of Ransom's brigade, did great execution and fired about six hundred shots in a short time. This battery I observed specially; the others, in rear and on the right also, did good execution.”

Within ten minutes, or more, Ledlie's division had entered the breach in the parapet of the salient and plunged into the crater—a cavity 135 feet in length, 97 feet in breadth, and 30 in depth,* with sloping sides, the soil sandy, but filled with great blocks of clay. Wilcox's division immediately followed, and then Potter's, while the Federal artillery—guns and mortars—opened all along their lines, concentrating their heaviest fire on the lines and ground right and left of the crater.

General Beauregard, having no reserves, had instructed each of his brigade commanders that, in the event of a breach and attack, they should close rapidly towards that point, leaving a picket line to hold the trenches elsewhere. This instruction was promptly executed upon the order of Division-Commander Bushrod R. Johnson. General Beauregard, aroused from sleep by the explosion, and immediately informed of its precise locality by Colonel Paul, an officer of his staff, despatched the latter to General Lee to make the report, request assistance, and appoint a rendezvous with him at Bushrod Johnson's headquarters, near Cemetery Hill. He then repaired at once to that point, and, after ascertaining that his previous instructions for the event were being properly carried out, went forward to the Gee House, within 500 yards and immediately in rear of Elliott's salient, and, from that commanding point, took a full view of

* General Johnson's statement. See Appendix.

the scene of combat. Returning soon afterwards to Johnson's headquarters—where, he had been told, General Lee was now awaiting him—he reported the situation, and learned that General Mahone's division had been ordered up. Generals Lee and Beauregard afterwards repaired to the Gee House, where they remained till the end of the action.

Meanwhile, and within ten or fifteen minutes of the explosion, General Elliott had ordered his regiments on the left of the crater to form on the brow of the hill, beyond the gorge-line which crossed the summit, and charge the Federals out of the mine; but he had no sooner reached the open ground, followed by Colonel Smith, of the 26th South Carolina, and half a dozen men, in execution of this movement, than he fell, severely wounded, and was immediately borne to the rear.* Colonel F. W. McMaster, on whom now devolved the command, despatched Colonel Smith, with the 26th and three companies of the 17th, by the trench and covered way on the left, to hold a shallow ravine in rear of the hill of Elliott's salient, there to resist any direct advance by which the enemy might seek to fall on the rear of the Confederate lines.†

The Federals now attempted to force their way along the trenches. Numbers of them, emerging from the crater, got into the ditch of the gorge-line, where a hand-to-hand fight ensued; while others, creeping along the glacis of the exterior line, got over the parapet into the main trench.‡ The troops on the right and left of the crater fought them from behind the traverses connecting with the sinks, and from barricades thrown up at the angles of the trenches; while the adjacent brigades, from their main parapets, the covered ways, and ravines running to the rear, and from piles of earth at their bomb-proofs, concentrated a deadly fire on such of the Federal forces as were moving across from their lines, and on those in and near the crater, whenever they exposed themselves.

The Confederate front and flanking batteries, so judiciously located, swept the ground in front and rear of the crater, so that the Federals found themselves obstructed from direct advance or retreat. These batteries also played into the crater itself, where

* General Johnson's and Colonel McMaster's statements. See Appendix.

† Colonel McMaster's statements. See Appendix.

‡ Ibid.

the shells were dropped with such precision upon the huddled mass of Federals that numbers of them preferred to run the gauntlet back to their lines. Wright's battery of four guns, admirably situated and protected, on the left of Elliott's salient, poured its whole volume of fire, with astonishing rapidity and effect, directly into their right flank; while one gun of Davidson's battery, in Wise's line, threw its canister and grape at short range into their left flank, both batteries, as occasion required, sweeping the ground in front of the crater. Major Haskell's battery of four 8 and 10 inch mortars, under Captain Lamkin, in rear on the Jerusalem plank road, and one Coehorn and two 12-pounder mortars of Lamkin's, in the ravine, about 200 yards to the left and rear of the crater, and two 8-inch mortars, were served with unremitting and fatal execution; while a battery of three 8 or 10 inch mortars, on the right of the Baxter road, under Lieutenant Langhorn, fired at intervals with very good effect.

The order for the Federal column of attack was to advance and seize Cemetery Hill. In all subsequent orders of General Meade this was the main objective; but upon their attempt to form for that purpose outside of the crater they were swept by such a fire from the batteries and infantry, including Colonel Smith's force, in the ravine in rear, and the 59th Virginia, under Captain Wood, formed in a ditch on the right of the crater and perpendicular to the main trench, that they rushed back and clung to the protection of the crater, continuing the contest for the possession of the trenches.

About 7.30 o'clock Ferrero's negro division was ordered to push through the breach and carry Cemetery Hill. They moved across the open space between the Federal and Confederate lines into, out of, and beyond the crater; but at this point they broke under the fierce artillery and musketry fire there concentrated upon them; and, after having been partially reorganized, broke again, now fleeing in wild disorder into and out of the crater, back to General Burnside's rearmost lines, within the Federal intrenchments. They carried back, on their way, Bell's brigade,* of Turner's division, which, having been pushed across from Burn-

* General Ord's report, dated August 3d, 1864, in "Conduct of the War" (1865), p. 102.

side's lines by Ord to support their assault, was then attempting to press forward from the right of the crater. Such was the concentration of fire upon their front and flanks that the Federals were unable to develop and form their column of attack, and this was their last attempt to charge.

Meanwhile the struggle had continued for the possession of the trenches. On the Confederate right of the crater these were held by the remainder of the 22d and the 23d South Carolina, aided by the 26th and part of the 46th Virginia. Barricades were constructed, and the Federals did not succeed in advancing more than thirty yards. On the left they gradually occupied the trenches for less than two hundred yards, turning the barricades by advancing along and under cover of the glacis, and springing thence into the trench, until Colonel McMaster erected a last barricade* at the bend, in advance of the covered way leading to General Eliott's quarters. From this point the glacis took a direction which exposed the Federals attempting to use it to a flank fire from the exterior parapet, held by the right of Ransom's brigade; and here the enemy's advance was effectually checked, both in the trench and outside of it.

The entire Federal offensive had now been reduced to an impotent and fractional conflict in the trenches, when, at 9.45, General Meade gave General Burnside a peremptory order to withdraw his troops.† It even appears, from what General Badeau says of this order to withdraw,‡ that it originated with, and was first suggested by, General Grant himself, and not by General Meade. Says General Badeau:

"Burnside's despatches to Meade, reporting the fight, were meagre and unsatisfactory in the extreme; and Grant at last rode out to the National line, and there dismounting, walked across the front, under a heavy fire, to a point where Burnside was watching the battle. *He took in the situation at a glance, and, perceiving that every chance of success was lost, at once exclaimed, 'These troops must be immediately withdrawn. It is slaughter to leave them there.'*"§ He then returned to Meade's headquarters, and a written order to this effect was sent to Burnside."

It follows from this that, before Meade's order to withdraw was

* Colonel McMaster's statement. See Appendix.

† See "Conduct of the War" (1865), Appendix, vol. i., pp. 229, 230.

‡ "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. ii., p. 482.

§ The italics are ours.

issued—that is to say, before 9.30 A. M.—General Grant, after coming personally to the front, saw “that every chance of success was lost.” General Burnside, however, considering that a retreat across the open space between the lines could only be effected with great slaughter, asked for and obtained a suspension of the order, to await a more favorable opportunity. It is evident that his object was not to go on with the attack—still less to renew it—but to retire the men with the least possible sacrifice of life. General Meade at first refused, but finally gave him discretion as to the time for withdrawal.* The remaining Federal supports (Warren and Hancock) took no part in the attack; and they also—General Warren at 9.45, General Hancock at 9.25—received orders “to suspend all offensive operations” and resume their original position. So did General Ord.†

Such was the situation—the Federals unable to advance, and fearing to retreat—when, at ten o’clock, General Mahone arrived with a part of his men, who lay down in the shallow ravine, to the rear of Elliott’s salient, held by the force under Colonel Smith, there to await the remainder of the division.‡ But a movement having occurred among the Federals which seemed to menace an advance, General Mahone threw forward his brigade with the 61st North Carolina, of Hoke’s division, which had now also come up. The 25th and 49th North Carolina, and the 26th and part of the 17th South Carolina, all under Smith, which were formed on Mahone’s left, likewise joined in the counter-movement, and three-fourths of the gorge-line were carried with that part of the trench, on the left of the crater, occupied by the Federals. Many of the latter, white and black, abandoned the breach and fled to their lines, under a scourging flank fire of artillery and musketry from Wise’s brigade.§

At about 11.30 Wright’s brigade, which had then reached the ground, was detached and pushed forward, separately, by General Mahone, to drive the Federals out of the crater, but it suffered a repulse.|| General Beauregard now ordered a concentration of all available batteries to be made upon the crater and adjacent

* “Conduct of the War” (1865), Appendix, vol. i., p. 230.

† Ibid., pp. 234, 238, 240.

‡ Colonel McMaster’s statement. See Appendix.

§ General Johnson’s statement. See Appendix.

|| Ibid.

trenches, and, under cover of this fire, a combined movement of the forces of Mahone and Johnson was prepared, ordered by Generals Lee and Beauregard. Saunders's brigade of Mahone's division, with the 61st North Carolina, of Hoke's division, and the 17th South Carolina, of Johnson's division, moved on the left and rear of the crater, under General Mahone; and the 23d and part of the 22d South Carolina on the right, under General Johnson.* But before this last charge the Federals, thoroughly demoralized under the cross-fires of our artillery and musketry, were running the dread gauntlet back to their intrenchments, so that this last attack met with but little resistance. The fact is that the crater and lines were so rapidly emptied of Federals, at the last moment of the charge, that the Confederate batteries slackened their fire, and only thirty men, with three stands of colors, were captured.†

The total Confederate loss was 1172. Johnson's division (of which 2500 were engaged about the crater), including Colquitt's brigade, temporarily attached to it, bore of this loss 922—66 officers, 856 men—the share of Elliott's brigade therein amounting to 672 in killed, wounded, and missing. A few of these were prisoners, captured during the fight in the trenches, and, of the others, about 256 figured among the victims of the explosion, inclusive of 22 men belonging to Pegram's battery. Mahone's division lost 250 men—killed, wounded, and missing—out of about 1500.

The Federal loss is reported, by Mr. Swinton, at about 4000 men; by General Meade, at 4400 killed, wounded, and missing, 246 prisoners, 2 colors, and 2 guns; and by General Badeau, at 4400. In our opinion the enemy must have lost more than 5000 men.

Thus came to an end this transcendent scheme for the capture of Petersburg, "planned with consummate skill"—says General Badeau—"and every contingency cared for in advance. With the enemy drawn up in force to the north bank; the National troops brought rapidly back, the Army of the Potomac and the Eighteenth corps massed in rear of the mine; artillery prepared to cover the approach; the mine itself a success—there was every reason to anticipate a brilliant conclusion to the operation."

* General Johnson's statement. See Appendix.

† Ibid.

Whereupon General Grant is credited with having said in regard to this masterly stroke, in which the highest expectations were centred, "Such an opportunity of carrying fortifications I have never seen, and do not expect again to have." And yet, writes General Badeau, with a frankness that does him no little honor, this affair proved to be "one of the most discreditable to the National arms that occurred during the war." This we will not contradict; but when he states that "it was more than thirty minutes after the explosion before the rebels recovered from their panic and returned to their lines," he is in error. He no less errs when he asserts that "the [Federal] advance was not checked; the troops were not discouraged; the ground was clear before them; there was yet no serious resistance; they halted simply because they were not commanded to do otherwise." The Confederate officers there present—and foremost of all Colonel McMaster—testify that they rallied their men, restored order, and opened fire not more than five minutes after the mine had exploded. What stopped the Federal troops in their advance and prevented them from reaching the crest of Cemetery Hill—as they had been ordered to do—was the tremendous and raking cross-fire of artillery, prepared by General Beauregard for that very purpose, and the unflinching stand and prompt and accurate infantry fire of our troops, in front, as well as to the left and right of the crater.

Upon this very point General Bushrod Johnson, in his earnest and straightforward manner, says:

"The 23d and part of the 22d South Carolina regiments on the right, and the 17th and 18th on the left of the crater, opened a destructive fire from our parapets on the advancing column and on the enemy in the breach. The flanking arrangements of our works, on both sides of the breach, afforded peculiar advantages, and soon the fire along the line of my division extended far out on each flank, wherever the enemy's column could be reached, and swept the ground in front of the crater.

"To the men on the left of Wise's brigade, occupying the eminence, south of Baxter road, about two hundred yards from the crater, the enemy's masses presented a most inviting target.

"Wright's battery of four guns, admirably located and intrenched on the left of Elliott's brigade, and in rear of our front line, poured its whole column of fire on the enemy's masses and right flank. The position of this excellent battery was perhaps unknown to the enemy, and the superior manner in which it was served, the rapidity of its fire, and the terrible effect on the enemy's forces, no doubt greatly astonished and demoralized them.

“Major Haskell’s mortar-battery, in charge of Captain Lamkin, consisting of four Coehorns, on the Jerusalem plank road, and one Coehorn and two 12-pound mortars in the ravine, some two hundred yards to the left and rear of the breach, and two mortars to the left of Wright’s battery, were all opened promptly on the assaulting columns. The practice of the four mortars on the plank road was admirable. Their shells dropped with precision upon the enemy’s masses, huddled in disorder in front of and in the crater. Some three mortars on the right of the Baxter road, commanded by Lieutenant Langhorne, opened and continued, at intervals, with good effect until the close of the engagement.”

This sufficiently explains why the Federals, notwithstanding their thorough state of preparation—“every contingency being cared for in advance”—did not accomplish what was expected of them. Nor is their failure at all attributable to the absence of their corps and division commanders; for every colonel and every subordinate officer knew—if not every man of the assaulting column—what orders had been issued, and that the work to be done was to carry the Confederate lines and take possession of the hill beyond. The truth is, that, losing sight of the invincible spirit of the veteran troops confronting them, they had counted upon inextricable confusion on the part of the Confederates, and had not anticipated the reception in store for them from the skilfully located batteries of General Beauregard.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Divers Operations of Federal Columns.—General Hancock's Expedition.—General Warren's.—The Charge made by General Hagood's Brigade.—Defeat of General Hancock's Corps by Generals Hill and Hampton.—Insignificant Command Given to General Beauregard.—His Dissatisfaction.—General Whiting Requests him to Inspect the Works at Wilmington.—General Lee Thinks General Beauregard will be Given Command of Northwest Georgia.—He is Ordered to Charleston, to Examine into a Difficulty between Generals Jones and Ripley.—Finds the Department much Disorganized.—His Interview with President Davis at Augusta.—The Latter Details to him General Hood's Plan of Campaign.—General Beauregard Approves it.—President Davis Decides to Give General Beauregard the Military Division of the West.—General Beauregard Accepts.—He Leaves for General Hood's Headquarters.—His Communication to General Cooper.—General Hood Demands, but does not Secure, the Surrender of Resaca.

SOME two weeks after the explosion of the Federal mine and the attempted capture of Petersburg, the enemy, with a view, no doubt, to divert public attention from the inglorious results of "that miserable affair," as General Grant is reported to have called it, resorted again to divers operations, within and outside of the limits of his lines of intrenchment.

General Hancock, with his own corps, to which were added the 10th and all of Gregg's cavalry, was charged with the first expedition. This movement was intended to create a diversion on the north bank of the James River, but it proved to be another sore disappointment to the enemy, and General Hancock, on the 20th of August, about eight or ten days after his departure, was ordered back to his former position at Petersburg, having sustained a loss of more than 1500 men.*

Meanwhile, and before General Hancock's return, an expedition, aimed at the Weldon Railroad, was undertaken by General Warren. It led to several sharp actions between the contend-

* Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 532.

ing forces, where much vigor and stubbornness were exhibited on both sides, resulting, however, in the final retention of the road by the Federals. Their loss amounted to not less than 4455 killed, wounded, and missing.* This shows what a strong effort General Lee had made to dislodge the enemy from the Weldon road. Unfortunately, and owing to the impossibility of sending additional reinforcements, he failed in his purpose. He would not and could not afford to sacrifice more lives for the possession of a line of communication which, though of great advantage to us, was not indispensable, for we still held the Danville route, by which Richmond as well as the army could be provisioned.†

* Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 535.

† It was during this attempt to regain the use of the Weldon road that, on the 21st of August, General Hagood, of South Carolina, distinguished himself in a personal encounter with a Federal officer.

Owing to inaccurate reports of his scouts General A. P. Hill, who commanded the Confederate forces against Warren's expedition, mistook the exact position of the enemy's line on the left, and, through General Mahone, who labored under the same error, Hagood's brigade was ordered to press the rear and flank of the Federals. He was to be supported by five brigades of Mahone's division, supposed to be already in front. The brigade drove the skirmishers from their rifle-pits, but found itself in presence of "a strongly intrenched line, crowded with men and artillery, extending right and left as far as could be seen."* The five brigades of General Mahone were not there. General Hagood saw at once how perilous a strait he was in, and used his utmost endeavors to halt his command; but the men, "intent on carrying the position before them, neither heard nor heeded his voice,"† and had actually reached the parapets of the works before they understood what overwhelming disaster threatened them. The situation was nearly desperate, all the more that a flanking column had now been sent behind the brigade, with the evident purpose of cutting off its retreat. At this moment a Federal officer, Captain Daly, of General Cutler's staff, boldly rode forward and seized a regimental flag of the brigade. Seeing this, General Hagood, then on foot, came up as fast as he could, and, calling upon his men to fall back, demanded the immediate return of the colors. Upon the officer's refusal to comply—there being no time for parley—General Hagood shot him through the body, and "as he reeled from the saddle upon one side sprang into it from the other, Orderly Stoney seizing the flag from his falling hands."‡ Instantly facing about, the South Carolina brigade, under the lead of its intrepid commander, charged and easily dispersed the Federal line in its rear, and, regardless of the severe fire poured upon it from the enemy's

* General Hagood's Memoirs. See Appendix.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

Very shortly after this affair, whereby the enemy had gained the possession of a road but lost many lives, General Hancock was met and defeated, at or near Reams's Station, by a Confederate force under Generals A. P. Hill and Hampton. Their hard-won success was conceded by the enemy, though since that time it has been a matter of surprise that General Hancock was not immediately reinforced from General Warren's position, or that the troops sent to relieve him were marched by the longer of the two roads leading to him. The Federal loss was reckoned at 2400, killed, wounded, and missing, out of about 8000 men.* Our own loss was severe also, though we have no means now at hand, of ascertaining the exact figures.

Since the battle of Drury's Bluff (May 16th) General Beauregard, the first general commissioned by the Confederate Government, had been in command of only two divisions, numbering together less than 10,000 men of all arms; and from and after the arrival of General Lee at Petersburg (June 18th) he had held a subordinate position, very similar but really inferior to that of a corps commander, whose force generally consisted of three divisions of about 5000 men each. His army (so-called) occupied nearly all the new lines he had established on the night of the 17th of June, from the Appomattox to the old lines where these crossed the Jerusalem plank road. They measured a length of over two miles, and, although commanded by some of the enemy's works in front, had been made quite secure by artificial means.

It is not to be wondered at that such a position had become irksome to General Beauregard. It was all the more so because a very important movement against Washington, through the Shenandoah Valley, had been set on foot and confided to an officer who was gallant and meritorious, but whose rank in the Confederate army was lower than that held by General Beauregard, and whose merit and experience as a strategist had not been tested.

works, made good its retreat, though with heavy loss, to the shelter of the valley.

General Beauregard spoke in high terms of the coolness and daring of General Hagood upon this occasion, and strongly recommended him for promotion—which he most assuredly deserved.

* Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 538.

General Beauregard, though not openly cast aside, had been placed in an unworthy position, and was wasting his powers upon work that, under the guidance of General Lee, almost any subordinate general could have performed. The fact that Early, a lieutenant-general, and not General Beauregard, was selected for the campaign referred to above, proves how deeply rooted was the prejudice prevailing against Beauregard at Richmond.

That General Early did his utmost to carry out the operation intrusted to him no one will for a moment doubt, and those who know him well, and appreciate his devotion to the cause he was serving, would certainly be the last to cast even a shadow of censure upon him; but it is none the less true that to retrieve the failing fortunes of the South at that juncture something more than devotion, earnestness, and gallantry was required on the part of the leader of this all-important expedition. He should have had experience in handling separate, independent commands; rapidity of conception and execution; the power to shape and control events; the unwavering confidence in success which ever forces a like confidence upon an army; the capacity and habit, as it were, of assuming responsibilities; the prestige of acknowledged ability. These traits were pre-eminent in General Beauregard, who was available at that time, and whose presence at Petersburg could certainly have been dispensed with after General Lee's arrival.

Early in the month of September General Beauregard had determined to ask for a change of command, when General Whiting expressed a desire that he should reinspect his defensive works at Wilmington and the mouth of Cape Fear River. With General Lee's consent he complied with this request, returning to Petersburg about the middle of the month. A few days later he was informed by General Lee that there was a probability of his being ordered to the command of the Army of Northwestern Georgia, then under General Hood. Though somewhat surprised at such an announcement—for he remembered what answer the President, two years before, had given to the Congressional delegation asking for his return to the Army of Tennessee*—he nevertheless prepared and forwarded to General Lee the following memorandum:

* See volume i., p. 418.

"NEAR PETERSBURG, VA., *September 19th, 1864.*

"Being strongly impressed with the responsibility of that position (the command of the Army of Northwestern Georgia), I am fearful of not being equal to the present emergency; but, being anxious to do all in my power to serve the cause, I will obey with alacrity any order of the War Department which may put me in command of that army. With a view, however, to increase my usefulness as far as practicable, I hope I will be authorized to take with me such members of my general staff as I may consider indispensable to success, to wit: 1. Chief of Staff and First Assistant. 2. Quartermaster. 3. Medical Director. 4. Inspector. 5. Chief-Engineer. 6. Commissary, if required, as well as such other members of my general staff as I may find necessary when I shall have assumed command.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

This was readily assented to by General Lee, who assured him that his request would undoubtedly be granted by the War Department.

Shortly afterwards (on or about the 23d of September) General Beauregard was ordered by the President to repair to Charleston, and, while awaiting further orders there, to inquire into the difficulty existing between General Sam. Jones, commanding the Department, and General R. S. Ripley, commanding the First Military District, of South Carolina.* Before leaving Petersburg he took an affectionate farewell of General Lee and of his staff, and also of such officers of his own military family as were not to accompany him to his new field of action.

General Beauregard reached Charleston on the 25th of September, and immediately informed the President of the fact. The latter was then at Macon, Ga., the headquarters of General Howell Cobb, and on his way to confer with General Hood, at Palmetto, Ga. He instructed General Beauregard to meet him at Augusta, where he expected to be, on the 2d of October, before returning to Richmond.

Meanwhile, General Beauregard entered on the duties assigned to him at Charleston. He discovered a change for the worse, in the condition of the defences, since his departure for Weldon, N. C., about seven months before. The system of signals and telegraphs that he had established along the coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, by which to gather news of the movements of the enemy and his fleets, had fallen into complete neglect. The

* See General Beauregard's letter, in Appendix.

parapets of Fort Sumter, formed partly of the *débris* and ruins of its former magnificent walls and casemates, had crumbled down, and were being gradually washed away by the rains and the waves of the sea, thus rendering parts of the parade visible to the sentries in the rigging of the enemy's blockaders. The want of harmony existing between the Commander of the Department and the Chief of the First Military District was evident; and General Beauregard soon perceived that the former could not control the restless and insubordinate spirit of the latter, who required a firm hand to keep him within bounds. The investigation of the difficulties between these two officers revealed facts which confirmed General Beauregard in this opinion. He therefore came to the conclusion that the sooner General Ripley was sent to the field the better it would be for the service. Hence, on the 27th, he forwarded the following telegram to President Davis, who was then at General Hood's headquarters :

"CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 27th, 1864.

"To President JEFF. DAVIS, General Hood's Headquarters, Ga. :

"Matters here are very unsatisfactory, requiring prompt action on the part of Government. This State should be one district, under a Major-General, and the whole Department under a Lieutenant-General or General. I will telegraph changes required soon.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

"Operator will repeat same message to General R. E. Lee, at Petersburg, Va., and to Hon. J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War, at Richmond.

"Official.

"H. W. FIELDEN, A. A. G."

On the 2d of October, in accordance with his instructions, General Beauregard repaired to Augusta, and the next day had a long conference with the President, who had also arrived there during the night. The General gave him a long and detailed account of his investigation at Charleston, repeating and minutely explaining the important suggestions contained in the foregoing telegram. He thereupon earnestly recommended that Colonel D. B. Harris, who had been so efficient an aid to him, during his long defence of Charleston, should be made a major-general, and assigned to the command of the new District of South Carolina. Mr. Davis would only promote him to a brigadier-generalship, giving him the command of the First Subdistrict of South Carolina—in other words, of the City of Charleston and its Harbor. General Beauregard was desirous that the President should make the promotion at once; but he preferred

delaying it until his return to Richmond. Meanwhile, Colonel Harris was attacked by the yellow fever, then prevailing at Charleston, and died of it on the 10th of October, before hearing of his well-deserved promotion. In him the Confederacy lost a brave and efficient officer. As a division or even a corps commander he would have had few superiors. General Beauregard had repeatedly recommended him for promotion; but it was with some difficulty that he had obtained for him the rank of major after the Shiloh campaign, and of colonel after nearly two years of distinguished services at Charleston. General Harris was a graduate of West Point, before General Beauregard entered that institution. He had resigned shortly after joining the army, and, at the opening of the war took service in the Confederacy. He was captain of engineers at the battle of Manassas, and, after serving for some time with General Cocke, joined General Beauregard, and remained with him until his untimely death. All who knew Colonel Harris admired and respected him. Not only was he an able and experienced Engineer, but his coolness under fire, and the determined though simple and modest manner in which he performed his duties, no matter under what circumstances, had endeared him to the scarred veterans—officers and men—among whom he had served. His favorite and characteristic motto—one he constantly used, and to which he was faithful to the last—was: “The path of duty, the safest of all.”

The President, without directly assenting to General Beauregard's suggestions as to the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, adopted most of them; and Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee was accordingly assigned to that command, *vice* Major-General Sam. Jones, who took charge of the Military District of South Carolina; while Major-General Howell Cobb was placed over the Military District of Georgia. Florida had also been put under the command of a major-general (J. Patton Anderson), immediately after the battle of Olustee, or Ocean Pond.

Having gone over and concluded these different matters with General Beauregard, the President entered into an interesting and minute account of his recent visit to General Hood's headquarters, at Palmetto, Ga. He praised highly the new Commander of the Army of Tennessee, predicting that he would carry out a different policy from that of General Joseph E. Johnston, who would have retreated ere long—said Mr. Davis—to the very

Gulf of Mexico, should Sherman have followed him that far south. He spoke with high praise of the plan of operations of General Hood, who was on his march to flank General Sherman, then at Atlanta, and cut his line of communication with Middle Tennessee. He was also to destroy the railroad and bridges, from Atlanta to Chattanooga, in as many places as possible, giving battle only when the chances should be favorable to him. General Beauregard readily approved of this movement, which was perfectly feasible, was according to the principles of war, and would, if carried out, compel Sherman to turn back, to protect his line of communication and force a battle with Hood, who, having the choice of position, in a mountainous country, might inflict on his adversary such heavy losses as would prevent his farther advance into Georgia, or make his retreat to Dalton—or even to the vicinity of Chattanooga—a military necessity. A change of base in war, when practicable—which is not often the case—is always attended with great results;* for one of the cardinal principles of tactics is, “to operate on the communications of your enemy, without exposing your own,” which General Hood could well do on this occasion, as he could readily establish his new lines of communication *via* the Selma, Jacksonville, and Rome Railroad, then built to Blue Mountain, ten or twelve miles from Jacksonville, where could soon be established his new depot of immediate supplies.

The President, having ascertained that General Beauregard favored this expected movement, determined to place him in command of what was to be the Military Division of the West, embracing the two Departments under Generals Hood and Taylor, and he informed General Beauregard of his decision to that effect. General Hood’s Department consisted of Tennessee and such part of Western and Northern Georgia as was not included in General Hardee’s command; General Taylor’s consisted of Alabama, Mississippi, and Eastern Louisiana. A command composed of nearly five States—that is to say, covering more than one-third of the territorial extent of the Confederacy—was now offered to General

* “Although it is a maxim never to abandon your line of communication, yet to change that line is one of the most skilful manœuvres of the art of war, where circumstances authorize it. It is in such a case that a commander should be bold to strike great blows, and manœuvre on his enemy’s flank. Victory is then in his hand.”—NAPOLEON, *at St. Helena*.

Beauregard. Had he consulted his own interests, or taken thought of his personal fame, he would have declined the heavy responsibility about to be imposed upon him; for he knew that, important as his command was in territorial extent, he would be without troops directly under him, with very scanty resources to count upon, and—far worse than all—with a marked feeling of discouragement and distrust growing among the people. He knew, furthermore, that he was not superseding General Hood, or in any way depriving him of his command, but that he was merely sent to him as an adviser. In proof of this we quote from President Davis's letter to General Hood, dated September 28th, from Opelika, Ala.:

"* * * It seems to me best that I should confer with General Beauregard, and, if quite acceptable to him, place him in command of the Department embracing your army and that of General R. Taylor, so as to secure the fullest co-operation of the troops, *without relieving either of you of the responsibilities and powers of your special commands*, except in so far as would be due to the superior rank and the above assignment of General Beauregard. He will necessarily, if present with either army, command in person. Before final action there will be time for you to communicate with me, and I shall be glad to have your views.*

"Very respectfully and truly yours,

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

General Beauregard accepted, nevertheless, the trust reposed in him, under the condition, however, that he should be able to rely on the support of the War Department. The President promised him its cordial co-operation, and desired that he should go at once to confer with Generals Hood and Taylor. He left that night.

Another topic was discussed during the Augusta conference. The President spoke of his troubles with Governor Brown, of Georgia, who, he said, did not give the Government a cordial support, and was ever disposed to throw petty obstacles in the way of procuring recruits, conscripts, and even supplies of provisions and manufactured goods. General Cobb, he also asserted, was very much embarrassed in his work, as commander of his military district, by the want of harmony, so perceptible in his official relations with Governor Brown. While in command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, General Beauregard had always been on very friendly terms with Governor Brown.

* "Advance and Retreat," p. 255.

He offered to call on the latter while on his way to General Hood's headquarters, and to do all in his power towards accomplishing what the President desired. It was so agreed. Mr. Davis left that evening for Richmond, and the next morning (October 4th) General Beauregard began his prearranged journey, arriving the same day at Milledgeville, where he was most kindly received by Governor Brown. The latter granted all that was asked of him, and offered General Beauregard his most cordial support. A few days afterwards, the following telegram was forwarded from Opelika, Ala., to Mr. Davis:

"OPELIKA, ALA., Oct. 7th, 1864.

"To President DAVIS, Richmond:

"I have arranged, satisfactorily, matters between Governor Brown and General Cobb relating to exempts and State militia. Am now *en route* for Hood's front.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

From Milledgeville, General Beauregard had to travel *via* Macon, Columbus, Opelika, and Newnan, to get to General Hood's headquarters, as the latter had already left Palmetto to operate against the railroad from Atlanta to Marietta. The Opelika and Atlanta Railroad, from Fairburn to the latter place, was in the possession of the Federals, and Newnan was as near as General Beauregard could get with safety, as he had no escort with which to repel any hostile force he might meet on his way. He had stopped at Macon for a day to confer with General Cobb, whom he found, as ever, zealous and energetic, and who heard with joy how "oil had been poured on the troubled waters" surrounding Governor Brown.

From Macon, fearing that Colonel Harris, whose illness had been reported to him, might not recover, General Beauregard telegraphed General Hardee, recommending General Custis Lee, Colonel William Butler, or Colonel Alfred Rhett, as Commander of the First Subdistrict of South Carolina, in case of Colonel Harris's death. But, in the end, neither General Hardee nor General Jones removed the commander of that subdistrict. General Hardee was one of the finest corps commanders in the Confederate service; but, determined and intrepid as he was on the battlefield, he, like General Sam. Jones, was given to hesitation and procrastination when dealing with matters of importance in administration.

General Beauregard reached Newnan on the 7th of October, and left immediately, on horseback, for Cave Spring, about seventy miles distant, where he arrived on the evening of the 9th. There at last he had a conference with General Hood, who confirmed what President Davis had already said of his plan of operations. General Beauregard now came to the conclusion that the movement had been rather hastily undertaken, and without proper provisions being first made for the change of base. It was evident to him that the matter had not been sufficiently considered in its details, and that a great deal had been left to future determination, and even to luck. It was easy to discover in the details of the plan evidences of the fact that General Hood and Mr. Davis were not accustomed to command armies in the field, especially armies like ours, for the management of which much had to be foreseen, and much prepared or created.

Sadly impressed with what he had seen and heard, during his conference with General Hood, General Beauregard resolved to repair at once to Jacksonville, about thirty miles southwest of Cave Spring, and about twelve miles from the terminus of the Selma and Rome road. He was there on the 11th, and immediately telegraphed General Taylor to come to him without delay. General Beauregard had not yet assumed command, and had determined not to do so until he had seen and freely conferred with both of his Department Commanders.

Meanwhile, he directed supplies of all kinds to be sent to Jacksonville, as a new depot of distribution, and made a personal examination of the approaches to the place, with a view to erect there all necessary works for its protection. He ordered, in General Hood's name, that the Selma Railroad should be rapidly completed, from its terminus, Blue Mountain, to Jacksonville; and local officers found there, and still on sick leave, were appointed to fill, temporarily, all indispensable positions, not only at Jacksonville, but also along the new line of operations, so as to expedite the transfer of supplies for General Hood's army.*

On the 12th of October, three days after his conference with General Hood, he addressed a communication to General Cooper, giving a minute account of his interview at Cave Spring, stating

* See letters to General Hood, and to others, in Appendix.

what General Hood had done and what he proposed doing. The following passage of this document is submitted : *

"Not being sufficiently well acquainted with the nature of the country referred to, and not having yet assumed command of my new Department, I advised General Hood not to carry out his first project" (crossing to the north side of the Coosa River, twelve miles below Rome, which was occupied by one division of the enemy, and then crossing the Oostanawla), "unless confident of being able to recross the Oostanawla above Rome, before General Sherman could concentrate superior forces against him, or could endanger his communications. He readily consented to this suggestion.

"It was also determined that, as a success was necessary to keep up the present buoyant spirit of the Army of Tennessee, a battle should not be fought unless with positive advantage on our side of numbers and position, or unless the safety of the army required it.

"Under these circumstances, being still unprovided with a staff, baggage, and horses (which were left in Virginia when I was ordered to Charleston), and wishing to confer, before assuming command, with Lieutenant-General R. Taylor, relative to the condition of his Department and his ability to co-operate with General Hood in the present campaign; being desirous, moreover, of arranging matters necessarily connected with the change of base from Jonesboro', Georgia, to Jacksonville, Alabama, I repaired to this place (Jacksonville) for the object stated, hoping to be able to return to the front in time for a battle, should one occur; but, to be certain of doing so, I instructed General Hood to keep me advised of the movements of the enemy. I expect, nevertheless, to rejoin him in a few days. * * *

"I remain, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

On the same day, October 12th, General Hood demanded the unconditional surrender of Resaca, which was refused; and, not wishing to lose time or sacrifice his men, he passed on, to continue breaking up the railroad. This he did successfully, as appears by the following message:

"NINE MILES SOUTH OF LAFAYETTE, GA., Oct. 15th, 1864.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"The army struck the communication of the enemy, about a mile above Resaca, on the 12th instant, completely destroying the railroad, including the block-houses from that point to within a short distance of Tunnel Hill, and about four miles of the Cleveland Railroad, capturing Dalton and all intermediate garrisons, with their stores and equipments, and about one thousand prisoners.

"The main body of Sherman's army seems to be moving towards Dalton.

"JOHN B. HOOD."

* The whole of the letter will be found in Appendix.

CHAPTER XL.

General Beauregard Assumes Command of the Military Division of the West.

—The Departments Comprised in this Division.—Circular Addressed to that Section of the Confederacy.—Telegrams from Generals Roddy and Forrest.—General Beauregard Establishes a Base of Operations at Jacksonville.—Anecdote of a Young Soldier.—General Hood Resolves to Continue the Destruction of General Sherman's Communications, and to Cross the Tennessee River at Gunter'sville.—General Beauregard Approves the Plan, but Fears it will not be Successfully Executed.—General Hood Persists.—Reluctant Assent of General Beauregard.—Similarity between General Hood's Plan of Campaign and President Davis's.—General Beauregard's Communication to the War Department, October 24th.—Telegram to General Cooper.—General Hood Moves on October 22d.—Difficulties of Making Change of Base to Tusculum.—General Beauregard Leaves on October 24th, to Rejoin General Hood.—General Hood Changes his Line of March.—Failure to Seize Decatur.—General Hood again Alters his Plan.—His Army too Destitute of Provisions to Cross into Tennessee.—General Beauregard's Chagrin.—He Proposes Crossing the River with the Troops, and then leaving General Hood in sole Command.

ON the 17th of October General Beauregard assumed command of his new Department, and published the following order:

“HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 17th, 1864.

“General Orders, No. 1:

“In obedience to the orders of the President of the Confederate States I assume command, this day, of the Military Division of the West, east of the Mississippi River, comprising the Department of Tennessee and Georgia, commanded by General J. B. Hood, and the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, commanded by Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor. These officers will retain command of their respective Departments, issuing orders necessary for the proper discharge of their duties.

“In assuming command of this important Military Division I enjoin on all officers and soldiers harmony, zeal, implicit and prompt obedience to orders, and confidence in themselves and their commanders; and success will then surely crown their efforts to drive the enemy from our soil, and establish the independence of our country.

“The following are the officers of my personal and general Staff:

1st Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm.....	A. D. C.
1st Lieutenant A. N. Toutant.....	A. D. C.
Colonel George W. Brent.....	A. A. G.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Otey.....	A. A. G.
Major Henry Bryan.....	A. I. G.
Major J. B. Eustis.....	A. I. G.
Major-General M. L. Smith.....	Chief of Engineers.
Major Edward Willis.....	Chief Quartermaster.
Major F. Molloy.....	Chief Commissary.
Surgeon R. L. Brodie.....	Medical Director.
Surgeon Samuel Choppin.....	Medical Inspector.

"The Medical Director, Chief Quartermaster, and Chief Commissary will act only as inspectors of their respective Departments until further orders.

"All communications to the Headquarters of this Military Division will be addressed to this place until further notice.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.

"Official.

"GEO. W. BRENT, A. A. G."

The general outlines of the Military Division of the West were given in the preceding chapter, but it is necessary here to specify more minutely its precise limits. These are indicated and explained in the following orders forwarded from the War Department to General Beauregard:

"RICHMOND, VA., Oct. 3d, 1864.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"The Department of Tennessee and Georgia, under General Hood, includes all of the State of Georgia north and west of the following line: commencing at Augusta and running along the line of the Augusta and Savannah Railroad to Milton; thence along the western boundary-lines of the counties of Bullock and Tatnall; thence along the south bank of the Ocmulgee River to the northeast corner of Irwin County; thence south to the Florida line and to the Appalachicola River. All the territory west of this Department and the Appalachicola River, and east of the Mississippi River, forms the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, under Lieutenant-General Taylor. Special order has been this day issued placing you in command of both these Departments.

"S. COOPER, A. and I. G."

On the day on which General Beauregard assumed command (October 17th) he caused the following proclamation to be issued:

Circular.

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 17th, 1864.

"In assuming command, at this critical juncture, of the Military Division of the West I appeal to my countrymen, of all classes and sections, for their generous support and confidence.

"In assigning me to this responsible position the President of the Con-

federate States has extended to me the assurance of his earnest support; the executives of your States meet me with similar expressions of their devotion to our cause; the noble army in the field, composed of brave men and gallant officers, are no strangers to me, and I know that they will do all that patriots can achieve.

"The history of the past, written in the blood of their comrades, but fore-shadows the glorious future which lies before them. Inspired with these bright promises of success, I make this appeal to the men and women of my country to lend me the aid of their earnest and cordial co-operation. Unable to join in the bloody conflicts of the field, they can do much to strengthen our cause, fill up our ranks, encourage our soldiers, inspire confidence, dispel gloom, and hasten on the day of our final success and deliverance.

"The army of Sherman still defiantly holds the City of Atlanta: he can and must be driven from it. It is only for the good people of Georgia and surrounding States to speak the word, and the work is done.

"We have abundance of provisions, and there are men enough in the country liable and able for service to accomplish the result. To all such I earnestly appeal to report promptly to their respective commands, and let those who cannot go see to it that none remain at home who are able to strike a blow in this critical and decisive hour.

"To those soldiers of the army who are absent from their commands without leave I appeal, in the name of their brave comrades, with whom they have in the past so often shared the privations of the camp and the dangers of the battle-field, to report to their respective commands within the next thirty days; and an amnesty is hereby granted.

"My appeal is to every one, of all classes and conditions, to come forward freely, cheerfully, and with a good heart, to the work that lies before us. My countrymen! respond to this call as you have done in days that have passed, and, with the blessing of a kind and over-ruling Providence, the enemy shall be driven from your soil, the security of your wives and daughters from the insults and outrages of a brutal foe shall be established, soon to be followed by a permanent and honorable peace. The claims of home and country, wife and children, uniting with the demands of honor and patriotism, summon us to the field; we cannot, dare not, will not fail to respond.

"Full of hope and confidence, I come to join in your struggle, sharing your privations, and, with your brave and true men, to strike the blow that shall bring success to our arms, triumph to our cause, and peace to our country.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.

"Official.

"GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G."

The following despatch was received on the 18th of October from General P. D. Roddy, who was then at Courtland. It was dated on the 17th:

"No cavalry [enemy's] have passed Decatur. Scouts report but a small garrison at Decatur yesterday, and no force on the north side of the river,

from Florence up to Decatur. All other force is believed to be going towards Bridgeport."

Two days later the following telegram was received from General N. B. Forrest, dated Corinth, October 19th:

"I am moving to meet General Washburn, who is reported crossing five thousand troops at Clifton. If he crosses I will attack. If I can defeat him I can then cross and destroy N.W. Railroad to Nashville, and be in position as desired" [by General Taylor].

These two telegrams are important, as showing the reasons for General Hood's proposed future campaign into Middle Tennessee.

After completing all necessary arrangements for the establishment, at Jacksonville, of a good base for General Hood to operate from, General Beauregard, on the 19th of October, started to join the Army of Tennessee at Blue Pond, in a northeasterly direction, six miles beyond Centre, which is itself about thirty miles from Jacksonville. On his arrival there he ascertained from General Wheeler that General Hood and his army had retired to Gadsden, on the Coosa River, some twenty-seven miles to the westward. Wheeler reported Sherman's army not far from his front, and that he had been skirmishing that day with the Federal cavalry, supported by some infantry. General Beauregard was surprised that no intelligence of this retrograde movement had been sent to him. He began to fear that General Hood was disposed to be oblivious of those details which play an important part in the operations of a campaign, and upon which the question of success or failure often hinges. Leaving immediately for Gadsden, General Beauregard arrived there on the 21st, at 11 o'clock A. M.

On his way an incident occurred which was of no importance in itself, but which illustrates the tone and spirit animating the Confederate soldier, even at that late hour of our struggle. During the evening of the 20th, while General Beauregard was awaiting, at a cross-road store, the arrival of his staff-wagon, a young lad, wearing the Confederate uniform and carrying a light rifle-musket, stepped up to the fireplace to warm himself. General Beauregard was sitting close by, and, observing that the lad's shoes were very much worn, kindly said to him, "My young friend, you seem to be badly shod."

"Yes," was the reply, "we are, many of us, in that condition;

but let another fight come on with the Yankees, and we will all have new shoes."

Smiling at this curiously spirited answer, the General asked him how old he was.

"Seventeen, sir," he answered, "and I was at the battle of Manassas." Saying which he raised his cap and, showing a scar on the side of his head, added, "That's what I got there."

"What regiment do you belong to?" said the General; "and how is it you are so far behind it?"

"I belong now to the gallant 30th Louisiana," said the young veteran. "I had a chill this afternoon, and I lay down under a tree. I fell asleep there, and when I woke up the army had passed on."

Feeling now quite an interest in the young soldier, General Beauregard remarked, "I suppose you must be tired and hungry. I shall have something given you to eat, and take you in my wagon when it gets here."

"No, sir, thank you," was the sturdy answer. "I have already had something to eat, and will get more when I join my regiment. Good-night, sir." And away he went.

General Beauregard requested one of his aids to get the lad's name and tell him with whom he had been talking. His name was obtained, and inscribed in the officer's memorandum-book, but the book was lost during the course of the war.

At Gadsden, General Beauregard found General Hood more than ever resolved upon continuing the destruction of Sherman's railroad communication beyond the Tennessee River. His reasons for doing so were, that, as he had already caused Sherman, in so short a time to retrograde from Atlanta to Dalton, he believed that by crossing his army at Guntersville north of Gadsden, and continuing to tear up the railroad from Stevenson to Nashville—his cavalry, meanwhile, being sent to destroy the long bridge at Bridgeport—he would compel his adversary to follow him into Middle Tennessee, in order to protect his line of communication and his large supplies at Nashville.

The plan was no doubt bold, and likely to lead to great results, if carried out fearlessly and, above all, judiciously. But General Beauregard was apprehensive that General Hood might not be able to execute it as designed. According to his observation General Hood had already evinced want of experience as a com-

mander, though he had ever been a gallant and resolute subordinate officer. General Beauregard, therefore, expressed his solicitude as to the execution of the operation. Among other objections he urged the lack of time in which to prepare a new base of operations, either at Tusculumbia—near which the Memphis and Charleston Railroad was said to be in good condition—or at some point on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, north of Corinth, should our army be forced to cross the Tennessee, at Clifton or Savannah, to escape pursuit by Sherman with greatly superior forces.

General Hood argued that the two roads were in fair condition, and, if necessary, could be materially improved before he was likely to have need of them; that he would find ample supplies in Middle Tennessee, and, besides, would get those of the enemy. He said he would take his pontoon-train with him, and thus be enabled to cross the Tennessee at any point he thought advantageous, should he be compelled to retire his forces; and that, by means of the Beauregard torpedoes, protected by rifle guns behind strong parapets, he could always hold at bay the enemy's few "tinclad" gunboats long enough to allow him to recross the river, in case of emergency.

These details were minutely and earnestly discussed by the two generals during their long conference, which lasted far into the night. General Beauregard was not thoroughly convinced; but knowing that President Davis did not intend that he should supersede General Hood in the command of the Army of Tennessee, and that he would neither approve nor support his course if he should do so, he thought it wiser to yield and let General Hood have his own way. The plan was a good one in itself, but success depended upon the manner in which it should be carried out.

Another reason—which was not without weight with General Beauregard—for not opposing General Hood's idea was the assertion by the latter that his proposed movement, as now amended, had the sanction of General Bragg, at that time the President's military adviser.

In reality—and though different in many minor details—the movement now about to be made closely resembled, and almost formed part of, the system of operations and general plan of campaign devised by President Davis himself, when he visited

General Hood in the latter part of September. On page 565, vol. ii., of Mr. Davis's work we read as follows :

"With a view to judge better the situation, and then determine, after personal inspection, the course which should seem best to pursue, I visited General Hood's headquarters at Palmetto. The crisis was grave. It was not to be expected that General Sherman would remain long inactive. * * * To rescue Georgia, save the Gulf States, and retain possession of the lines of communication upon which we depended for the supplies of our armies in the field, an effort to arrest the further progress of the enemy was necessary; and to this end the railroads in his rear must be effectually torn up, the great railroad bridge over the Tennessee River at Bridgeport destroyed, and the communication between Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Nashville completely cut off. Could this be accomplished, all the fruits of Sherman's successful campaign in Georgia would be blighted, his capture of Atlanta would become a barren victory, and he would probably be compelled to make a retreat towards Tennessee, at every mile of which he might be harassed by our army."

Mr. Davis had, of course, said all this to General Hood, and had, in substance, repeated every word of it to General Beauregard. In thus insisting upon carrying out his new movement General Hood knew that he was putting into execution part of Mr. Davis's own plan; and, in not opposing that plan, General Beauregard knew that he was in nowise disregarding Mr. Davis's views, still less disobeying his general instructions.

Three days after this second modification of General Hood's movement General Beauregard made it a point to send a communication on the subject to the War Department. He had followed the same course, about twelve days before, with reference to the alteration General Hood had made in his plan, on the 9th of October, previous to General Beauregard's meeting him at Cave Spring. Thus apprised in season, the War Department could have objected, or proposed any change it deemed advisable; and General Beauregard's main object was to afford this opportunity to the Administration at Richmond.

Following is the communication alluded to :

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST.

IN THE FIELD, GADSDEN, ALA., Oct. 24th, 1864.

"General SAMUEL COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., C. S. A., Richmond, Va. :

"General,—I shall leave to-day, about 12 M., to join General Hood, who is *en route* to the vicinity of Guntersville, on the Tennessee River. At what

time and place the army will cross future events will determine.* The army of General Sherman is on the road between Dalton and Gadsden, and his advance forces are about fifteen miles distant from Gadsden.

"In view of the present movement, a change of base has become necessary, and orders have accordingly been issued, transferring it from Jacksonville to Tuscumbia, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. To secure our lines of communication and an uninterrupted source of supplies, Lieutenant-General Taylor has been directed to place in complete running order the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston railroads, from Corinth to Tuscumbia, and that all supplies and troops for the army be sent by that route. He has been directed to garrison Corinth and Bear Creek bridge, and protect the important points along these lines by block-houses and field-works, with one or more companies of infantry at each. Post officers have been assigned at Tuscumbia, and it has been suggested to General Taylor to assign Brigadier-General Adams, now at Talladega, to command at Corinth. Major-General Forrest, as soon as he has executed his instructions in the destruction of the Northwestern Railroad, from Nashville to the Tennessee, has been ordered to report immediately to General Hood, in Middle Tennessee.

"General Taylor has likewise been instructed to confer with their Excellencies Governors Clark (of Mississippi) and Watts (of Alabama), in order to obtain such State troops and militia as may be necessary to secure and protect the important points along our railroad communications. The railroad from Memphis to Corinth will be destroyed, and the iron removed, for the purpose of supplying our wants elsewhere. The road to Jacksonville will also be completed, but the rolling-stock will be gradually reduced to the amount used thereon prior to the present movement from Jonesboro', and transferred to such roads as may require it for the exigencies of the army.

"Major-General M. L. Smith, Chief-Engineer, has been instructed to confer with General Taylor, for the purpose of securing our railroad lines, by the proper field-works on the Tennessee River, between Eastport and Florence, as will guard it against navigation by the enemy. To make this the more effectual torpedoes will be placed at proper points. These batteries, armed with 20 and 30 pounder Parrott and rifled guns, will protect the torpedoes and effectually obstruct the passage of gunboats. The guns will be protected by strong and heavy traverses.

"Every precaution possible has been taken to cover our lines of communications and render successful the great object of this campaign.

"The chiefs of the quartermaster and commissary departments have been instructed to take all necessary and proper measures to send stores and supplies to the points above indicated, and co-operate in the movement.

"I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter addressed to General Hood, suggesting the propriety of General Cheatham issuing an address to the citizens of Tennessee, on entering that State, setting forth that he comes to that State with his corps and that of Major-General Forrest to aid in their redemption, and calling upon them to co-operate with him in the destruction of the

* Guntersville had been the point designated.

enemy's lines of communication, while the main body of the army is engaged in destroying his lines between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The object of such an address will be to arouse the people of that State and distract the enemy as to our intent and aims.*

"My headquarters for the reception and appropriate distribution of papers has been transferred to Oxford, Ala., near Blue Mountain, from which point a line of couriers will connect with the army.

"Our movements after crossing the Tennessee will be determined by those of the enemy.

"I trust, General, that we will shortly be able to communicate to you and the country such tidings as will redound to the honor of our arms and the success of our cause.

"I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

Before this was written and forwarded the following telegram was sent to Richmond:

"GADSDEN, ALA., *Oct. 22d*, 1864: 5 P. M.

"General S. COOPER, A. and I. G., Richmond, Va.:

"Army of Tennessee arrived here yesterday, and left to-day for vicinity of Guntersville. Circumstances will determine when and where it will cross Tennessee River. The position of Sherman's army is not definitely known. His advance forces are eighteen miles from here, on road to Dalton.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

It must be borne in mind that, when General Hood left General Beauregard at Gadsden, it was understood that he would cross the Tennessee River at Guntersville, or its immediate vicinity, to continue the destruction of Sherman's railroad communications; and that Hood's cavalry was also to destroy the bridge on the Chattanooga road, at Bridgeport.

No sooner had General Beauregard yielded his assent to the plan, so exhaustively explained in the foregoing document, than General Hood completed his arrangements to move his army. It began marching on the morning of the 22d. General Beauregard, who had instructed Lieut.-General Taylor and the chiefs of the quartermaster's and commissary's departments to meet him at Gadsden, remained there to confer about the necessary preparations to carry out the new change of base to Tusculum. The pontoon-bridge across the Coosa, forgotten in the hurry of departure, was, by order of General Beauregard, removed, and sent at once to General Hood.

* See Appendix.

General Beauregard was not long in discovering that this change of base was more difficult to make than the change from Jonesboro' to Jacksonville had been; for the Mobile and Ohio road, from Okalona to Corinth, contrary to General Hood's statement, was in a very dilapidated condition. So was the road from Corinth to Cherokee, near Tuscumbia. For a long period it had been but little used, and meantime it had been greatly injured by both armies.

On the 22d General Beauregard instructed Lieut.-General Taylor to order General Forrest's division and Roddy's brigade of cavalry to report to General Hood, between Guntersville and Decatur.* Forrest was then about Jackson, Tenn., and Roddy at or about Tuscaloosa, guarding the Tennessee River from Eastport, on the left, to the eastward beyond Guntersville. On the 23d he addressed a communication to Lieut.-General Taylor, relative to the new change of base to Tuscumbia, and what he desired him to do in that connection.†

Having now completed all his orders and instructions, General Beauregard, on the 24th, started to rejoin General Hood's army, which he supposed to be then crossing the Tennessee River, at or near Guntersville. On his way thither he stopped at the home of the young heroine Miss Emma Sanson, who within that year had intrepidly piloted General Forrest during his pursuit of General Grierson's raiding expedition through North Alabama. This young woman had received a unanimous vote of thanks and a grant of public lands from the General Assembly of the State of Alabama. She was absent at the time of General Beauregard's visit, and he missed seeing her.

When he had gone nearly two-thirds of the distance to Guntersville, to his surprise and disappointment, he was informed that General Hood had turned off to the left, on the road to Decatur, some fifty miles westward, again neglecting to report the important change in his programme, despite General Beauregard's impressive remarks to him at Gadsden, on the occasion of his former omission of a like nature. When he finally joined General Hood, on the 27th, at Decatur, which was then being invested by the Army of Tennessee, General Beauregard cautioned him anew, in a more pointed manner, against the irregularity of his official

* See letter to General Taylor, in Appendix.

† Ibid.

proceedings, and openly expressed his regret that Hood had gone so far down the river to effect a crossing—a movement which would increase the distance to Stevenson by nearly one hundred miles, and give Sherman more time to oppose the march in force.

General Hood said that he had understood, when half-way to Guntersville, that the crossing at that point was strongly guarded by the Federals, and that there was no crossing-point below nearer than Decatur, which he thought he could take without serious loss. General Beauregard was of opinion that the capture of Decatur should have been accomplished by a *coup de main* at daybreak, for the enemy, now aware of General Hood's presence and intention, would be prepared to meet and resist him.

The reconnoissances that day showed that the place was too strong and too well garrisoned to be assaulted; and, again changing his plan, General Hood now resolved to attempt a crossing below Decatur, half-way to Courtland, where, he had been informed, he would find a favorable point of passage.

On the afternoon of the 28th the Engineers reported no favorable point nearer than Courtland, some twenty miles to the west. The army, therefore, left, on the 29th, for that town, which was about seventy miles distant from Guntersville. Already four or five days had been lost. Upon arriving there the Engineers, who had been sent on ahead of the troops, reported that a crossing could be effected, but not without difficulty.

At this moment, when General Beauregard hoped that the long-expected movement would at last be begun, General Hood informed him that he feared he had not provisions enough left to go into Middle Tennessee with; that many of his men were again shoeless, or nearly so, and that it would be very imprudent to commence a new campaign in that lame condition. He said he would, therefore, prefer going on to Tuscumbia, twenty miles farther west, where, from all reports, there was a good crossing-place, only ten or twelve miles from Cherokee, the terminus of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Over that railroad he could get all necessary supplies in a few days. It would be impossible to express General Beauregard's chagrin at such an outlook. He began to fear that the army would never reach Middle Tennessee, and so informed General Hood, who could no longer conceal the fact that he also looked at his enterprise rather despondingly. At Tuscumbia the army would be about ninety miles from Gun-

tersville, a distance which it would be necessary to double in order to get back to that point, making it, in all, one hundred and eighty miles.

It was now too late to change General Hood's plan, and the wisest policy was to make the best of it. General Beauregard, therefore, offered no opposition, but strongly advised that everything should be hurried forward with the greatest expedition; and that, instead of marching to the eastward after crossing the river, the army should begin a campaign in Middle Tennessee, there to capture or destroy the scattered detached forces of the enemy, while most of our cavalry should be sent to tear up the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, commencing at Bridgeport, or as near that place as practicable; that meanwhile General Hood with his army should endeavor to reach Nashville with the least possible delay, and capture its garrison, under General Thomas, with the large supplies there collected for his forces and those of General Sherman. Such an active campaign, if commenced at once, would compel the latter to return immediately into Middle Tennessee to defend his line of communication. General Hood readily concurred in those views, and expressed his conviction that he could carry them out successfully.*

Fortunately, before leaving Gadsden, on the 24th, General Beauregard had given all necessary orders for the repairing of the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston railroads, and had directed that all available railroad stock should be transferred to them. General Taylor had promised to give the matter his special attention, and to turn in that direction all the supplies then moving towards Jacksonville, Ala. Thus, General Beauregard hoped to see the Army of Tennessee resupplied and in a fair way to carry out the campaign planned for it. He proposed crossing the river with the troops, and then leaving General Hood in sole command, for he remembered the words of Napoleon when the Directory, in 1796, offered to send him a general of greater experience, to assist him in the campaign of Italy: "One bad head in command of an army in the field is always better than two good ones."

* See General Beauregard's letter to General Cooper, November 6th, 1864, to be found in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XLI.

Arrival of General Hood's Army at Tuscumbia, October 30th.—General Beauregard Requests a Summary of his Plans of Future Operations.—Request not Complied with.—General Beauregard Inspects the Banks of Tennessee River.—Advises an Address to the People of Tennessee.—Heavy Rains Begin on the 2d of November.—General Hood takes up his Headquarters at Florence on the 10th.—Telegrams to the War Department.—Telegram of General Forrest.—Letter of General Beauregard to General Cooper.—Advice to General Hood Concerning the Disorderly Conduct of Scouts.—Despatch from General Taylor.—Further Advance of the Enemy.—Procrastination of General Hood.—He Declines to send Cavalry to Support General Wheeler.—General Beauregard Urges him to Greater Activity.—General Beauregard Leaves Tuscumbia for Corinth.—Again Urges an Immediate Advance.—Leaves Corinth for Macon.—General Hood Moves on the 21st of November.—The Enemy Falls Back.—Attack of his Works in Front of Franklin.—Our Loss Severe.—Letter to General Beauregard from President Davis.—Comments upon it.—General Beauregard Leaves for Augusta.—His Letter of December 6th to the President.—Inadmissibility of the Plea that Mr. Davis Lacked Timely Notice of General Hood's Proposed Movements.

The army reached Tuscumbia on the afternoon of the 30th of October, and on that day General Hood received the following communication :

“HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, *October 30th*, 1864.

“*General*,—General Beauregard desires that you will forward him, for the information of the War Department, a brief summary of the operations of your army from the date of its departure from Jonesboro', Ga., to the present time; also a concise statement of your plans of future operations, intended for the same office.

“I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

“GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

“General J. B. Hood, Comdg., etc., etc.”

For reasons which cannot be explained this request was not readily complied with.

On the 31st of the same month General Beauregard inspected the banks of the Tennessee, to select suitable positions for the erection of field-works for the protection of the troops while crossing at that point, intending also to fortify the opposite bank.

to facilitate a recrossing, should one become necessary; and, with a view to stimulate the enthusiasm of the people of that part of Tennessee which was about to be occupied by the army, he made the following suggestion to General Hood:

“HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, *October 31st, 1864.*”

“*General*,—General Beauregard directs me to ask your attention to the propriety of your publishing an address to the people of Tennessee on entering that State.

“One coming from you, as commander of the army, and one from Governor Harris, he regards as highly important.

“Respectfully, your obedient servant,

“GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

“General J. B. HOOD, Comdg., etc., etc.”

Meanwhile the pontoon-bridge was commenced; it was completed on the 2d of November. General Steven D. Lee's corps was then thrown across the river, and immediately started some defensive lines around Florence. These were inspected, on the 5th, by General Beauregard, who materially modified all that part of them which was commanded by a height in front. Two divisions of General S. D. Lee's corps were now advanced on Shoal Creek, about seven or eight miles north of Florence.

Unfortunately, heavy rains began on the 2d, and lasted for many days. The river rose rapidly, and the roads became impassable. Part of the bridge being submerged, Cheatham's corps, which was to have crossed shortly after Lee's, was unavoidably delayed.

General Hood moved his headquarters to Florence on the 10th of November, preparatory to taking the offensive. On the 31st of the preceding month (October) he had sent this despatch to the Secretary of War:

“Florence is in our possession, and the pontoon-bridge is being laid down. I hope to be able to advance across the river so soon as supplies can be obtained.”

On the same day General Beauregard had sent General Cooper a corresponding telegram, in the following words:

“TUSCUMBIA, ALA., *November 3d, 1864: 9 A. M.*

“General S. COOPER, Adjt.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

“Part of the army occupied Florence, but want of supplies and bad weather have delayed forward movement, which will be resumed as soon as practicable.

“G. T. BEAUREGARD.”

On the same day General Forrest, telegraphing *via* Paris, West Tennessee, and Corinth, Miss., forwarded to General Beauregard a despatch, thus describing the result of his encounter with the enemy:

"My batteries, on the Tennessee River, have engaged the enemy all day with great success. Two gunboats and two transports were destroyed in attempting to pass. One gunboat and two transports are now in my possession, ready for use; but the other gunboat and transport floated down the river in a disabled condition, and both will be either destroyed or captured, as my troops are still in pursuit. There is one gunboat and three transports still above my batteries, all of which will be destroyed or captured."

To this General Beauregard immediately replied, as follows:

"TUSCUMBIA, *November 3d, 1864: 2 P. M.*

"General N. B. FORREST:

"I congratulate you on your brilliant success. We hold Florence as a base to operate, in three or four days,* towards Lawrenceburg or Waynesboro'. Meet the army soon as possible in direction of either place, making first a demonstration towards Columbia, if practicable, to distract the enemy, now supposed marching from Nashville and Chattanooga. Send up river to Florence, if possible, all surplus captured supplies."

This was addressed to General Forrest at Johnsonville, Tenn., *via* Corinth and Jackson, Tenn., by couriers, and shows what were General Beauregard's expectations on the 3d of November.

His letter to General Cooper, dated November 6th, is more explicit, and gives a full and correct statement of the amended plan of operations adopted on the 3d, after thorough discussion of the subject by Generals Beauregard and Hood. The reader will, no doubt, peruse it with interest:

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, *November 6th, 1864.*

"*General*,—I have the honor to enclose for the information of the War Office copy of a communication addressed to General J. B. Hood, on the 30th ultimo, asking a summary of the operations of his army from Jonesboro', Ga., to that date, and for a statement of his plan of future operations for the authorities at Richmond, accompanied by his reply, on the 3d instant, enclosing copies of his telegrams to the Government during the period referred to. I renewed my request on the 4th instant for his plan, and on the same day received a reply, stating that 'it was not possible for him to furnish

* General Beauregard thought the movement would begin on the 7th at latest.

any plan of future operations, as so much depended on the movements of the enemy; the matter having been fully discussed between General Beauregard and himself.' I forward copies of three letters and their several enclosures.

"The plan referred to, which was discussed and approved on the 3d, subject to such modifications as the movements of the enemy might determine, was to move as soon as possible from Florence into Middle Tennessee, towards Lawrenceburg, thence to Pulaski or Columbia, as circumstances might indicate. General Forrest, with his command, was ordered to form a junction with the Army of Tennessee, in the direction of Lawrenceburg or Waynesboro', first, however, making a demonstration towards Columbia, to distract the enemy, then reported to be advancing towards Pulaski and Rogersville from Nashville and Chattanooga.

"Brigadier-General Jackson, with two brigades of his cavalry and one of Wheeler's, was to cover and support the right flank of the army, while Brigadier-General Roddy, with his command, was to cover the line of communication from Tusculum to Corinth, and thence towards Meridian.

"Major-General Wheeler, with his command, was to guard the country from Jackson's right to Atlanta.

"The portable pontoon-bridge which has been thrown across the Tennessee at Florence will move with the army, and will be replaced as soon as practicable by a permanent pontoon-bridge at the most suitable point for that object.

"Proper defensive works are now being constructed at Florence, by Lee's corps, for the protection of the bridge, and to secure the recrossing of the army, in the event of disaster.

"Various points along the river, from Florence down, are being examined for the purpose of selecting proper sites for batteries, and strengthened by torpedoes in the river, to prevent the passage of the enemy's gunboats and transports.

"Points below Eastport, where the army may recross in case of necessity, have been ordered to be examined and chosen, the roads to be repaired, and the necessary defensive works constructed. The attention of Major-General Smith, Chief-Engineer, has been specially directed to Savannah, Clifton, and Decatur, Tenn., as points well suited for the purposes indicated.

"In the mean time minute and careful investigations have been made as to the condition of the roads in Middle Tennessee, and also of those districts best able to furnish supplies of provisions and forage for the army.

"It is now contemplated that the army will cross the river and take up its line of march on the 9th instant, with fifteen days' rations. Lee's corps is now on the north side of the river, in front of Florence, two divisions being encamped on Shoal Creek, six or seven miles from that town.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.

"General S. COOPER, A. and I.-Genl., Richmond, Va."

Careful instructions were given, on the 9th, to Major-General M. L. Smith, Chief-Engineer, by General Beauregard as to the

proper mode of protecting the Tennessee River against any attempted passage of the enemy's gunboats.*

The day following he addressed a letter to General Hood, advising him to regulate, by specific orders, the system of scouting then in practice by the commands of Generals Wheeler, Roddy, and Forrest, in rear of the front line of the army, and suggested that cavalry scouts should be furnished with all necessary supplies, thus preventing the depredations on private property much complained of at the time, and so ruinous to discipline and order.†

These instructions, and others verbally given, appeared to produce an unfortunate effect upon General Hood, who began to chafe under the supervision exercised over him by General Beauregard, and to fear his superior influence with the army. That supervision would have been much greater and more direct had General Beauregard not perceived this growing sensitiveness, and had he not also been thoroughly aware that any open interference on his part would bring upon him the censure of the War Department.‡

His letters of November 12th, through his Chief of Staff, and of November 15th, written by himself, show what caution and considerateness he used towards the Commander of the army, and how far from his thought it was to overshadow him in any way.§ But, in his opinion, General Hood's preparations for the offensive were so slow and hesitating as to jeopardize the object of the campaign; and he therefore, in all his interviews with General Hood, urged the necessity of an immediate advance and greater rapidity in the movements of the troops. His intention, as he distinctly stated, was not to remain with or accompany the army, but merely to see it safely across the Tennessee and on the move forward. For it must be remembered that other important matters claimed his attention, in General Taylor's Department, along the Mississippi River, where the enemy appeared to be moving his forces towards Memphis and Paducah. An early attack on Corinth was

* See General Beauregard's letter, in Appendix.

† See letter to General Hood by Colonel G. W. Brent, A. A. G., in Appendix.

‡ President Davis had authorized General Hood, should he deem it necessary, to communicate directly with the War Department. See Chapter XXXIX.

§ See Appendix. See also, in Appendix, General Hood's letter of November 12th, complaining of interference on the part of General Beauregard.

also to be feared, as was a concentration in Middle Tennessee against General Hood's offensive advance.

From Selma, on the 15th, General Taylor forwarded him the following telegram :

"Following just received, dated Jonesboro', Ga., November 14th : 'Scouts and prisoners report enemy destroying railroad between Atlanta and Marietta. Prisoners report Sherman in Atlanta, and that camp rumor says he will move towards Mobile or Savannah. Prisoners also report 15th and 20th Corps at Atlanta. Large fires observed in Atlanta for last three days.'"

On the 16th General Wheeler, through General Taylor, forwarded the following telegram :

"SELMA, 16th, *via* MERIDIAN.

"To General BEAUREGARD :

"Will send Major-General Gardner to Corinth soon as possible. Following just received, dated Jonesboro', 15th : 'Enemy advanced early this morning, with infantry, cavalry, artillery, and wagon-train. Have driven our cavalry back upon this place. Strength not yet ascertained.' Enemy have burned many houses in Rome, Marietta, and Atlanta ; also burned railroad and railroad bridges over Chattahoochee."

It now became evident that the inactivity of the Commander of the Army of Tennessee, after his arrival at Tusculumbia, on October 30th, had given Sherman ample time to repair the damage done to the railroad from Atlanta to Chattanooga. He had been able to send back to that fortified place all his sick and wounded, as well as his surplus guns ; and to draw from Nashville and elsewhere the supplies of provisions, ammunition, wagons, and horses required by him for his movement to the Atlantic coast.

Jackson's division of cavalry being urgently needed to co-operate with and support General Wheeler's forces, General Beauregard now requested General Hood to send it without delay.* By telegraph, on the 17th, Hood replied as follows :

"To General BEAUREGARD :

"To send Jackson's division at this time would materially endanger the success of the operation of this army. J. B. Hood, General."

This refusal General Beauregard thought ill-timed, for the army was still motionless at Florence, and its immediate safety could hardly depend upon the presence of Jackson's cavalry. Sherman had left Atlanta on the 15th, and news of his march,

* See telegram and letter of Colonel Brent, A. A. G., in Appendix.

in two columns, one on the Jonesboro' road, the other on the McDonough road, was being received from various quarters—through General Cobb as well as through General Wheeler. General Hood was aware of it, but could not be persuaded to comply, just then, with General Beauregard's request, nor did he appear anxious to make a forward movement, as is shown by his telegram of that date:

“FLORENCE, *Nov. 17th*, 1864.

“To General BEAUREGARD:

“I have now seven days' rations on hand, and need thirteen days' additional. Please use every effort to have these supplies pressed forward.

“J. B. HOOD, General.”

Realizing the fact that nothing could be gained—while much might be lost—by further procrastination, and wishing to spur on General Hood to definitive action, General Beauregard, on the same day, sent him the following letter:

“HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, *November 17th*, 1864.

“*General*,—General Beauregard directs me to say that he desires you will take the offensive at the earliest practicable moment, and deal the enemy rapid and vigorous blows, striking him while thus dispersed, and by this means distract Sherman's advance in Georgia.

“To relieve you from any embarrassment, while operating in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, he authorizes you to issue all such orders, in General Taylor's Department, you may deem necessary to secure the efficient and successful administration and operation of your army, sending to Lieutenant-General Taylor, or whoever may be in command, copies of all such orders.

“He wishes you to send forthwith to Major-General Wheeler one brigade of cavalry of Jackson's division and the balance of that division as soon as it can be spared, should Sherman advance into Georgia; and also to advise General Wheeler that, in such a case, Clanton's brigade is subject to his orders.

“These Headquarters will be removed in the morning from this place to Montgomery, Alabama.

“Respectfully, your obedient servant,

“GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

“General J. B. Hood, Comdg., etc., etc.”

Unable to await any longer the tardy preparations of General Hood for the offensive, General Beauregard left Tuscumbia on the 17th for Corinth, and reached the latter place on the next day. On his arrival there he forwarded various telegrams to the War Department, to Generals Hood, Taylor, Cobb, and

Wheeler, and lost no time in giving all necessary orders for proper defensive works and the collection there of as strong a garrison as could be had. He also gave most minute instructions for the prosecution of the road to Tusculumbia, and repairs of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, as far as needed, towards Meridian.

While at Corinth alarming telegrams from Generals Hardee, Taylor, Cobb, and Wheeler were received by him relative to Sherman's advance on Macon. He determined to leave at once for that locality, and telegraphed General Hood to take the offensive at once, in order to destroy or capture the Federal forces in Middle Tennessee, and compel Sherman to return to Kentucky, even should he have already reached the coast.

General Beauregard arrived at Macon on the 24th, after many annoying delays at Meridian, Demopolis, Selma, and Montgomery, and had a long and important conference with Generals Cobb and Taylor. The latter had been ordered to Macon, to assist Generals Cobb and Hardee in the defence of Georgia. He was an officer of acknowledged merit, though not educated as a soldier, and could be relied upon whenever judgment and firmness were requisite. General Hardee, who appreciated these qualities in General Taylor, had urgently solicited his presence at Savannah, to aid in preparing for Sherman's threatened approach. General Beauregard decided upon sending him at once, and soon afterwards forwarded some important communications to General Hardee concerning Sherman's movements, and what could best be done to anticipate them.*

At last, on the 21st of November, General Hood, being ready to march, started on his offensive campaign into Eastern Tennessee, which was destined not to be of long duration.

On his approach the enemy retired from Columbia, where an abundance of supplies was found; and on the 30th our forces, having arrived in front of Franklin, made a vigorous attack, at 4 P. M. on that day, and drove the enemy from his outer line of temporary works to his inner works, which he abandoned during the night, leaving his killed and wounded in our possession. He retreated rapidly towards Nashville, our cavalry still pursuing. It was then that General Cheatham failed to attack the enemy

* See, in Appendix, General Beauregard's order to Lieutenant-General R. Taylor, and letters of November 27th and 29th to General Hardee.

in flank, while he was filing away on his front, thus disregarding the orders given him by General Hood and frustrating his plan. Our loss was severe, many of our best officers being among the killed and wounded. There fell Major-General Cleburne and Brigadier-Generals John Adams, Gist, Strahl, and Grandberry. Among the wounded were Major-General John Brown and Brigadier-Generals Canty, Manigault, Quarles, Cockerell, and Scott. Our aggregate loss amounted to 4500.* It was a hard-fought battle, but, withal, a barren Confederate victory.

On the 30th of November, in response to his telegram of the 24th, General Beauregard received the following letter from President Davis:

"RICHMOND, Nov. 30th, 1864.

"General BEAUREGARD, care of Colonel Wm. Brown:

"Yours of the 24th received. It is probable that the enemy, if short of supplies, may move directly for the coast. When that is made manifest you will be able to concentrate your forces upon the one object, and I hope, if you cannot defeat his attempt, that you may reduce his army to such condition as to be ineffective for further operations. Until Hood reaches the country proper of the enemy he can scarcely change the plans for Sherman's or Grant's campaigns. They would, I think, regard the occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky as of minor importance.

JEFFERSON DAVIS."

This letter reached General Beauregard on or about the 4th of December, on his way from Macon to Augusta, where he arrived on the 6th of December, at 6 P. M., after an uninterrupted and fatiguing journey, from Montgomery, Macon, Milledgeville, Sparta, and Mayfield. He had thus retraced his steps and abandoned his intention of visiting Mobile, then seriously threatened, because of the reception, on December 2d, of a despatch from Richmond extending his Department to the Atlantic coast.

It will be seen by the foregoing communication from the President that, far from disapproving General Hood's tardy and persistent effort to march into Tennessee and Kentucky, he was of opinion that nothing effective could be accomplished "until Hood reaches the country proper of the enemy." Does this indicate opposition to the plan adopted? On the contrary: Let Hood go on, let him reach, as soon as he can, "the country proper of the

* See General Hood's telegram to General Beauregard, in Appendix. See also his report.

enemy;" then will he compel Sherman to retrace his steps and abandon his march into Georgia. Such is the only interpretation to be given to Mr. Davis's letter.

The President's despatch of November 7th to General Hood, quoted by the latter in his book,* as showing opposition to the campaign into Tennessee, is not more explicit and defined. In neither does Mr. Davis do more than set forth surmises and suppositions. In neither does he state any positive objection, or advise any positive course of action. Had he shown open opposition to the campaign, it is needless to say that General Hood could not and would not have undertaken it, nor, under such circumstances, would General Beauregard have given it his assent.

From all points of the vast Department over which General Beauregard now had command came despatches and communications and urgent calls for advice and assistance. Despondency and confusion were gradually taking possession of the public mind and gaining upon the commanders of the various menaced points in that part of the Confederacy. All that personal energy and unremitting attention could accomplish was done by General Beauregard to respond to the unceasing calls upon him. He neglected none, and, in all his answers and counsels, endeavored to instil that hope and confidence in our success which he himself, perhaps, no longer entertained. During his short stay at Augusta he met General Bragg, who had just arrived, and held with him a long conference in relation to the condition of affairs in General Hardee's Department. General Bragg promised heartily to co-operate with him, but failed to do so when the occasion arose.

Before leaving Augusta to repair to Charleston, on his way to Savannah, General Beauregard wrote the following letter to President Davis:

" AUGUSTA, GA., Dec. 6th, 1864.

"To his Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, President of the Confederate States:

"Sir,—Your letter of the 30th, acknowledging the receipt of my telegram of the 24th of November, was received by me on the road from Macon to this place.

"With the limited reliable means at our command I believe that all that could be has been done, under existing circumstances, to oppose the advance of Sherman's forces towards the Atlantic coast. That we have not, thus far,

* "Advance and Retreat," p. 273. The telegram referred to will be found in the Appendix.

been more successful, none can regret more than myself, but he will doubtless be prevented from capturing Augusta, Charleston, and Savannah, and he may yet be made to experience serious loss before reaching the coast. On the 16th of November, when about leaving Tuscumbia, Ala., on a tour of inspection to Corinth, Miss., I was informed by General Hood of the report just received by him, that Sherman would probably move from Atlanta into Georgia. I instructed him at once to repeat his orders to General Wheeler to watch closely Sherman's movements, and, should he move, as reported, to attack and harass him at all favorable points.

"I telegraphed to Lieutenant-General Taylor, at Selma, Ala., to call on Governor Watts, of Alabama, and Governor Clarke, of Mississippi, for all the State troops that they could furnish, and, with all the available movable forces of his Department, to keep himself in readiness to move at a moment's notice to the assistance of Major-General Howell Cobb and Major-General G. W. Smith, who were then at or about Griffin, Ga., threatening Atlanta.

"I also telegraphed to General Cobb to call upon Governor Brown, of Georgia, and Governor Bonham, of South Carolina, for all the State troops that could be collected.

"I made all necessary preparations to repair forthwith to Georgia, in the event of Sherman's executing his reported movement.

"On my arrival at Corinth, on the 18th of November, having been informed that Sherman had commenced his movement, I issued all necessary orders to meet the emergency, including an order to General Hood to send one division of cavalry (Jackson's) to reinforce Wheeler; but this order was suspended by him, his objection being that his cavalry could not be reduced without endangering the success of his campaign in Tennessee, and that General Wheeler already had thirteen brigades under his command. I finally instructed him to send only one brigade, if he contemplated taking the offensive at once, as already had been decided upon. I then left Corinth for Macon, where I arrived on the 24th of November.

"I did not countermand the campaign into Tennessee to pursue Sherman with Hood's army for the following reasons:

"1st. The roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa rivers, across Sand and Lookout mountains, had been, by the prevailing heavy rains, rendered almost impassable to artillery and wagon-trains.

"2d. General Sherman, with an army better appointed, had already the start of about two hundred and seventy-five miles, on comparatively good roads. The transfer of Hood's army into Georgia could not have been more expeditious by railway than by marching through the country, on account of the delays unavoidably resulting from the condition of the railroads.

"3d. To pursue Sherman the passage of the Army of Tennessee would necessarily have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a devastated country, affording no subsistence or forage, and, moreover, it was feared that a retrograde movement on our part would seriously deplete the army by desertions.

"4th. To have sent off the most or the whole of the Army of Tennessee in pursuit of Sherman would have opened to Thomas's forces the richest

portion of the State of Alabama, and would have made nearly certain the capture of Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.

"5th. In October last, when passing through Georgia to assume command of the Military Division of the West, I was informed by Governor Brown that he could probably raise, in case of necessity, about six thousand men, which, I supposed, might be doubled in a levy *en masse*.

"General Cobb informed me at the same time that at Augusta, Macon, and Columbus he had about six thousand five hundred local troops, and that he hoped shortly to have collected at his reserve and convalescent camps, near Macon, two thousand five hundred more. Of these nine thousand men he supposed about one-half, or five thousand, could be made available as movable troops for an emergency.

"To oppose the advance of the enemy from Atlanta the State of Georgia would thus have probably seventeen thousand men, to which number must be added the thirteen brigades of Wheeler's cavalry, amounting to about seven thousand men. The troops which could have been collected from Savannah, South Carolina, and North Carolina, before Sherman's forces could reach the Atlantic coast, would have amounted, it was supposed, to about five thousand men.

"Thus, it was a reasonable supposition that about twenty-nine or thirty thousand men could be collected in time to defend the State of Georgia, and insure the destruction of Sherman's army, estimated by me at about thirty-six thousand effectives of all arms, their cavalry, about four thousand strong, being included in this estimate.

"Under these circumstances, after consultation with General Hood, I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas's army and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him he would compel Sherman, should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the defence of Kentucky, and perhaps Ohio, and thus prevent him from reinforcing Grant. Meanwhile, supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee, thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its limited resources.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

Thus was the President kept well advised, not only of the main movements of our forces, but of the reasons for them. General Beauregard thought it incumbent upon himself to do so, and, from the moment he assumed command of the almost boundless Department placed under him to the day he was relieved of it, never did he, in a single instance, fail to inform Mr. Davis, or the War Department, of every new phase of the military situation in that part of the country. Mr. Davis therefore gives an erroneous impression in his book, when he leads the reader to believe that he was unaware of General Hood's "*change of plan*," and did not oppose it, because when notified of the same "*it was too late to*

regain the space and time which had been lost."* It may have been "too late" on the 30th of November; but was it "too late" on the 12th of October, on the 22d and 24th of the same month, on the 3d and the 6th of November—dates at which both the President and the War Department, as we have seen, had been officially apprised of the successive alterations, deemed necessary by General Hood for the success of his campaign? That General Beauregard had originated none of these alterations, and that he, more than once, deplored their adoption, has already been shown; and that the President, though made conversant in season with General Hood's amended views and intentions, said nothing to indicate his disapproval of them, is no less a patent and well-established fact. His disapprobation, if not officially expressed and communicated to General Hood, could be of no import, was altogether futile, and might as well have been acquiescence. Mr. Davis never hesitated to reject the plans of any of the generals commanding in the field when, in his opinion, there was sufficient reason for so doing. He had gone farther, and, on former occasions, had openly prohibited the execution of many a proposed military movement. We refer to the plan of aggressive campaign prepared by General Beauregard and submitted to the President, through Colonel Chestnut, on the 14th of July, 1861; to the advance urged at the Fairfax Court-house conference, in October of the same year, by Generals J. E. Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith; to the plan of campaign suggested, instead of the invasion of Pennsylvania, in 1863; to the proposed concerted attack upon Butler's forces, near Bermuda Hundreds, in May, 1864, by the whole of General Beauregard's army, reinforced by 10,000 men from the Army of Northern Virginia. On those occasions the President's purpose was clear, his opposition unmistakable. No doubt could exist as to his meaning. Here, on the contrary, so vague and equivocal, so liable to misconstruction, was the language made use of in Mr. Davis's despatch of November 7th to General Hood, and in his letter of November 30th to General Beauregard, that, had the campaign into Tennessee resulted in success instead of disaster, this same despatch and this identical letter could have been interpreted to show Mr. Davis's unqualified approbation of the movement.

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 569. The italics are ours.

CHAPTER XLII.

General Beauregard's Effort to Reinforce General Hood by Drawing Troops from the Trans-Mississippi Department.—His Communication to General E. Kirby Smith.—He Urges that Two or more Divisions be Sent to the Army of Tennessee, or that a Diversion be Made towards Missouri.—His Advice as to Best Method of Crossing.—War Department Authorizes Call upon General E. K. Smith.—General Beauregard Leaves for Charleston.—He again Presses General E. K. Smith to Forward his Troops.—The Latter Considers the Attempt Impracticable.—No Steps taken to Carry out the Movement.—General Beauregard Arrives in Charleston.—He visits Savannah on the 9th of December, and Consults with General Hardee as to the Defence of the City.—Returns to Charleston.—Letter to President Davis.—Detailed Orders to General Hardee.—Second Visit to Savannah.—General Sherman Demands the Surrender of the City on the 17th of December.—His Demand Refused.—Preparations for Evacuation.—General Beauregard's Confidential Circular.—He Goes to Pocotaligo.—Sends Memorandum of Orders to General Hardee.—Successful Evacuation of Savannah.—Want of Transportation for Troops.—General Beauregard in Charleston on the 22d of December.—Prepares new Defensive Lines.—His Presence Required by General Hood.—He Applies to be Relieved of the Command of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.—Request Granted.—His Last Letter to General Hardee.—He Leaves for Montgomery.

BEFORE following General Beauregard on his way to Savannah, *via* Charleston, where he arrived on the evening of December 7th, it may be of interest to mention what he had endeavored to do immediately after the battle of Franklin, with a view to reinforce General Hood's army upon its entrance into Tennessee. He had cast his eyes towards the Trans-Mississippi Department, then under General E. Kirby Smith, and, with that rapidity of strategic conception so remarkable in him, had formed a plan of concentration which, if carried out in season, might have materially changed the aspect of our military affairs. We submit his communication to that effect:

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 2d, 1864.

"To General E. KIRBY SMITH, Comdg. Trans-Miss. Dept. :

"*General*,—You are probably aware that the Army of Tennessee, under General J. B. Hood, has penetrated into Middle Tennessee as far as Columbia, and

that the enemy is concentrating all his available forces, under General Thomas, to oppose him. It is even reliably reported that the forces, under General A. J. Smith, in Missouri, and Steele, in Arkansas, have been sent to reinforce Thomas. It becomes, then, absolutely necessary, to insure the success of Hood, either that you should send him two or more divisions, or that you should at once threaten Missouri, in order to compel the enemy to recall the reinforcements he is sending to General Thomas.

"I beg to urge upon you prompt and decisive action; the fate of the country may depend upon the result of Hood's campaign in Tennessee.

"Sherman's army has lately abandoned Atlanta, on a venturesome march across Georgia to the Atlantic coast about Savannah. His object is, besides the destruction of public and private property, probably to reinforce Grant, and compel Lee to abandon Richmond. It is hoped that Sherman may be prevented from effecting his object; but should it be otherwise, the success of Hood in Tennessee and Kentucky would counterbalance the moral effect of the loss of Richmond. Hence the urgent necessity of either reinforcing Hood, or making a diversion in Missouri in his favor.

"Hoping that you may give us the desired assistance,

"I remain, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

A copy of the foregoing letter was immediately forwarded to Richmond for the information of the War Department, and this telegram preceded it:

"MONTGOMERY, ALA., *Dec. 2d*, 1864: 9 P. M.

"His Ex. President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va., *via* Tallahassee, Fla.:

"Generals Steele and A. J. Smith are reported to be reinforcing General Thomas at Nashville. Cannot General E. Kirby Smith reinforce General Hood in Middle Tennessee, or take offensive in Missouri? His assistance is absolutely necessary at this time.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The next day, and while General Beauregard was already on his way to Georgia, there to gather up, from every quarter, all available forces to check Sherman's advance, he caused the following letter to be sent to General E. K. Smith, in order to give him all possible facilities for successfully executing the transfer of his troops to the eastern side of the Mississippi:

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
MONTGOMERY, *Dec. 3d*, 1864.

"To General E. KIRBY SMITH, Comdg. Trans-Miss. Dept.:

"*General*,—I am this day in receipt of telegram from General Beauregard (who is now *en route* to the Atlantic coast), dated Opelika, Ala., *Dec. 3d*, in which he directs that I recommend for your favorable consideration that detached floating booms, armed with torpedoes, in addition to light batteries on shore, be placed in the Mississippi River, to prevent the enemy's gunboats from

passing or offering annoyance at the point that you may select for the transfer of troops to this side, should you deem it expedient to make such transfer.

"These booms should be triangular in shape, about 40 feet in length by about 20 feet base; should be made of five longitudinal pieces and five or six cross ones, strongly halved into and on top of the former. The booms should be anchored across the river, about forty feet apart from centre to centre, and torpedoes should be anchored in the open space between them.

"A second row of booms, breaking openings with the first, should be anchored about one hundred feet below the first row, being in the same manner as the former armed with torpedoes.

"The torpedoes should be about six feet below the surface of the water. The booms should be firmly anchored, with the apex of the triangle up stream.

"I have the honor to be, General, respectfully, your obt. servt.,

"GEORGE WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G."

The Secretary of War, the Hon. James A. Seddon, had answered General Beauregard's telegram to the President, and, though he doubted General E. Kirby Smith's willingness to respond to the emergency, had, however, authorized the call upon him.* But his reply reached Headquarters after General Beauregard's departure from Montgomery. When the War Department was apprised of the fact the following telegram was forwarded to Lieutenant-General Taylor:

"MERIDIAN, Dec. 14th, 1864.

"*By Telegraph from Richmond, 7th, via Mobile, 13th.*

"To Lieut.-Genl. TAYLOR:

"Transmit by most rapid means the following despatch to General E. Kirby Smith, Shreveport, La.: 'If practicable, cross troops. Aid General Hood, or divert forces from operating against him in Tennessee. If crossing be impossible, cannot you make demonstrations to withdraw troops of the enemy?'

"'We have intelligence that Steele, with 15,000 men, had reached Memphis, and was proceeding to aid Thomas, commanding the enemy in operations against Hood. The campaign in the Trans-Mississippi has ceased or been abandoned, while the enemy concentrates east of the Mississippi.

"'The co-operation of your troops should, in some force, avail us.'

"JAS. A. SEDDON, Secy. War."

To avoid all possible misunderstanding and present the case in a stronger light, Colonel G. W. Brent, A. A. G., transmitted to

* Mr. Seddon's telegram to General Beauregard read: "Your telegram of the 2d inst. is referred to me for answer. If General E. K. Smith can now act as you suggest, it would be well he should do so. You are authorized so to inform him, and to request his prompt attention. He has, however, failed heretofore to respond to like emergencies, and no plans should be based on his compliance." The telegram was dated Richmond, December 4th, 1864.

General E. K. Smith, through Dr. Macken, special courier of the War Department, a duplicate copy of General Beauregard's first letter, with this additional communication :

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 13th, 1864.

"To General E. KIRBY SMITH, Comdg. Trans-Miss. Dept. :

"General,—On the 2d inst. General Beauregard transmitted to you, by his aide-de-camp, Captain Toutant, a letter requesting that you would, without delay, send to the support of General Hood two or more divisions, or threaten Missouri, to distract the enemy, so as to induce him to recall his reinforcements to Thomas. Since that date General Beauregard has been ordered to the East, and is now absent, and I am in receipt of a telegram from the Hon. Secretary of War directing General Beauregard to order the movement indicated in the letter of the 2d instant.

"In the absence of the General I transmit you a copy of the said letter, and request a speedy compliance with it. Your prompt attention and action are not only required by the order of the Secretary of War, but by the exigencies of the public service.

"I am, General, very respectfully, your obt. servt.,

"GEORGE W. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G."

Thus, it is made apparent that General Beauregard's earnest appeal to General E. K. Smith was approved, and promptly acted upon, by the War Department. General Hood in his book also discloses the fact of his great anxiety to receive reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi Department. He writes :

"The President was still urgent in his instructions relative to the transference of troops to the Army of Tennessee from Texas—[why from Texas, which would have caused additional delay?]—and I daily hoped to receive the glad tidings of their safe passage across the Mississippi River." *

But no "glad tidings" came. General E. K. Smith could not be moved to action. He allowed exaggerated rumors and obstacles, trifling in their nature, to prevent him from adopting the step which had been so earnestly urged upon him. And here we may appropriately remind the reader that, scarcely one month before, General Forrest, with his light batteries alone, had captured and destroyed several of the enemy's gunboats and transports on the Tennessee River—thus proving that they were by no means so formidable as reported. It is to be regretted that General E. Kirby Smith, although, in many respects, an officer

* "Advance and Retreat," p. 299.

of merit, did not exhibit the energy, daring, and determination that so eminently distinguished General Forrest. Had the latter, and not the former, been then in command of the Trans-Mississippi Department, what a difference might have been made in the result of the war! *

General Beauregard remained only one day in Charleston; and, as General Hardee was at that time in Savannah, he left on the 8th for the latter place, stopping on his way at Pocotaligo, to confer with Major-General Sam. Jones. He strongly advised the driving back of the enemy from his too close proximity to the Charleston Railroad. At 7 A.M., on the 9th, he reached Savannah. After a careful study of the situation and a full consultation with General Hardee, relative to the defence and possible evacuation of that city, he wrote out the following order and gave it to General Hardee that evening before taking leave of him:

"SAVANNAH, Dec. 9th, 1864.

"Lieut.-General W. J. HARDEE, Comdg., etc., etc.:

"General,—It is my desire, after the consultation that has taken place, that you shall hold this city as in your judgment it may be advisable to do, bearing in mind that, should you have to decide between a sacrifice of the garrison and city, you will preserve the garrison for operations elsewhere.

"Very respectfully, yours, etc.,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

The enemy was now so near the railroad, between Savannah and the river, that General Beauregard was compelled to ascend the stream as far as the bridge—a distance of some fifteen miles—before he could safely take the train, which he did on the 10th, at 1 A.M., being accompanied by Colonels Otey and Roman and Major James B. Eustis. At 5 P.M. on that day he was again in Charleston, and the next morning caused the following order to be published:

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
CHARLESTON, Dec. 11th, 1864.

"General Orders, No. —:

"1. This Military Division having been extended by his Excellency the President to embrace the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, it is announced, for the information of all concerned.

"2. In urgent cases district and subdistrict commanders are authorized to

* See, in Appendix, General E. Kirby Smith's reasons for not acceding to General Beauregard's call upon him.

communicate directly with these Headquarters, transmitting immediately copies of said correspondence to their proper Commanders.

“By command of General Beauregard.

“JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.”

The outlook for the immediate future of the Confederacy had become very alarming. Hood's army, near Nashville, was seriously threatened by Thomas, who was hourly awaiting his coming reinforcements. Sherman, almost unimpeded in his march through Georgia, had all but reached his destination. News had also been received that two corps of Grant's army, reinforced by cavalry, were advancing in North Carolina, *via* Weldon, with a large train of wagons; and General Beauregard was asked for troops with which to oppose the reported movement.*

In a long and explicit letter to President Davis, General Beauregard thus explained the situation in General Hardee's Department:

“CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 13th*, 1864.

“To his Excellency President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

“(Confidential.)

“*Sir*,—I arrived here, on my way to Savannah, on the evening of the 7th, and remained until the following afternoon, to obtain information relative to the present condition of this Department.

“The Second and Third Subdistricts, embracing Charleston and its defences, were reported to me short of provisions and ammunition for a siege. I arrived at Pocotaligo during the night of the 8th, and after spending several hours in conference with General Jones as to the state of affairs in that vicinity, I proceeded to Savannah, arriving there on the morning of the 9th.

“General Jones informed me that, after collecting all that could be safely spared from the other points in the District of South Carolina, his forces consisted of about five thousand five hundred effectives of all arms, of which about three thousand were militia and reserves.

“Immediately upon my arrival at Savannah I called upon General Hardee, who communicated to me the following information:

“1st. That the enemy, supposed to be from thirty-five thousand to forty thousand men of all arms, were advancing on the River road, Middle Ground road, Central Railroad, and Louisville road, and were then reported to be about ten miles from the city, or about six miles from General Hardee's intermediate line of works, known as the Overflow Line; and that a portion of the enemy's troops was reported about three miles from Monteith Station, on the Charleston Railroad.

“2d. That his forces in and around Savannah, south of the Savannah River, consisted of about ten thousand effectives of all arms, about one-half of which were reserves and militia; that the main body occupied the works and lines

* See General Whiting's telegram, in Appendix.

guarding the city and its approaches, while the rest was then engaged in delaying the advancing columns of the enemy, which he supposed, however, would reach the front of his lines that day or the next; hence he had given orders for all extra trains on the Gulf Railroad and Charleston Railroad to be sent in the direction of Charleston as soon as practicable.

"3d. That on the north side of the Savannah River, and along New River, the number of troops was small, and only just sufficient to guard the works there constructed.

"4th. That Wheeler's cavalry was mostly operating in rear of the enemy, south of the Savannah River.

"5th. That in Savannah there were about thirty days' provisions for the forces in and around the city.

"I advised General Hardee, in accordance with previous instructions, to defend the city so long as consistent with the safety of his command, and suggested that he should make such preparations and arrangements—which I regretted to discover had not been made—as might be necessary for the evacuation of the city at the proper time, should that necessity arise. With these views General Hardee coincided. I particularly called his attention to the necessity of keeping open his communications with Charleston, *via* the Screven's Ferry Causeway and the Charleston Railroad, the latter being already partially interrupted by a battery of the enemy, near Coosawhatchie. I informed General Hardee that I would return at once to Pocotaligo, to advise with General Jones relative to re-opening, without delay, the communications at Coosawhatchie, and preventing their further interruption.

"When leaving Savannah, at 9 P. M., I received intelligence that the enemy had approached the railroad, between the city and the river, so as to render the running of my train dangerous. I therefore took the cars at the bridge, which I reached by steamboat. On arriving at Pocotaligo, early the next morning, I conferred with General Jones as intended, and came on to Charleston, to furnish him with all available means required by him.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

On the 13th, 14th, and 15th important telegrams* were exchanged between Generals Beauregard and Hardee—the latter alluding to the critical duties now pressing upon him, and asking for additional orders, the former referring to his despatches of the 8th and his letter of instructions of the 9th. He advised anew the immediate repair of the Screven's Ferry Causeway, and the establishment of a pontoon-bridge across the Savannah River, with flat-boats, which, he thought, could be impressed from neighboring rice-plantations. He directed General Hardee's special attention to the necessity, under all circumstances, of maintaining

* See Appendix.

his communications with General Jones at Pocotaligo; explained his views as to the best method of obstructing, by means of trees and torpedoes, the creeks east of Screven's Ferry; and recommended, at places which he designated, the construction of rifle-pits and batteries for field-pieces. He also made it clear that, in case it became necessary to abandon Savannah, the river should be obstructed as far down as possible, in order to protect the country and railroad from Charleston to Augusta, and place either or both beyond the reach of a flank attack. On the 16th, at 8 A. M., in answer to General Hardee's telegram of 3.30 P. M. of the previous day, he stated that he must be where most urgently called; that each officer should now bear his own responsibility and do for the best. He promised, however, to leave that day for General Jones's headquarters, and immediately afterwards for Savannah—which he did, reaching the latter place at eleven o'clock at night.

The next day (the 17th) was an eventful day for Savannah. General Sherman, elated by the success of his march through Georgia, addressed the following communication to General Hardee:

"IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, *Dec. 17th, 1864.*

"General WILLIAM J. HARDEE, Comdg. Confederate Forces in Savannah, Ga.:

"*General*,—You have doubtless observed from your status at Roseden that sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and up Ogeechee to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of all kinds, and more especially heavy ordnance, necessary to the reduction of Savannah. I have already received guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot as far as the heart of the city. Also, I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied.

"I am therefore justified in demanding the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time your answer before opening with heavy ordnance.

"Should you entertain the proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the inhabitants and garrison. But should I be forced to resort to assault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army, burning to avenge a great national wrong they attach to Savannah and other large cities which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war. I enclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the surrender of the town of Resaca, Ga., to be used by you for what it is worth.*

"I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, U. S. A."

* This demand of General Hood for the surrender of Resaca (October 12th,

Without loss of time, and after full consultation with General Beauregard, an answer was forwarded by General Hardee. Before submitting it to the reader it is proper to say that General Sherman's threats, should an unconditional surrender be refused, were striking indications of what must have been his premeditated design with regard to the "large cities" of the South—and villages and hamlets—whose misfortune it might be to fall into his power. This letter of General Sherman is a stumbling-block in the way of his later assertions, and conflicts with the statements he has seen fit to make since the war about the burning of Columbia. But we shall have occasion to discuss this subject hereafter.

General Hardee's answer was clear, firm, to the point. It was written with moderation and dignity, and in that respect was in contrast with the communication of the Federal commander.

It read as follows :

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
SAVANNAH, GA., Dec. 17th, 1864.

"Major-Genl. W. T. SHERMAN, Comdg. Federal Forces near Savannah, Ga. :

"*General*,—I have to acknowledge receipt of a communication from you of this date, in which you demand 'the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts,' on the ground that you 'have received guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot into the heart of the city,' and for the further reason that you 'have, for some days, held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied.' You add, that should you be 'forced to resort to assault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, you will then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and will make little effort to restrain your army,' etc., etc.

"The position of your forces, a half-mile beyond the outer line for the land defence of Savannah, is, at the nearest point, at least four miles from the heart of the city. That and the interior line are both intact.

"Your statement that you have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied is incorrect. I am in free and in constant communication with my Department.

1864,) contained the following words: "If the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken." We do not intend to discuss the propriety of such demands of surrender, or to approve of the tone characterizing them; but it should be remembered that General Hood was addressing an invading enemy, whose passage through the South had already been marked by acts of cruelty, pillage, and devastation. Whereas General Sherman was the commander of that invading army, whose conduct at Atlanta, after its surrender, had aroused and justified a feeling of resentment on the part of the commander of the Confederate forces.

"Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts is refused.

"With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraphs of your letter of what may be expected in case your demand is not complied with, I have to say that I have hitherto conducted the military operations intrusted to my direction in strict accordance with the rules of civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret the adoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate from them in future.

"I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-General."

The War Department had approved General Beauregard's views as to the stand to be made at Savannah. It had even indicated that the same programme might be adopted with regard to Charleston. The following telegram* is given in support of this averment:

"RICHMOND, Dec. 17th, 1864.

"To General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"The spirit of your instructions to General Hardee, relative to the defences of Savannah, is approved. It is hoped Savannah may be successfully defended. But the defence should not be too protracted, to the sacrifice of the garrison. The same remarks are applicable to Charleston. We must rely upon your judgment to make the fullest possible defence consistently with the safety of the garrisons.

"S. COOPER, A. and Insp.-Genl."

This approbation was a cause of no small relief to General Beauregard, and allowed him more latitude than he would otherwise have had.

Active, urgent preparations for the evacuation were instantly begun. It was now but a question of a few days. So little had yet been done that General Beauregard feared there would be insufficient time to save most of the public property, and destroy what must otherwise fall into the hands of the enemy. Most of the orders then issued were not only suggested by him, but, in many instances, written under his dictation.† His memorandum for the location of troops, dated December 18th, and left with General Hardee, shows the amount of work accomplished during his last visit to the invested city. On the 19th he completed the order relative to the final evacuation, which was forwarded to the different commands, headed "Confidential

* It was a ciphered telegram.

† See Colonel John. G. Clarke's letter to General Beauregard, in Appendix.

Circular," and signed by General Hardee, as Commander of the Department. We refer the reader to this memorandum and to this circular, which will both be found in the Appendix to the present chapter.

General Hardee remained at Savannah, to carry out the dispositions taken by General Beauregard; and the latter, on the same day, left that city to confer with his District and Subdistrict Commanders, and advise with them as to the best methods of putting his plans into execution.

The next day he caused the following letter to be sent to General Hardee:

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
POCOTALIGO, S. C., Dec. 20th, 1864.

"Lieut.-General W. J. HARDEE, Comdg., etc., etc.:

"General,—I am directed by the General Commanding to forward to you the accompanying memorandum* of orders, which he wishes you to issue immediately after the evacuation of Savannah. They are designed to carry out his views as to the best disposition of troops under your command for the defence of Charleston and the State of South Carolina generally—Savannah being in the possession of the enemy.

"Major-General G. W. Smith's command (about two thousand men) being sent to Augusta, will leave, of the troops coming from Savannah, about six thousand five hundred, which, added to those under the immediate command of Major-General Sam. Jones, on the line of the Savannah and Charleston Railroad—say about five thousand five hundred, exclusive of those in and around Charleston—make about twelve thousand troops. Of these he thinks there should be about two thousand five hundred to guard the left bank of the Combahee, with about one thousand in reserve at a central point between the Combahee and the Ashepoo.

"About three thousand five hundred in the Fourth Subdistrict, with about one thousand of them in reserve at or near Adams's Run and Green Pond, and about five thousand in the Second and Third Subdistricts, in addition to those already there. The cavalry guarding the left (or coast) flank, and the front and right flanks, should, of course, be used to support the troops to which they are nearest.

"The orders indicated in the accompanying memorandum will make a distribution approximating as nearly to these numbers as circumstances will permit. In carrying them out it will be necessary that you should send promptly the troops carried to Hardeeville by Brigadier-General Taliaferro to rejoin their respective brigades, and the detached companies or battalions of South Carolina reserves and militia to report to Brigadier-General Chestnut, at Grahamville; and the companies of the 3d South Carolina Cavalry,

* We invite the reader's special attention to the memorandum above referred to. See Appendix.

under Colonel Colcock, to unite with those now in front of Grahamville and near Coosawhatchie and Pocotaligo and Kirk's squadron, together with the section of horse artillery attached to the 3d South Carolina Cavalry.

"Endeavor to bring and keep together, as far as practicable, the troops of the same organization.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C."

While the foregoing communication was being penned this telegram was forwarded to Richmond:

"POCOTALIGO, S. C., *Dec. 20th, 1864.*

"President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

"General Hardee reports that about fifteen hundred of the enemy's infantry crossed yesterday Savannah River, from Argyle Island to Izard's plantation. Wheeler holds them in check. General Hardee will probably evacuate Savannah to-night. His first defensive line will be in rear of the Combahee. Wheeler's cavalry will guard country thence to the Savannah River. All quiet here. No report from General Hood since 28th of November.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

He now ordered that the Savannah River Railroad bridge and trestle-work on the Carolina side should be immediately and thoroughly destroyed, and that Generals Wheeler and Taliaferro should be instructed to that effect. Through Captain Courtney, at Hardeeville, he also communicated with Commodore Hunter, and pointed out the necessity of commanding the Savannah River by his gunboat, as long as possible, from the enemy's battery to a point as far up the stream as navigation would permit.

During the night of the 20th, and in strict obedience to General Beauregard's instructions, Savannah was successfully evacuated. President Davis was informed of the fact as follows:

"POCOTALIGO, S. C., *Dec., 21st, 1864.*

"General Hardee reports to-day from Hardeeville that evacuation of Savannah, as instructed by me,* was successfully accomplished last night. All the light artillery and most of the stores and munitions were brought off. The heavy guns were spiked and otherwise disabled. Line of defence behind Combahee River will be taken as soon as possible.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the same day he sent this telegram to General Hardee:

"POCOTALIGO, S. C., *Dec. 21st, 1864.*

"I congratulate you on the success of the evacuation. You can delay

* See, in Appendix, Colonel Clarke's letters to General Beauregard.

movement on Combahee line long enough to secure your supplies, provided you send your surplus artillery here and reinforce Fourth District and Charleston, as per my memorandum of yesterday, forwarded to you to-day by staff-officer.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

"Lieut.-General HARDEE,

"Hardeeville, S. C."

Sufficient transportation had not been prepared for the troops at Pocotaligo and Hardeeville, and for those whose movements were now so important for the defence of Charleston and other threatened points in South Carolina. General Beauregard, who was much disappointed at this want of forethought on the part of the district and subdistrict commanders, at once issued energetic orders designed to remedy the evil, and among them the following:

"POCOTALIGO, S. C., *Dec. 21st, 1864.*

"Lieut.-Colonel JOHN M. OTEY, A. A. G.:

"Forces here and at Savannah are almost unprovided with transportation. Have impressed forthwith sufficient for three thousand men here, same in Fourth Subdistrict, and six thousand about Charleston. I leave about 2 P. M.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the same day the following telegram was also forwarded:

"POCOTALIGO, S. C., *Dec. 21st, 1864.*

"Lieut.-Colonel JOHN M. OTEY, A. A. G.:

"Until further orders there must be three full trains on road from Coosawhatchie to Hardeeville, and three or four near here, awaiting troops for Fourth District and Charleston. See that it be done at once.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the 22d General Beauregard was again in Charleston, his mind engrossed with the preparations to be made for the safety of that city and the establishment of new defensive lines for the State. It would uselessly encumber the narrative, to insert here the various orders he issued at that time. Most of them, as also part of his correspondence in that connection, will appear in the Appendix to the present chapter. His activity was quickened by the unofficial news of General Hood's disaster at or near Nashville, and the desire, more than once expressed, since General Beauregard's arrival in Charleston, that he should visit, as soon as possible, the Army of Tennessee.

The three following letters show what minute attention General Beauregard was giving to the impending dangers of the moment:

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 25th*, 1864.

"Lieut.-General W. J. HARDEE, Comdg. Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla.:

"*General*,—If the pontoons now at Pocotaligo are not required there, General Beauregard deems it best that the officer in charge of them be ordered by telegraph to send them to this city at once.

"He also deems it best, and directs, that the wagons lately sent from this city to Pocotaligo be furnished with covers, as most of them are without them.

"I am further directed to inquire of you what torpedoes have been put down lately in the channel and harbor. If none, the Commanding General directs that they be laid at once where originally contemplated, especially in front of the rope obstructions. Mr. Fraser Mathews is suggested as one who could be charged with this duty, if no one else can accomplish the work.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOHN M. OTEY, A. A. G."

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 27th*, 1864.

"Lieut.-General W. J. HARDEE, Comdg. Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla.:

"*General*,—I am instructed by the Commanding General to direct as follows:

"1st. That you make, silently and cautiously, all necessary preparations for the evacuation of Charleston—should it become necessary—taking at the same time the proper steps to save the garrisons of the different works.

"Detailed and confidential instructions should be given as to the spiking, by means of rat-tail files, all heavy guns and such others as cannot be moved; for disabling carriages, chassis, and batteries.

2d. That the infantry and cavalry of your command be organized forthwith into brigades and divisions, under good commanders. That all the troops be supplied with knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, blankets, and shoes; and that ample transportation be supplied, as also ammunition for small-arms and light batteries.

"3d. That all light batteries be organized into battalions of three batteries each; one battalion being attached to each division, the others in reserve, under the Chief of Artillery.

"The battalions attached to divisions, although under the orders of the division commanders, in battle and on the march, will, nevertheless, make all their returns and reports to the Chief of Artillery, and all correspondence relative to the organization, equipment, and interior management of batteries will pass through the same channel. Such batteries will only be under the orders of the Chief of Artillery when in permanent camp or winter-quarters.

"The Commanding General also directs that, should field-officers be needed for the battalions, you will apply by telegraph to the War Department, and request immediate attention.

"I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"JOHN M. OTEY, A. A. G."

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 29th*, 1864.

"Lieut.-General J. W. HARDEE, Comdg. Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla. :

"1st. The lines in Christ Church require the special attention of your Engineer and the Commander of the Second Subdistrict. The woods in front of the lines should be cut into abatis at once, and positions for field-guns in embrasure should be established immediately along them.

"2. The batteries commanding approaches through the creeks should be put in perfect order and garrisoned.

"3d. A pontoon-bridge should be thrown across Cooper River at the most favorable point, if practicable.

"4th. I think you ought to apply for the promotion of Majors Lucas and Manigault, to give them more authority over their battalions.

"Respectfully yours,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

Two days before, General Beauregard had forwarded the following telegrams to the War Department :

1. "CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 27th*, 1864.

"General S. COOPER, Adj.-Genl., Richmond, Va. :

"In event of having to abandon the coast, and enemy's movements will permit a choice of base of operations, shall it be towards North Carolina or Georgia? Latter is true base for forces of this Department; but views of War Department may require otherwise.*

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

2. "CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 27th*, 1864.

"General S. COOPER, Adj.-Genl., Richmond, Va. :

"General Hood desires me to visit Army of Tennessee. Colonel Brent, my Chief of Staff at Montgomery, says my presence is required West, owing to some confusion in various matters, and want of supplies and ammunition. Unless otherwise instructed, I will leave here as soon as I can make definite arrangements for future operations in this State.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the 30th General Beauregard, having completed all possible arrangements for the pending emergency, asked to be relieved of the command of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, in order that he might devote all his time and attention to his Department proper—the Military Division of the West. His request was granted by President Davis, in the following despatch :

"RICHMOND, *Dec. 30th*, 1864.

"To General G. T. BEAUREGARD :

"Your despatch of this day received, also copy of that to General Cooper,

* This telegram, and that which immediately follows it, were in cipher.

in relation to assignment of General Bragg. You will leave with General Hardee orders and instructions in regard to the Department east of Augusta, and will resume the command of the District west of Augusta, as heretofore defined. The change will be more formally announced from the Adjutant-General's office.

JEFFERSON DAVIS."

Before taking leave of General Hardee, and of Charleston, where he had ever met with so much sympathy and encouragement, General Beauregard, in a last letter, thus expressed his views as to what should be done after his departure:

CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 31st, 1864.

"Lieut.-General W. J. HARDEE, Comdg. Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla.:

"*General*,—I enclose herewith a copy of a telegram received to-day from the President relieving me, at my request, of the general command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. My presence is absolutely required at this moment at Montgomery and with the Army of Tennessee, and I cannot inform you when I will be able to return in this direction. The interruption of railroad communication might render it impracticable to get back in time to be of assistance to you, should you require my aid suddenly.

"The telegram of the President not being explicit as to the status of Augusta, I have requested that it should be included in your Department, as you now have under you the whole of Wheeler's cavalry and nearly all the available forces of Georgia, which are also required by you for the defence of South Carolina. The defence of the city is so intimately connected with that of the western portion of this State, that you will consider it within the limits of your Department until further orders from the War Department.

"I have already given you all the verbal instructions possible for the defence of Charleston and this State. The answer of the War Department, not yet received, to my telegram of the 27th instant, will determine whether, in the event of evacuating this city, you will retire towards Georgia or North Carolina as a base. The first is your natural base; but should you have reason to expect large reinforcements from the latter State, you should, of course, retire in that direction.

"You will apply to the defence of Charleston the same principle applied to that of Savannah: that is, defend it as long as compatible with the safety of your forces. Having no reason at present to expect succor from an army of relief, you must save your troops for the defence of South Carolina and Georgia.

"The fall of Charleston would, necessarily, be a terrible blow to the Confederacy, but its fall, with the loss of its brave garrison, would be still more fatal to our cause. You will, however, make all the preparations necessary for the possible evacuation of the city, and 'clear your decks for action.' Should it not take place, the trouble and expense of transportation will amount to little; but should you be compelled to evacuate the city when unprepared, the loss of public property would be incalculable.

"All the cotton in the city should be removed; and if any be in the city at the time of its evacuation, it must be destroyed.

"As already instructed, you should organize all your troops for the field, collecting sufficient transportation, ammunition, and provisions for an active campaign. You must have depots of provisions and forage at several points in the interior of the State. Columbia would be a very suitable point; Florence also, if you expect to move in the direction of North Carolina. Augusta, Mayfield, and Milledgeville must be depots for future operations.

"Your defensive lines from the Savannah River would be as already explained to you:

"1st. The Combahee and Salkehatchie to Barnwell Court-house, thence to the Savannah River.

"2d. The Ashpoo and Salkehatchie to Barnwell Court-house, thence to Savannah River.

"3d. Edisto to Branchville, thence across towards Barnwell Court-house.

"4th. Edisto and Caw-caw Swamp, or Rantool Creek.

"5th. Edisto and Ashley.

"Wheeler's cavalry must protect your front towards Savannah River, and your right flank from Barnwell Court-house towards Augusta. At least, the larger portion of his cavalry must be south of that river to watch the movements and check the progress of any force moving towards Augusta or the interior of Georgia, until the rest of the cavalry and other forces could be sent to give battle to the enemy.

"Please keep General Cobb and myself advised of your movements and those of the enemy, in order that we may give you in time any assistance in our power.

"Hoping that you may be successful in holding Charleston, and repelling any advance of the enemy,

"I remain, respectfully, your obt. servt.,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

These dispositions being taken, General Beauregard left Charleston on the 2d of January, 1865, and on the 8th reached Montgomery, on his way to Tupelo, Miss. He carried with him sad forebodings of inevitable calamity to the Confederacy—the consequence of General Hood's disastrous campaign into Middle Tennessee.

CHAPTER XLIII.

General Hood Desires General Beauregard to Visit the Army of Tennessee.—Despatches Concerning General Cheatham.—General Beauregard's Inability to go to General Hood's Assistance.—The Disaster at Nashville.—General Beauregard's Great Anxiety.—He is Again Urged to go to the West.—He Telegraphs the War Department for Authority to Place General Taylor in Command of the Army of Tennessee, if Necessary.—The War Department Approves.—General Beauregard Starts for Corinth.—His Instructions to General Hardee.—Reaches Macon on the 6th of January.—Confers with General Cobb.—Suggests Advisability of Restoring General J. E. Johnston to his Former Command.—Despatch from General Hood Stating that the Army had Recrossed the Tennessee River.—He Again Calls on General Beauregard.—Urges One Hundred Days' Furlough for the Trans-Mississippi Troops.—The Idea Disapproved by the War Department and by General Beauregard.—Troops from the Army of Tennessee Sent to the Assistance of General Hardee.—General S. D. Lee's Corps, under Stevenson, goes First.—Shattered Condition of the Army.—General Hood Asks to be Relieved of his Command.—Lieut.-General Taylor Appointed in his Stead.—General Hood's Farewell Circular to his Troops.—General Taylor Assumes Command.—General Beauregard Visits Mobile January 21st.—He Inspects all the Works.—Leaves for Augusta.—The Enemy Believed to be Advancing on that City.—General Beauregard Gives his Attention to all the Threatened Points of his Vast Department.

Just before the battle of Nashville, which began on the 15th of December, and ended on the 16th, General Hood expressed the wish that General Beauregard should visit the Army of Tennessee, if he could.* This was proof sufficient that matters were not going on satisfactorily in that quarter, for at no previous time had General Hood evinced the least desire to have General Beauregard with him or his army.

A few days before the following telegram, in cipher, had also been forwarded to General Beauregard, but it was not received until on or about the 15th at Charleston:

"HEADQUARTERS, SIX MILES FROM NASHVILLE,
ON FRANKLIN PIKE, *Dec. 8th*, 1864.

"A good lieutenant-general should be sent here at once to command the

* See his telegram, in Appendix.

corps now commanded by Major-General Cheatham. I have no one to recommend for the position. Have sent same despatch to the Secretary of War.

"J. B. Hood, General."

The motive actuating him in this instance will be found in his report, entitled "Operations of the Army of Tennessee," already referred to in one of our preceding chapters. In his book ("Advance and Retreat," p. 286 *et seq.*) General Hood also explains why he was so desirous that General Cheatham should no longer serve with him. In justice to the latter, however, it is but fair to lay before the reader this additional telegram, forwarded both to the Secretary of War and to General Beauregard, and of the same date as the preceding one:

"HEADQUARTERS, SIX MILES FROM NASHVILLE,
ON FRANKLIN PIKE, Dec. 8th, 1864.

"Major-General Cheatham made a failure on the 30th of November, *which will be a lesson for him.* I think it best he should remain in his position for the present. I withdraw my telegrams of yesterday and to-day on this subject.

"J. B. Hood, General."

Unfortunately, when General Beauregard received the two telegrams he was so much absorbed in the operations along the southern coast of South Carolina and at Savannah, which was then threatened by General Sherman's army, that he could neither go to the Army of Tennessee, nor, at that time, assist General Hood in any way whatever.

On the 15th of December, General Thomas, having collected all his available troops at Nashville, while General Hood had, unfortunately, divided his own,* commenced his attack, which was, at first, handsomely repulsed. It was renewed the next day with great vigor, when, at about 3.30 P.M., "a portion of our line, to the left of the centre, suddenly gave way,"† creating no small confusion among the Confederates, and resulting in the loss of fifty pieces‡ of artillery, with other materials of war, and a hasty retreat — by many termed a "rout" — to the south side of Duck River. It was there that S. D. Lee's gallant corps protected the retreating Confederate columns until Franklin was

* He had sent General Forrest and some infantry towards Murfreesboro', to watch or capture a small force of Federals.

† General Hood's telegram of December 17th. See Appendix.

‡ In his book ("Advance and Retreat," p. 303) General Hood says "fifty-four" pieces.

reached,* when Forrest so opportunely joined the army, and thence, with skill, determination, and endurance, formed its rear-guard to the Tennessee River.

Speaking of this battle, General Hood in his book says:† “At an early hour (16th) the enemy made a general attack along our front, and were again and again repulsed at all points, with heavy loss, especially in Lee’s front. About 2.30 P. M. the Federals concentrated a number of guns against a portion of our line, which passed over a mound on the left of our centre, and which had been occupied during the night. This point was favorable for massing troops for an assault under cover of artillery. Accordingly the enemy availed himself of the advantage presented, massed a body of men—apparently one division—at the base of the mound, and, under the fire of artillery, which prevented our men from raising their heads above the breastworks, made a sudden and gallant charge up to and over our intrenchments. Our line, thus pierced, gave way; soon thereafter it broke at all points, and I beheld for the first and only time a Confederate army abandon the field in confusion.”

On the 24th and 25th of December, General Beauregard, who was still in Charleston, received telegrams from Colonel G. W. Brent, his Chief of Staff, then at Montgomery, Ala., informing him that he had “nothing official from Hood,” but that, from a despatch received from General S. D. Lee, then at Florence, he was “apprehensive that some reverse may have occurred.”‡ Such information, vague in the main, but significant in more than one respect, caused great anxiety to General Beauregard; but he could not leave Charleston at that juncture, and was therefore compelled to await further tidings.

A day or two later Colonel Brent again telegraphed as follows:

“MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 27th, 1864.

“To General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Charleston, S. C.:

“If you can be spared from your present duties, I think it important that you should come here as soon as practicable.

“GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.”

* There it was that General S. D. Lee was severely wounded in the foot, and compelled to leave the field.

† “Advance and Retreat,” p. 302.

‡ See the two telegrams referred to, in Appendices to the present and to the preceding chapter.

General Beauregard's determination to go to the Army of Tennessee as soon as he could had been taken before the receipt of these despatches; but, fearing now that a disaster might have happened to General Hood, he telegraphed President Davis as follows:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 25th*, 1864.

"Should circumstances require another commander for the Army of Tennessee, I respectfully recommend Lieut.-General Richard Taylor for that position. He is zealous, energetic, intelligent, and judicious. He might remain still in command of his department until relieved by a competent officer.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

When five days had elapsed, no answer having been made to this despatch, General Beauregard reiterated his inquiry, by sending to the President the following telegram:

"CHARLESTON, *Dec. 31st*, 1864.

"On reaching Army of Tennessee am I authorized to appoint General Taylor to its command, should I find its condition such as to require a change of commander? Please answer at Montgomery.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

When General Beauregard left Charleston, on the 2d of January, 1865, General Hood's headquarters were supposed to be at or near Corinth, Miss. It was not, just then, an easy matter to reach that point; for the railroad between Augusta and Montgomery had been destroyed, and a circuitous route, *via* Milledgeville and Macon, was the only one left; this unavoidably prolonged the journey and delayed General Beauregard in his effort to join General Hood's army.

At Augusta, on his way to Milledgeville, he received President Davis's despatch of January 2d, authorizing him to give the command of the Army of Tennessee to Lieutenant-General Taylor, should circumstances justify him in so doing.* This relieved General Beauregard of much anxiety for the moment.

He took advantage of his short stay at Augusta to issue instructions to General Hardee relative to the defence of Branchville against Sherman. He informed General Hardee that he had selected a defensive line behind Briar Creek, in Georgia, to correspond with that of the Salkehatchie, in South Carolina,† put-

* See telegram of Mr. Davis, in Appendix.

† See telegram from General Beauregard to General Hardee, in Appendix. See, also, order of War Department giving limits of Department South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.

ting it under General G. W. Smith, who then had command of the Georgia reserves.

General Beauregard reached Macon on the 6th of January, in the afternoon, and remained there a whole day, in conference with General Cobb in regard to military affairs in his district. It was after this conference that General Beauregard, who had had occasion to speak of his efforts to procure the services of Major-General D. H. Hill, bethought himself also of another officer, General Joseph E. Johnston, whose retirement, for months past, had been the subject of varying comments and painful regret throughout the South. General Beauregard was of opinion that the military experience and other eminent qualities of such an officer could not, at this juncture, be well dispensed with; and, with his usual rapidity of action, he immediately telegraphed the Hon. W. P. Miles, member of Congress, and Chairman of the Military Committee of the House, that, should the War Department be willing to restore General Johnston to active duty in the field, he, General Beauregard, would gladly yield to him his former command. But nothing was then done in the matter; nor was it likely that the suggestion would ever be favorably entertained. So thought the Hon. W. P. Miles, who, in his answer to General Beauregard, said:

"I received your telegram with reference to General Johnston, and showed it to the Secretary of War. I fear he will not be assigned to duty."

General Beauregard had not yet left Macon when he received the following despatch from General Hood:

"HEADQUARTERS, CORINTH, *Jan. 3d*, 1865.

"The army has recrossed the Tennessee River without material loss since the battle of Franklin. It will be assembled in a few days in the vicinity of Tupelo, to be supplied with shoes and clothing, and to obtain forage for the animals. Copy sent to the Secretary of War.

"J. B. Hood, General."

This afforded a gleam of comfort to General Beauregard, who was now inclined to think that rumor had perhaps exaggerated the report of General Hood's disasters. On the same day, however, another telegram arrived. It was in these words:

"HEADQUARTERS, AT CORINTH, *Jan. 3d*, 1865.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"Your despatch of January 1st received. My despatch from Spring Hill, Tenn., informed you of the result of the battle of Nashville, after which I

thought it best to withdraw the army from Tennessee, which was done, crossing the river at Bainbridge. To make the army effective for operations some rest is absolutely necessary, and a good supply of shoes and clothing.

"I think it of vital importance that the Trans-Mississippi troops should be furloughed, by organizations, for one hundred days, and will so telegraph the President. It would be well if you could visit the army.

"J. B. Hood, General."

The telegram of January 1st, referred to by General Hood, had been forwarded to him to ascertain what was then the real condition of his army, as no direct intelligence from him to that effect had been received for more than two weeks. It ran thus:

"MONTGOMERY, ALA., Jan. 1st, 1865.

"General J. B. Hood, Corinth:

"General Beauregard desires a report of your operations since your report of 11th of December. Advise by telegraph as far as practicable. Write fully the condition of the army, and what is necessary to give it effective means for operations. We have no despatch since yours of 15th of December.

"GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G."

The idea of granting furloughs of one hundred days to entire organizations, when the service of every man in the army was then of such vital importance to the cause, could not for a moment be encouraged. General Beauregard referred the matter at once to the War Department and openly opposed it. Mr. Seddon's views coincided with his own, as is shown by the following despatch:

"RICHMOND, VA., Jan. 8th, 1865.

"General BEAUREGARD:

"Repress, by all means, the proposition to furlough the Trans-Mississippi troops. The suggestion merely is dangerous; compliance would probably be fatal. Extinguish the idea.

JAMES A. SEDDON, Secretary of War."

The "idea" was accordingly "extinguished," as Mr. Seddon so energetically expressed it; for, on the same day, after informing the War Department that he would lose no time in carrying out its instructions, General Beauregard informed General Hood that his "application relative to his Trans-Mississippi troops" was disapproved by the Secretary of War; that it was considered a dangerous experiment, and that he fully agreed with Mr. Seddon in that respect. "Discountenance it in full," were the ending words of the despatch forwarded to that effect.* General Hood was thus compelled to abandon his strange plan for increasing

* See Appendix.

the effectiveness of his army; but the following telegram shows how reluctant he was to do so:

"To General BEAUREGARD:

"TUPELO, *Jan. 11th*, 1865.

"I am very anxious to see you here in reference to the Trans-Mississippi troops, and also as to some system of furlough for other troops, and on other important matters.

J. B. HOOD, General."

In the mean time, and acting upon the suggestion of General Beauregard, who as early as December 23d had advised General Hood "to come with or send to Augusta" such of his forces as were not absolutely required to hold his defensive line,* the War Department expressed its willingness that troops from the Army of Tennessee should be sent, in the direction of South Carolina, to the assistance of General Hardee. Immediate steps were taken by General Beauregard to hasten the execution of this judicious measure; and on the 16th of January, the day following his arrival at Tupelo, he held a long and important conference with General Hood on this subject. The latter, while expressing his willingness to obey the President's and General Beauregard's orders, declared the impracticability of doing so before removing, not only his sick and wounded, but all his stores, from Tupelo; which, he thought, would require at least four days.

Of all the shattered corps of that gallant army, General S. D. Lee's, then under the command of Major-General Stevenson, was in the best condition. General Beauregard, therefore, desired that it should be sent off as soon as transportation could be collected, without waiting for the remainder of the army; and all necessary orders were issued to that effect.† The bad condition of the roads, the scarcity of provisions, or rather the extreme difficulty of gathering them for distribution on the march, added to unavoidable delays consequent upon the inadequate means then at our disposal—not to speak of the demoralized condition of the men themselves—thwarted, and more than thwarted, the usefulness of that and all other measures tending towards the same end.

General Beauregard could now realize the full truth of the reported disintegration and confusion of the Army of Tennessee. Very little—if anything—remained of its former cohesive

* See, in Appendix, General Beauregard's telegram to Colonel Brent.

† See Appendix.

strength. If not, in the strict sense of the word, a disorganized mob, it was no longer an army. None seemed more keenly alive to the fact, and suffered more from it, than General Hood himself. So humiliated, so utterly crushed was he, in appearance, by the disastrous results of his defeat and its ruinous effects upon his army, that General Beauregard, whom he had just apprised of his application to be relieved from its command, had not the heart virtually to disgrace him by ordering his immediate removal. He had not the slightest doubt that General Hood's application would be readily acceded to, and therefore generously abstained from using the power with which he had been clothed.

Two days after his arrival at Tupelo the following telegram was received by him:

"RICHMOND, *Jan. 15th*, 1865.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Tupelo, Miss. :

"By telegraph yesterday General Hood requested to be relieved from command of the Army of Tennessee. His request is granted, and you will place Lieutenant-General Taylor in command, he retaining command of his Department as heretofore, and you, with such troops as may be spared, will return to Georgia and South Carolina.

"JAMES A. SEDDON, Secretary of War."

Both Generals Hood and Taylor were immediately informed of this order; and General Beauregard, after giving detailed instructions to General Smith, Chief-Engineer, for the defence of Choctaw and Open Bluff, Ala., and the river at those points, started on the 19th of January for Augusta, Ga., *via* Mobile. He had on that day requested General Hood to hold Cheatham's corps (less Gibson's brigade) in readiness to move at a moment's notice, and to see to it that one hundred rounds of small-arms ammunition per man should be sent with the troops going to Georgia.

On his departure from Tupelo he left with General Taylor the following special field order, with date in blank, to be filled on the day of its going into effect: .

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUPELO, MISS., *Jan. —*, 1865.

"1st. General J. B. Hood is relieved, at his own request, by the War Department from the command of the Army of Tennessee. He will report for orders to the War Department, at Richmond, Virginia.

"2d. Lieutenant-General R. Taylor, commanding Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and Eastern Louisiana, will assume command of the Army of Tennessee until further orders.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

It was only on the 23d that General Hood took leave of the army, after addressing a circular to his troops, in which, with characteristic manliness, as will be seen, he took upon himself the entire responsibility of the Tennessee campaign. He said :

*"Soldiers,—*At my request I have this day been relieved from the command of this army. In taking leave of you accept my thanks for the patience with which you have endured your many hardships during the recent campaign. I am alone responsible for its conception, and strived hard to do my duty in its execution. I urge upon you the importance of giving your entire support to the distinguished soldier who now assumes command, and I shall look with deep interest upon all your future operations and rejoice at your success.

"J. B. Hood, General."

From that day till the time of its transfer to Georgia and South Carolina, Lieutenant-General Taylor became the commander of what was left of the Army of Tennessee; not, precisely, against his will, but strictly in obedience to orders, and without having either sought or desired the position. He wrote a simple but energetic address to the troops, and did his best to stimulate them to the performance of their last duty to the cause for whose triumph they had so nobly fought and bled. But he well knew, while he thus endeavored to quicken to new deeds of heroism the overtaxed valor of the broken forces he now had under him, that it was too late to arouse them to further hope and endurance.

General Maury had repeatedly called General Beauregard to Mobile, for the purpose of inspecting its defensive works and of giving such advice as his experience should suggest. Other duties, more pressing at the time, had prevented compliance with the request, which, however, had not been overlooked or forgotten.

General Beauregard reached Mobile on the 21st of January, and remained there four days. He visited every work around the city, and gave minute instructions for its protection, as well as that of the various harbor approaches. To Major-General M. L. Smith, Chief-Engineer, who was not with him during this inspection, he telegraphed, on the 23d, as follows :

"City land defences, next to lower bay, where enemy will probably attack, are still unfinished. System of barbette guns adopted for land batteries is the worst possible. Their fire will be silenced by enemy's sharp-shooters as soon as they get within range."

On the 25th General Beauregard was on the road to Augusta, where he was anxiously awaited. From Tensaw Landing, Ala., he forwarded the following telegram to General Hardee:

"I suggest the immediate preparation of a pontoon-bridge of at least fifty boats."

The purpose of this suggestion was to protect General Hardee's retreat northward, especially across the Santee, in case the railroad bridge over it should be destroyed by Sherman's cavalry, an event which might have compelled the surrender of all our forces south of that stream.

The services of Major-General D. H. Hill had at last been accepted by the War Department, and General Hardee, to whom he was ordered for duty, had, on the 19th of January, assigned him to the command of Augusta. From that city, on the 28th, he reported the enemy rapidly advancing towards him, and expressed the hope that troops would be hurried up as fast as possible. General Hardee immediately forwarded his telegram to General Beauregard, adding to it these words: "I think your presence of extreme importance at this juncture." The next day the following telegram was also sent by General Hardee:

"Enemy failed in his attempt to cross the Combahee, but 15th and 17th Corps are about to cross the Savannah, to unite with column moving towards Augusta."*

Pursuant to General Beauregard's orders, Cheatham's corps had been pushed forward to Georgia with all possible speed; and, on the 30th, at Lieutenant-General Taylor's own suggestion, Stewart's corps was also made to move eastward. Its services, General Taylor thought, would be of far more value against Sherman than in any fitful effort to arrest Thomas, should he begin in earnest a movement southward.

From the time General Beauregard left Mobile till his arrival at Augusta, on the 1st of February, he was incessantly engaged in issuing orders and giving and sending instructions for the rapid transportation of the remnant of General Hood's army. It was then that he called the attention of the War Department to

* See Appendix for these two telegrams.

† See General Taylor's telegram, in Appendix.

the necessity of speedily finishing the railroad from Milledgeville to Mayfield, and asked authority to assign Major Hottle, A. Q. M., to that important work, which he deemed essential to further military operations. But General Gilmer was of a different opinion, and the War Department, therefore, paid no attention to General Beauregard's suggestion. He likewise appealed to Governors Brown (of Georgia) and Clark (of Mississippi), strongly advising them to use the militia of their respective States, and all other means in their power, to secure the return of deserters and absentees to their commands. To Brigadier-General Mackall, as he passed through Opelika, he gave specific orders concerning Palmer's battalion and the impressment of horses for the artillery on its way to the east. Truly may it be said that, during these trying weeks of depression and anxiety, his presence being called for, simultaneously, at almost every point, he displayed unfailing energy and forethought, spoke words of comfort to the depressed—whose number increased with every additional reverse—and never allowed the minutest details of his multitudinous duties to escape his attention.

CHAPTER XLIV.

Generals Beauregard and Hardee Meet, by Appointment, at Augusta.—They Hold a Conference at Green's Cut Station with Generals D. H. Hill and G. W. Smith.—Military Situation as there Developed, and Plan Adopted and Forwarded to the War Department, with General Beauregard's Endorsement.—Disappointment as to the Number of Troops.—Order to General Stevenson.—Enemy begins his Forward Movement on 1st of February.—Disposition of his Forces on the March.—General Beauregard's Plan for Opposing him.—He Advises Concentration at Columbia, and Abandonment of Sea-coast Cities and Towns.—His Plan of Operations, if Aided by the Government.—Ordered to Resume the Command of General Hardee's Department.—General Beauregard's Instructions to General Wheeler.—Telegram to General Cooper.—Tardiness of General Hardee in Evacuating Charleston.—General Beauregard in Columbia.—Confers with General Hampton and the Mayor.—General Hardee's Anxiety.—General Beauregard Goes again to Charleston.—Finds no Definite Steps Taken for the Evacuation.—His Instructions to General Hardee.—Despatches to General Lee.—Returns to Columbia.—General Beauregard Orders Quartermaster and Commissary of Subsistence to Remove Stores from that City.—General Hardee becomes Ill.—His Command Turned Over to General McLaws.—General Beauregard's Telegrams to General Lee.

On his arrival at Augusta, General Beauregard was met by Lieutenant-General Hardee, who had been invited to await him there. The object of their conference was to adopt a plan for opposing the probable immediate advance of Sherman from Savannah, Beaufort, the southeastern portion of South Carolina, and the whole extent of the Confederate line, along the Salkehatchie and the Combahee.

Major-General D. H. Hill, commanding the Subdistrict of Augusta, and Major-General G. W. Smith, commanding the "Georgia reserves," occupied at that time the defensive line of Briar Creek, some twenty-five miles south of Augusta, with their headquarters at or near Green's Cut Station, on the Augusta and Savannah Railroad. General Beauregard was desirous that both of them should be present at the projected meeting; and as they could not, just then, absent themselves from their commands, it was decided that Generals Beauregard and Hardee should go to them.

The conference was held on the 2d of February, at Green's Cut Station, and lasted several hours. The views and measures there presented by General Beauregard were accepted with but little—if any—modification. They are embodied and clearly expressed in the following document, which is laid before the reader. Therein will be found a succinct but correct picture of the military situation at that time, and the reasons actuating General Beauregard in the formation of his judgment upon the subject:

“HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
AUGUSTA, GA., *Feb. 3d*, 1865.

“Notes of conference had on the 2d day of February, A.D. 1865, at Green's Cut Station, Ga., at which General Beauregard, Lieut.-General Hardee, Major-General D. H. Hill, and Major-General G. W. Smith were present.

“The following was the estimated strength of the forces, in and about Augusta and the State of South Carolina, which could be relied on as effectives to resist the advance of Sherman:

General Hardee:	Regular infantry, P. A. C. S.....	8,000	
	Militia and reserves.....	3,000	11,000
	Light artillery.....	2,000	
	Butler's division, mounted and dis- mounted.....	1,500 *	3,500
Total under General Hardee.....			14,500
Major-General Smith:	Georgia militia.....	1,200	
General Brown:	Reserves.....	250	1,450
Total.....			15,950
“ infantry.....			12,450
Lee's corps:	Infantry.....	4,000	
Cheatham's corps:	“	3,000	
Stewart's corps:	“	3,000 †	10,000
Total infantry.....			22,450
	Artillery.....	800	
	Army of Tennessee.....	10,800	
	Wheeler's cavalry.....	6,700	
<i>Recapitulation.</i>			
Total infantry.....			22,450
“ light artillery.....			2,800
“ cavalry, mounted and dismounted.....			8,200
Grand total.....			33,450

* One-half only available at that date.

† Only about two-thirds of that number ever reported.

"Cheatham's and Stewart's corps had not arrived. The head of Cheatham's corps was expected to come on the 4th or 5th, and the head of Stewart's on the 10th or 11th.

"In view of Sherman's present position, his manifest advance towards Branchville from Pocolaligo and Coosawhatchie, the weakness of our forces, and the expected arrival of the reinforcements above referred to, it was deemed inadvisable to concentrate our forces at Branchville and there offer battle to Sherman.

"During the pending negotiations for peace it was thought of the highest importance to hold Charleston and Augusta as long as it was humanly possible. Moreover, it being in violation of all maxims of the military art to adopt a place as a point of concentration which it was possible that the enemy, with a largely superior force, could reach before our columns could arrive, it was, therefore, concluded—

"1st. That the line of the Combahee should be held as long as practicable, resisting the enemy strongly at all points.

"2d. Should the enemy penetrate this line or turn it in force, General Hardee should retire with his forces, covering his rear with about five hundred cavalry, towards Charleston, resisting the advance of the enemy in that direction vigorously behind every available creek, river, or swamp; while Wheeler, dividing his forces temporarily, should fall back with the main portion in the direction of Columbia, checking the enemy's advance, should he follow, and hold the line of the Congaree until reinforcements could arrive. The other portion of his cavalry was to fall back towards Augusta, covering that place.

"3d. Should the enemy follow General Hardee and indicate an attack on Charleston, and whenever it should become evident that a longer defence was impracticable, General Hardee should abandon the place, removing all valuable stores, and hasten to form a junction in front of Columbia with the forces of General Beauregard, who would have to cover Columbia, and take up the Congaree as a line of defence.

"4th. That the infantry now on the line of Briar Creek (about twenty-five miles south of Augusta) should be removed as soon as the stores were brought back, and take up a new position along Spirit Creek, about fifteen miles nearer, which should be fortified. A four-gun battery, with embrasures and heavy traverses, was to be placed on the Savannah River, near the mouth of Spirit Creek, and a similar one at Sand Bar Ferry, both batteries aided by torpedoes in the river.

"5th. It was held in contemplation to send Lee's corps to Branchville; and in the event of the happening of the contingency alluded to in the second and third resolutions, Major-General Stevenson, commanding that corps, should retire towards the Congaree, protected by the cavalry, where he would watch and guard its crossings until the arrival of Generals Beauregard and Hardee.

"In the course of the conference General Hardee expressed the opinion that it would require at least twenty thousand men to defend Charleston successfully during about twenty days—the extent of provisions there accumulated. He said, however, that his subordinate commanders in that district, Briga-

dier-Generals Taliaferro and Elliott, and Colonel Rhett, estimated the force required at from that number to about twenty-five thousand men.

"The troops arriving from the Army of Tennessee were still without artillery and wagons. Three batteries were expected to arrive at Augusta in two or three days, but the other six and the wagon-trains could not be expected to commence arriving before eight or ten days.

"The enemy, moving with a certain number of days' rations for all his troops, with the hope of establishing a new base at Charleston after its fall, has in reality no lines of communication which can be threatened or cut—his overpowering force enables him to move into the interior like an ordinary movable column.

Respectfully submitted.

"GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G."

The foregoing report, written by Colonel Brent, from notes furnished him by General Beauregard on his return from the conference, was forwarded to the War Department, with the following endorsement:

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
AUGUSTA, *Feb. 5th*, 1865.

"Respectfully forwarded to the War Department for the information of the President. If it be true, as reported by prisoners and deserters, that Schofield's corps (23d), from Middle Tennessee, and Sheridan's (19th), from the Valley of Virginia, have joined Sherman's army, it cannot be estimated at less than fifty-four thousand infantry and artillery—*i. e.*, six corps, at nine thousand men each—to whom must be added about four thousand cavalry, forming a total of not less than fifty-eight thousand disciplined and well-organized men.*

G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

When it became necessary to operate with the Confederate forces mentioned in the first part of the foregoing report, it was found that their number was most sadly diminished. This reduction—which caused extreme disappointment to General Beauregard—was due to the exhaustion of the men, numbers of whom had dropped out of the ranks on the march, never afterwards reporting for duty; and to the fact that the Georgia State troops, or "reserves," amounting to about fifteen hundred effectives, were not allowed to pass beyond the boundaries of their State, and were, therefore, not available for any operations in the two Carolinas. Cheatham's and Stewart's corps had also been delayed on their march from Tupelo, Miss.; and Lee's corps, under Major-General

* General Sherman afterwards informed General J. E. Johnston, in North Carolina (April 18th, 1865), that he had over seventy thousand men in all.

C. L. Stevenson, was still destitute of its means of transportation and of its artillery.

On the 3d General Hill was required to return one of the brigades of Lee's corps which he then had with him at Green's Cut Station, and the following order was thereupon issued to Major-General Stevenson :

" AUGUSTA, *Feb. 3d*, 1865.

"*General*,—General Beauregard desires that you will forthwith move with your corps by rail to Branchville, and assume command at that point of all troops which may be there. You will carry with you five days' cooked rations. On reaching Branchville you will open communication with Lieutenant-General Hardee, at Charleston, and advise him of your arrival. You will report here in person to General Beauregard, to receive instructions from him.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" GEO. W. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

" Major-General C. L. STEVENSON,
Comdg. Lee's corps."

During the latter part of the month of January reports were rife that General Sherman would resume his march, on or about the 1st of February, after having consumed nearly a month and a half in recruiting and refitting his army. This would have given the Confederates ample time to collect and reorganize another army in his front, if the resources of the country had not been exhausted, and if the railroad communications and rolling-stock then at our disposal had not been so much damaged by hard usage and the raiding incursions of the enemy. As it was, and despite very great efforts to that end, the remnant of Hood's army, with its artillery and wagon-trains, could not be transported in time to defend the interior of South Carolina.

On the 1st of February, General Wheeler, commanding the Confederate cavalry, with headquarters near Lawtonville, S. C., about half-way between the Salkehatchie and Savannah Rivers, telegraphed that the enemy had commenced his forward movement, with infantry and cavalry ; that he had crossed the Coosawhatchie at McBride's Bridge, and was marching in a northerly direction. That Federal force consisted of the 14th Corps, commanded by General Jefferson C. Davis, first on the left, according to General Sherman's map ; and of the 20th Corps, commanded by General A. S. Williams, second on the left ; both under General Slocum, and constituting the left wing of the advancing column. Then came the 15th Corps, commanded by

General J. A. Logan, being third from the left, and the 17th, commanded by General F. P. Blair, being fourth from the left. These two latter corps were under General Howard, and formed, together, the right wing of this invading expedition. Each corps consisted of about fifteen thousand men, infantry and artillery, exclusive of the cavalry, under General J. Kilpatrick, reported to be about four thousand strong.

On the 3d of February, having more fully ascertained the condition of affairs in South Carolina and Georgia, and knowing how insufficient would be the forces then at our command in these two States to oppose any serious movement on the part of Sherman, General Beauregard conceived a plan by which he hoped, late as it was, to redeem the fortunes of the Confederacy, and sent to Mr. Davis the following telegrams:

1. "AUGUSTA, *Feb. 3d*, 1865.

"To his Excellency President DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

"Three points threatened by enemy are of greatest importance to hold at present: Charleston, Branchville, and Augusta. Sherman is now apparently moving on Branchville. If we had sufficient force to give him battle a concentration of forces should immediately take place there; but General Hardee reports only thirteen thousand seven hundred effectives, infantry and artillery, of whom about three thousand are State reserves and militia. Lee's corps, just arrived here, and now on its way to Branchville, numbers only about four thousand effectives.* Cheatham's and Stewart's corps, averaging about three thousand each,† will not all arrive here before 10th instant, by which time enemy will probably have possession of Branchville. Concentration of Hardee's forces and mine cannot, therefore, take place south of Columbia.

"I respectfully urge the vital importance of concentrating at Columbia such forces as can be sent from North Carolina and Virginia. Ten or twelve thousand additional men would insure the defeat of Sherman and the reopening of General Lee's communications with his base of supplies. I will repair to Columbia as soon as practicable, and, with your approval, will assume command of all forces which may be assembled there. When railroad to Branchville shall have been tapped by enemy General Lee's supplies will have to be sent *via* Washington, Ga., and Abbeville, S. C.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

2. "AUGUSTA, GA., *Feb. 3d*, 1865.

"To his Excellency President DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

"The fall of Charleston and Columbia would necessitate soon abandonment of Wilmington and East North Carolina. If troops from there and

* It had no more than thirty-three hundred and fifty.

† The strength of each was twenty-five hundred men.

from Virginia could be sent me at Columbia, with their transportation, I would defeat, and might destroy, Sherman's army. No time, however, should be lost.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The two telegrams here submitted show how clear to General Beauregard was the necessity of abandoning all those cities and posts which he knew must soon fall of their own weight, and for whose protection troops were used that could now be better employed at other points. But no attention was paid to his suggestions. The Government persevered in following its beaten track, and preferred fighting the enemy's superior forces with disjointed portions of our own; thus reversing the essential maxim of war: "To command success, concentrate masses against fractions."

If General Beauregard had been aided in his effort to collect, in time, at or near Branchville, along the Charleston and Augusta Railroad, a force of some twenty-five thousand men, infantry and artillery, independently of the ten or twelve thousand General Hardee had behind the Combahee and Salkehatchie, his defensive plan would have been as follows.

As soon as he ascertained how General Sherman's four corps were advancing towards Branchville and the four principal crossings of the south branch of the Edisto (which are lined with endless, impassable swamps), he would have put some five thousand men to defend, aided by abatis and rifle-pits, the three left crossings from the west; guarding each of the minor ones with dismounted cavalry and two or three field-pieces. General Beauregard would then have retired, with the rest of his troops—numbering about twenty-two thousand—in front of Sherman's extreme right flank corps, the 17th, which crossed at Bionnecker's Bridge. He would have allowed this corps to cross about two-thirds of its number, when he would have attacked it with his whole force, and the result could not have been doubtful. He would then have pursued the remainder of that corps with about five thousand infantry and some cavalry; and, with the main body of his troops—seventeen thousand, more or less—he would have turned westwardly, crossing at Bionnecker's Bridge, and, marching thence towards Hobman's Bridge, would have attacked the 15th Corps in rear, while the five thousand men left to defend the bridge would have assailed them in front. Thus pressed the 15th Corps might have been captured or destroyed. General Beauregard, reinforced successively by the troops at the other two bridges, and those left to

guard Augusta, would have been able to march against the remaining two corps of Sherman's army. It is evident that these corps (isolated so far from their base), at Beaufort or Savannah, could not have reached either point without being sorely crippled, if not destroyed.

We have thus minutely transcribed this plan, because of its strategic value and entire feasibility. General Beauregard had veteran troops under him and veteran commanders, who were all confident of his ability to lead them; and he was justified, by the light of his past experience, in again counting upon victory. It was, indeed, unfortunate that the War Department and Generals Bragg and Hardee did not understand the wisdom and necessity, at this juncture, of the concentration he advised. It would have resulted in the re-establishment of our lines of communication and depots of supplies, and in the eventual relief—if not permanent salvation—of the Confederate Capitol.

On the 4th of February, General Beauregard was ordered to "assume command of all the forces in the district as defined before his departure to the West," with authority, should he deem it advisable, to re-assign General Hardee to his old corps, and attach to it any other forces he might select. Had the reinforcements asked of the War Department been sent with this order, the military situation in South Carolina would soon have worn quite a different aspect. As it was, the authority to act, without the means, could and did avail little.

On the same day General Beauregard forwarded the following instructions to General Wheeler. They are given in full, because they show the movements of the enemy at that time, and indicate what measures were about to be adopted to oppose him:

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
AUGUSTA, GA., *Feb. 4th*, 1865: 11.45 A. M.

"Major-Genl. JOS. WHEELER, comdg. cavalry at Fiddle Pond, near Barnwell Court-house, S. C.:

"*General*.—General McLaws reports that the enemy, late last night, had forced a passage across the Salkehatchie, in the vicinity of River's Bridge, forcing him back towards Branchville. Should you have received no definite orders from General Hardee, for the present contingency, you will cross the Salkehatchie, with the bulk of your forces, as close to River's Bridge as safely practicable, and re-establish your communications with General McLaws (or Stevenson) at or about Branchville, protecting, at the same time, the Charleston Railroad from that point towards Blackville, and beyond it, if possible.

"When compelled to fall back from the railroad you will defend the crossings of the Edisto above Branchville, operating in conjunction with General Stevenson for the protection of Columbia, and the crossings of the Congaree above and below that city.

"The remainder of your force (say about one brigade) left south of the Salkchatchie will retire fighting in the direction of Augusta, holding the enemy in check wherever practicable. It will be sent to rejoin you as soon as circumstances will permit.

"Continue to keep General Hill advised of your movements, and of those of the enemy.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

On the 6th it was still uncertain whether the enemy, after reaching Branchville, would attempt to strike Augusta, Columbia, or Charleston. He was, no doubt, inclined to move on the two last at once, and our force was insufficient to check his progress. He was advancing upon the Charleston Railroad, General Wheeler striving to get between him and Augusta, and having all bridges below Holman's Bridge destroyed.

The following telegram from General Beauregard to General Cooper, dated Augusta, February 8th, 1865, describes the situation then existing:

"Enemy cut railroad to Charleston yesterday (the 7th) near Blackville. Lee's corps is in position on south fork of Edisto, protecting approaches to Columbia. Head of Cheatham's corps arrived here last night. McLaws's division is at and about Branchville. I shall leave here to-morrow for Columbia.

Upon reaching Columbia, about noon on the 10th, General Beauregard immediately telegraphed General Hardee advising the concentration of his forces from the Combahee line to a line behind the Edisto, so as to shorten it as much as possible.

On the day following, in answer to General Hardee, who had informed him of the crossing of the enemy to James Island in front of his works, General Beauregard forwarded the following telegram:

"COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb.* 11th, 1865.

"Lieut.-General HARDEE, Charleston, S. C.:

"By late movements of the enemy it is apparent that he intends to move upon Charleston, or to cut off your communications along the Northeastern Railroad. It is therefore advisable that you proceed to execute, as soon as possible, the movement agreed upon the 2d instant. Guard well your left flank and the crossings of the Santee.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

But General Hardee, for reasons which were never clearly explained, imprudently delayed following the advice thus given him. It is easy to understand that he was loath to abandon Charleston, in the effort to capture and destroy which millions of dollars had been spent in vain by the Federal Government, thousands of lives lost, and more than one military reputation irretrievably wrecked. No one felt greater reluctance than General Beauregard to abandon Charleston. He had largely contributed to build up that city's high renown, and valued it as he did his own. Still, an imperative duty lay before him and before those who, up to this time, had helped to place that brave city beyond the grasp of the enemy. The place must be evacuated; and the sooner this should be done the better it would be; otherwise its garrison, its stores, and public property must fall into the hands of the enemy, thus adding disgrace to misfortune. On the 12th of February, the evacuation not having yet begun, and General Hardee having asked for additional advice, General Beauregard replied that he could not judge of the precise moment for beginning the movement, but that, in his opinion, further delay might be fatal.

In the mean time the War Department, as usual, had been kept well informed of the movements of the enemy, and knew that General Stevenson had fallen back to the north branch of the Edisto; that Wheeler was moving towards Augusta, to check the advance of the invading column; also that a monitor was in the Stono, and constant firing maintained, though not, as yet, upon Charleston; that the enemy had crossed the North Edisto near Orangeburg; that McLaws had retired from Branchville to the "Four-hole Swamp;" and that sixteen transports had appeared in Bull's Bay, north of Bull's Island, on the coast of Christ Church Parish.

A few hours after his arrival at Columbia, General Beauregard had a long interview with the Mayor of the city, Doctor T. J. Goodwyn, and, almost at the same time, with Major-General Wade Hampton, who was then in South Carolina with Brigadier-General Butler, for the purpose of recruiting men and horses for his division of cavalry. As they were both of that State, and well acquainted with its topography and resources, General Beauregard requested their assistance in the defence of Columbia. They responded with alacrity, and were forthwith assigned to duty. Gen-

eral Hampton was given the command of the city and its vicinity, and General Butler placed under him. But soon perceiving the necessity of having a single head to the cavalry—now materially increased by the accession of General Butler's command—and desirous of availing himself of the ability of so distinguished an officer as General Hampton, General Beauregard applied for his immediate promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general. His request being readily acceded to, that tried and experienced cavalry commander, the acknowledged peer of the hard-fighting Forrest, was thus enabled to take precedence over General Wheeler, who, though an active, zealous, and gallant officer, was comparatively unknown in South Carolina, and, therefore, could not have rendered equal service with General Hampton.

At this juncture General Hardee's anxiety and uncertainty of mind as to the evacuation of Charleston appear to have been extreme. He had apparently forgotten, or was no longer heedful of, the clear and definite arrangements agreed upon at the Green's-cut Station conference on the 2d of February, which should have been amply sufficient for his guidance. So urgent and repeated, however, were his calls upon General Beauregard, that the latter concluded to comply with them. Accordingly, notwithstanding the threatening movements of the enemy in the direction of Branchville and Columbia, which required his close supervision, he ordered the railroad track to be cleared of all trains that might impede the celerity of his trip; and, on the afternoon of the 13th, after sending a telegram to that effect, started for Charleston, where he arrived shortly after daylight on the 14th.

To his extreme surprise and regret, he found that no positive step had yet been taken for the evacuation so much spoken of, because, it was said, of a certain opposition on the part of Governor Magrath and of the Confederate Government itself. General Beauregard, however, had no trouble in convincing General Hardee of the absolute necessity of abandoning the city and concentrating our forces, not at Columbia, as had been originally decided—for it was then too late to do so—but at another point on the Charlotte Railroad, namely, Chesterville, S. C.

Most of the day which General Beauregard spent in Charleston on that occasion was devoted to the preparations for the movement of the troops, embodied in the following document, which he left with General Hardee for his guidance:

“HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
CHARLESTON, *Feb. 14th*, 1865.

“Memoranda of Orders for Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee.

“1st. One brigade of Wright's division in St. Paul's will move by railroad to Monk's Corner, and thence march into position (at or about Snowden's), from Sandy Run to Santee River.

“2d. The remainder of Wright's division to move *via* Summerville, thence to Groomsville, thence along Northeastern Railroad to St. Stephen's depot.

“3d. The troops around Charleston will commence their movement when Wright's division shall have reached Summerville.

“4th. Troops in Christ Church will take steamers to Strawberry Ferry, *via* Cordesville, to St. Stephen's depot.

“5th. The troops from James Island along sea-front first, thence in succession to Ashley Ferry; thence to Six-mile House; thence to St. Stephen's depot.

“6th. Troops in Charleston to follow movements to Six-mile House, thence to St. Stephen's depot.

“7th. When the troops shall have arrived at Monk's Corner, McLaws shall commence the retrograde movement from the left flank, resting at Four-hole Bridge, passing in rear of Four-hole Swamp; thence by Pineville road to Pineville; thence to St. Stephen's depot.

“8th. The troops on McLaws's right shall follow the movement as they are uncovered from the left.

“9th. The rear-guard of the troops executing these movements shall destroy all bridges and trestle behind them, and railroads, when possible.

“10th. The troops concentrated at St. Stephen's shall move to form a junction with the troops at Columbia, or with the same at Chesterville, following one of the routes, according to the movements of the enemy, as follows:

“1st. *Via* Manchester and Kingsville to Columbia or Manchester, Camden, and Brown's Ferry, on the Catawba, to Chesterville.

“2d. *Via* Darlington, Kelly's Bridge, on Lynch's Creek, and Brown's Ferry, on the Catawba, to Chesterville.

“3d. *Via* Cheraw, Chesterville, Lancaster, and Brown's Ferry, on the Catawba, to Chesterville.

“In view of the facility the enemy has at Branchville and Orangeburg, and in the direction of Columbia, to cut the line of retreat of the garrison of Charleston, as above referred to, it becomes necessary to commence the evacuation as soon as the necessary preparations can be made.

“The holding of Charleston is now reduced to only a question of a few days. Its loss does not jeopardize the safety of the State of South Carolina, but the loss of its garrison would greatly contribute to that end.

“G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.”

That night (February 14th) General Beauregard ordered the track cleared again, and started on his return to Columbia. On

arriving at Florence, at 7 A. M., on the 15th, he sent the following telegram to General Hardee:

"Order all roads and bridges repaired on the three routes designated. Horses impressed in and about Charleston must be used for remounting Young's cavalry. Impress, also, saddles and bridles, if necessary.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the same day, and from the same place, he telegraphed General Lee as follows:

"I have arranged with General Hardee for the immediate evacuation of Charleston, and concentration of our forces at Chesterville, S. C.; if those of General Bragg could be added thereto success might crown our efforts, however dark may appear the present hour.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

While stopping, a few hours later, at Sumterville he forwarded this telegraphic message to General Lee:

"SUMTER STATION, S. C., *Feb. 15th, 1865.*

"General R. E. LEE, Richmond, Va.:

"Generals Stevenson and Hampton report from Columbia enemy has appeared in their front and driven their pickets across Congaree, at railroad bridge near Kingsville. They consider movement on Columbia serious. I am on my return there.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

And to General Hardee he sent the following important despatch:

"SUMTERVILLE, *Feb. 15th, 1865.*

"Lieut.-General HARDEE, Charleston, S. C.:

"Commence immediately movement as arranged; and, if practicable, average twenty miles a day. Collect at once sufficient provisions and forage, at proper points, on the several routes designated.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

General Beauregard reached Columbia on the afternoon of the 15th, and soon afterwards sent a message to General Lee as follows:

"COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 15th, 1865: 7.30 P. M.*

"General R. E. LEE, General-in-chief, Richmond, Va.:

"Have just arrived from Charleston. Generals Stevenson and Hampton report Sherman's four corps moving on this place, two of them pressing our troops back on south side to within about four miles of the river. Cheatham's corps has not yet arrived. We will hold the city as long as practicable with present available means.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

He had already had despatches sent to Generals Stewart and Cheatham, calling upon them to hasten their movements on Columbia; and to Major Roland Rhett, A. Q. M., and Captain J. D.

Witherspoon, A. C. S., orders were given, on the 15th, to remove all quartermaster and subsistence stores, with the exception of fifty thousand rations, to some point on the Charlotte Railroad, in the direction of Chesterville.

During the evening of the same day (15th) General Beauregard received a telegram from General Hardee, enclosing one from Mr. Davis, showing that, even at that late hour, he was still hesitating concerning the evacuation of Charleston. As will be seen, the President encouraged, and, in a great measure, was the direct cause of this blameworthy procrastination.

General Hardee's telegram read thus:

"CHARLESTON, *Feb. 15th*, 1865.

"To General BEAUREGARD:

"The following despatch was received last night from President Davis: 'Your despatch of 12th received to-day. The enemy may, and probably does, intend an attack on Charleston, but it is by no means manifested by present operations. It is proper, under the view presented, to remove whatever is not needful for defence of the place, and then to postpone evacuation as long as prudent. If General Beauregard can hold the enemy in the field, the course herein indicated may preserve the city and harbor for further uses, and save us the pain of seeing it pass into the hands of the enemy. General Beauregard and yourself are so well informed of the condition of the armies and the practicability of routes, that I must leave you to the free exercise of your judgment. It, however, seems to me that the bridge over the Santee can be defended against a boat expedition up that river without materially injuring other operations; and a movement by the enemy, overland, from Bull's Bay is hardly to be anticipated.'"

General Beauregard's answer followed without delay. It was in the following words:

"COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 15th*, 1865.

"General HARDEE, Charleston, S. C.:

"Despatch of to-day received containing President's. I have far from sufficient force to hold the enemy in check in the field. He is, at this moment, investing Columbia with his four corps (as reported), on the south side of Congaree. Hence I see no good reason for deviating from the plan already decided upon; on the contrary, I urge its immediate execution.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

The movement was accordingly ordered to begin, on the 16th, without further delay.* Unfortunately, however, General Hardee, who had been unwell for several days, was obliged, at this critical hour, to leave his post; and the command of his forces

* See General Hardee's telegram, in Appendix.

devolved upon the officer ranking next under him, General L. McLaws.* It is for this reason, no doubt, that the evacuation was not effected until the night of the 17th and the early morning of the 18th.

The following telegrams, sent by General Beauregard to General Lee, so thoroughly explain the whole situation, that no further explanation seems necessary :

1. "COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 16th, 1865.*

"General R. E. LEE, General-in-chief, Richmond, Va. :

"I returned last evening from Charleston. I shall assume command to-day of all forces in South Carolina. The present military situation is thus : our forces, twenty thousand effective infantry and artillery, more or less demoralized, occupy a circumference of about two hundred and forty miles, from Charleston to Augusta. The enemy, well organized and disciplined, and flushed with success, numbering nearly double our force, is concentrated on one point, Columbia, of that circumference. Unless I can concentrate rapidly here in my rear all available troops, the result cannot be long doubtful. General Hardee still hesitates to abandon Charleston, notwithstanding I have repeatedly urged him to do so, thereby losing several days of vital importance to future operations.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

2. "COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 16th, 1865.*

"General R. E. LEE, General-in-chief, Richmond, Va. :

"Enemy commenced shelling the city this morning. He is apparently moving up towards Saluda River. Our forces occupy south bank of that stream and Congaree.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

3. "COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 16th, 1865.*

"General R. E. LEE, General-in-chief, Richmond, Va. :

"Enemy has forced a passage across the Saluda River above Columbia. I will endeavor to prevent him from crossing the Broad, but my forces here are so small it is doubtful whether I can prevent it. Columbia will soon be evacuated.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

From the contents of this chapter, and the orders and telegrams annexed, it is evident that, in the amended version of his account of the evacuation of Fort Sumter,† Mr. Davis is hardly more correct than when he first stated that Colonel (afterwards General) Elliott was then in command, and "*on receiving the general order of retreat * * * addressed his men in the glowing language of*

* See Appendix for despatch of Major Roy, A. A. G.

† See the amended version of the first edition of "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 204.

patriotism and unswerving devotion to the Confederate cause."* Mr. Davis now admits that General Elliott was not there at the time, and that to Captain Huguenin, the last commander of the fort, was reserved the sad honor of retiring the garrison. The acknowledged efficiency of Captain Huguenin, and the peculiar circumstances under which he was placed, deserved notice on the part of the ex-President of the Confederacy. We have already endeavored, in a preceding chapter, to do justice to Captain Huguenin and to the other meritorious officers who made famous the successful defence of Fort Sumter, but whose names are not even mentioned in Mr. Davis's account.

The "plan of evacuation" of Charleston and its harbor—attributed by Mr. Davis to General Hardee—was devised by General Beauregard. The minutest details concerning it were marked down by him and impressed upon General Hardee, who, far from having formed any "plan" to that effect, did not even perceive the necessity of withdrawing the troops at that time, and so long delayed the execution of the movement that, with a view to carry it out, General Beauregard resumed command of the Department, and then ordered General Hardee to evacuate at once. This is the first error noticeable in Mr. Davis's amended account of that event. Another is his omission to state that, because of General Hardee's ill-health and absence at the time, it was General McLaws who commanded the troops at the evacuation. His third error is the mention he makes of "Colonel Stephen Elliott, Jr.," as "the gallant commander of that fort," intimating thereby, and leading the reader to believe, that, prior to July, 1864, when Captain Huguenin was sent there, no other officer than Colonel Elliott had been in command of Fort Sumter. The reader is aware that, after Colonel Rhett had defended the fort for a prolonged period, he was withdrawn from that work, to take charge of the city defences; and that Fort Sumter was afterwards commanded—first by Major Elliott; second, by Captain Mitchell, who fell at his post; and third, by Captain Huguenin, one of the gallant officers of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (Regulars), who was still on duty there when the evacuation took place.

* See first edition (as originally published) of "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 204. The italics are ours.

CHAPTER XLV.

The Enemy Crosses Broad River on the 16th of February.—General Beauregard Orders the Evacuation of Columbia.—It is Effected on the 17th.—General Beauregard's Arrival at Ridgeway.—His Despatches to the War Department.—General Hampton's Plan to Oppose the Advance of the Enemy.—General Beauregard Goes to White Oak.—His Letter to General Lee.—He Reaches Chesterville.—His Telegram to President Davis Urging Concentration.—Remarks upon General Badeau's Interpretation of this Telegram.—Apprehension of the Enemy upon this Point.—Reasons upon which General Beauregard Founded his Advice.—His Arrival at Charlotte on the 22d.—General Lee's Despatch Giving Command of the Southern Army to General Johnston.—Impossibility of Beating Back Sherman without Reinforcements.—General Lee's Despatch to the Secretary of War.—Comments thereon.—What Colonel Taylor (Lee's Adjutant) Thought of the Necessity for Concentration.—General Beauregard's Plan the only Wise One.—General Johnston Assumes Command.—His View of the Situation.—General Beauregard's Answer to General Lee.—Arrival of General Johnston at Charlotte on the 24th.—Sherman's Line of March after Destroying Columbia.—Fall of Fort Fisher.—General Bragg Retreats to Goldsboro'.—His Tardy Junction with General Johnston.—Wisdom of General Beauregard's Plan Vindicated.

THE enemy effected the crossing of Broad River during the night of the 16th of February. With our small force of infantry and a few light batteries, under General Stevenson, aggregating about three thousand men, and the cavalry, under Generals Wheeler and Butler, some four thousand men, commanded by General Hampton, we had endeavored, in vain, to impede his progress. The evacuation of Columbia therefore became a necessity, and General Beauregard ordered its execution at daylight on the following morning. The infantry and artillery were to head the retreat, and the cavalry, bringing up the rear, was to file out of the city as the Federal columns should enter it.* This movement was carried out to the letter with perfect system and order. The conflagration and pillage that took place after our troops had left will form the subject of another chapter.

* See letters to Generals Hampton, Stevenson, and Cheatham, in Appendix. See, also, instructions to Colonel G. W. Brent.

General Beauregard rode out of Columbia, with his staff, at 10 A. M. on the 17th, taking a northerly route towards Chester, where he thought he might still be able to form a junction with General Hardee's forces.

He arrived at Ridgeway, about twenty-five miles from Columbia, on the night of the 17th, and remained there nearly two days, giving orders to his different commands, and reporting to the President and General Lee every incident of importance connected with the movements of his troops. His first telegram to the latter read as follows :

"RIDGEWAY, S. C., *Feb. 17th*, 1865: 9.30 P. M.

"General R. E. LEE, Richmond, Va. :

"Enemy having forced crossing of Saluda and Broad rivers above Columbia, city had to be evacuated this morning. My forces are now retiring on this place. Everything possible shall be done to retard enemy's advance, but I cannot separate cavalry from infantry without fear of disaster, owing to small number of latter—only about three thousand effectives. Moreover, having no supply trains, troops must move along railroad.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

In answer to a despatch from the Secretary of War, alleging interference with provisions at Charlotte which had been ordered to Richmond by the Commissary-General, General Beauregard immediately forwarded this telegram :

"RIDGEWAY, S. C., *Feb. 17th*, 1865: 9.30 P. M.

"General BRECKINRIDGE, Secy. of War, Richmond, Va. :

"Far from interfering with provisions at Charlotte Junction, I have done all I could to send everything forward from Columbia.* I advise removal of *all supplies*, except two hundred thousand rations, from Charlotte to a safer place farther north ; no time should be lost.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the 18th he informed General McLaws, who had temporarily relieved General Hardee, that Columbia had been abandoned ; that Hampton's cavalry was still near the city ; that the future intentions of the enemy were not yet fully ascertained ; but that all instructions given to General Hardee must be rapidly carried out.

On the same day General Hampton, by despatch, proposed a plan of concentration to check the enemy's further advance. It

* See, in Appendix to preceding chapter, General Beauregard's orders to Major R. Rhett, A. Q. M., and to Captain Witherspoon, A. C. S., for removal of stores from Columbia.

was ably conceived, and, under other circumstances, might have resulted successfully. But, as Cheatham's and Hardee's troops could not have reached the designated point in time, and as the 14th Corps (Federal) had already crossed to the east of Broad River, it being probable that the 20th would cross on the next day, at Alston, General Beauregard was of opinion that, with our small forces then available, we could effect no serious damage to the 15th Federal Corps, and that our line of retreat to Chesterville might, on the other hand, be entirely cut off by the 14th and 20th Corps—thus opening an unobstructed country to the enemy through the State of South Carolina. General Hampton's suggestion, therefore, was not adopted.*

From Ridgeway, General Beauregard passed on to White Oak, where, on the 19th and 20th, he sent important instructions to Generals Hampton and Stevenson, directing their movements and line of march, and advising necessary measures for the removal of rations at Chesterville.

He also forwarded the following message to General Lee:

"WHITE OAK, *Feb. 19th, 1865.*

"General R. E. LEE, Richmond, Va.:

"*General*,—After close examination and exerting every means in my power, I find it impossible for the troops now in Charleston to form a junction with me this side of Greensboro' (North Carolina). Believing it best, from the information just received from Governor Vance and General Bragg, to transport the troops by rail to that point, I have directed General McLaws to move them by rail as rapidly as possible. I am also of the opinion that Cheatham, at Newberry, this morning, with two thousand men, and Stewart, eighteen hours behind him, with twelve hundred, cannot form a junction with me except by moving across, *via* Statesburg and Manchester, and thence, by rail, to Greensboro'. This movement will require some days, owing to the difficulties of crossing Broad and Wateree rivers. The enemy has advanced to-day to near Winnsboro', in force, and is still moving along the railroad, keeping between this place and Broad River, thus cutting off Cheatham and Stewart.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

This was before the enemy had decided to move eastward. General McLaws was informed of the countermanded movement, and General Bragg, at Wilmington, was asked to communicate with and afford him all the aid in his power.

General Beauregard arrived at Chesterville on the night of the

* See Appendix.

20th. He remained there until the next day, at 10 A.M., when he left for Charlotte, N. C., having lost all hope of concentrating at Chester, with Hardee's, Cheatham's, and Stewart's forces.

From Chesterville, on the 21st, General Beauregard sent the following telegram to President Davis:

"Should enemy advance into North Carolina, towards Charlotte and Salisbury, as is now almost certain, I earnestly urge a concentration in time of at least thirty-five thousand infantry and artillery at latter point, if possible, to give him battle there and crush him; then to concentrate all forces against Grant, and then to march on Washington to dictate a peace. Hardee and myself can collect about fifteen thousand men, exclusive of Cheatham and Stewart, not likely to reach in time. If Lee and Bragg could furnish twenty thousand more, the fate of the Confederacy would be secure.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

It seems, according to Mr. Davis's book,* that this demand for reinforcements, although "implying a compliment" to General Lee, had no other result than to "disturb" him; and it is hardly necessary to add that no attention whatever was paid to it.

A curious feature of the Confederate history may here be elucidated. In his "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," General Badeau speaks of the foregoing despatch and proposed concentration in terms of complete discourtesy.† He alludes to General Beauregard's ill-health at the time, and to that cause ascribes what he considers the folly of his proposition. He even connects it with the fact that on "the day after this despatch was received Johnston superseded Beauregard in command of the troops opposed to Sherman."

If it was folly on the part of General Beauregard to suggest and urge the concentration of our forces at that period—and it must not be forgotten that he had been attempting to bring it about ever since the 3d of February‡—it was also folly on the part of General Lee to write, in the despatch wherein he asked for the appointment of General Johnston, the following words: "It is necessary to bring out all our strength and, I fear, *to unite our armies, as, separately, they do not seem able to make head against the enemy.*" And again: "I fear it may be necessary to abandon our

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 631.

† "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. iii., p. 397.

‡ See, in preceding chapter, General Beauregard's telegrams of that date.

cities, and preparations should be made for this contingency.”* The only difference between the two generals was, that General Lee saw the necessity of concentration too late, and failed to act upon it; whereas Beauregard saw it much earlier, and would have tried to carry it to a successful conclusion, had the power been given him to execute his plans. That General Grant himself dreaded the effects of such “folly”—*i. e.*, the concentration proposed and the demand for reinforcements by General Beauregard—is conclusively shown by the following quotation from General Badeau’s book: “At this time again Grant saw reason to apprehend a movement of Lee before Richmond or Petersburg, *either to screen the withdrawal of the rebel army, or to distract attention from operations elsewhere.*”† And General Grant is reported to have said, on the 25th of February: “Deserters from the rebel lines, north of the James, say it is reported among them that Hill’s corps has left, or is leaving, to join Beauregard.”‡ That, late as it was, the course proposed by General Beauregard was the true strategic measure to adopt, is shown by the apprehension of the enemy. And General Badeau again quotes, as follows, General Grant’s words to General Meade, on the 3d of March: “For the present, *it is better for us to hold the enemy where he is than to force him South. * * * To drive the enemy from Richmond now would endanger the success of these columns*”§—meaning Sherman’s and Schofield’s.

And what was General Beauregard attempting to compass, with a view to a successful conclusion of the war? That the end had been nearly reached by both contending parties was evident at the time, and has been set forth, with startling certainty, by researches among the Federal archives. The desire for peace was eager all over the North; and any decisive victory or series of victories, on our part, would not only have disheartened our adversaries, by re-opening before them a vista of long and protracted struggles, with levies of men now become most exacting, but would have reanimated the whole South, and brought back thousands of absentees to our ranks. Under such circumstances,

* General Lee’s communication, of February 19th, 1865, to General Breckinridge, Secretary of War, in Appendix.

† “Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,” vol. iii., p. 394.

‡ Ibid., vol. iii., p. 395.

§ Ibid., vol. iii., p. 405.

with a wise, far-seeing Administration, and with prompt, energetic action in the field, was it folly to assume that we could have claimed and obtained an honorable peace? General Beauregard knew that the South was not exhausted; that there still remained in it strong powers of vitality; that the "granaries of that vast and fertile territory bulged with stores of corn."* He also knew that the Army of Northern Virginia was wasting away in a futile attempt to preserve Richmond and Petersburg; that General Lee was not in a position to undertake any movement against the army confronting him; and that should reinforcements be drawn from his ranks, none of his plans would thereby suffer or be prevented; while, by utilizing one or two corps of the Army of Virginia, Sherman could have been checked, cut off from his base, and, eventually, defeated. That the undertaking was a perilous one, is undoubted; but it was practicable, nevertheless; and, situated as we then were, a bold and vigorous effort of the kind was necessary, unless we were willing to await, with crossed hands, the fate which the unimpeded movements of the enemy must inevitably draw upon us. Basing his opinion upon all these considerations, General Beauregard, who, despite his great anxiety, could not and would not despond, wisely counselled that measure of concentration which the Administration, unfortunately, disregarded, and General Badeau, with naught before him but the equivocal proof of an accomplished fact, presumptuously condemns.

On the night of the 22d General Beauregard arrived at Charlotte, where, to his no small surprise, the following telegram was handed to him:

"HEADQUARTERS, *Feb.* 22d, 1865.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"I have directed General J. E. Johnston to assume command of Southern army, and to assign you to duty with him. Together, I feel assured you will beat back Sherman.
R. E. LEE."

Had General Lee accompanied this despatch with an order for two corps of his army to march to the assistance of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, his assurance that, "together," they would be able to "beat back Sherman" would have been well founded; otherwise it was entirely meaningless. With what troops was

* Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 571.

this defeat of Sherman's army to be accomplished? General Johnston had none, and General Beauregard's forces—marching from different points, and not yet united at any, notwithstanding his unceasing efforts to bring them together—consisted of about five thousand men of the Army of Tennessee and the troops of the Department under General Hardee, amounting to about eleven thousand. Two thousand of the former, commanded by Major-General Stevenson, were near Charlotte. One thousand, under Lieutenant-General Stewart, were near Newberry, approaching Charlotte; and two thousand, under Major-General Cheatham, were between Newberry and Augusta, also marching towards Charlotte. The troops of the Department, under Lieutenant-General Hardee's command, were moving from Charleston to Cheraw. Eleven hundred of them were South Carolina militia and reserves, not expected to leave the State.*

The concentration of all their available forces within any given time, at any given place, was not the greatest obstacle that Generals Johnston and Beauregard had to overcome; the question was, how could they, with less than fifteen thousand men under them (for the South Carolina militia and cadets had to be deducted), have driven back an army numbering fully seventy thousand men, according to General Sherman's own estimate of its strength? But it seems that, in General Lee's opinion, however courteous his language may have been, the deficiency lay in the commander, not in the number of his troops; for, on the 19th of February, in General Lee's despatch, already alluded to and addressed to General Breckinridge, Secretary of War, he thus expressed himself: “* * * I do not see how Sherman can make the march anticipated by General Beauregard; but he seems to have everything his own way, which is calculated to cause apprehension. General Beauregard does not say what he proposes, or what he can do. I do not know where his troops are, or on what lines they are moving. His despatches only give movements of the enemy. He has a difficult task to perform under present circumstances, and one of his best officers, General Hardee, is incapacitated by sickness. I have also heard that his own health is indifferent, though he has never so stated. Should his strength give way, there is no one on duty in the Department that could replace

* General Johnston's "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 572.

him, nor have I any one to send there. General J. E. Johnston is the only officer whom I know who has the confidence of the army and people; and if he was ordered to report to me I would place him there on duty." *

It seems strange that General Lee should have declared himself ignorant of the whereabouts of General Beauregard's forces, and of the lines upon which they moved, when so many despatches of General Beauregard, to him and to the War Department, were replete with the most exact information on these two points, as is shown by the telegrams contained in this and the preceding chapter, and in the appendices to both. But stranger still appears his further assertion that he has "also heard that his own [General Beauregard's] health is indifferent, though he has never so stated." And, acting upon this supposition, without making the least inquiry of General Beauregard, he proposes, not that General Johnston shall be called from retirement and held in readiness, should his services be required for the emergency referred to, but that he shall be immediately ordered to supersede General Beauregard and take command of his army.

And why should General Lee have been "disturbed" by General Beauregard's urgent demand for reinforcements from the Army of Virginia? Why should his plan for concentration have been the apparent immediate cause of his removal, when we find the vital necessity of just such a movement strongly advocated by Colonel W. H. Taylor, late Adjutant-General of the Army of Northern Virginia—"one who," as he says himself, "*was brought into daily and intimate relations with General Lee,*" and whose statements upon such topics were but "*the reflex of the views and opinions*" † of his commander? In Colonel Taylor's book, entitled "Four Years with General Lee," we find the following significant passage given as a certified extract from his war journal:

"EDGE HILL, Feb. 24th, 1865.

"Now that General Johnston has been placed in command of his old army by General Lee, it is not probable that the latter will go to South Carolina—at any rate, not immediately. * * * It is not to be denied that our condition at this time is a critical one; *but although it is a crisis in our affairs, it is the same with the enemy. Suppose we were to concentrate on Sherman and crush him,*

* See, in Appendix, General Lee's despatch to General Breckenridge, Secretary of War.

† "Four Years with General Lee," p. 140. The italics are ours.

*would not the aspect of affairs be entirely changed? Well, that is not beyond the range of possibility. Much depends on the check given to Sherman's career. Richmond may be lost to us, and Sherman may be overwhelmed. The defeat of Sherman would restore Richmond. To be rid of him would more than compensate for such temporary sacrifice."**

We cannot understand, therefore, how General Beauregard incurred the disapproval of General Lee, for wishing to carry out a measure which General Lee's own better judgment seems to have approved,† but which failed of execution, because the General-in-chief bent before the will of those who would not abandon Richmond, even temporarily, and allowed, nay, proposed, General Beauregard's removal, although the latter was advocating the only plan which, at this dark hour, could have made success possible.

At the eleventh hour, and when delay, from whatever source it might arise, was so much to be dreaded, General Johnston, at the request of General Lee,‡ was abruptly placed in command of our forces operating in the two Carolinas, and instructed to "beat back Sherman," but without being given the means wherewith alone such a result could be obtained.

The question which naturally arises now is, how did General Johnston carry out these instructions? We know that when the troops under him were assembled, in obedience to orders already issued by General Beauregard, he officially assumed command on the 25th of February, and published on that occasion an able and soldierly address to his troops. But what were his expectations, and what course was it then his intention to pursue? He thought the Southern cause, at that time, irretrievably lost, and so, evidently, did General Lee himself; and he resumed the duties of his military grade with no hope beyond that of contributing to obtain peace on such conditions as, under the circumstances,

* "Four Years with General Lee," pp. 143, 144. The italics are ours.

† Ibid., pp. 145, 146.

‡ In President Davis's work, vol. ii., p. 631, we read: "A few days subsequent to the events in North Carolina to which reference has been made, General Lee proposed that General J. E. Johnston should be put in command of the troops in North Carolina. He still had the confidence in that officer which I had once felt, but which his campaigns in Mississippi and Georgia had impaired. With the understanding that General Lee was himself to supervise and control the operations, I assented to the assignment."

ought to satisfy the Southern people and their Government.* General Beauregard and, in fact, most of our leaders, in the field and elsewhere, believed that the end of the war was close at hand. But, in Colonel Taylor's language, as already quoted, General Beauregard also knew that, "*although it was a crisis in our affairs, it was the same with the enemy.*" He therefore strongly believed that our best chance of obtaining an honorable peace was to base it upon a victory over the enemy, which could only be gained by great vigor and an immediate concentration.

The following is General Beauregard's answer to the order informing him of his removal from the command of his army:

"General R. E. LEE, Richmond, Va. : "CHARLOTTE, N. C., Feb. 22d, 1865.

"Your despatch informing me that you had directed General Joseph E. Johnston to assume command of the Southern army and to assign me to duty with him, has just been received. In the defence of our common country I will, at all times, be happy to serve with or under so gallant and patriotic a soldier as General Johnston.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

This was a noble answer, denoting an entire absence of personal ambition on the part of its author. To General Johnston—who, before accepting the command offered him, had visited General Beauregard, "to ascertain if he had been consulted on the subject"†—the latter had also given, in substance, the same assurance. It will be remembered, no doubt, that some time in January, after leaving Charleston and before reaching the Army of Tennessee, General Beauregard had endeavored to have General Johnston restored to active service, and had even proposed to yield him his former command.‡ No action, however, had been taken in the matter by the War Department, and General Beauregard had reason to believe that, after all he had accomplished with the restricted means at his disposal, he would continue to control the military operations of his Department. He had made no complaint whatever about his health, although others may have taken upon themselves to report it as being "indifferent." The truth is, he had seldom been so well since the opening of the war. Nor had he expressed any fear that his health might impair his

* General Johnston's "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 372.

† Ibid., p. 371.

‡ See Chapter XLIII. of this work, p. 329.

energy or prevent the full execution of his own or the Government's plans. General Lee's answer (which we give in the Appendix) shows how well he appeared to appreciate the disinterestedness marking General Beauregard's conduct. We must say, however, that had General Beauregard been aware of the personal intervention of General Lee and of the reason assigned for his removal, he would, while unhesitatingly sacrificing his rank for the public good, have plainly shown his consciousness of the injustice done him.

By some curious fatality, worthy of note, it seems to have been General Beauregard's destiny, at various periods of our four years' struggle, to be subordinated to officers of his own grade in the army, ranking him only by date of commission. At the battle of Manassas, in July, 1861, he was placed under General Joseph E. Johnston; in February, 1862, during the Shiloh campaign, under General Albert Sidney Johnston; in June, 1864, at Petersburg, under General R. E. Lee; in February, 1865, again under General Joseph E. Johnston. And it may be remarked that no other full general was ever so circumstanced, until, near the close of the war, when General Lee was given what Mr. Davis, perhaps appropriately, called "the nominal dignity of General-in-chief" * of the Confederate armies. General Hood, when under General Beauregard's orders, during the Tennessee campaign, was only a provisional general, and had been elevated to that rank in order to give him precedence over other officers of his own army, who held commissions of older dates than his own. To General Beauregard's honor, it must be said that it was always through his single-minded efforts to effect a concentration for some great object that he thus lost the prerogatives of his rank, and often the power to carry out his own plan for the defeat of the enemy. The truth is—and both the army and the people knew it—that his desire for the good of the service always predominated over the ambition to command. Congress, in acknowledgment of his eminent services, on four different occasions passed votes of thanks to him and to the troops under him: first, after the fall of Sumter, in April, 1861; second, after the battle of Manassas, in July, 1861; third, after the battle of Shiloh, in April, 1862; fourth, for the repulse of the Federal

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 361.

ironclad fleet in Charleston Harbor, in April, 1863. No other Confederate general was honored to that extent during the war. And may it not be added that a strange contrast was thus presented between the ill-will of the Administration and the manifest admiration and gratitude of the representatives of the people? It is known, furthermore, that Congress would have reiterated its thanks to General Beauregard, after the battle of Drury's Bluff, in May, 1864, and also after the almost incredible stand he made at Petersburg, from June 15th to 18th, of the same year, had not the fear been expressed by some members, that to pass votes of thanks again in his honor would indicate too much partiality for him.

General Johnston arrived at Charlotte on the 24th, and, after a long conference with General Beauregard, assumed command the next day. He desired the latter to continue the concentration of our forces, at the most available points, from Charlotte to Raleigh, which General Beauregard had been so long endeavoring to effect. General Johnston's intention, as soon as the place of concentration could be definitely fixed, was to repair to it and assume command in the field, while General Beauregard should complete all other arrangements, and, with such troops as he might have at hand, watch over our various lines of communication. The Appendix to the present chapter contains the telegrams, orders, and instructions issued by General Beauregard in furtherance of this end.

After burning and destroying Columbia, as will be shown in the next chapter, General Sherman sent forward the right wing of his army in a northerly direction, towards Winnsboro', where, on the 21st, a junction was made with his left wing, under General Slocum. From Winnsboro' they marched as follows: the right wing, crossing the Catawba at Peay's Ferry, went towards Cheraw and Fayetteville; the left wing, crossing at Rocky Mount, after a delay of several days, also began its march towards Cheraw. In the mean time, according to General Sherman,* Kilpatrick, with his force of cavalry, had been ordered to make a feint in the direction of Lancaster, so as to lead General Beauregard into the belief that the whole Federal army would soon be marching upon Charlotte. General Beauregard was perfectly aware of Kilpatrick's presence

* "Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman," p. 288.

"on the Lancaster and Camden road;"* but he was convinced, nevertheless, as is shown by his despatch of the 24th to General Lee, that "the enemy's movements would seem to indicate Cheraw and Fayetteville as their present objective."† The tenor of this latter despatch and its date, which corresponds with the arrival of Kilpatrick near Lancaster, are proof sufficient that the "delusion" so complacently referred to by General Sherman existed more in his own mind than in General Beauregard's.

While these movements were being executed Fort Fisher and the other Confederate works at the mouth of Cape Fear River, after a short but glorious resistance, were captured by the Federal forces operating against them. It was there that General Whiting redeemed his reputation, and, after receiving a mortal wound behind the shattered ramparts of Fort Fisher, died in the hands of the enemy. Wilmington surrendered to General Terry on or about the 22d of February, and General Bragg, with nearly eight thousand men, retreated towards Goldsboro', to form a junction at last with General Johnston's forces. The wisdom of the policy advocated by General Beauregard weeks before, but which had been disapproved of by the War Department, was here clearly demonstrated. Had our untenable seaports and harbor defences, and even the Confederate capital, been abandoned in time, and the troops occupying them withdrawn and concentrated at or about Branchville, S. C., reinforced by two or more corps from the Army of Northern Virginia, a stand could have been made by which Sherman's invading army, then so far from its base—the sea-coast—would have been effectually checked, and the course of events materially changed. As it was, place after place fell before overpowering numbers, and the junction of General Bragg's forces with those of General Johnston was only partially effected, after Schofield had united his forces with those of Sherman.

* See, in Appendix, his despatch of 27th to General Lee.

† See, in Appendix, his despatch of that date to General Lee.

CHAPTER XLVI.

General Sherman's Preconceived Determination to have Columbia Burned.—His Denial.—His Despatch to General Halleck, Showing his Intent.—Contradictions Contained in his Hartford Speech.—General Hampton's Advice not to Burn the Cotton in Columbia.—General Beauregard of the same Opinion.—Orders to that effect Issued on the 16th of February.—Statement of Generals Beauregard, Hampton, and Butler.—Surrender of the City.—How it was Pillaged.—Signal Thrown up at 8 P. M.—Outbreak of the Fire.—Vain Efforts by the Citizens to Arrest its Progress.—General Sherman's Connivance in the Plan.—Testimony of General Howard.—Admission by General Sherman that his Troops Burned Columbia.—The City Destroyed.—Orders of General Sherman in the Morning to Arrest the Fire and Pillage.—Letters of General Wade Hampton.

In a preceding chapter (Chapter XLII.) we had occasion to comment upon the threats, indirectly made, by General Sherman in his demand for the surrender of Savannah (December 17th, 1864); and the intention was declared to recur to the matter at the proper time, as evidence of the Federal commander's preconceived purpose in regard to other Southern cities that might eventually fall into his power. The following is the passage:

"But should I be forced to resort to assault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, *I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army, burning to avenge a great national wrong they attach to Savannah and other large cities which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war.*"*

It will give additional significance to this utterance, and show that it was not written in vain, if the reader will note the following passage from Major-General Halleck's despatch to General Sherman, bearing date of Washington, December 18th, 1864—the day after the demand made for the surrender of Savannah: "Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by *some* accident"—[the word "some" is italicized by General Halleck himself]—"the place may be destroyed; *and if a little salt should be sown upon its*

* The italics are ours.

site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession." *

General Sherman says, in his Memoirs, while speaking of the burning of Columbia: "Many of the people think this fire was deliberately planned and executed. This is not true." Despite irrefutable evidence staring him in the face, he denies the part taken by his army in the work justly asserted to have been done by it. But on the 24th of December, 1864, he sent the following answer to Major-General Halleck's official despatch of December 18th, 1864: "I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and don't think 'salt' will be necessary. When I move, the 15th Corps will be on the right of the right wing, and their position will bring them naturally into Charleston first; and if you have watched the history of that corps, you will have remarked that they generally do their work up pretty well. The truth is the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her. * * * I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston." †

Thus, General Sherman agreed with General Halleck in the barbarous programme, and promised its thorough execution. This furnishes unequivocal proof of "malice aforethought" and premeditated incendiarism.

The fate of the towns, villages, and hamlets lying in the track of General Sherman's army in South Carolina shows the sincerity of his expressions. Hardeeville, Grahamville, McPhersonville, Barnwell, Blackville, Midway, Orangeburg, and Lexington, situated between the border of Georgia and the City of Columbia, were given to the flames, and a like doom was reserved for the capital of the State. The torch was mercilessly applied to buildings, public and private, for hundreds of miles on the route of the invading army. Gross indignities were perpetrated on the persons of inoffensive inhabitants. Agricultural implements were wantonly destroyed; dwellings, mills, barns were pillaged and pitilessly reduced to ashes; horses, mules, cattle, goats, and donkeys,

* "Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War," vol. i., p. 287. The italics are ours.

† "Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War," vol. i., p. 291.

not carried away, were killed. Provisions of all kinds were loaded on interminable trains of wagons, and what could not be thus taken was ruthlessly destroyed. For, as General Sherman openly said, in his address at Salem, Ill., "We were determined to produce results * * * to make every man, woman, and child in the South feel that if they dared to rebel against the flag of their country, they must die or submit." This is in striking contrast with his Hartford speech of June 8th, 1881, in which he says: "These orders were purposely most merciful, because I have not but most kindly feelings towards South Carolina, by reason of old associates and friends made before the war, some of whom were known to be in Columbia, and to whom I extended, personally and officially, every possible assistance."

The facts of the case are these: On the 16th of February, the day on which Lieutenant-General Hampton received official news of his promotion, and was regularly assigned to the command of all the cavalry operating around Columbia, he gave it as his opinion, in a conference with General Beauregard, that, as the enemy was destroying cotton wherever he could find it on his march through South Carolina, it would be not only useless but, perhaps, dangerous to burn the cotton-bales, which, for want of time and a better place to put them, had been piled in the wide streets of Columbia. The reason then given by General Hampton was, that by burning the cotton, as was originally intended, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy, we might set fire to neighboring buildings, and eventually endanger the whole city. As General Beauregard was aware that, owing to the destruction of the South Carolina Railroad by the enemy, the cotton then in Columbia could not be removed from its limits, he readily adopted General Hampton's suggestion, and, through the latter, issued at once explicit orders to that effect. Captain Rawlins Lowndes, General Hampton's adjutant at the time, was the officer who published and signed the orders we refer to, and saw to their prompt and faithful distribution among the troops.

This is corroborated by Generals Beauregard, Hampton, and Butler; by Colonel Otey; by Captain Lowndes; by Lieutenant Chisolm; by the various brigade and regiment commanders on duty that day; in fact, by every officer and private belonging to the Confederate forces then assembled in and around the threat-

ened city, which General Sherman had declared to be "*quite as bad as Charleston*," and therefore, in his opinion, doomed.

To give additional strength to this statement and present it in its proper light, we add the following statement of Generals Beauregard, Hampton, and Butler, fully supported by the officers whose names have been already mentioned—not to speak of hundreds of honorable citizens of Columbia, conspicuous among whom were Dr. Goodwyn, its respected Mayor, and the Rev. Doctors A. Toomer Porter and P. J. Shand—to wit:

"That when, between 9 and 10 o'clock A. M. on the 17th, General Butler's last trooper rode out of the capital of South Carolina, just as the vanguard of the Federal army was entering it, not one bale of the cotton piled in its streets had been set afire. The only thing burning at the time of the evacuation was the depot of the South Carolina Railroad, situated on the distant outskirts of the city—too far to have communicated the fire to any other building, and which, for want of material, very soon burned itself out."

This silences all contradiction, for this is simply the truth.

It remains none the less a fact, however, that Columbia was destroyed by fire. When was it so destroyed, and by whom?

Between 8 and 9 o'clock A. M., on the 17th, Dr. Goodwyn, the Mayor, and three Aldermen, whose names we are unable to give, formally surrendered the city to the first officer of the hostile army whom they met, and were "promised protection to the town and its inhabitants until communication could be had with General Sherman."* At 11 o'clock A. M. Columbia was in the possession of the Federal forces. The first detachment that entered it formed part of the command of the officer (Colonel Stone) to whom the surrender was made, and belonged to the 15th Corps, of whose work General Sherman had exultingly spoken in his despatch to General Halleck, already given.

No sooner had the Federals entered the city than universal pillage began. Stores and private buildings were indiscriminately sacked, and neither check nor restraint was put upon the soldiery by their officers. At about 2 P. M. General Sherman rode in. He also promised protection to the city, as Colonel Stone had previously done. Meanwhile, and, in fact, hours before General Sherman's appearance, open and undisguised warnings were given the inhabitants of the fate awaiting them. Some were cautioned

* Testimony of Dr. Goodwyn before the Investigation Committee.

to leave immediately, as, before the next morning, everything around them would be reduced to ashes.* The signal at which the conflagration was to begin—three rockets, to be fired, at about eight o'clock, in front of the Mayor's residence—was also spoken of and distinctly described, at times with jeers and threats, occasionally with an appearance of compassion for the unfortunate inhabitants. At the appointed hour these rockets shot upwards, attracting the attention of the whole city, and shortly afterwards the troops scattered down the streets; suddenly fires broke out in every direction, at points distant from each other, and the flames spread on all sides. Citizens, with their fire-companies, at first rushed to the burning houses, attempting, as best they could, to save them from destruction; but they were unable to effect any good, not only on account of the extent of the conflagration, but because the Federals, wild with joy at the bonfires they had lighted, pierced the hose and disabled the engines.†

Before morning, on the 18th, the greater portion of the city was a heap of smouldering ashes. Most of its inhabitants—old men, women, and children—passed that winter night unsheltered from wind and cold. And General Sherman rode through the streets that night and looked on.

That General Sherman did not issue direct and open orders for the destruction of Columbia we are willing to admit; but that he knew what work would be accomplished by his army, "*burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina*;" that he countenanced the vandalism of his troops, is undeniable. Otherwise, not only would there have been no ambiguity about the order to burn, but a positive order *not to burn* would have been issued. Invading columns, such especially as composed the notorious 15th Federal Corps, require no prompting to be aware that, in military discipline as well as in law, what is not prohibited is allowed.

Among the witnesses summoned—so to say—by General Sherman in support of his allegation that the Confederate cavalry, and not his troops, caused the destruction of the capital of South Carolina, is General O. O. Howard, who commanded the right wing

* See testimony of Mrs. L. S. McCord and William H. Orchard before Investigation Committee.

† Report of Investigation Committee.

of the Federal army at that time. General Sherman in his Hartford speech said: "Mr. Davis was not in Columbia during that fire, nor was General Hampton. I was, and so was General O. O. Howard * * * and fourteen thousand honest, good, true Union soldiers. * * * The fire in Columbia, on the night of February 17th, 1865, in my judgment, then and now, was caused by particles of burning cotton. * * * The cotton was unquestionably set fire to by the Confederate cavalry," etc. General Sherman is unfortunate in the selection of his witness, for we have it from the Rev. P. J. Shand, who was in Columbia at the time of its destruction, and saw and personally felt the effects of the ruthlessness of the enemy, that, in November, 1865, upon his visiting General Howard, at his headquarters in Charleston, on matters of business, the latter stated to him, in the presence of a friend, that "though General Sherman did not order the burning of the town, yet, somehow or other, the men had taken up the idea that if they destroyed the capital of South Carolina it would be peculiarly gratifying to General Sherman."* And upon another occasion, two years later, in the presence of the Hon. James L. Orr, then Governor of South Carolina, afterwards United States Minister to Russia, and of General John S. Preston, also of South Carolina, General Howard distinctly stated to General Hampton, referring to the burning of Columbia, that "no one was authorized to say that the Federal troops did not burn Columbia, as *he saw them doing so in numerous instances, and in various localities of the town.*"† But, what is still more striking, is the fact that General Sherman himself admitted that the burning of Columbia was the act of his own troops, though he endeavored to screen them from odium by declaring them mad and irresponsible from the effects of liquor. To the Rev. A. Toomer Porter, "*in the bright light of the burning city,*" and on the day following to Doctor Goodwyn, he said that, owing to the indiscretion of their Governor and Mayor, who had allowed hundreds of casks of whiskey to be left in the evacuated city, his men had got so drunk as to be entirely beyond his control. Pointing to the ruins surrounding him, he remarked, "And this is the result." "There was no allu-

* The Rev. P. J. Shand's testimony before Investigation Committee.

† See letters of Hon. James L. Orr and of General John S. Preston, in Appendix. The italics are ours.

sion made to General Hampton, to accident, or to cotton," says Doctor Goodwyn.* That allusion was an after-thought, prompted, as General Sherman himself admits, by his desire "to shake the faith of his [General Hampton's] people in him, for he was, in my opinion, boastful, and professed to be the special champion of South Carolina."†

But the unconscious admission of General Sherman that Columbia was destroyed by the Federal troops is not confined to what has just been stated. In his "Memoirs" (vol. ii., p. 349), alluding to the death of Mr. Lincoln, of which he apprised General Johnston in his first interview with the latter, on the 17th of April, 1865, he says: "Mr. Lincoln was peculiarly endeared to the soldiers, and I feared that some foolish woman or man in Raleigh might say something or do something that would madden our men, *and that a fate worse than that of Columbia would befall the place.*" This is significant, and shows conclusively that it was the men of the Federal army who burned Columbia. "Madden" the same men in Raleigh, and Raleigh will suffer a like fate to that of Columbia. This is clearly the meaning of General Sherman's words.

When, to "gratify" their Commander-in-chief, the men of the 15th Federal Corps, who "generally did their work up pretty well," had wreaked vengeance all night upon the defenceless people now in their power, General Sherman, satiated at last with what he himself termed "a horrible sight,"‡ issued peremptory orders to turn out the guard and stop the burning and pillage then going on. In spite of the alleged drunkenness of the Federal forces, which has been denied by many a credible witness, so good was their discipline, so complete the control of their officers—and so obedient these to General Sherman—that scarcely an hour and a half had elapsed after his orders were given before quiet reigned throughout the city.

When, in General Sherman's opinion, it became time to put an end to what Mr. Whitelaw Reid has called "the most monstrous barbarity of that barbarous march;"§ when he thought that even

* See, in Appendix, extracts from the Rev. A. Toomer Porter's and Dr. Goodwyn's testimony, as given before the Investigation Committee.

† From General Sherman's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 287.

‡ The Rev. A. Toomer Porter's testimony.

§ From Mr. Whitelaw Reid's work, "Ohio in the War."

the capital of South Carolina had been sufficiently scourged, he issued the order, which was immediately and unhesitatingly obeyed. In proof of the stern discipline exacted by the officers of General Sherman's army, it may be stated here that nine Federal soldiers who, in various places, still loitered in the streets and disregarded the order, were, in the presence of many a citizen and by-stander, mercilessly shot dead.

We do not deny that some of the cotton piled in the streets of Columbia was set on fire and actually burned on the 17th of February; but what we assert is, that it was after—hours after—the city had been evacuated by the Confederate troops; and that it was the work of General Sherman's own men. They could not carry the cotton with them or use it; and whether on their march through the streets into which the cotton-bales had been rolled, or while reclining against them during their halts, with lighted cigars and pipes, unintentionally or by design, unquestionably they caused the cotton to ignite. This was easily effected, because the cotton was badly packed, and protruded from the bales in many places. The citizens, unhindered by the soldiery, quickly extinguished this fire. The general conflagration of the buildings, shown to have been the premeditated work of the Federal troops, was, by understanding, begun at dark; and, fanned by a sharp wind blowing from the west, soon reached the cotton, setting it in a blaze, thus increasing the conflagration in that part of the city. The Appendix to this chapter contains the proof of what is here alleged. So does the following letter, written, in 1866, by General Wade Hampton to the Hon. Reverdy Johnson, then a Senator in the United States Congress:

“WILD WOODS, MISSISSIPPI, *April 21st, 1866.*

“TO HON. REVERDY JOHNSON, United States Senate:

“*Sir*,—A few days ago I saw in the published proceedings of Congress that a petition from Benjamin Kawles, of Columbia, S. C., asking for compensation for the destruction of his house by the Federal army, in February, 1865, had been presented to the Senate, accompanied by a letter from Major-General Sherman. In this letter General Sherman uses the following language: ‘The citizens of Columbia set fire to thousands of bales of cotton rolled out in the streets, and which were burning before we entered Columbia. I myself was in the city as early as nine o'clock,* and saw these fires, and knew what efforts were made to

* Were this true—as it is not—General Sherman would have entered Columbia before the Confederate troops left it. We have already shown at what

extinguish them, but a high and strong wind prevented. I gave no orders for the burning of your city, but, on the contrary, the conflagration resulted from the great imprudence of cutting the cotton-bales, whereby the contents were spread to the wind, so that it became an impossibility to arrest the fire. I saw in your Columbia newspaper the printed order of General Wade Hampton, that on the approach of the Yankee army all the cotton should thus be burned, and, from what I saw myself, I have no hesitation in saying that he was the cause of the destruction of your city.'

"This charge, made against me by General Sherman, having been brought before the Senate of the United States, I am naturally most solicitous to vindicate myself before the same tribunal. But my State has no representative in that body. Those who should be her constitutional representatives there are debarred the right to enter into those halls. There are none who have the right to speak for the South; none to participate in the legislation which governs her; none to impose the taxes she is called upon to pay, and none to vindicate her sons from misrepresentation, injustice, or slander.

"Under these circumstances I appeal to you, in the confident hope you will use every effort to see that justice is done in this matter.

"I deny, emphatically, that any cotton was fired in Columbia by my order. I deny that the citizens 'set fire to thousands of bales rolled out into the streets.' I deny that any cotton was on fire when the Federal troops entered the city. I most respectfully ask of Congress to appoint a committee, charged with the duty of ascertaining and reporting all the facts connected with the destruction of Columbia, and thus fixing upon the proper author of that enormous crime the infamy he richly deserves. I am willing to submit the case to any honest tribunal. Before any such I pledge myself to prove that I gave a positive order, by direction of General Beauregard, that no cotton should be fired; that not one bale was on fire when General Sherman's troops took possession of the city; that he promised protection to the city, and that, in spite of his solemn promise, he burned the city to the ground, deliberately, systematically, and atrociously. I therefore most earnestly request that Congress may take prompt and efficient measures to investigate this matter fully. Not only is this due to themselves and to the reputation of the United States army, but also to justice and to truth. Trusting that you will pardon me for troubling you,

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"WADE HAMPTON."

It is needless to add a word more to show upon whom rests the responsibility for the burning of Columbia. In vain will General

hour the evacuation took place; when Generals Beauregard, Hampton, and Butler withdrew; when the Federal forces took possession; and when—hours afterwards—General Sherman rode in. The Report of the Investigation Committee, ordered by the Legislature of South Carolina, clearly establishes that it was between the hours of 2 and 3 P.M. that General Sherman made his appearance in Columbia.

Sherman attempt to wipe this stain from his reputation as a military commander. His wisest course would have been to maintain absolute silence concerning all that refers to Columbia, trusting to the effects of time to soften, in the minds of his countrymen, the ignominy of having designedly connived at the destruction of a surrendered and, therefore, defenceless city.

CHAPTER XLVII.

General Hardee's Despatch of the 3d of March to General Johnston.—His Despatch of the 4th.—Failure to Follow General Beauregard's Instructions.—General Hampton Forms a Junction with General Hardee on the 10th.—General Hardee Retires towards Averysboro'.—General Sherman's Entire Army Marching on Goldsboro'.—General Johnston at Smithfield.—Is Attacked on the 15th, near Averysboro', by two Federal Corps.—Enemy Repulsed.—General Hardee Falls Back towards Smithfield.—General Johnston Determines to Attack General Sherman's Exposed Flank.—Battle of Bentonville.—Success of the Confederates.—Distinguished Conduct of Troops of the Army of Tennessee.—Number of General Johnston's Troops at the Battle of Bentonville.—Confederate Loss.—Probable Loss of the Enemy.—Junction on the 24th of Generals Sherman and Schofield.—General Beauregard Repairs to Smithfield on the 25th.—On the 26th he Returns to Raleigh.—His Various Telegrams, Suggestions, and Orders.—General Johnston's Despatch to him of the 30th of March.—General Beauregard Declines the Command of Western Virginia and East Tennessee.—Various and Contradictory Reports of Threatened Raids by Stoneman's and Grierson's Commands.—General Beauregard Determines to Repair to Greensboro'.

On the 3d of March, General Hardee, from Cheraw, S. C., forwarded this telegram to General Johnston :

"The enemy changed position yesterday, advanced on Chesterfield Courthouse, and crossed Thompson's Creek, above that point, late in the afternoon. I am evacuating Cheraw, and shall move to Rockingham, where I hope to receive your instructions. General Butler thinks army of Sherman is moving on this place, or on Rockingham."

On the next day (4th), from Rockingham, he telegraphed General Johnston as follows :

"The enemy pressed us closely yesterday morning, on leaving Cheraw, and it was with great difficulty that the bridge over the river was destroyed. It was, however, effectively destroyed ; but the enemy succeeded in laying a pontoon, and at last accounts (9.30 this morning) had crossed a brigade. Most of my command will reach this place to-night.

"I brought off all of the supplies that my transportation—which is in a wretched condition—could admit of. In obedience to General Beauregard's instructions of 24th ultimo, I shall move towards Greensboro' to-morrow. I had made arrangements to move by Fayetteville, but received a despatch from

General Bragg stating that Schofield was moving up the west bank of Cape Fear River. His despatch contradicting this report was not received until yesterday, when my troops and trains were moving on the Rockingham road, and I had ordered the destruction of all bridges on the Fayetteville road. Sherman, I think, will march to Fayetteville, to form a junction with Schofield and to obtain supplies."

General Hardee here refers to General Beauregard's instructions of the 24th of February, but omits all mention of those of the 26th, which were full and explicit, and intended to meet every exigency which might arise.* He made a great mistake in not adhering to them, as he himself must have seen, before his forces reached Rockingham. Much time and many supplies would have been saved had he adopted the course marked out for him. General Beauregard, in several despatches to General Johnston, frankly—and, we think, properly—censured General Hardee's failure to follow his instructions. He even sent him a direct order to march at once on Fayetteville, if possible; and if not, on Raleigh.†

Owing to unavoidable delays and high-water General Hampton and the cavalry with him could only form a junction with General Hardee, at or near Fayetteville, on the 10th of March, just before the enemy crossed the Cape Fear River, at Cedar Creek, Fayetteville, and Elliott's Ferry, seven miles above. On the 11th the troops under General Bragg were on their way to Goldsboro' from Kinston, where the Federals had been strongly reinforced from Wilmington. They had been beaten, on the 8th, by General Bragg, with Hill's and Hoke's forces, and suffered a loss of about fifteen hundred prisoners and three field-pieces, exclusive of a large number of killed and wounded. It was a creditable affair to the handful of Confederates who took part in it, and we must say that Major-General Cox and the three Federal divisions under him displayed lack of vigor in their resistance.

General Hardee now retired towards Averysboro', leaving a brigade behind Silver Creek, to hold the enemy in check. This force was subsequently withdrawn, and replaced by dismounted cavalry, which occupied the slight works there thrown up by the infantry. On the 14th the enemy attacked the works sharply, but was repulsed, and fell back about four miles. There he was reported to have received supplies, by the river, from Wilming-

* See these instructions, in Appendix.

† See Appendix.

ton. General Beauregard was anxious that General Johnston should now immediately concentrate his forces against Schofield, and defeat him before he could effect his junction with the main body of General Sherman's army. Circumstances and the views of the General commanding, which, in that respect, differed from those of General Beauregard, prevented the execution of the suggested movement.

On the 15th of March, General Sherman's entire army had crossed Cape Fear River, and was on its march to Goldsboro'. His four corps advanced in the following manner: the 17th on the right, the 15th next in order, the 14th and 20th on the left, with the cavalry in close supporting distance to that flank.

General Johnston, believing that the enemy might be inclined to move on Raleigh as well as on Goldsboro', had collected a portion of his forces at Smithfield, while General Hardee was on his way from Fayetteville to Raleigh, with part of his cavalry on the road leading to Raleigh, and part of it on the Goldsboro' road. On the 16th, at a point five miles south of Averysboro', he was attacked by the two Federal corps under General Slocum and by Kilpatrick's cavalry. General Hardee had posted his force in two lines. On the first was formed Colonel Alfred Rhett's brigade of Regulars, from the defences of Charleston, supported by a battalion of light artillery and some of Hampton's cavalry. That line was attacked by Jackson's division, a part of Ward's, and by a portion of Kilpatrick's cavalry, in two successive assaults and a movement in front and flank. After repulsing with slaughter two attacks and maintaining the front line for several hours, the command fell back to the second line, which General Hardee held, driving back the enemy. General Sherman speaks of this defence as "stubborn." Our loss was computed at five hundred. That of the enemy, according to prisoners' accounts, amounted to thirty-two hundred. General Sherman, in his "Memoirs," gives the casualties on the Federal side at "twelve officers and sixty-five men killed, and four hundred and seventy-seven men wounded; a serious loss," he adds, "because every wounded man had to be carried in an ambulance."* General Johnston, in his "Narrative of Military Operations," criticises General Sherman's report, and says that if his soldiers were "driven back repeatedly

* Sherman's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 302.

by a fourth of their numbers, with a loss so utterly insignificant," then "General Sherman's army had been demoralized."*

General Hardee, now fearing an attempt to turn his left, and knowing his incapacity to resist the odds against him, fell back, in the night, towards Smithfield.

On the day of this occurrence, and with a view to avoid all misunderstanding among subordinate commanders, General Beauregard was officially announced as second in command to General Johnston.

The latter's telegrams to General Beauregard, dated March 20th, 21st, and 23d, speak of the encounter with the enemy at Bentonville, and give the various incidents of that fight—the last of the war, in the east—and one which was much to the honor of the Confederates. Taking advantage of the fact that General Sherman's left wing was at some distance from the right, General Johnston, on the morning of the 19th, determined to strike a blow while he had the chance to do so. Of that determination, and of the manner in which it was carried out, General Sherman says:

"I have always accorded to General Johnston due credit for boldness in his attack on our exposed flank at Bentonville; but I think he understates his strength, and doubt whether at the time he had accurate returns from his miscellaneous army, collected from Hoke, Bragg, Hardee, Lee, etc."

This last expression of opinion was evidently given in extenuation of the failure of the Federals to withstand the attack made by the much inferior force opposed to them; for, further on, General Sherman also says:† "With the knowledge now possessed of his small force, of course I committed an error in not overwhelming Johnston's army on the 21st of March, 1865." Without attempting to discuss what General Sherman could or could not have done, had he known the real weakness of the Confederate troops in his front, we merely add that they were even weaker than he supposed them to be, for neither General S. D. Lee's forces, nor General Cheatham's, nor even Generals Wheeler's and Butler's cavalry, were with General Johnston at the time.

General Hardee was hurriedly marched to Bentonville, and, as

* Johnston's "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 383.

† General Sherman's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 306.

soon as his troops reached that place, the battle opened. It lasted until evening. The enemy was driven a mile from his intrenchments, one of his corps was routed, and three of his guns were captured. He rallied on fresh troops, however, and then attempted the offensive, which the Confederates successfully and easily resisted until dark. Nothing more was done that night. The next morning the entire Federal army was in front of General Johnston's forces, and intrenched. The 15th Corps had moved from the direction of Goldsboro', on our left flank and rear, necessitating, on our part, a change of front to the south. All further attack being impossible, General Johnston merely held his position to cover the removal of his wounded and occupy the enemy. On that and the following day (20th and 21st) several assaults were made by the enemy, but they were invariably repulsed. "The troops of the Tennessee army," said General Johnston, in one of his despatches to General Beauregard, "have fully disproved the slander that has been published against them." Such well-deserved testimony in their behalf must have been most gratifying to their old commander, who, having so often tested their mettle, knew that even at this dark hour of our struggle, and after they had been so hardly tried, there were no better troops in the Confederate service. What might not have been the result of the battle of Bentonville, if to Bragg's and Hardee's forces, and to the small portion of the Army of Tennessee there present, had been added two corps of the Army of Northern Virginia; or if, without them, General Johnston's forces had really amounted to 49,868 men, as General Badeau asserts, in his "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant!"*

The effective strength under General Johnston, at the battle of Bentonville, did not exceed 14,100 men. General Butler's division of cavalry, posted to watch General Sherman's right column, took no part in the action; nor did General Wheeler's forces; nor did the 2000 men of the Army of Tennessee, under General Cheatham, who only arrived on the 20th and 21st, and had nothing to do during the first day's encounter.† The Federal army, on the other hand, must have numbered at least 60,000 men. Half of it—or the whole left wing, composed of two

* Vol. iii., p. 432.

† Johnston's "Narrative of Military Operations," pp. 392., 393.

corps—was engaged on the 19th; and the other half—that is to say, the two corps forming the right wing—appeared on the field, and participated in the fight, on the afternoon of the 20th.*

The Confederate loss was as follows: killed, 223; wounded, 1467; missing, 653; making an aggregate of 2343.† We took 903 prisoners, but were unable to ascertain the full extent of the enemy's casualties. "From the appearance of the field and the language of the Federals it largely exceeded 4000."‡

On the 24th the junction of Generals Sherman and Schofield, at Goldsboro', was an accomplished fact. While apprising General Beauregard of it, General Johnston, after disposing of his troops to the best advantage, anxiously awaited the arrival of General S. D. Lee's forces, and urged all possible rapidity in his movements. That gallant officer, not then entirely recovered from his wound received at the battle of Nashville, was doing his utmost, in the face of untold difficulties, to press forward his heterogeneous and hastily gathered command.

On the 25th General Beauregard repaired to Smithfield to confer with General Johnston, and ascertain in what way he could aid him most effectively, and whether his presence might not be beneficial with the troops in the field. General Johnston assured General Beauregard that his services, at this juncture, were more valuable where he then was than at any other point, and that, from rumors of the probable movement of some of the enemy's cavalry, his personal direction, at Greensboro' or Salisbury, might soon be required. He therefore, without further delay, returned to his headquarters at Raleigh.

The following telegrams forwarded by him to General Johnston and others will show how actively engaged he was in preparing troops for the front, and how, as usual, he was alive to the minutest necessity of the situation:

1. "RALEIGH, N. C., *March 27th*, 1865.

"Colonel ALFRED. ROMAN, A. A. G., etc., Augusta, Ga.:

"Send unarmed troops as rapidly as possible, properly organized. Subsistence will be collected, as soon as practicable, at Newberry or Alston, on Broad River. Thence troops must march to Blackstocks or Winnsboro'. Major McCrady, at Charlotte, will keep you advised of condition of Charlotte Railroad and of bridge at Alston.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

* Johnston's "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 393.

† Ibid., p. 393. ‡ Ibid.

2. "RALEIGH, N. C., *March 27th*, 1865.

"General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, N. C. :

"Middle and West Georgia, with Tennessee, form one Department. Cobb is in command of portion of Georgia referred to. Hill commanded remainder belonging to Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Best present arrangement would be to divide Georgia in two districts, under Mac-kall and Fry; the whole being under Cobb, or higher officers, if they can be had.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

3. "RALEIGH, N. C., *March 27th*, 1865.

"General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, N. C. :

"General Lee * reported on 25th, from Pinckneyville, he will strike railroad at Catawba Bridge. Why so high he does not state. Colonel Roman reports yesterday from Augusta he will forward shortly eighteen hundred men, fully armed and equipped. He says arms and accoutrements are now exhausted there.

"General Holmes states that arms he had were issued by Colonel Hoke, at Charlotte, to Army of Tennessee.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

4. "RALEIGH, N. C., *March 27th*, 1865.

"General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, Smithfield, N. C. :

"On reconsideration I would suggest that each of the States embraced within your proper geographical Department shall form a separate military district, under a Major-General, reporting direct to you, with such subdivisions in each as may be found necessary, under carefully selected officers.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

5. "RALEIGH, N. C., *March 27th*, 1865.

"General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, N. C. :

"For information relative to troops of Army of Tennessee left in Mississippi, see my endorsement of March 5th on Major-General Stevenson's letter of February 27th.

"Sharp's and Brantley's brigades must be with Lee's forces now on their way to join you.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

6. "RALEIGH, N. C., *March 29th*, 1865.

"General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, N. C. :

"General Taylor reports Canby's army attacking Mobile from eastern side, and heavy force of Thomas's cavalry moving down through North Alabama. I wonder if Minerva has stamped on the earth for our foes ?

"G. T. BEAUREGARD."

7. "RALEIGH, N. C., *March 29th*, 1865.

"Major-General J. F. GILMER, Chief-Engineer, C. S. A., Richmond, Va. :

"General Cobb and Mayor of Macon having represented iron referred to cannot be taken without serious injury to public service and to that city, I have authorized General Cobb and Colonel Meriwether to select the road from which iron should be taken forthwith.

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

* General S. D. Lee.

8.

"RALEIGH, N. C., *March 29th*, 1865.

"Lieut.-General S. D. LEE, Chester, S. C.:

"Send wagon-train by most direct route (dirt road) to Raleigh. Send your artillery to Yorkville, or best point on Broad River, for supplying men and animals. Report point selected. G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the 30th, General Johnston, by telegram from Smithfield, informed General Beauregard that a raid, reported to be Stoneman's party, four thousand strong, was on the point of reaching Lenoir's Station, and that he should communicate with Brigadier-General Bradley Johnson, at Salisbury, or, if necessary, go to that point himself, and issue all orders required to meet the emergency. General Beauregard was already advised of the rumor, and had been in correspondence with General Bradley Johnson on the subject. As a provision against the danger threatening Lenoir, he had also telegraphed General S. D. Lee, at Chester, S. C., to stop part of his forces at Salisbury, to meet and defeat the enemy. In his answer to General Johnston he acquainted him with the various dispositions he had taken, and assured him he would certainly go there, should the necessity arise.

On the same day (30th) a hurried despatch was received by General Beauregard from General Johnston, emanating from the Commander-in-chief of our armies, General Robert E. Lee. A new and unforeseen danger had arisen in Western Virginia and East Tennessee, to guard against which the War Department and General Lee were, at that moment, embarrassed and distressed to no inconsiderable degree. It was an additional complication in our grave and perilous situation; a crisis requiring, it was thought, the greatest promptitude, skill, and energy. Again, as in so many other instances during the course of the war, a call was made upon General Beauregard. The despatch we refer to was in these words:

"SMITHFIELD, *March 30th*, 1865.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"Following despatch just received: 'Can General Beauregard be spared for command of Western Virginia and East Tennessee—would the duty be agreeable to him?—R. E. LEE.'

"General Lee apprehends movements in that direction by Thomas.

"J. E. JOHNSTON."

Without hesitation General Beauregard forwarded the following answer:

“RALEIGH, N. C., *March 30th*, 1865.

“General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, N. C.:

“My preference is to remain with you as at present, for I could scarcely expect, at this juncture, to be furnished with a force at all commensurate with the exigency, or able to make headway against the enemy, reported advancing from East Tennessee towards Southwestern Virginia. A mere territorial command, substantially bereft of troops, and in which I could render no positive service, would not be agreeable, for I could not hope to be effective, whereas here I may be useful.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.”

Thereupon General Johnston telegraphed:

“I have received your despatch in reply to General Lee’s offer, and read it with great pleasure. I shall forward it with the same feeling.”

It now appeared that the raiding party mentioned above consisted of Terry’s force, not Stoneman’s. General Beauregard was advised to verify the fact, through General Martin, at Asheville. Shortly afterwards General Johnston again telegraphed that Brigadier-General Bradley Johnson reported Stoneman’s cavalry to be moving on the railroad, and desired that, for the present, troops should be ordered to stop at Greensboro’ and Salisbury. And it might be well, he thought, for General Beauregard himself to go as far as Greensboro’—all of which he was preparing to do when he received the despatch. Ferguson’s cavalry was, at the same time, hurried on from South Carolina.

On that day (31st) General Beauregard also received from General Featherstone, of S. D. Lee’s troops, at Salisbury, the information that he had two brigades with him, and another expected the next morning, as well as Johnson’s battalion of artillery; with all of which he would begin to fortify at the bridge. He added that scouts were “scarce, and not very reliable,” but that the reports made, such as they were, indicated a movement on the Danville Railroad, by Stoneman or Grierson; and, further, that he counted upon a regiment of cavalry in the course of the next night.

General Beauregard, thereupon, concluded to stay at Greensboro’, which he knew to be a central point, until events should assume a more definite shape, and, meanwhile, to examine into the defensive condition of the place. He reached Greensboro’ late that evening.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Strength of the Federal Army at Goldsboro'.—General Sherman's Reasons for Remaining there Two Weeks.—Position of the Confederate Forces.—General Beauregard's Command Extended on the 1st of April.—Dispositions Taken by him.—General Lee's Withdrawal from Petersburg.—Evacuation of Richmond.—General Beauregard Returns to Greensboro'.—Receives Despatches from Mr. Davis on the 4th and 5th.—Goes Back to Raleigh on the 7th, and to Smithfield on the 8th.—The President Urges him to Come to Danville.—Surrender of General Lee's Army.—President Davis Goes to Greensboro'.—General Beauregard Awaits him there.—Interview between them on the 11th.—President Davis's Despatches of that Day.—General Beauregard's Orders to Generals Lomax, Walker, and Bradley Johnson.—President Davis Summons General Johnston to Greensboro'.—He Arrives on the 12th.—Conference between the President, his Cabinet, and the Two Generals.—General Johnston Reluctantly Authorized to Treat with General Sherman.—General Johnston Forwards Letter to General Sherman on the 14th.—Incident Mentioned of Silver Coin Transferred to General Beauregard.—General Sherman's Answer to General Johnston.—Troops Ordered to Halt at all Points.—General Beauregard's Suggestion to General Johnston concerning Negotiations.—General Breckinridge Present on the Second Day of the Conference.—Agreement Entered into between Generals Johnston and Sherman on the 18th.—General Breckinridge Communicates Paper to President Davis.—His Delay in Answering.—Letter of General Breckinridge to President Davis.—His Final Answer to General Johnston.—Despatches from General Sherman.—Death of President Lincoln.—What the South Thought of it.—General Breckinridge's Telegram of April 24th.—General Johnston's Answer.—Negotiation Renewed between Generals Johnston and Sherman.—They Meet Again at Durham's Station.—Terms Agreed upon, April 26th.—General Johnston Ignorant of the Whereabouts of President Davis.—Responsibility of Concluding Terms Thrown upon Generals Johnston and Beauregard.—President Davis's Efforts to Organize a Cavalry Escort.—Circular of General Johnston to his Army on April 27th.

At this stage of the military operations just described the main body of the Federal army, united at Goldsboro', consisted of its right wing, under General Howard, aggregating 28,834 men; its left wing, under General Slocum, aggregating 28,063 men; its centre, under General Schofield, aggregating 26,392 men, exclusive of the artillery, numbering 2443 men, with 91 guns; and

the cavalry division, under General Kilpatrick, with an effective strength of 5659 men; making a grand aggregate of 91,391 men.* This estimate does not include General Stoneman's force of cavalry, amounting to 4000, then operating around Greensboro' and Salisbury, and which, though not originally belonging to General Sherman's army, was then under his command.†

For about fifteen days after its junction with General Schofield this army remained quiet near Goldsboro', preparatory, as it appears, to the effort General Sherman was about to make to place it "north of Roanoke River, and in full communication with the Army of the Potomac."‡

The small Confederate army, under General Johnston, stood between the two roads leading to Raleigh, on the one hand, and to Weldon, on the other, so as to be ahead of the enemy on whichever line of march he might adopt, and in order, also, to be able to unite with the Army of Northern Virginia, in case General Lee should favor such a movement, although it was now, probably, too late to carry it out successfully. The position was wisely selected. Wheeler's cavalry was stationed north, and Butler's south, of the enemy's camps surrounding Goldsboro'.

On the 1st of April, owing to a despatch just received from General Lee, empowering him "to assume command of all troops from Western Virginia and Western North Carolina within his reach," General Beauregard left Greensboro' for Salisbury. His purpose was, if possible, to confer with Generals Lee and Johnston relative to the actual condition of affairs, and the best disposition to be made of all available troops, from Salisbury to Greensboro'. As Salisbury appeared to be less threatened than Greensboro' by the enemy's cavalry—Stoneman's—reported to be advancing from Mount Airy and Wytheville, in West Virginia—General Beauregard ordered three brigades, under Featherstone, Shelly, and Gowan, with two light batteries, to move, without delay, in the direction of Greensboro', whither he returned the same evening. Soon afterwards, Stoneman appearing more di-

* General Sherman's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 334. Our addition differs from that of General Sherman, though made up from aggregates furnished by him. He finds 88,943—a difference of 2258. It is easy to perceive that the error is not ours.

† General Sherman's "Memoirs." See his answer to General Johnston, vol. ii., p. 347.

‡ Ibid., vol. ii., p. 341.

rectly to threaten Danville, which was then defended by a mere handful of troops, under General H. H. Walker, General Beauregard sent him Shelly's brigade, of some six hundred men, three batteries from Hillsboro', and also ordered thither General Wheeler's cavalry, which had been sent by General Johnston to aid in the projected movement to oppose Sherman.

Just at this time occurred the too long delayed and now inevitable evacuation of Richmond (April 2d), which, in General Johnston's opinion, necessitated the recall of Wheeler's force, as General Sherman, altering his purpose to form a junction with General Grant, might be tempted to march at once upon Smithfield and Raleigh. Colonel J. F. Wheeler's cavalry was allowed, however, to proceed to Danville, where the Confederate Government had now determined to take temporary refuge, supposing—and indeed knowing—that General Lee, upon his retreat from Petersburg, would endeavor to reach Danville with his army.*

The line of our defences around Petersburg was broken on the 2d of April, in the morning, and our troops were compelled to fall back on their inner works, thus making the evacuation of the city a mere question of hours.

General Lee had "advised that Richmond should be evacuated simultaneously with the withdrawal of his troops that night;"† and President Davis, informed of the disaster, began immediate preparations for his removal and that of the heads of the various State Departments from the capital of the Confederacy. He says: "The event had come before Lee had expected it, and the announcement was received by us in Richmond with sorrow and surprise; for, though it had been foreseen as a coming event which might possibly, though not probably, be averted, and such preparation as was practicable had been made to meet the contingency when it should occur, it was not believed to be so near at hand."‡ And here it is appropriate to say that, far from lamenting the abandonment of Richmond, to which it had clung with such blind pertinacity, the Government should have ordered it weeks, if not months, previously, when the military necessity for such a movement was clearly indicated as the best—and perhaps the only—method of salvation. An effort to concentrate, at

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 668.

† Ibid., vol. ii., p. 661.

‡ Ibid., vol. ii., p. 656.

this late hour, when every avenue of retreat was closed and the enemy had formed his junction and accomplished his purpose, was vain and useless.

When this sad news reached General Beauregard—who on the day previous had received a confidential intimation of it—he was bitterly grieved; all the more, because he saw what the necessary result must now be. He was thoroughly convinced that the present hopeless strait could have been avoided had his counsel prevailed, when he urged the withdrawal of a portion of General Lee's army to strike Sherman's columns, then far from their base; and even later, about the 21st of February, when he again strenuously advised concentration at or near Salisbury, with a reinforcement of twenty thousand men from Generals Lee and Bragg, to defeat Sherman first, and attack Grant afterwards. The battle of Bentonville had proved to General Beauregard that the spirit of the Confederate troops was unbroken, and that, with approximate equality in numbers, those troops could achieve victory. It was now plain that the grand drama which had lasted for four years was fast drawing to an end. But he resolved, nevertheless, not to relax his efforts to uphold the cause until the last hour.

On his return to Greensboro', General Beauregard was greeted with kindness by its leading citizens, especially ex-Governor Morehead, whose hospitality he accepted, for himself and staff, during the remainder of his stay in that town.

A system of light defensive works was now devised by General Beauregard for the protection of Greensboro', which had become an important depot of supplies. The troops temporarily detained there were called out to construct these defences, in which he caused to be placed a few field-pieces, procured from Hillsboro', where they then lay, unsupplied with horses and of no use.

The reports concerning Stoneman's raid indicated that he was moving from Wytheville, along the Virginia and Tennessee railroad, with a force of cavalry, variously estimated at from four to eight thousand men, and some light artillery; that a portion of this force had been thrown well out on his right flank, towards Wilkesboro', Jonesville, Madison, etc., committing depredations on its way, and threatening the railroad from Salisbury to Danville, *via* Greensboro'; hence great alarm was felt in all these towns.

On the 4th of April, General Beauregard received a telegram from President Davis, and another on the 5th, both from Danville, making inquiry concerning the movements of the enemy, and approving the forwarding of cavalry, which, he said, would be of special value to that place, with the infantry already on its way to it. He also stated that he had had no news from General Lee for several days. Neither General Johnston nor General Beauregard were better informed as to the movements of the Army of Northern Virginia, concerning which the greatest anxiety prevailed in all quarters. Danville, now the temporary seat of Government, would have been guarded with the utmost care, in order to tranquillize Mr. Davis, had not the enemy's movements, since the fall of Richmond, required the presence of all our available forces with General Johnston. This was explained to the President by a despatch from General Beauregard, dated Greensboro', April 5th, 1865.

The greatest energy was now used to hurry on the returned troops of Hood's army coming from Chester. Fifteen hundred of them had left that place on the 6th, on their way to Smithfield. And there being, in appearance, no further immediate danger threatening Greensboro', General Beauregard, upon inquiring whether he should remain there and await other developments, received the following answer:

"NEAR SMITHFIELD, *April 6th*, 1865.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"It is not necessary to remain longer. No news from General Lee.

"J. E. JOHNSTON."

General Beauregard consequently returned, on the 7th, to Raleigh, which was, properly speaking, his headquarters at that time. He was anxious to see and confer with General Johnston about the disastrous events which, from all sides, were now crowding upon the country; and, on the 8th, he started for Smithfield, where he and General Johnston exchanged views. He returned during the same evening to Raleigh.

On the day following this telegram, in cipher, was handed to General Beauregard:

"DANVILLE, *April 9th*, 1865.

"General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

"General Walker, commanding here, desires your presence, in view of the probable concentration of forces from Thomas's army against this place at a very early period, and I think your services here will be more useful than at

any other point on the railroad line. Please make the greatest possible despatch in coming, as a revision of the defensive lines is desirable.

“JEFFN. DAVIS.”

Before General Beauregard had had time to decide upon any course of action a second despatch came to him, in the following words:

“SMITHFIELD, *April 9th*, 1865.

“General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

“The President wishes you to go to Danville immediately, to talk with him of general operations.”

J. E. JOHNSTON.”

This indicated great anxiety on the part of the President; and though he knew that the alleged danger of an attack by General Thomas's army on Danville, at that time, was purely imaginary, General Beauregard took immediate steps to obey Mr. Davis's behest. He was on the point of starting, when he received from Colonel Otey, his Adjutant-General, at Greensboro', the news of the capitulation of General Lee and his army on that day. The surrender of such an army, under such leaders, must necessarily cause discouragement and despair to settle upon the country. It was easy to see that the remaining Confederate forces, wherever they might be, would soon have to follow the example of General Lee's army, as our resources were small in comparison with those of the enemy, which seemed to be steadily increasing, while ours were no less steadily diminishing. Such were General Beauregard's thoughts, as he journeyed over the road to Greensboro', on his way to Danville.

Before reaching his destination, and supposing that the news from the Army of Northern Virginia might have caused other dispositions to be taken, he inquired (April 10th) of General Walker, if his presence was still necessary at Danville. The answer he received was an affirmative one; but almost at the same time came the following despatch from Colonel McLean, A. Q. M., in charge of the President's party:

“The President started for Greensboro' at 10 h. this evening, and would be glad to see you on his arrival. Please give me every information about raiders. Are Greensboro' and road now safe?”

General Beauregard's immediate answer was:

“Will await here arrival of President. Road between this place and Danville safe. Raiders are at or near Salem.”

He then without delay telegraphed General Ferguson to hurry up with his cavalry brigade, from High Point, as fast as he could. The need of cavalry was greatly felt at that hour, not only to oppose the enemy, but to obtain trustworthy information. General Beauregard had mostly to depend for the latter on the scouting parties, organized by him out of such "volunteers" as he could find, and sent in every direction.

In view of General Beauregard's repeated changes of locality, from Salisbury to Raleigh, and his expected trip to Danville, he had concluded to establish his headquarters, for the future, in a box-car, so as to be always ready to move, at a moment's notice. He gave orders accordingly, and was provided with three box-cars, one of which he used as his office, bedroom, and dining-room, the other for the movable portion of his staff, and the last for the horses.

On arriving at Greensboro' he had these three cars put on a side-track, near the depot. Early in the morning he was informed that the President's train, carrying himself, his Cabinet, and the Government officers, had arrived during the night, and was then close to his own. He crossed over to Mr. Davis's car, and, upon entering it, was struck by the helpless appearance of the gentlemen assembled there. A warm welcome was given to General Beauregard, who could hardly find time to answer the rapid questions that were poured from all sides upon him, especially by the members of the Cabinet, with whom he was but slightly acquainted. The President soon afterwards made his appearance. He also extended a cordial greeting to General Beauregard; and, taking him aside, questioned him closely and anxiously about current military events. The facts were far from encouraging, and General Beauregard had a gloomy account to give.

He stated that Sherman, after the battle of Bentonville, had moved to Goldsboro', where he had formed a junction with Schofield, and had re-supplied himself with all he required, and was now advancing with fully ninety-one thousand men on Smithfield, where was the greater part of General Johnston's force, amounting to less than twenty thousand infantry, and some four thousand cavalry, which had to be much scattered, in order to cover his front and flanks and protect his communications; that a very strong force of the enemy's cavalry, under Stoneman, was re-

ported to be moving along the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, having already reached Wytheville, Christiansburg, and Salem, whence he was threatening our lines of communication, from Salisbury to Danville; and that he feared, every moment, to hear of his having broken these lines at some important point; that he, General Beauregard, was collecting at Salisbury, Greensboro', and Danville all the remnants of the Army of Tennessee, still coming in, in small fractions, to rejoin their commands; that he was endeavoring to assemble the convalescents and furloughed men, as well as all the stragglers and deserters he could reach; that he was in great need of cavalry with which to defend our communications and ascertain the movements of the enemy, all his scouts and couriers being persons too old or too young to be very efficient, who had patriotically offered their services, furnishing their own horses and equipments; that he was, however, daily expecting General Ferguson's brigade of cavalry, which was coming from Augusta, Ga., as rapidly as possible, and, in all likelihood, would reach Graham that day.

General Beauregard, in his conference with the President, also told him that, from Macon, General Cobb reported that the enemy's cavalry had penetrated North Alabama, from the Tennessee River, threatening Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery; while another force of cavalry, supported by infantry and artillery, was advancing, through North Georgia, on Atlanta, Columbus, and Macon, where he, General Cobb, had but few troops, principally local and State reserves, to oppose to them.

He reported further that General Taylor confirmed the news of the Federal advance on Selma and Montgomery, and feared a movement from the Mississippi River, Memphis, and Vicksburg, through the interior of Mississippi, towards Okalona and Meridian; that a determined attack was soon to be expected on Mobile (as reported by General Maury, commanding there), from New Orleans and Pensacola, where there was a large increase of Federal troops; to oppose which General Maury had but an insignificant force under him.

General Beauregard also said to Mr. Davis that the picture he presented to him was most gloomy, but that he thought it his duty to attempt no concealment of the truth, so that the President might have a clear knowledge of the situation, and be prepared for the inevitable.

President Davis lent an attentive ear to the account thus given of the hopeless condition of the Confederacy, but appeared, nevertheless, undismayed. He said that the struggle could still be carried on to a successful issue, by bringing out all our latent resources; that if the worst came to the worst, we might, by crossing the Mississippi River, with such troops as we could retreat with, unite with Kirby Smith's army, which he estimated at some sixty thousand men, and prolong the war indefinitely. General Beauregard did not expect, and was amazed at, this evidence of visionary hope on the part of the President. He admired his confidence, but inwardly condemned what to him seemed to be a total want of judgment and a misconception of the military resources of the country.

The President on that day (11th April), after his interview with General Beauregard, sent three telegrams to General Johnston, by way of Raleigh; one to General Walker, at Danville; and one to Governor Vance, also at Raleigh. They fully indicate the state of Mr. Davis's mind at the time, and need no commentary:

1. "GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 11th*, 1865: 12 M.
"General J. E. JOHNSTON, Headquarters, *via* Raleigh:

"The Secretary of War did not join me at Danville. Is expected here this afternoon.

"As your situation may render best, I will go to your headquarters immediately after the arrival of the Secretary of War, or you can come here. In the former case our conference must be without the presence of General Beauregard.

"I have no official report from General Lee. The Secretary of War may be able to add to information heretofore communicated. The important question first to be solved is, at what point shall concentration be made, in view of the present position of the two columns of the enemy and the routes which they may adopt to engage your forces before a prompt* junction with General Walker and others? Your more intimate knowledge of the data for the solution of the problem deters me from making a specific suggestion on that point.

JEFFN. DAVIS."

2. "GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 11th*, 1865: 3.30 P. M.
"General J. E. JOHNSTON, Headquarters, *via* Raleigh:

"The enemy's cavalry, in small force, this morning cut the Danville Railroad, ten miles from here, and, as reported, moved eastwardly.

* The telegram in our files has the word "prompt," as we have given it, instead of "proposed," as written in Mr. Davis's book. The meaning of the despatch is not altered by the use of either word.

"Lest communication should be lost, I telegraph to say that General Beauregard proposes, after General Walker shall join him, which will be ordered to commence forthwith, to unite with you at the Yadkin, in front of Salisbury. And this seems to me to be the most easy method, if pursued, of effecting the proposed junction.

JEFFN. DAVIS."

3.

"GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 11th*, 1865.

"General J. E. JOHNSTON, Headquarters, *via* Raleigh:

"Despatch of 1.30 P. M. received. Secretary of War has not arrived. To save time and have all information it is probably better that you come here. In that event you will give the needful instructions to your second in command, and, if circumstances warrant, suspend the movement suggested in despatch of 3.30 P. M. for a time, which will enable you to communicate from here with that officer, or to indicate that the line has been broken by the enemy, so as to interrupt communication.

JEFFN. DAVIS."

4.

"GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 11th*, 1865.

"General H. H. WALKER, Danville, Va.:

"The movements of the enemy in Eastern North Carolina indicate the necessity for prompt movement on your part to make a junction here with General Beauregard, and then with General Johnston, on the Yadkin, in front of Salisbury. You will keep in communication with General Beauregard, on whose information the supposed necessity for your immediate action is based.

"JEFFN. DAVIS."

5.

"GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 11th*, 1865.

"Governor Z. B. VANCE, Raleigh, N. C.:

"I have no official report, but scouts, said to be reliable, and whose statements were circumstantial and corroborative, represent the disaster as extreme.

"I have not heard from General Lee since the 6th instant, and have little or no hope from his army as an organized body. I expected to visit you at Raleigh, but am accidentally prevented from executing that design, and would be very glad to see you here, if you can come at once, or to meet you elsewhere in North Carolina at a future time. We must redouble our efforts to meet present disaster. An army holding its position with determination to fight on, and manifest ability to maintain the struggle, will attract all the scattered soldiers and daily rapidly gather strength.

"Moral influence is wanting, and I am sure you can do much now to revive the spirit and hope of the people.

JEFFN. DAVIS."

General Johnston was, just then, busily engaged in removing stores and supplies from Raleigh, and in order to do so with more celerity he asked General Beauregard to send him one hundred cars, which was done. In his telegram, forwarded on that occasion, he also spoke of reinforcements (twelve hundred men of Pettus's brigade), which he was hurrying on to General

Beauregard for the additional safety of Greensboro'. The necessity for such a movement was all the more urgent because, on the morning of that day (11th), the raiding cavalry had cut the Danville road, about twelve miles above Greensboro', and had arrived in the afternoon at High Point and Jamestown, on the Salisbury road. The damage done, however, was not great, and could easily be repaired.

Acting under the powers given him by General Lee, in his despatch of April 1st, already referred to, General Beauregard was now issuing direct orders to Generals Lomax, Walker, and Bradley Johnson. Five hundred men were accordingly sent to Salisbury on the 12th, and minute instructions forwarded to General Lomax as to the best mode of saving supplies and of collecting his own as well as other cavalry commands for the protection of Greensboro'.

General Johnston had also been summoned to Greensboro' by the President. He arrived punctually, and at mid-day, on the 12th, after first consulting with General Beauregard, whose guest he then was, went, in his company, to meet Mr. Davis. The latter was found at his temporary headquarters, with three members of his Cabinet—Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan. After an exchange of formal courtesies, the President, without asking aught of the military condition in General Johnston's Department, or elsewhere, expressed his conviction that, by calling back the absentees and enlisting the men who had not, as yet, been reached by the Conscrip Bureau, he could, in a few weeks' time, put a large army in the field, and thus enable us to go on with the struggle. These were very much the same views that he had previously expressed to General Beauregard and to Governor Vance, and which were also embodied in his proclamation of April 5th.* Generals Johnston and Beauregard differed entirely from him, as neither could see the possibility, at that hour, of bringing these men into the ranks. Here the conference rested, and was postponed to the next day, to await the arrival of the Secretary of War, General Breckinridge, whose presence was deemed necessary before any final action should be taken. He came in the evening, and confirmed the news of General Lee's surrender. Generals Johnston and Beauregard were now more than ever convinced that the pro-

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 677.

longation of hostilities with any hope of success was an impossibility; and that the only course left Mr. Davis while still, nominally, the Chief Magistrate of the Confederacy, was to open negotiations for peace. This opinion was urged by General Johnston, in his own and in General Beauregard's name, at the renewal of the conference, on the 13th. After asking the opinion of the members of the Cabinet present—General Breckinridge included—and receiving the assurance from all, except Mr. Benjamin, that they agreed with the two generals, Mr. Davis openly stated his objection, basing it mainly upon his belief that the Federal Government would refuse to treat with him, or accept any proposition he might offer. It was then suggested by General Johnston that the preliminary overtures might be made by himself, and not by the President. This, at last, was agreed to, and a letter, dictated by Mr. Davis, written by Mr. Mallory and signed by General Johnston, was handed to the latter, with authority to forward it to General Sherman.

Thus closed the last official interview held between President Davis, General Johnston, and General Beauregard.*

General Johnston lost no time in causing this letter to be forwarded to General Sherman. It was intrusted to the care of Lieutenant-General Hampton, at or near Hillsboro', and was, in obedience to his orders, delivered on the succeeding day. It read thus:

"The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the relative military condition of the belligerents. I am, therefore, induced to address you in this form the inquiry whether, in order to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, the request that he will take like action in regard to other armies; the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war."

Except some raids of the Federal cavalry, at Salisbury and other minor points, in relation to which General Beauregard was yet issuing orders to Generals Lomax, Bradley Johnson, and Ferguson,

* For further and confirmatory details concerning this conference the reader is referred to the Appendix to this chapter, where will be found a letter from General Johnston to General Beauregard (with the latter's endorsement), dated Baltimore, Md., March 30th, 1868.

nothing of importance occurred from the 14th to the day of the meeting of Generals Johnston and Sherman. The greater part of the Confederate forces, then temporarily under Lieutenant-General Hardee, was marching towards Greensboro', where General Johnston's headquarters had been established. The army proper was within a few miles of that place on the morning of the 16th.

It is necessary to mention an occurrence of the day before, which, though in itself of no great importance, was the cause somewhat later of much complication and annoyance.

Mr. John N. Hendren, "Treasurer, C. S.," as he signed himself, had been ordered by the President to turn over to General Beauregard, "as a military chest to be moved with his army train," certain silver coin, "estimated at \$39,000," with the request that an officer should be designated to take charge of the sum and accompany its transfer to him "by a schedule of explanation." General Beauregard referred the matter to General Johnston, as was plainly the proper course to be pursued by him, and stated in his endorsement that the Secretary of War authorized the use of said coin for the wants of the army, in case of need.* It appears—owing, no doubt, to General Johnston's absence at the time—that no immediate attention was paid to the matter, which greatly incensed the Treasurer, who thus brought upon himself a rather sharp reprimand from General Beauregard. Further than that, the latter disclaims all personal knowledge of any incident connected with this money, or any other alleged to have been distributed at that period, except that, after the surrender, he and each member of his staff received, as a last payment—and the first for many months—the sum of \$1.15, said to have formed part of the above-mentioned \$39,000 in silver coin.

General Sherman's answer, dated the 14th, met with some delay, and only reached General Johnston on the 16th. It was as follows:

"I have this moment received your communication of this date. I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the suspension of further hostilities between the armies commanded by you and those commanded by myself, and will be willing to confer with you to that end. I will limit the advance of my main column to-morrow to Morrisville, and the cavalry to the

* See Appendix for letters of Mr. Hendren, and endorsement on them by General Beauregard.

University, and expect that you will also maintain the present position of your forces until each has notice of a failure to agree.

"That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee, at Appomattox Court-house, on the 9th instant, relative to our two armies; and, furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to suspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia. General Stoneman is under my command, and my order will suspend any devastation or destruction contemplated by him. I will add that I really desire to save the people of North Carolina the damage they would sustain by the march of this army through the central or western parts of the State."

In accordance with this arrangement General Hardee was ordered to halt his command wherever it might be, and to draw his supplies from Greensboro'. The same order to halt was extended to the other commands. The officers to whom it was sent—General Hardee especially—were much concerned as to its meaning, and thought its effect would be detrimental to the troops, if it were not quickly explained. To their inquiries and remarks General Beauregard's answer was, that he could not, just then, inform them of General Johnston's purpose; that the latter would, no doubt, do so himself, on his return from Hillsboro'; and that, meanwhile, the troops should be kept well in hand for rapid movement, at a moment's notice. But that was a difficult task to perform. The men knew they were on the eve of an extraordinary event; that something worse than a battle overhung them; that, like General Lee's forces, they also might at any hour be compelled to surrender; and they feared that they might thus lose their arms and whatever private property they might then be possessed of. This apprehension—which, we must admit, was a natural one—induced many a good and gallant soldier—especially in the cavalry—to abandon the ranks and start for "home," without first obtaining permission to do so. Indeed, the whole army seemed to understand that they had fought their last fight; that the cause, for which they had so intrepidly struggled, was now lost; and that the sooner they were disbanded the better. Their irregular manner of leaving the army, by hundreds and more at a time, was another argument against the sanguine expectations indulged in by Mr. Davis.

Through General Hampton's instrumentality the time and place of meeting were arranged for the proposed conference between Generals Johnston and Sherman, who met, accordingly, at noon,

on the 17th, at Durham Station, some sixteen miles east of Hillsboro'. Nothing definite having been concluded at 2 o'clock P. M. on that day, it was agreed to adjourn until ten o'clock on the morning of the 18th.

Just before the opening of the second day's conference General Beauregard sent to General Johnston the following suggestion, the substance of which we find embodied in article 2d of the terms of agreement about to be submitted to the reader:

"GREENSBORO', *April 18th, 1865: 8 A. M.*

"General J. E. JOHNSTON, near Hillsboro', N. C.:

"Should your negotiations terminate favorably, let me suggest that you secure, if possible, the right to march our troops to their homes, and there muster them duly out of service, depositing their regimental colors in their respective State capitals for preservation.*

G. T. BEAUREGARD."

General Breckinridge, who had been telegraphed for by General Johnston, was present at the meeting of the 18th, but not in an official capacity, as General Sherman would have objected to that. It was thought by General Johnston that, should the Secretary of War be with him during the negotiation, the Confederate Government would be more apt to ratify whatever terms might be agreed upon.

After a long but courteous discussion, wherein General Breckinridge, more than once, expressed his opinion, the following paper was drawn up, accepted, and signed by the two Commanding Generals:

"Memorandum or basis of agreement made this 18th day of April, A. D. 1865, near Durham Station, in the State of North Carolina, by and between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army, and Major-General William T. Sherman, commanding the Army of the United States in North Carolina, both present.

"1st. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the *status quo* until notice is given by the Commanding General of any one to its opponent, and reasonable time—say forty-eight (48) hours—allowed.

"2d. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State Arsenal; and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of the State and Federal authority. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the Chief of Ordnance, at Washington City, subject to the future

* The dotted words were written in cipher.

action of the Congress of the United States, and, in the mean time, to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

"3d. The recognition, by the Executive of the United States of the several State Governments, on their officers and Legislatures taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and, where conflicting State Governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

"4th. The re-establishment of all the Federal Courts in the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution and laws of Congress.

"5th. The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

"6th. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

"7th. In general terms, the war to cease; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the disposition of the arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composing said armies.

"Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfil these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above programme.

"J. E. JOHNSTON, General Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina."

General Breckinridge returned to Greensboro' on the 19th, and thence to Salisbury, carrying with him a copy of the liberal agreement to submit to the President, promising an immediate answer, which he hoped would be favorable; but which, nevertheless, was long delayed, owing to some unexplained objection on the part of Mr. Davis, and to the fact of his having gone to Charlotte, without waiting for the conclusion of the conference.

Five days had elapsed since its termination, and still nothing was heard from President Davis. General Johnston had gone back to Greensboro', and there had published General Orders No. 14, for a suspension of arms pending negotiations between the two Governments. A like order had also been issued by General Sherman.

Unable to account for such procrastination, General Johnston, on the 23d, forwarded the following telegram to General Breckinridge:

"General Sherman writes that he expects the return of his officer from Washington to-morrow."

To this no answer came, but the result was that General Breckinridge saw the President, and also addressed him the following strong and urgent letter:

"CHARLOTTE, N. C., *April 23d*, 1865.

"To his Excellency the PRESIDENT:

"*Sir*,—In obedience to your request I have the honor to submit my advice on the course you should take upon the memorandum, or basis of agreement, made on the 18th instant, by and between General J. E. Johnston, of the Confederate States Army, and General W. T. Sherman, of the United States Army, provided that paper should receive the approval of the Government of the United States.

"The principal army of the Confederacy was recently lost in Virginia. Considerable bodies of troops not attached to that army have either dispersed or marched towards their homes, accompanied by many of their officers. Five days ago the effective force in infantry and artillery of General Johnston's army was but 14,770 men; and it continues to diminish. That officer thinks it wholly impossible for him to make any head against the overwhelming forces of the enemy. Our ports are closed, and the sources of foreign supply lost to us. The enemy occupy all or the greatest part of Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina, and move almost at will to the east of the Mississippi. They have recently taken Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, Macon, and other important towns, depriving us of large depots of supplies and of munitions of war. Of the small force still at command many are unarmed, and the Ordnance Department cannot furnish 5000 stand of small-arms. I do not think it would be possible to assemble, equip, and maintain an army of 30,000 men at any point east of the Mississippi. The contest, if continued after this paper is rejected, will be likely to lose entirely the dignity of regular warfare. Many of the States will make such terms as they may; in others separate and ineffective hostilities may be prosecuted; while the war, wherever waged, will probably degenerate into that irregular and secondary stage, out of which greater evils will flow to the South than to the enemy.

"For these, and for other reasons which need not now be stated, I think we can no longer contend with a reasonable hope of success. It seems to me that the time has arrived when, in a large and clear view of the situation, prompt steps should be taken to put a stop to the war. The terms proposed are not wholly unsuited to the altered condition of affairs. The States are preserved, certain essential rights secured, and the army rescued from degradation.

"It may be said that the agreement of the 18th instant contains certain

stipulations which you cannot perform. This is true, and it was well understood by General Sherman that only a part could be executed by the Confederate authorities. In any case grave responsibilities must be met and assumed. If the necessity for peace be conceded, corresponding action must be taken. The modes of negotiation which we deem regular, and would prefer, are impracticable. The situation is anomalous, and cannot be solved upon principles of theoretical exactitude. In my opinion you are the only person who can meet the present necessities.

"I respectfully advise—

"1st. That you execute, so far as you can, the second article of the agreement of the 18th instant.

"2d. That you recommend to the several States the acceptance of those parts of the agreement upon which they alone can act.

"3d. Having maintained with faithful and intrepid purpose the cause of the Confederate States while the means of organized resistance remained, that you return to the States and the people the trust which you are no longer able to defend.

"Whatever course you pursue, opinions will be divided. Permit me to give mine. Should these or similar views accord with your own, I think the better judgment will be that you can have no higher title to the gratitude of your countrymen and the respect of mankind than will spring from the wisdom to see the path of duty at this time, and the courage to follow it, regardless alike of praise or blame.

"Respectfully, and truly your friend,

"JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secretary of War."

Another telegram from General Johnston to the Secretary of War, following close upon this letter to the President, had, at last, the desired effect; and, on the 24th, from Charlotte, Mr. Davis wrote:

"General J. E. JOHNSTON, Greensboro', N. C.:

"The Secretary of War has delivered to me the copy you handed to him of the basis of an agreement between yourself and General Sherman. Your action is approved. You will so inform General Sherman; and if the like authority be given by the Government of the United States to complete the arrangement, you will proceed on the basis adopted.

"Further instructions will be given as to the details of the negotiation and the methods of executing the terms of agreement when notified by you of the readiness on the part of the General commanding the United States forces to proceed with the arrangement.

JEFFERSON DAVIS."

Hardly had the foregoing communication been received by General Johnston, when two despatches were brought to him from General Sherman, the purport of which is clearly ex-

plained in the following telegram to the Confederate Secretary of War:

"GREENSBORO', *April 24th*: 6.30 P. M.

"Hon. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secretary of War:

"I have just received despatches from General Sherman informing me that instructions from Washington direct him to limit his negotiations to my command; demanding its surrender on the terms granted to General Lee, and notifying me of the termination of the truce in forty-eight hours from noon to-day. Have you any instructions? We had better disband this small force, to prevent devastation of country.

"J. E. JOHNSTON, General."

This news was disheartening in the extreme; and the stringent measures the Federal Government was now preparing to adopt were perhaps the result of the calamity that had befallen the South, no less than the North, in the assassination of President Lincoln. Throughout every State of the then dying Confederacy there was but one feeling—that of abhorrence of the crime, and outspoken regret for its commission. The idea that any Confederate, whether in the army or out of it, had, through a feeling of vengeance and with the approbation of the country, suggested, countenanced, or planned such an act of barbarism, could only be entertained by those who were ignorant of the history of that period, and of the characteristics of the Southern people. Certainly Mr. Lincoln's sad end can no more be laid to the account of the Confederacy, or of any of those who formed part of its government, than the lamentable death of the late President Garfield can be attributed to the Republican party and its leaders. The South knew that, had President Lincoln's life been spared, he would have ratified the treaty entered upon by the commanders of the two armies then in the field; for, as both General Sherman and Admiral Porter testify, "he wanted peace on almost any terms," and his greatest desire was "to get the men composing the Confederate armies back to their homes, at work on their farms and in their shops."* It was the overstrained, embittered zeal of the new Federal Administration—born of a double crime, murder and apostasy—that destroyed in its bud the work of peace and reunion, so ably and liberally prepared—to their honor be it said—by Generals Johnston and Sherman.

* General Sherman's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 326. See also "Admiral Porter's Account of General Sherman's Interview with Mr. Lincoln," *Ibid.*, pp. 328, 329.

Apparently, the Secretary of War did not understand the meaning of General Johnston's last despatch to him; or his views might have been altered by exterior pressure, for he was then at Charlotte, with Mr. Davis, who was still bent on organizing a cavalry force to escort him and his party to the Southwest.

General Breckinridge answered:

"CHARLOTTE, N. C., *April 24th*, 1865: 11 P. M.

"General J. E. JOHNSTON, Greensboro', N. C.:

"Does not your suggestion about disbanding refer to the infantry and most of the artillery? If it be necessary to disband these, they might still save their small-arms and find their way to some appointed rendezvous. Can you not bring off the cavalry and all the men you can mount from the transportation and other animals, with some light field-pieces? Such a force could march away from Sherman, and be strong enough to encounter anything between us and the Southwest. If this course be possible, carry it out and telegraph your intended route.

"JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secretary of War."

This reached General Johnston on the 25th. His reply was prompt and energetic. It deserves attention and respect:

"GREENSBORO', *April 25th*: 10 A. M.

"Hon. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secretary of War:

"Your despatch received. We have to save the people, save the blood of the army, and save the high civil functionaries. Your plan, I think, can only do the last.

"We ought to prevent invasion, make terms for our troops, and give an escort of our best cavalry to the President, who ought to move without loss of a moment. Commanders believe the troops will not fight again. We think your plan impracticable. Major-General Wilson, U. S. A., has captured Macon, with Major-Generals Cobb and G. W. Smith, Brigadiers Mackall and Mercer, and the garrison. Federal papers announce capture of Mobile, with three thousand prisoners.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General."

No answer was given to this. General Johnston received neither orders nor instructions from Mr. Davis after the latter's communication of the 24th of April. His memory serves him amiss if it suggests otherwise—unless General Breckinridge's telegram of the 25th to General Johnston can be considered as an answer from the President; but that, as must be evident to the reader, was not an answer to the foregoing despatch.

It was because nothing was heard from the President or the Secretary of War that, again, on the 25th, at 11.30 A. M., General Johnston telegraphed as follows:

"HON. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secretary of War:

"I have proposed to General Sherman military negotiations in regard to this army."

This was done after due consultation with General Beauregard, who thoroughly approved General Johnston's course, and thought it imperative that some positive and immediate step should be taken, to extricate the army and its commanders from the desperate position in which they were placed.

The same unaccountable silence was maintained on the part of what was still called the Government of the Confederate States. General Johnston and General Beauregard were forced to conclude that Mr. Davis was unwilling to assume any further responsibility, and wished to transfer its weight to their shoulders. They were not deterred by this consideration, however, and General Johnston, in harmony with General Beauregard, at 7 A. M., on the 26th, sent a third telegram to the Secretary of War, in these terms: "I am going to meet General Sherman at the same place."

The meeting was held, and the following terms agreed upon by Generals Johnston and Sherman, without any difficulty whatever:

"Terms of a military convention entered into this twenty-sixth (26th) day of April, 1865, at Bennett's House, near Durham's Station, N. C., between Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, commanding the United States army, in North Carolina.

"1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston's command to cease from this date.

"2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro', and delivered to an ordnance officer of the United States army.

"Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be retained by the Commander of the troops, and the other to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation, in writing, not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly released from this obligation.

"4. The side-arms of officers and their private horses and baggage to be retained by them.

"5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes: not to be disturbed by the United States authorities so long as they observe their obligation and the laws in force where they may reside.

"J. E. JOHNSTON, Genl. Comdg. Confed. States forces in N. C.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Genl. Comdg. United States forces in N. C."

Additional terms were agreed upon the next day between General Johnston and General Schofield, who had been empowered to complete all necessary arrangements relative to the surrender. We ask attention to General Sherman's letter to that effect, in the Appendix.

The supplemental terms were as follows:

"1. The field transportation to be loaned to the troops for their march to their homes, and for subsequent use in their industrial pursuits. Artillery horses may be used in field transportation, if necessary.

"2. Each brigade or separate body to retain a number of arms equal to *one-seventh* of its effective strength, which, when the troops reach the capitals of their States, will be disposed of as the General commanding the Department may direct.

"3. Private horses, and other private property, for both officers and men, to be retained by them.

"4. The Commanding General of the Military Division of West Mississippi, Major-General Canby, will be requested to give transportation by water, from Mobile to New Orleans, to the troops from Arkansas and Texas.

"5. The obligations of officers and soldiers to be signed by their immediate commanders.

"6. Naval forces within the limits of General Johnston's command to be included in the terms of this convention.

"J. E. JOHNSTON, Genl. Comdg. Confed. States forces in N. C.

"J. M. SCHOFIELD, Maj.-Genl. Comdg. United States forces in N. C."

Not knowing, on the 27th, where the President or the Secretary of War could be found, General Johnston addressed the following despatch to Brigadier-General Echols (whom he believed to be at Charlotte), through Colonel Hoke, then commanding that post:

"A military convention has been made by General Sherman and myself terminating hostilities between our commands. Send intelligence to Secretary of War, if you can, and give the information to Major-General Stoneman."*

Colonel Hoke, in transmitting the message to the Secretary of War, added:

"I have sent a flag of truce with a letter of General Cooper to General Stoneman."

* This telegram, and those preceding, to and from General Breckinridge, as also his letter to President Davis (April 23d), are copied from files of the late Secretary of War of the Confederate States, now in the possession of his son, Major Clifton R. Breckinridge.

The fact is patent that the Confederate Government (or those who formerly constituted it) abandoned Generals Johnston and Beauregard, and the forces under them, in their extremity, without advice or instructions, and without any information whatever concerning its whereabouts or its intended movements. The truth is, that at the time we speak of Generals Johnston and Beauregard represented the only Confederate organization then in existence in the East. They fully realized the fact, and knew that nothing could be gained by hesitation or delay with an adversary so conversant as General Sherman was with the exact condition of affairs in his front. Hence General Johnston's determined action. His circular to the Governors of the surrounding States explains the motives actuating him.*

What would have become of the Confederate forces under Generals Johnston and Beauregard, what height of demoralization would the army not have reached, had General Johnston waited for authority to act from the President, whose only care at that juncture appeared to be to seek personal safety in flight? His efforts to organize and fit out a large cavalry escort† for himself and suite are only partially excused by attributing them to trepidation and bewilderment. The letter of General Breckinridge to Mr. Davis, dated May 3d, gives a melancholy account of the demoralized condition of the body-guard of the President's party. "Nothing can be done with the bulk of this command," said General Breckinridge. "It has been with difficulty that anything has been kept in shape. I am having the silver paid to the troops, and will in any event save the gold and have it brought forward in the morning, when I hope Judge Reagan will take it. Many of the men have thrown away their arms. Most of them have resolved to remain here, under Vaughn and Dibble, and will make terms. A few hundred men will move on, and may be depended on for the object we spoke of yesterday."‡

President Davis seems to have been unconscious of the fact that he was not in the position of a Charles Stuart, or any other monarch, fleeing from his country and from rebellious subjects, who

* See Appendix.

† Mr. Davis gives the number of men forming it as "about two thousand, representing six brigade organizations." ("Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., pp. 689, 690.)

‡ The entire letter is given in the Appendix.

believed he had the inherent right to sacrifice the lives of his followers in efforts to insure his individual safety. As soon as the Confederacy was overthrown—and it was virtually so when General Lee surrendered at Appomattox—Mr. Davis became a private citizen. Had he then wisely accepted that position and left the country (as General Breckinridge and Mr. Benjamin did, after the fall of General Johnston's army), using his own means to do so, and unbetrayed by official display, he would, undoubtedly, have escaped both capture and imprisonment, and would have been spared the stories circulated at the time, which, false though most of them were, went far to impair his dignity.

General Beauregard, in accordance with instructions from General Johnston, had again stopped all further movements of our troops, and informed the Federal officer commanding the 6th Corps, at or near Danville, that the truce had been resumed between the two contending armies. The following order was then published to the Confederate forces:

“HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, NEAR
GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 27th*, 1865.

“General Orders, No. 18:

“By the terms of a military convention made on the 26th instant, by Major-General W. T. Sherman, U. S. A., and General J. E. Johnston, C. S. A., the officers and men of this army are to bind themselves not to take up arms against the United States until properly relieved from that obligation, and shall receive guarantees from the United States officers against molestation by the United States authorities, so long as they observe that obligation and the laws in force where they reside.

“For these objects duplicate muster-rolls will be made immediately, and, after the distribution of the necessary papers, the troops will march, under their officers, to their respective States, and there be disbanded, all retaining personal property.

“The object of this convention is pacification to the extent of the authority of the Commanders who made it.

“Events in Virginia, which broke every hope of success by war, imposed on its General the duty of sparing the blood of this gallant army and saving our country from further devastation and our people from ruin.

“J. E. JOHNSTON, General.

“Official.

“KINLOCH FALCONER, A. A. G.”

CHAPTER XLIX.

General Beauregard Completes his Last Official Duties.—Turns his Thoughts Homeward.—Names of the Officers Serving on his Staff.—His Efforts during the War to Obtain Promotion for Deserving Staff-officers.—His Telegram to General Cooper, April 28th.—General Cooper's Reply.—Promotion Demanded for other Meritorious Officers, but Granted for Two only.—Abandoned Box-car at the Depot at Greensboro' containing Confederate Archives.—General Beauregard Forwards it to Charlotte.—He Starts to Return Home on the 1st of May.—Expedients Employed to Defray his Expenses on the Journey.—Instance Given to Show the Patriotism of the Southern People.—General Beauregard Reaches Newberry, S. C., on May 5th.—He bids Adieu to those Members of his Staff who were from South Carolina.—His Parting Visit to Governor Pickens.—He Passes through Augusta, Atlanta, West Point, and Montgomery, reaching Mobile on the 19th.—Is Impressed by the Depression of the People.—How General Sherman could have been Checked and Defeated.—General Beauregard Avoids the Visits of Confederate Officers and Men while in Mobile.—Leaves for New Orleans.—Arrives on the 20th of May at the Pontchartrain End of the Railroad, Five Miles from the City.—Is Informed of Crowds Waiting to Greet him.—Endeavors to Avoid all Public Demonstrations.—Is Welcomed at every Step.—Reaches Home at Sunset.

As soon as the work of arranging and verifying the muster-rolls and other papers relative to the return of the troops to their respective States had been completed, General Beauregard, released from these sad but necessary duties, turned his thoughts to his own personal affairs and his approaching departure for Louisiana. He had, on the 27th of April, addressed an affectionate farewell letter to the officers of his personal and general staff, which we have already inserted in the biographical sketch immediately preceding the narrative of his military operations. We append a list of their names:*

PERSONAL STAFF.

1. Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm, of South Carolina, A. D. C.
2. Lieutenant A. J. Toutant, of Texas, A. D. C.

* A complete list of the staff, and of all detached officers and men serving at General Beauregard's headquarters, up to the 1st of May, is given in the Appendix.

3. Captain R. T. Beauregard, of Louisiana, Acting A. D. C.
4. Cadet H. T. Beauregard, of Louisiana, Acting A. D. C.
5. Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Rice, of South Carolina, Volunteer A. D. C.
6. Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. Paul, of Virginia, Volunteer A. D. C.

GENERAL STAFF.

1. Colonel George W. Brent, of Virginia, A. A. G.
2. Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Otey, of Virginia, A. A. G.
3. Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Roman, of Louisiana, A. A. and I. G.
4. Major Henry Bryan, of Georgia, A. A. and I. G.
5. Major James Eustis, of Louisiana, A. A. and I. G.
6. Captain Albert Ferry, of Louisiana, A. A. and I. G.
7. Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Waddy, of Virginia, Chief Ordnance Officer.
8. Surgeon R. L. Brodie, of South Carolina, Medical Director.
9. Surgeon Samuel Choppin, of Louisiana, Medical Inspector.

During the war General Beauregard had exerted himself to the utmost to have additional rank given to staff-officers who, in his opinion, were worthy of promotion. He thought that a full general should be entitled, in war, to four aides-de-camp—a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, a major, and a captain. Instead of which two aids only, with the rank of lieutenant, had been allowed a full general, according to law. During the winter of 1864–1865 Congress, however, at last passed a bill giving three aids, with the rank of major, to every full general. But the law, as was well known, was never enforced by the War Department. Fearing lest the Confederacy should die without doing at least partial justice to that faithful and self-sacrificing class of officers, General Beauregard addressed the following telegram to Adjutant-General Cooper, who at that date was still at Charlotte:

“GREENSBORO’, N. C., *April 28th, 1865: 7.30 A. M.*

“Before leaving here the Secretary of War promised to have General Johnston’s aids and mine commissioned majors, according to law. Has it been done? It is highly desirable it should be done before disbanding troops. I am glad to hear of Lieutenant-Colonel Riley’s promotion.

“G. T. BEAUREGARD.”

General Cooper’s answer was forwarded and duly received the same day. It ran thus:

“CHARLOTTE, *April 28th, 1865.*

“General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

“The Secretary of War and myself strongly recommended to the President the promotion of yours and General Johnston’s aides-de-camp; and though the matter was considered by him, the order for their promotion was not given. He has left, and I am powerless to effect your wishes. It would give me pleasure if I could.

S. COOPER, A. and I. G.”

While at Charleston, General Beauregard had also recommended many of his officers as deserving of promotion for gallant and meritorious services during the long and remarkable siege of that city; but none of them were promoted save two—namely, Major (afterwards Brigadier-General) Stephen D. Elliott, one of the commanders of Sumter after its first intrepid defender, Colonel Rhett, had been withdrawn from the unconquered fortress, with all its heavy artillery; and Major D. B. Harris, the able and indefatigable Engineer, who was made a lieutenant-colonel, and was even promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, though he died without being apprised of the fact. The others remained unnoticed until the very last moment during the expiring hours of the Confederacy, when, at General Beauregard's solicitation to the Secretary of War, two of them, by going to Charlotte, N. C., in person, obtained deserved promotion. The first, Brigadier-General Taliaferro, was thus made Major-General; and the second, Captain F. D. Lee, who had been in charge of the Torpedo Department at Charleston, became a major. This was tardy justice; and it is surprising, when we remember the confusion prevailing at that time in the Executive Bureaus, that even so much was obtained.

As an illustration of the intense preoccupation then existing among some of the high civil functionaries of the defunct Government, General Beauregard relates that, shortly after the President had left Greensboro' for Salisbury and Charlotte, he noticed at the depot, at Greensboro', a train of box-cars, from one of which some straggling soldiers were throwing out papers which were flying to and fro in every direction. Upon inquiry it was ascertained that these cars contained the official records of the Government from Richmond, and had been abandoned there, without a guard, and without directions as to the disposition to be made of them. General Beauregard gave orders at once that sentinels should be put over them, and that they should be immediately forwarded to Charlotte; which was done. He afterwards learned that General Johnston, on arriving at that place, found these cars again unprotected, and that he also took special pains to have them properly guarded. They were finally turned over to the Federal authorities, in order to prevent further destruction.

It was only on the 30th of April that General Beauregard was able to begin preparations for his homeward journey. He had collected from Greensboro' all the Louisianians who were there

on detached service, separated from their commands, and had invited them to join his staff and to return with him to New Orleans. He thus got together about twenty of them, who gratefully accepted his kind offer; and on the 1st of May, at 10.30 P. M., after making his adieus to those members of his general staff whose route lay in a different direction, to General Johnston, to his military household, and to many officers who had not yet left, he started, with his party, travelling sometimes by rail, sometimes on horseback, and sometimes even—for the few who had no horses—on foot.

General Beauregard felt the difficulty of procuring the necessary funds for defraying his own and his companions' expenses on the journey. Except the silver coin (\$1.15 each) which had been given to himself, his staff, and the troops, as already related, neither General Beauregard nor those who accompanied him had any money in specie; and even Confederate notes, which had become altogether valueless, were scarce among them.

But one of General Beauregard's aids, Lieutenant Chisolm, who was seldom at a loss for resources in an emergency, proposed that a wagon should be procured and stocked with provisions and stores, such as tobacco, nails, yarn, twine, thread, and whatever else the people along their route were likely to be in need of, and that these articles should be used in lieu of money. The suggestion was adopted; and as the quartermaster and the commissary of the post had received orders to distribute their supplies on hand to the several commands, the wagon was soon loaded as desired, and the plan of barter, when tried upon the journey, surpassed the most sanguine expectations. The people on the way were happy to secure these useful commodities in return for what few provisions they could spare. It is our duty to add that, however poor or helpless the people were, as soon as they learned that what they were asked to barter was needed by General Beauregard and his staff, they almost invariably refused to accept any compensation whatever. This was carried so far that General Beauregard, although deeply touched by it, had to forbid his name being mentioned until the exchange had been entirely effected and the goods carried off.

To show the patriotism of the Southern people—notably of the women—even at that hour, an incident may be mentioned which occurred just before General Beauregard and his companions

reached the South Carolina and Georgia border. They had come to a small town, and were relating the latest news of the surrender of our armies to the inhabitants, who had rushed to the road to obtain what they knew would be trustworthy information. There, as everywhere, they heard it with great sorrow. Old men—for no others were there—and women of all ages, of all classes, shed tears as they took General Beauregard's hand and asked him "if he really thought the struggle was over forever." Among those present was a tall, gaunt old lady, who, although sunburned and with hands hardened by toil, had an unmistakable air of culture and refinement. She took the general warmly by the hand, the tears meanwhile running down her furrowed cheeks, and said, "General, is there no longer any hope of success?" "None, madame," was the answer; "we have fought our last fight, and must now submit bravely to our hard fate." "Ah! General, I lost four brave, manly sons in this war, and I have but one left, my youngest, but I would have given his life too for the triumph of our cause!" No Roman matron could have spoken more nobly.

On arriving at Newberry, S. C., on the 5th of May, General Beauregard told those officers of his staff who were citizens of South Carolina that they must now leave him and return to their families. They strongly objected, and insisted upon accompanying him until he should have reached his home in safety. This he positively refused to allow; for travelling was then very difficult, especially in Georgia, owing to the destruction of the railroads; and he was unwilling that they should put themselves to so much inconvenience on his account. They yielded, therefore, though reluctantly, and on the next morning (May 6th) finally parted from the General, after a most affectionate leave-taking. Four years of toil and dangers, shared together, had cemented between them a friendship which no after-event could possibly impair.

General Beauregard and the remainder of his party arrived at Augusta, Ga., during the afternoon of the 8th, after passing through Charlotte, N. C., Rockhill, Newberry, Edgefield, and Hamburg, S. C. He had stopped at Edgefield on the morning of the 7th to pay a parting visit to Governor Pickens, whose residence stood just outside of the town. At the Governor's kind and pressing invitation he and his staff remained there an entire day.

General Beauregard prolonged his stay in Augusta several days, for the sake of the rest he so much needed after the fatigue and emotions of the last few weeks. He then started by rail for Atlanta, which he had not seen since the destruction of the town by General Sherman's army. Of that handsome and fast-growing city there remained but a few houses standing here and there on its outskirts. Only blackened walls and chimneys now marked the alignments of the streets. It was a relief to General Beauregard when the train left for West Point, which was then the terminus of the railroad, since the destruction by Wilson's cavalry of that part of the track running to Montgomery. From West Point he went across country to Montgomery, then occupied by Federal troops under Major-General A. J. Smith, a former friend and classmate of General Beauregard at the United States Military Academy. This was on the 17th of May. General Smith did all in his power to assist General Beauregard in his further journey southward.

Mobile was reached on the 19th. General Beauregard went directly from the railroad depot to the steamer by which he was to leave for New Orleans. He refused to stop in the city, in order to avoid the visits of a number of Confederate officers and men, who, he was told, proposed calling on him. The fear of involving them in trouble with the Federal authorities was his reason for depriving himself of the pleasure of meeting them once more.

There were now but a few hours intervening before General Beauregard would again set foot in Louisiana. When about to enter upon this last stage of his long journey he could not help painfully noting the difference between the feeling, the tone, and the outward appearance of the people four years before, when he was on his way to take command in Charleston, and that which he now felt and saw around him. Free, resolute, hopeful were the masses then; sorrowful, despondent, heart-broken he found them now. Johnston's army after Lee's, Taylor's after Johnston's, had surrendered. The Trans-Mississippi forces, under Kirby Smith, must soon do the same. It was for them a question not even of days but of hours. None, except perhaps Mr. Davis, could then imagine that General Kirby Smith was capable of making a stand in the Trans-Mississippi country and of continuing there to uphold our cause. "The great resources of his Department, its vast extent, the numbers, the discipline, and the efficien-

cy of his army"*—words copied from General Kirby Smith's order of April 21st to his forces—were in striking contrast with his refusal, and his reasons given at the time for refusing,† to send assistance to General Hood, in his hard campaign around Nashville, after the battle of Franklin. Mr. Davis had, no doubt, forgotten the expression of opinion of the War Department (December 4th, 1864) concerning General Kirby Smith: that he had heretofore failed to respond to many calls made on him, and "that no plans should be based on his compliance."‡

General Beauregard also bitterly reflected upon General Sherman's long and slow march, from Atlanta to Savannah, from Savannah to Goldsboro', and from Goldsboro' to Raleigh, a distance of 650 miles, which it had taken him 109 days, or an average of six miles a day, to accomplish. He knew that this had been effected, without material opposition, because of want of forethought on the part of the officers of the War Department, from whom no reinforcements could be obtained, and by reason of whose apathy no concentration could be made at any point, notwithstanding his repeated and urgent appeals. And what added keenness to his regret was the recollection that, had General Hood crossed the Tennessee River at Guntersville when he should have done so, he would have had ample time to destroy the scattered Federal forces in that part of the State, take Nashville, with all the supplies there collected, and march to the Ohio, without encountering serious obstacles. Or possibly he might, after taking Nashville, have crossed the Cumberland Mountains and gone to form a junction with General Lee, so as to strike General Grant before General Sherman could come to his assistance. The success of either movement might have compelled General

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 697.

† See his letter to General Beauregard, in Appendix to Chapter XLII, wherein he wrote, under date of January 6th, 1865: " * * * The country has been so devastated by the contending armies, and is so exhausted, that the troops would require transportation for supplies for near three hundred miles from the interior to the Mississippi. * * * The country north of Red River is bare of supplies, and is at this season utterly impracticable for the operations of armies and the movement of troops. More than two hundred miles of destitution intervene between our supplies and the enemy's works on the Arkansas. Near five hundred miles of desert separate our base on Red River from the productive region of Missouri," etc.

‡ See, in Appendix, Mr. Seddon's telegram to General Beauregard.

Sherman to follow the Confederate forces into Middle Tennessee; thus showing the correctness of General Hood's original plan, which, though badly executed, was, nevertheless, undoubtedly well conceived.

On the 20th of May, General Beauregard and his party arrived at the Pontchartrain end of the new canal and shell road, five miles in rear of New Orleans. There he was informed that crowds of people were anxiously awaiting his return to greet his passage through the city. Acting under the same impulse, and for the same reasons that led him to avoid all public demonstration in Mobile, he determined at once to reach his residence through the most retired streets. But he was only partially successful in doing so, for even there, wherever he appeared, men, women, and children flocked out from their houses, waving their handkerchiefs and pressing around his horse to shake the General by the hand. He could find no words to say in response, but was most deeply moved by such a spontaneous outburst of sympathy and affection. And thus, as the sun was setting in the west, he finally came to his once happy home, left more than four years before, to find—as he feelingly said—a seat vacant that formerly was occupied by one who had never heard his footsteps at the door without hastening to welcome him to his own fireside.

CHAPTER L.

Management of the Confederate Administration.—Importation of Arms.—Permitted under International Law.—Blockade Ineffective the First Year.—Federal Government Obtained all Arms Wanted from Abroad.—Failure of Confederate Government in that Respect.—Inefficiency of the Agent.—No Arms Forwarded during 1861.—Administration Occupied with Manufacturing Arms at Home.—Nitre Beds.—Purchase of a Navy.—Ten First-class Steamers Offered to the Confederate Government in May, 1861.—Offer Declined.—Attempts to Build Ironclads, and late Obtainment of a Few Ships.—Object not to Raise the Blockade, but to Assail the Federal Mercantile Marine.—Efforts Inefficient.—Financial Operations.—Sale of Time Bonds in Europe Secured by Cotton, our True Resource.—\$75,000,000 Offered to the Confederates in London and Paris for Time Bonds Secured by Cotton.—Administration Resorted to Constant Issue of Treasury Notes, not Redeemed.—Compulsory Funding in Bonds.—Destroyed Credit of Confederate States.—Diplomacy.—Consisted of Arguments about Rights and Dependence of England on American Cotton.—Confederate Administration Made no Offer of Commercial Advantages by Treaty.—Low Duties and Navigation Laws.—No Diplomacy.—Defence of Territory, Population, and Supplies.—Progressive Losses.—Effect on Public Opinion and Feeling.—Confederate Conscription, instead of State Troops.—Impressment Makeshifts, instead of Efficiency in Commissary and Quartermaster Departments.—Causes Concurring to Produce a Disastrous End.—The South after the War.—Present Attitude in the Union.—The Future in Store.—Memory of the Late Struggle.

IN bringing this book to a close it may be pertinent and profitable to the reader in search of truth, to pass briefly in review the management of the Confederate government in several matters vitally affecting the issue of the cause. To do this it is necessary to note our success or failure in providing the ways and means of defence. These consisted: first, in the importation of arms and munitions of war from Europe; second, in the purchase of a navy; third, in the financial operations of the government; fourth, in its diplomacy with foreign nations, especially England and France. As a result following the action of the administration in these particulars, it is important to observe the progressive failure of the government in defending the territory, population, and supplies of the Southern States. With correct ideas on these subjects

and a knowledge of public opinion and feeling concerning the management of Confederate affairs, the materials will be present for judging of the causes which led to the disastrous end. Thus is the web of fate woven. But, in touching upon these grave topics, which control military events and shape history, no more can be attempted here than a brief, if suggestive, outline.

1. It was patent to every man of intelligence in the country that arms, ammunition, accoutrements, soldiers' clothing, shoes, and blankets must be procured from Europe. The Confederate government was established in February, 1861. War was declared in the latter part of April. During three months there was not the slightest obstacle to the obtainment of arms and munitions. And, after declaration of war, the laws of nations authorized the citizens of neutral powers to sell to belligerents articles contraband of war, and to supply gunpowder and every description of arms. These laws were specifically confirmed by decrees of the courts of England and of the United States. Neutrality and a recognition of the belligerent rights of the Confederate States were soon assured by England, France, and other nations of Europe. And the blockade attempted of the Southern seaports was, for six months, no more than nominal, and thereafter very imperfect, to say the least of it, up to the close of the war.

On the 1st of May, 1861, the British Minister at Washington was informed by the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, that he had sent agents to England, and that others would go to France, to purchase arms for the United States. This fact was communicated to the British Foreign Office, which interposed no objection. The government of the United States managed to receive in safety all the warlike supplies which it induced British manufacturers and merchants to send, and its arsenals were replenished from British sources. A reference to the bills of entry in the custom-houses of London and Liverpool shows that from May 1st, 1861, to December 31st, 1862, vast shipments of implements of war were made to the Northern States. The official custom-house returns set forth that 341,000 rifles, 41,500 muskets, 26,500 flint guns, 49,982,000 percussion-caps, and 2250 swords were exported to the North. And from one-third to one-half as much more was shipped as "hardware."

Meantime, the head of the Confederate administration, elected on account of his acquaintance with military no less than civil af-

fairs, a graduate of West Point, distinguished as a colonel in the Mexican war, and afterwards Secretary of War, and familiar with the *personnel* of the United States army—a man who expressed his conviction that the North would certainly make war upon the South, and urged military preparations for defence—picked out Major Caleb Huse and sent him to England, as agent, to purchase arms. Major Huse was also a graduate of West Point, of the class of 1847, from Newburyport, Mass., and, since the war, has been, and still is, principal of a preparatory school at West Point, N. Y. He did not go abroad until after war was declared, and ran the blockade from the harbor of Charleston, with instructions to buy ten thousand (!) rifles.* On the 30th of December, 1861, he wrote: "Not able to send anything." It seems, however, to have been held by the Confederate administration that Major Huse displayed prodigious energy when he sent the information that he "had in a warehouse at St. Andrew's Wharf, Liverpool, 25,000 rifles, 2000 barrels of powder, 500,000 cartridges, 13,000 accoutrements, 226 saddles, with blankets, socks, etc.;" these "guarded by government watchmen, and the wharfingers ordered not to ship or deliver without acquainting the Board of Customs." So much for the commercial caution and skill of this select agent, whose reputation is assuredly that of an estimable citizen, but not that of an active, enterprising, and practical man. If there were other agents sent to Europe by the Confederate government to purchase and ship arms the fact has not been published. The competent agency of John Frazer & Co., of Liverpool, might have been obtained by the government, and that of Confederate officers, one or more, who furnished the Russian government with arms during the Crimean war of 1855, and had information of the available arms in Europe. But their knowledge and experience were not utilized. Most of the wholly insufficient supply of arms that was obtained came through the private enterprise of merchants shipping at their own risk, and were sold to the government after landing. A large number were also acquired by capture on the fields of battle.

While the timely importation of what we sorely needed from abroad received comparatively insignificant and inefficient attention, the energies and agents of the administration seemed chiefly occupied in the preparation, within the Confederate States, of

* See Chapter V., Vol. I.

nitre beds and other elaborate arrangements, which required time, and therefore accomplished little before the tide of war was fatally turned against us.

Of men willing to engage in the defence of their country Mr. Davis himself testifies there were many more than the government could arm. There were very many out of the army who were anxious to enter it, but for whom the government had no arms. Three hundred and sixty thousand offered their services to the government before it moved from Montgomery, at the end of May, 1861. In 1862 accepted regiments were encamped at Richmond which had been awaiting their arms for several months. The chief anxiety of General Albert Sidney Johnston at Bowling Green was to procure arms and men. Half of his troops were imperfectly armed, and whole brigades remained without weapons during the autumn of 1861. Importunate cries went up to the government from the West for the supplies which would enable patriotic citizens to defend their homes. Here, there, everywhere, the difficulty of the Confederate administration was the want of arms. The first Secretary of War, General L. P. Walker, after vainly urging the importation of arms by the hundred thousand, resigned, because it was determined by the President not to put into camps of instruction, for the campaign of 1862, the large number of troops on which the Secretary insisted.

2. In the procurement of a navy the Confederate administration was not more successful. An appropriation of ten millions of dollars in bonds, invested in cotton, would have enabled the Government to obtain a sufficient number of first-class steamships, to prevent a blockade; and such a proposition was actually made to it. When the East India Company surrendered to the Crown its control of British India it had for sale a fleet of swift and stout steamers, built for armament, to secure the Company's interests in the Indian seas, and for long voyages. These vessels, of great size and power (then recently built) were ten in number—four first-class, and six, for our purposes, scarcely inferior. They could have been bought in England at less than one-half the cost, and could have been equipped, manned, armed, and put on the coast of the United States within six months after the formation of the Confederate government*—that is, by August or Septem-

* See Chapter V., Vol. I.

ber, 1861—for \$10,000,000, or covered by 40,000 bales of cotton. The owners were willing to receive cotton or such other payment as might be convenient. Mr. Charles K. Prioleau, of the Liverpool branch of the house of John Frazer & Co., made this negotiation of his own accord;* and an agent of the firm went from Charleston, S. C., to Montgomery with his proposition, that the Confederate government should buy these vessels on the terms mentioned. But the proposal was declined. This occurred about three months after the organization of the Confederate government, and constitutes a strange commentary upon the predictions of a terrible war, and the anxiety of Mr. Davis to prepare for it. Mr. Prioleau is a man of high standing, socially and commercially, and the correctness of his statements cannot be doubted.

The season of 1860 was a fine one for cotton, and a large crop was made. The people of the Cotton States were prosperous and rich. There were very many who did not need their crops for their immediate support, and there were very many who had money for investment. Although a good deal of cotton was shipped abroad, as usual, a considerable amount was held in the interior, and it was freely at the disposal of the government in exchange for its bonds, payable at a distant day. Recognizing the importance of preventing the closure of the Southern ports, it was early proposed and urged by men of prominence to purchase cotton with bonds of the Confederate States. Vice-President Stephens suggested 2,000,000 bales of the crop of 1860, and 2,000,000 more from the crop of 1861. With this cotton, or any considerable part of it, either got out before the ports could be effectually closed by blockade, or in hand and pledged, a large number of the best steamers, ironclads or others, could have been bought, or contracted for and built, in Europe. This line of policy would have enabled the government to procure a number of ships by the end of 1861, and in no long time a navy vastly superior to that of the United States. The blockade might have been prevented, and Northern shipping—which was the weak point of the North—might have been swept from the ocean; all the cotton we had to export might have been convoyed across the sea; all needed supplies might have been procured; the credit of the Confederate States might have been established, while that

* See Mr. Prioleau's letter to General Beauregard, in Chapter V., Vol. I.

of the United States might have been crippled, by the prevention of duties from imports and exports; and, by the development of such power and resources, the Confederate States might have secured the recognition of their established place among the independent nations of the world. But the administration failed to discover the true policy, or had not the capacity and energy to carry it out. That which is highly practicable for some men is wholly impracticable for others. Hence, the successes and failures that checker life mark the difference between men of eminent competence and those who bear the brand of signal incompetence on great occasions.

The blockade—at first a mere semblance—was allowed to grow gradually, and, by great and intelligent effort on the part of the North, became more efficient and real, although never perfect. Meanwhile, the Confederate administration expended its energies and resources, thus cramped, in a few partially successful attempts at building ironclads at the South, and had an agent in England to buy ships for the purpose of attacking Northern commerce on the seas. The frigate *Merrimac*, raised from the water at Norfolk, was by March, 1862, converted into the ironclad ram *Virginia*, with a draught of twenty-two feet. She was not seaworthy, and was unable to drive the Federal fleet out of the shallow waters of Chesapeake Bay; and when the peninsula was evacuated she had to be burned, on Craney Island, within two months after her completion. The steam-ram *Mississippi*, at New Orleans, was not finished when that city fell. The *Louisiana*, from defective machinery, was of little account. The *North Carolina* and the *Raleigh*, constructed at Wilmington, went to the bottom at the entrance of the Cape Fear River, without accomplishing anything. The *Palmetto State* and the *Chicora*, at Charleston, had home-made machinery, none having been imported by the government. This was so inadequate that what was effected with the vessels hardly merits a special mention. There was—we might say—one exception: the *Arkansas*, saved from destruction by the forethought of General Beauregard, but whose short and glorious career was due to the intrepidity of her commander, his officers and crew, and not to her own strength and capacity. None of these Confederate vessels or ironclads were, in the strict sense of the word, seaworthy, and, beyond river and harbor defence, none of them could render effectual service.

The agent of the Confederate government in Europe for the obtainment of ships was Captain J. D. Bullock. How late he went is not known. On the 24th of August, 1862, he got the *Alabama* afloat, under the famous Semmes—not to raise the blockade, but to assail the mercantile marine of the North. And up to that period the *Alabama* and the *Florida* had been the only ships of any consequence secured. The latter commenced her career from Mobile Harbor, under Captain Maffit. The *Sumter* and the *Jeff. Davis*, two frail, indifferent craft, extemporized for cruising from merchant-ships in Southern ports, had already closed their brief careers. The *Nashville*, a coasting steamer, made a voyage across the ocean in 1863, under Captain Pegram, and was run ashore on the coast of Georgia, to save her from capture. In 1864 the *Shenandoah* was bought in England, and placed under command of Captain Waddell; the *Georgia*, under Captain Maury. The *Tallahassee* and the *Chickamauga*—blockade-running screw-propellers had run into Wilmington—were also bought, and sent out with the Confederate flag, under Captains Wood and Wilkinson respectively, in 1864. What was done by the Confederate government to raise the blockade, on the one hand, and to sweep the commerce of the North from the ocean, on the other, was accomplished, almost exclusively, by the few ships mentioned. Such were the tardy and feeble efforts made, which show the extent of the failure to procure a navy. Meanwhile, we had naval officers of superior ability—one admiral, twelve captains, thirty commanders, and one hundred and twelve lieutenants—all ready and anxious for service. The principal officers had belonged to the navy of the United States common to both sections before the war, and among them were men of world-wide renown.

3. In regard to the financial operations of the Confederate government, it was believed by many that Treasury notes, payable for all public debts, except duties, could be used to the amount of from \$100,000,000 to, possibly, \$200,000,000. But, beyond that limit, it was unquestionable that such issues must exceed the necessities of business and bring about want of confidence, speculation, and depreciation. At best Treasury notes were simply a form of credit, based upon income or funds derivable from certain sources. And it was obvious that for the actual means of carrying on the government and meeting the requirements of a

great war we were necessarily dependent upon three resources: duties on imports and on exports; direct taxation; and the sale of bonds for money, or for cotton, which, in the markets of the world, commanded gold.

With a blockade interfering to prevent imports and exports it was plain that duties would yield but little revenue; and so long as such a state of things continued to exist that source must be of small avail.

With a blockade the marketing of the staple products of the country was also interrupted; and when, besides this, our people were urged to plant less cotton and to grow food crops, it was manifest that direct taxation would prove, not merely onerous, but, in the emergencies of the government, utterly inadequate.

The practical resource of the Confederacy, therefore, consisted in the sale of bonds, payable in ten, twenty, thirty, or forty years.

The people of the South were earnest and patriotic in their efforts permanently to establish their government; and, so far as they had means available for investment in bonds, they were willing to invest their money and their cotton. Their private resources were far ampler than those of their ancestors in 1776 and in 1812, when the blockade was complete; and they were able to make such investments to sustain the government. But, for the pressing exigencies of a great war, it was evident that the Confederate government must obtain means through large loans on time from bankers abroad, as is commonly done.

The sale of bonds abroad depended on the security offered. The Confederate government, newly set up, was involved in a struggle of vast proportions. Capitalists are proverbially cautious, and it could not be expected that the moneyed men of Europe would lend the large amounts needed upon the bare stake of the success of the Confederate States in achieving independence. But the people of the South raised cotton in large amounts, which, in the markets of the world, was equivalent to specie, and there was a general willingness to transfer a large portion of it to the Confederate government in exchange for bonds bearing 8 per cent. interest, and payable at a distant day. With this cotton, from the crops of 1860, 1861, and 1862, to sell or to pledge in Europe, funds necessary to carry on the war effectively, and to keep up the credit of the country, could have been obtained. And, using cotton as a tangible collateral secu-

ality, the Confederate government might have arranged to get the benefit of an advance of price.

It should not be forgotten that, in the summer of 1862, the British consul at Charleston, Mr. Bunch, made this official statement concerning the efficiency of the blockade: "Authoritative accounts and commercial letters, submitted to me by my government, prove that any vessel in Europe destined for a Southern port could be insured, with her cargo, at a premium of 7, 10, 15 per cent." And to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, the practicability of this policy and the financial failure of the administration, a single additional fact may be cited. As late as March, 1863, when the Treasury notes of the Confederate government were worth but twenty-five cents on the dollar, a loan of \$15,000,000 was asked on Confederate bonds, secured by cotton, to be delivered at Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, or New Orleans, or within ten miles of a railroad or stream navigable to the ocean. The applications in London and in Paris to take the loan exceeded \$75,000,000; and it stood in the London market at 5 per cent. premium. For this fact Mr. Davis is our authority.

The United States, during the war, had no such substantial basis on which to issue currency or to negotiate loans on time bonds. Their credit rested solely on their progress and prospective success in reducing the South by force of arms. And the helplessness manifested by the Confederate administration in utilizing its superior advantages in financial position gave strength and potency to the efforts of the Northern government, which borrowed, from time to time, all that it required.

That the Confederate government should purchase, with its bonds, the cotton in the South, and ship it or pledge its delivery, as above suggested, was proposed and pressed in the early days of its organization. But the policy was neither appreciated nor acted upon.

The customs collected up to August 1st, 1862, amounted to only \$1,437,400. And the people had been harassed by a direct tax, from which, to that date, only \$10,539,910.70 had been realized; \$15,000,000 were raised on bonds, secured by a duty on the exportation of cotton of one-eighth of a cent per pound; and \$22,613,346.61 were raised on 8.20 bonds. A resort to the issue of Treasury notes and call certificates to the amount

of \$248,106,116.61 covers nearly all the financial operations effected up to the date mentioned.

The permanent constitution of the Confederate States went into effect on the 22d of February, 1862; and in this constitution it was provided that Congress should appropriate no money from the Treasury except by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses, taken by yeas and nays, unless it were asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of departments, and submitted to Congress by the President. Therefore, unless the Executive asked for appropriations for any purpose, it was hardly possible to pass them, and, if passed, they were subject to the President's veto. So that the administration, and not Congress, was chiefly responsible for the financial operations.

By December, 1863, the currency put out by the Confederate government amounted to over \$600,000,000, or much more than threefold the sum required by the business of the country.

The scale of depreciation was as follows :

CONFEDERATE CURRENCY.

October, 1861.....	\$1.00 at par.	August, 1863.....	\$14.00 b. par.
November, 1861.....	1.10 below	September, 1863.....	14.00 "
December, 1861.....	1.16 "	October, 1863.....	14.00 "
January, 1862.....	1.20 "	November, 1863.....	15.00 "
February, 1862.....	1.30 "	December, 1863.....	20.00 "
March, 1862.....	1.50 "	January, 1864.....	21.00 "
April, 1862.....	1.55 "	February, 1864.....	21.00 "
May, 1862.....	1.50 "	March, 1864.....	23.00 "
June, 1862.....	1.50 "	April, 1864.....	20.00 "
July, 1862.....	1.50 "	May, 1864.....	19.00 "
August, 1862.....	1.50 "	June, 1864.....	10.00 "
September, 1862.....	2.00 "	July, 1864.....	21.00 "
October, 1862.....	2.00 "	August, 1864.....	23.00 "
November, 1862.....	2.50 "	September, 1864.....	25.00 "
December, 1862.....	2.50 "	October, 1864.....	26.00 "
January, 1863.....	3.00 "	November, 1864.....	39.00 "
February, 1863.....	3.00 "	December, 1864.....	49.00 "
March, 1863.....	4.00 "	January, 1865.....	50.00 "
April, 1863.....	5.00 "	February, 1865.....	56.00 "
May, 1863.....	1.50 "	March, 1865.....	60.00 "
June, 1863.....	6.50 "	April, 1865.....	100.00 "
July, 1863.....	9.00 "		

The administration relied mainly on the issue of Treasury notes and call certificates, which it could not redeem, and then on the

compulsory funding of these in bonds. The result of this financing was constant embarrassment, followed by a steady decline of credit. Only \$11,000,000 were due abroad when the Confederate government went down. The true resource of the country was neglected, and very little money was obtained in Europe.

4. The diplomacy of the Confederate administration consisted of arguments as to rights, and appeals to precedent. The arguments set forth the origin, construction, and federal character of the government of the United States under its Constitution, supplemented by the right claimed by all free people, under the Declaration of Independence, to alter or abolish their forms of government, and to institute such new governments "as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." These were expected to justify the secession of the Southern States, and the formation of the new republican government of the Confederate States. On this presentation of the case appeals were made to the monarchical governments of Europe—not at all in love with republicanism—to recognize the independence of the Confederate States, at whatever cost, as a matter of moral sentiment. It was further insisted, with confidence, that "cotton is king," and that the nations of Europe were dependent on the South, with its annual crops of cotton. England, especially, with her eight millions of factory hands, could not afford to have our ports closed, and must, of necessity, recognize our separate existence and raise the blockade. At the same time it was persistently sought to keep the Confederate States commercially independent of all the nations of Europe, and to confer no advantages in trade. The fact seems to have been wholly lost sight of by the administration that England had large interests in the cotton culture of her East Indian Empire; that the ruin of the Confederate States and the depression of rival cotton production would stimulate and promote British independence of American cotton; and that, unless compensatory and overbalancing interests in trade were tendered, England might seek commercial freedom by non-intervention.

The efforts of the Northern States to preserve the Union were not inspired by love of the Southern people. The value of the Union to them was in the great interests developed through the powers of the general government, exercised by the Northern majority and involving Northern prosperity. The war was waged

against the South by the North to retain the enormous benefits derivable through discriminating and prohibitory tariffs, exclusive navigation laws, and unequal and profligate appropriations from the common treasury.

The people of the South had long struggled for *ad valorem* duties laid for revenue, and against duties discriminating for the benefit of classes at the North. In 1833 the Union was nearly dissolved on the ground of the unconstitutionality, inequality, and oppression of such taxes. And, in framing the Confederate constitution, it was carefully provided that "no duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations shall be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry, and all duties, imports, and excises shall be uniform throughout the Confederate States."

It should be remembered that, during eighteen months, the question of African slavery was no obstacle to foreign relations. The United States government had declared, in despatches sent to its ambassadors abroad, that the war was made to save the Union only, and to maintain all the rights and institutions of the States unchanged. The United States Congress announced to the Confederate States and to the world the same policy. Thus did the United States government stand before the foreign powers, no less than before the South, as the supporter of African slavery, until September 22d, 1862. Then, as a war measure to cripple the South and assist the North in keeping the seceded States in the Union, President Lincoln issued his Proclamation of Emancipation. When this was done the time for the Confederate States to establish friendly relations with foreign nations had passed.

The fact should not be overlooked that the great Conservative party of England—which, to a considerable extent, represented the land-holding and agricultural interests of the country, formerly led by the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel, and latterly by the Earl of Derby and Mr. Disraeli—sympathized deeply with the conservative attitude of the people of the Confederate States. Although not in power during the war, the Tory party was strong and vigorous. It retired from control of the government, Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli resigning in June, 1859, on account of the question between Austria and Italy, and it came into office again, succeeding the Palmerston-Russell Administration, in June, 1866. The parties were nearly balanced, and any

blunder on the part of one placed the other in almost immediate power.

Soon after the government was organized the Confederate Congress unanimously voted the appointment of commissioners, to be sent to Europe to negotiate for a recognition and, in the event of war, possibly, for assistance. The Constitution ordained that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Congress, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Congress concur; and he shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Congress, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, etc." Thus was the treaty-making power vested in the President; and Congress had no authority to instruct the commissioners or to shape their negotiations.

Statesmen of the South expected that the commissioners would be sent as plenipotentiaries, instructed to propose, as conditions of our recognition and alliance, to England, France, and other nations that the Confederate States, for twenty years, would lay no higher duties on their productions imported than, say, 20 per cent. *ad valorem*; that for the same period no tonnage duties would be laid on their shipping, entering or leaving our ports, except what should be sufficient to keep in repair our harbors and rivers; that the coast navigation between ports of the Confederate States, during this time, should be free to them, subject only to police regulations; that upon the productions and tonnage of all nations refusing to recognize our independence there should be imposed a discriminating duty of, say, 10 per cent. additional; and that, if necessary—but not otherwise—the Confederate States government should make a league, offensive and defensive, with special guarantees—for instance, a guarantee to Great Britain of British America.

The tender of such treaties would have offered immense advantages to England and to France. With their great capital, and cheaper and more skilful labor, low duties for twenty years, with a discrimination of 10 per cent. against their competitors for the markets of the Confederate States, would have enabled them to furnish our supplies at enormous profits; and a tariff of 20 per cent. *ad valorem* would, according to experience, have yielded to our government the largest obtainable revenue, without in any way oppressing our people. The lucrative carrying trade of the Confederate States on the high seas, and the coast-

ing trade, hardly less remunerative, would have been chiefly theirs, with less cost to our people.

Would the Palmerston-Russell ministry have ventured to decline such a proffer of mutual benefits, and to persist in the policy of non-intervention? If it had, then the subject would have been taken straight into Parliament, with almost a certainty that the Whig ministry would have been speedily voted down, and the Conservative administration of Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli placed in power. And there can be little doubt that that administration would promptly have entered into such a treaty. Even the Whig Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell, openly expressed the opinion that the dissolution of the American Union would be permanent, and the Confederate States successful. John Bright, the Quaker Radical, and Richard Cobden, the Independent Liberal of the Manchester School of politics, then supporting the Whig administration, represented manufacturing constituencies, and were noted advocates of free-trade and low duties. It is more than likely that, in view of such benefits, their prejudices against the South and partialities for the North would have been nullified and overridden by the calls of unmistakable and gigantic interest to the people of England. The Emperor of the French, Louis Napoleon, was friendly in feeling to the South, and would gladly have joined England in such a programme. Without such inducements he proposed a mediation in October, 1862.

Under the action of the Confederate Congress the President appointed commissioners to Europe, with the Hon. William L. Yancey at the head of the commission, to go to England. But the instructions given him were not such as the past policy and political position occupied by the South naturally suggested; not such as Mr. Yancey expected; not such as the Secretary of State, the Hon. Robert Toombs, advocated; and not such as other leading Southern statesmen deemed of vital importance to the cause. Instead of seeking to use the power of laying duties and passing navigation laws, to conciliate the support of foreign nations; instead of using the treaty-making power, which was paramount to the legislative, to obtain the recognition of the independence of the Confederate States, the President gave no authority to the commissioners to make commercial treaties, or to agree to confer special trade or navigation interests. The commission went without

powers. It had nothing to propose and, therefore, nothing to treat about. The administration seemed to have no comprehension of the importance of appealing to the interests of foreign nations for the establishment of our independence. In addition to abstract disquisition it appeared to rely chiefly on compelling England by her dependence touching the supply of cotton for her manufactories. If there was really superior sagacity in forecasting the magnitude of the struggle in which the South was involved—which has been claimed, but which plain facts go far to refute—then the only explanation of this unexpected and ultimately fatal policy, on the part of President Davis, appears to have been the entertainment of a design by him to foster manufacturing classes in the Confederate States, and, for that purpose, to hold in the hands of the government the power of discrimination in laying duties on foreign commodities to the utmost extent practicable, and free from committals by treaties. This idea has support from the course of the administration in regard to the obtainment of arms and munitions of war, and the procurement of a navy.

When the Confederate commission presented itself in London it was received by the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, and interviews were held between them. But Mr. Yancey, as we have seen, was powerless. He had nothing to propose or to treat about. So when the minister of the United States, Mr. C. F. Adams, on the 12th of June, 1861, expressed the "great dissatisfaction" of his government, coupled with a threat to retaliate, if such interviews continued, the British Minister, having ascertained that it was the policy of the Confederate government to use the commercial dependence of England to obtain compulsory recognition, and to make no treaties conferring advantages in trade or commerce, cut short further official intercourse. Not until November, 1861, were Messrs. Mason, Slidell, Mann, and Rost sent over to Europe. And they, too, had only arguments to offer concerning legal rights and precedents unacceptable to monarchies; and they accomplished nothing. Our attempts at diplomacy were an egregious failure. In the language of the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, in the Confederate Senate, from 1862 to 1865—the Hon. James L. Orr—"the Confederate States had no diplomacy."

In defending the territory, population, and supply resources of

the Southern States the success or failure of the Confederate administration may be judged by a brief presentment of cardinal points. By the devoted courage and unsurpassed endurance of our volunteers, accepted in insufficient numbers, ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-armed, but led by officers of ability, brilliant victories had been achieved over the invading forces of the North; and drawn battles, hardly less distinguished, had been fought against heavy odds. But, although the armies of the United States had received terrible repulses on various occasions, they certainly made considerable progress in occupying important portions and positions of the Confederacy. In 1861 were fought the battles of Bethel, June 10th; Manassas, July 21st; Ball's Bluff, October 21st—in Virginia; and in Missouri the battles of Springfield, August 10th; Lexington, September 21st; Belmont, November 7th. In 1862 the battle of Seven Pines, May 31st; Port Republic, June 8th; the seven days' battles near Richmond, at the end of June; Cedar Run, July 19th; second Manassas, July 29th, 30th, 31st—in Virginia; followed by Boonsboro' and Sharpsburg, on the 14th and 17th of September. In the West there were fought the battle of Elkhorn, in Arkansas, March 5th; Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, Tennessee, on the 5th and 16th of February; and Shiloh, in North Mississippi, on the 6th and 7th of April. The Confederate States lost the harbor of Port Royal, South Carolina, November 7th, 1861; Norfolk, with its Navy Yard, May, 1862; and also Pensacola—these constituting the finest ports on the Southern coast. Of the cities, St. Louis and Louisville were lost in 1861; Nashville, in February, 1862; New Orleans, in April; Galveston, in May; Memphis, in June. Besides these, the Mississippi River was lost, and also the three States of Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee, whose young men, generally, were with the Confederacy in feeling, and—if they had had encouragement and timely assistance—would have recruited the Southern armies with thousands of brave soldiers. These states were all the more important on account of their large production of grain crops, meat, horses, and mules; and their loss was a series of severe blows to the Confederacy. The prime causes of these disasters may be noted in what has heretofore been pointed out.

It is notable that before September, 1862, public opinion concerning the management of Confederate affairs had undergone a decided change, and that grave doubts respecting the competency

of the Executive to guide the destinies of the South were entertained by many who had the opportunity of knowing what was done and what was omitted.

Fearing the result of such a feeling, Congress—which, upon the formation of the government, had never resorted to secret sessions except on very important occasions—began to transact no small amount of its business with closed doors; and secret sessions, heretofore the exception, now became almost the prevailing rule. There doubtless were circumstances under which it was eminently right to keep the North from knowing what took place in the legislative halls of the South. In war secrecy is often an element of success. But on many other occasions, and when there was no necessity to conceal anything from our enemies, the people of the Confederate States were kept in ignorance of their own affairs, and of the views and opinions of their representatives. Thus was the formation of public opinion restricted, if not altogether obstructed, and criticism on the conduct of the business of the people, in a degree, suppressed; thus was the power of the government gradually brought into the hands of the President, who was already possessed of enormous patronage, not to speak of the veto power. The people were cut off from the opportunity of finding a remedy for errors, no matter how gross and vital they might be. But there were results so patent that they could not be withheld from sight; and in some of these the public could not help perceiving a mismanagement which could only lead to disaster.

In the war of 1812 with England, and in the Mexican war of 1846, the general government called upon the states for troops needed in addition to the regular army; and the state authorities organized, officered, and sent forth their respective quotas. During the late war the Federal government again called upon the governors of the states for the soldiers required, and received them, officered, at their hands. But the President of the Confederate States, after declining to accept the services of thousands upon thousands of volunteers tendered, and after opposing bills offered in Congress, in January, 1862, authorizing him to call for troops from the states, to the number of fifty thousand and upward, as late as March, 1862, drove Congress, on the plea of necessity, to pass an act of conscription, which set aside the authority of the states, and gave the Executive power to conscribe the peo-

ple and appoint the officers. This arbitrary and unwarranted step, taken without the least foresight or sagacity—wholly unnecessary and unpopular—did not strengthen the administration or the cause with the people of the South. To this was afterwards added unjust impressments of private property for the use of the government—makeshifts odious to a free people, and resorted to, in a great measure, to assist the notorious incompetency of many appointees of the administration—most conspicuous among whom was the well-known and proverbially inefficient Commissary-General of the Confederate States.

As events rolled on, foreshadowing the inevitable effects of persistently recurring causes, anxiety and distrust of the Confederate government, which the Executive head had all but absorbed and jealously controlled, pervaded the minds of all intelligent men who were informed and were not blinded by partiality or warped by personal interest. And the dreaded result at last came. The weight of numbers—though not that weight alone; the prestige of reputed constituted Federal authority abroad—though not that prestige alone; but, concurring with these, want of sagacity, inefficiency, improvidence, and narrow-mindedness on the part of the administration; egotism and illiberality; culpable loss of time and of opportunity—these, altogether and combined, brought on the annihilation of the hope of Southern independence.

At the close of hostilities between the two contending sections the picture was a dark one. Civil strife, whatever be its cause, whatever its purpose, carries with it ruin, and is followed by cruel remembrances. During nearly six years after the furling of the Confederate battle-flag there was added to the mortification of defeat for the South the disheartening reality of humiliation and distinctive oppression. Power and the sense of victory achieved are not always accompanied by conciliation, justice, and generosity. Yet the South was earnest in laying down her arms, and accepted the result of the war with a brave and honest spirit. Time, the great soother of all human woes, has begun and is advancing with its work of pacification and obliteration. It is now a fact that the Southern States are as faithful supporters of Federal government as any of the Northern States of the Union.

Notwithstanding the cloud that has darkened its political horizon, a great future lies before the whole American republic. Gradually emerging from her ruin, and without slavery, the South

possesses her peculiar agricultural advantages, and is becoming both manufacturing and commercial in character. In the days of renewed prosperity to come this book may aid in recalling to mind and to honor the patriot soldiers and the statesmen who made every sacrifice in what they conscientiously believed to be the defence of constitutional liberty. Among these will be numbered General G. T. Beauregard.

APPENDICES TO VOL. II.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXVI.

RICHMOND, *Sept. 10th, 1862.*

To Genl. BEAUREGARD :

Special Orders, No. 22, dated August 29th, assign you to the command of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia—headquarters, Charleston. It was, through inadvertence, mailed to your address at Bladon Springs.

S. COOPER, A. and I. Genl.

MOBILE, *Sept. 11th, 1862.*

Genl. S. COOPER, Richmond, Va.:

I leave to-day for Charleston. Please forward there copies of orders and instructions. None received yet from Bladon.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

61 BROADWAY, N. Y., *July 22d, 1882.*

Dear General,—I am unable at this time to answer your note of 18th instant more specially than to state that when I was Chief of the Staff of your forces, charged with the defence of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, from the autumn of 1862 to the spring of 1864, I discovered in the archives of my office a document left behind by Major-General Pemberton, whom you immediately succeeded in command in that quarter, in October, 1862, which embraced a recommendation from that officer of the abandonment, as untenable, of the whole outer or immediate coast-line of defences. Upon this point my recollection is distinct. The exact details of the system of defence which General Pemberton recommended to be substituted for the one abandoned I cannot venture to give from memory. It remains to be said that the document referred to bore an adverse endorsement from the hand of Mr. Davis, so far at least as any immediate execution of the proposed plan was concerned; and, as well as I recollect, a further endorsement of like character on the part of General Lee. The dates of these papers I do not recollect.

Yours, very truly,

THOMAS JORDAN.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
RICHMOND, VA., *Sept. 17th, 1862.*

Special Orders, No. 128 :

* * * XVI. Major-General J. C. Pemberton, on being relieved in command of

the Department of South Carolina and Georgia by General Beauregard, will repair to this city and report for further orders. * * *

By command of Secretary of War. JOHN WITHERS, Assist. Adjt.-Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 24th*, 1862.

Special Orders, No. 178 :

I. Major-General J. C. Pemberton is relieved from duty in this Department, and will proceed to obey paragraph xvi., Special Orders, No. 128, Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office, Richmond, Va., September 17th, 1862. * * *

By command of Genl. Beauregard. THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 23d*, 1862.

Genl. PEMBERTON :

In view of your exact knowledge of the requirements of the Department, I have to request that you will furnish me, before leaving, with an estimate of the minimum forces, of all arms, which you may regard as essential for a successful defence of—first, Charleston and its dependencies; second, the District of South Carolina; third, Savannah and its dependencies; fourth, the District of Georgia.

You will also oblige me by having prepared a statement showing the present location of all the troops of different arms in the whole Department.

Respectfully, General, your obdt. servt., G. T. BEAUREGARD.

General Beauregard's Inspection of the Defences of Charleston and Savannah.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 24th*, 1862.

September 16th.—I inspected, with General Commanding Pemberton and Brigadier-General Jordan, my Chief of Staff, and Colonels Gonzales, Chief of Artillery, and Lay, C. S. Inspector-General, four new sand-batteries, *en barbette*, near the west end of Sullivan's Island, bearing on the floating boom which is being laid across the channel to Fort Sumter. These batteries are not yet finished, and only two 10-inch columbiads are in position, one not being serviceable yet. The magazines are not yet constructed. The boom is composed of railroad iron, strongly linked together with heavy iron bands, and is protected and buoyed up by pieces of timber of the length of the bars, bound together by iron rings. The bars are four feet under water, and the whole is anchored every sixth section with an anchor. About one-fourth of this boom is laid. It has been tested, I am informed, by running against it a loaded vessel towed by a steamboat, but it resisted well, parting the tow-line, a two-inch hawser. I am told it will all be completed in a week or ten days. It is proposed, also, to lay another one about one hundred yards in rear of this one, if sufficient chains and anchors can be had; also a rope obstruction about the same distance in front of the other, the object of which is to entangle the propellers of the enemy's steamers while under the fire of the heavy guns of the fort. The armament of the four sand-batteries is to consist of seven 10-inch columbiads, one 8-inch columbiad, and two 42-pounder rifled guns. Fort Sumter has *forty-six* heavy guns (above 32-pounders), and Fort Moultrie nine heavy guns, bearing at once on these ob-

structions. There will, besides, be two strong gunboats, armed each with four guns, to assist in their defence. I am informed they will be finished in one month. They are considered by me perfectly indispensable in the defence of this harbor.

We thus visited the Neck Battery, on Morris Island, erected to defend the approach to Fort Sumter. It is not yet entirely completed, requiring about two weeks longer to finish it. Its gorge ought to be entirely closed, to prevent surprise. A few rifled guns ought also to be put to bear on the main channel.

On returning I inspected the small work (Fort Ripley) now being built on cribs in the bay, about half-way between Castle Pinckney and Fort Johnson. It is intended for five heavy guns *en barbette*, and is nearly ready for its armament. Its foundation ought to be protected outside to the high-water mark with *débris*. A series of these small works in shallow water nearer to the entrance of the harbor would be very advantageous.

I did not visit Castle Pinckney, the armament of which is nine 24-pounders and one 24-pounder, rifled, as I am acquainted already with this work, and consider it nearly worthless, capable of exerting but little influence on the defence of Charleston.

September 17th.—I inspected this day, with General Pemberton and Colonels Gonzales and Lay, the defensive lines on James Island from the Wappoo to near Secessionville—a distance of about five miles. They consist of a system of forts, redoubts, redans, and *crémaillères*, not very properly arranged and located, with the exception of Fort Pemberton, on the Stono, and of some of the redoubts. A simpler system might, I think, have been originally devised, requiring a smaller number of men to defend it. However, the present one ought to answer our purpose, with a proper force of about one and a half men to the running yard of development. Each redoubt and redan has at least one heavy gun now in position. The lines between Dill's Creek and the Wappoo are not yet entirely completed, requiring about fifteen days more. Fort Pemberton is a strong work, and has an armament of twenty guns of various calibres. There are two batteries on the Ashley River to defend it and the entrance into Dill's Creek and the Wappoo. For want of guns they are still unprovided with their armament, except the one at Lawton's, which has four guns (32-pounders) of little use.

September 18th.—I inspected this day, accompanied by the same officers as on the 17th inst., Forts Moultrie and Sumter, which were found to be in fine order and condition, considering the repairs in progress at the latter. The armament of the first consists of thirty-eight guns of various calibres, from 24-pounders to 8-inch columbiads, and the garrison of about 300 effective men. The armament of the second work consists of seventy-nine guns of various calibres, from 32-pounders to 10-inch columbiads, and seven 10-inch mortars, and the garrison of about 352 effective men. The barracks in the latter work are being reduced in height, to protect them from the enemy's shots. The small steam-engine for making fresh water is in rather an exposed position. It ought to be removed to a safer place or be properly protected. Battery Beauregard, across Sullivan's Island, in advance of Fort Moultrie, to defend the approach from the east, is armed with five guns.

The work at the eastern extremity of the island, to defend the interior approach by water to the rear and west of Long Island, is a redoubt, armed with eight guns—two 32-pounders, the rest small guns.

I am informed by Major-General Pemberton that all the above works are sufficiently garrisoned. My conclusion is, that when the above works contemplated for the defence of this harbor, especially the obstructions and gunboats, are completed, and those works are properly armed with the heaviest guns, the enemy's vessels and gunboats will find it very difficult, if not next to impossible, to penetrate far enough to injure or take Charleston. Until then the city will not be properly protected.

September 19th.—I inspected this day, with the same officers, the works at Secessionville, which are irregular and but poorly constructed. A force of about 200 men is still at work upon them, increasing and strengthening them. The position is naturally a strong one, being surrounded with low marshes and a wide creek, except on one side, where there is a very narrow strip of level ground, along which the Abolitionists made their attack, which amounted to a surprise, and yet they were defeated by one-fifth their number. I do not, however, see the necessity or advantage of holding in force this advanced position. A strong picket would be sufficient. The armament of this work consists of two 8-inch naval guns, one 18-pounder, howitzer, six 32-pounders, one 32-pounder rifle, two 24-pounder rifles, and two 10-inch mortars.

September 20th.—I left this day at 9.30 A. M. for Savannah, on a tour of inspection, with General Pemberton and Colonel Gonzales. Stopped at Rantowle's Station to inspect works there. An open battery, with four guns (two 24-pounders and two 12-pounders), a strong and good position, commanding roads from Savannah and Church Flats, on Stono, three miles off, where there is also a battery of three guns (two 32-pounders and one rifled 12-pounder) to command an obstruction and prevent a landing from John's Island and the passage by water up Church Flats, in which case troops at Adams's Run, nine or ten miles off—a central and healthy point—would have to support that battery or fall back on the one at Rantowle's. The right flank of the latter should be extended, or a detached redan constructed towards the prairie or marshes in the direction of Wallace's, where there is also a battery of two guns (one 32-pounder and one rifled 6-pounder), occupying a strong, isolated position, to flank battery at the station, and two bridges across Rantowle's Creek—a branch of the Stono—below Church Flats. This river must be examined from the latter point to the Wappoo Cut, to determine if there are any landing-places by which the works at the overflow could be turned. There are two enclosed field works — miles from Charleston, commanding the road from Savannah to the long or new bridge across the Ashley. They appear to be well located, provided they cannot be turned on the right or left towards the Wappoo, which must be inquired into, if they are manned.

September 21st.—I inspected this day the defences of Savannah, with the same officers, and General Mercer commanding. They are not yet completed, but are progressing rapidly. Those on the river, I am informed, are finished, Fort Boggs excepted, which has, however, its armament—sixteen guns—in position. The

line of lunettes and redans around the city are about half finished, I should judge. These works are rather too close to each other, and unnecessarily strong in profile. There are about 1400 men (negroes) at work upon them. The obstructions—piling and cribwork filled in with stones and bricks—about one mile below Fort Jackson and its batteries, are nearly completed, requiring about ten or fifteen days longer to finish them. They will then obstruct very thoroughly, I think, the navigation of the river. They will, however, require to be watched and repaired constantly, owing to the effect of the current on the bottom between the cribs.

The outer line of defences, consisting of detached works or batteries, at Thunderbolt and other points, armed with heavy guns, were not visited for want of time, but I am informed by General Pemberton that they are completed, well armed, and, with a proper garrison, could not be taken by the enemy, if well defended. By their advantageous position they cannot be turned. He places great reliance on them. An additional work at Coffee Bluff, on the Ogeechee, to be constructed, in the opinion of the Chief-Engineer of the Georgia District, Captain McCready. This must be looked into.

Upon the whole, I consider Savannah thoroughly defended from a naval attack, and when its line of land defences will be completed, with a proper garrison of about 15,000 men, may be considered impregnable until the enemy shall bring against it an overwhelming force, which it is not probable they will ever attempt, as the result, if favorable, will not compensate them for the expense and trouble.

September 24th.—I inspected this day, with Colonel Gonzales, the line of works on the Neck to defend the city of Charleston from land attack from the north. It is a continuous bastion line of strong profile and elaborately constructed, but badly located, I believe, not being well adapted to the ground. It is commanded to a certain extent by woods in front, and can be enfiladed and taken in reverse by gunboats on the Cooper and Ashley rivers, particularly from the last. No traverses have been constructed. They are absolutely required. Even then this line could hardly be held successfully against a fleet of gunboats in each of said rivers. The two batteries at the Half-moon Battery are not finished; they are intended for five and three guns each, to command the Cooper River and Town Creek. The distance to the former is too great. A much better position could be found, I think, on the opposite side of the river, at Hobeaw Bluffs, but obstructions would also be required. The profile of the parapet of those batteries is too great, especially of the first one. Adaptation of “means to an end” has not always been consulted in the works around this city and Savannah. Much unnecessary work has been bestowed upon many of them.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 1st, 1862.

Capt. W. H. ECHOLS, Chief-Engineer:

I am instructed to furnish you with the following extract from a communication, dated 30th ult., from Dr. J. R. Cheves, in charge of outer obstructions:

"In consequence of the great deficiency of iron and the large demand for it in mooring the boom, it is proposed, at the suggestion of his Excellency Governor Pickens, to use granite rocks of three or four tons weight, there being much of this at Columbia, and the transportation of the same being represented to me as quite practicable."

It is the wish of the General Commanding to be informed of your views as to the feasibility, at this time, of getting the granite here and in position.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 30th, 1862.*

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

General,—In view of the probable inefficiency of the boom to prevent a fleet of steamers from passing the works defending the entrance of this harbor, it becomes as urgent as it is indispensable to increase the heavy armament of the works intended to command the anchorage in the harbor, and the entrances into the Ashley and Cooper rivers, to the utmost possible extent. Hence I have the honor to request that I may be furnished, as soon as practicable, in addition to calls for ordnance already made on the Department, with twenty 10-inch columbiads, five banded rifled 42-pounders, and five banded rifled 32-pounders—or, fifteen of the first quality, ten of the second, and five or more of the third. A greater number of each quality could be advantageously located, if they could be obtained.

I shall submit within a day or two for the information of the War Department a detailed report, showing the exact defensive condition of this harbor at present, and the extreme necessity for the additional heavy ordnance now called for.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Oct. 2d, 1862.*

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., C. S. A., Richmond, Va.:

General,—Should the Ordnance Department be otherwise unable to furnish me with the heavy guns essential for the proper armament of the defensive works in Charleston Harbor, I beg leave to suggest that some of those now in position at Over Bluff, on the Tombigbee River, and at Choctaw Bluff, on the Alabama River, may be prudently removed and sent here, unless they shall be necessary for the immediate defence of Mobile Bay. They cannot be required in their present positions until those rivers shall have been again swoollen—that is, in the latter part of the coming winter, or early part of the following spring, by which time other guns may be provided in their stead.

I cannot place before the War Department in too strong language the vital importance to us—if the harbor is to be retained—of increasing the armament of heavy guns to the greatest possible extent, as soon as practicable, in all possible ways.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 3d, 1862.

Capt. W. H. ECHOLS, Chief-Engineer:

The Commanding General instructs me to direct as follows:

You will examine Hobeaw Bluffs, on Cooper River, in vicinity of Mount Pleasant, to determine whether or not it will afford a good position for a battery of five or six guns, to command the channel of the river.

It must be also ascertained whether that channel can be effectively obstructed with the means and appliances at our disposition. You will likewise make a thorough examination of both sides of Stono River, from Church Flats to Wappoo Cut, to ascertain whether the enemy can effect a passage of the Stono between those two points to turn the works in that vicinity.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

LAKE CITY, FLA., Oct. 2d, 1862.

Genl. S. COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl.:

I am hard-pressed on the St. John's River; 3000 men reported by the commanding officer at St. John's Bluff as having landed at Mayport Mills. The enemy engaged our batteries, and were repulsed. Please send me one regiment of infantry as soon as possible. I asked for a regiment some ten days since, but have not heard from you on the subject.

JOS. FINEGAN, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS PROV. FORCES, DEPT. EAST AND MIDDLE FLA.,
JACKSONVILLE, FLA., Oct. 3d, 1862.

Genl. S. COOPER:

On my arrival on the river last night I found that the post at St. John's Bluff had been evacuated. The enemy had made a landing some five miles in the rear of the battery, but in what force I am unable to say. As at present advised, I think we had sufficient force to hold the place, and that its abandonment by Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkins, the commanding officer, was a gross military blunder that may require investigation.

JOS. FINEGAN, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 3d, 1862.

Governor F. H. PICKENS:

Dear Sir,—To be properly prepared for any emergency it is my opinion that there should be timely, that is, immediate, preparations made at one or more places outside the limits of this city, of buildings and sheds, and of provision depots, for the reception of the women and children in the event of a bombardment.

As I understand, it is the wish of the people and Government that the city shall be defended to the last extremity; hence I desire to be, in all respects, ready to make its defence equal to that of Saragossa. To that end I ask your co-operation in providing proper and ample places of refuge for all non-comba-

tants, when it shall be necessary for that class to leave. Otherwise my embarrassment must be great.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 3d, 1862.

Hon. W. P. MILES, M.C., Richmond, Va.:

My dear Colonel,—Your favor of the 30th ult. has just been received. I thank you for your exertions relative to those heavy guns ordered or called for for the new batteries on the west end of Sullivan's Island. I have lately made another call on the War Department for thirty or more heavy guns (10-inch and rifled 42-pounders and 32-pounders), as urgent and indispensable, having reasons to believe that the boom now being laid might not answer to check the passage of three or four ironclads moving in *echelon* rapidly against it; hence the necessity of more heavy guns. * * *

I am endeavoring to introduce gradually my system of managing men and things, and hope, if the enemy will give me time, to be prepared to give him a very warm reception whenever he will come here.

With kindest regards to all inquiring friends,

I remain, in haste, yours very truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

RICHMOND, VA., Oct. 3d, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD, Charleston, S. C.:

General Finegan telegraphs from Lake City, Florida, that 3000 Federals are landing at Mayport Mills, at the mouth of the St. John's River. He has repulsed three naval attacks on the batteries at St. John's Bluff, eighteen or twenty miles from Mayport, but is not strong enough to resist the threatened land attack.

He says that two regiments of infantry from the coast of Georgia sent to him for a few days will save the St. John's River, and perhaps East Florida. Send the assistance required as speedily as required. Answer by telegraph.

G. W. RANDOLPH, Secy. of War.

HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MIL. DIST., S. C.,

MCPHERSONVILLE, Oct. 3d, 1862.

Brig.-Genl. T. JORDAN, Asst. Adjt.-Genl. and Chief of Staff, Charleston, S. C.:

Sir,—I have the honor to enclose a letter written to Major-General Pemberton, on the subject of an increase of force in this district, which is applicable now as then. In consequence of the evident weakness of the points to which I referred General Pemberton ordered one battalion of sharp-shooters to Grahamville, and one to this post. He informed me that this was the only reinforcements he could spare.

Since then my force has been reduced by two pieces of artillery, taken from Hardeeville, and the battalion of sharp-shooters from this post. The battery of Captain Stephen Elliott consisted of only four effective pieces, all of which I considered necessary at this point. The seven companies infantry posted at Hardeeville are part of the flank and rear defence of Savannah, and could not with safety be diminished, especially as the companies are much reduced. When

the enemy makes the attempt to cut the railroad, in my opinion it will be at some point between Grahamville and the bridge over the Combahee River. It is the line most accessible and farthest removed from succor. There is reported by my pickets an increase of the force of the enemy on the south side of Coosa River. On account of the peculiar topography of the country between the Coosawhatchie and Combahee rivers, the cavalry will have to operate on foot to avail themselves of the natural and artificial positions of defence. There are very few points at which it would be practicable or advisable to operate mounted. I should have bayonets for a stubborn resistance. I would inform the General Commanding that I have had a secure boat-bridge built over the Salkahatchie River, five miles north of where the railroad crosses. This gives me a safe line of retreat and concentration towards Walterborough, should the railroad be taken.

I judge that the force west of Broad River should serve for the flank defence of Savannah. I am informed that the only practicable point for crossing the Coosawhatchie River, north of the railroad, is eighteen miles north, at Hickory Hill Post-office. There is a crossing practicable for cavalry and infantry at the point where the Coosawhatchie and Tulifinny separate, and a crossing lower down practicable for infantry only.

I will send you in a short time a connected sketch of the lines of defence and the detached works thrown up in this District. I would observe, however, that these works were made for the occupation of 10,000 men, which was the force assembled in this District during last winter, with artillery in proportion. The change of the policy of the Government in abandoning the defence of the coast by heavy artillery, and reducing the force to a corps of observation (composed largely of cavalry) rather than defence, renders a large part of these works comparatively useless. They can be used for retarding the advance of the enemy, but the final stand should be nearer the line of the railroad, to give time for reinforcements to arrive.

In that connection I need not call your attention to my dependence upon the rapid transmission of troops, in case of an attack in force. My desire is to inform the General Commanding fully on all matters of interest to the defence of this District. I shall take pleasure in carrying out any instruction he may think proper to send.

I respectfully forward the instructions furnished to the commanding officers at Hardeeville.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. S. WALKER, Col. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 3d, 1862.

Capt. W. H. ECHOLS, Chief of Engineers, Charleston, S. C.:

Sir,—You will order Captain F. D. Lee, of the Engineers, to advise with Doctor Chev  s as to the best method of modifying the construction of the floating boom, so as to dispense with the railroad-iron bars suspended from the timber floats, and to connect the latter directly with the iron links or chains.

This system of construction to be used as soon as found practicable. It would be of great advantage to have the wooden sections of the boom to present their side-angle to the force of the current. You will continue to throw *débris* around Fort Ripley until its foundations shall be covered about one foot above high-water mark, with a berme of twenty feet along-side of that work; and from thence, with a natural slope to the bottom of the bay. You will have laid a telegraphic wire from the battery on the Stono, near Church Flats, to Rantowle's Station, where an operator will have to be located.

I am informed that a part of the telegraphic wire can be obtained from James Island, where it is not now in use.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 3d, 1862.

Hon. GEO. W. RANDOLPH, Sec. of War, Richmond, Va. :

Two regiments ordered to General Finegan will be sent from Georgia, the War Department assuming the responsibility of detaching them at this time from Georgia, where the troops are already prostrated by disease, as General Mercer reports.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

RICHMOND, VA., Oct. 6th, 1862.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Charleston, S. C. :

If you think Savannah endangered by detaching two regiments to General Finegan, you will retain them.

It is not intended to deprive you of discretion in the matter.

G. W. RANDOLPH, Sec. of War.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 6th, 1862.

Genl. H. W. MERCER, Comdg., Savannah, Ga. :

The two regiments ordered to Florida must be recalled at once. Answer.

By command of Genl. Beauregard.

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXVII.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 13th, 1862.

Col. W. S. WALKER, Comdg. Third Mil. Dist., McPhersonville, S. C. :

Colonel.—Your letter of the 12th instant has been received, and I am instructed to say that every effort will be made to enable you to hold your position against any effort of the enemy to dislodge you. Nevertheless the Commanding General regards it as but prudent for you to send to the rear all surplus stores and supplies and unnecessary baggage, making at the same time preparations to move back the remainder at a moment's warning. You will also hold your entire command ready to be concentrated, and act whenever required, provided with three days' cooked rations, in haversacks, and two days'

provisions in wagons, forty rounds of ammunition in cartridge-boxes, kept untouched except in action, and a reserve supply of sixty rounds in wagon. As a measure of precaution against waste, let me suggest that it were well to explain to your officers that cooked provisions must not be allowed to become stale, but consumed from day to day, and replaced by freshly-cooked rations.

The pickets will be charged to use redoubled vigilance. Spies should be actively employed to procure information, and you are authorized to pay them well. Reinforcements, if required, will be thrown forward, if practicable—say two thousand from this place, one thousand from General Hagood's command, and two thousand from Savannah—and in this connection the General desires to be informed of the point upon which you think reinforcements should be concentrated.

It is more than probable that Mitchel's object will be either to cut the Charleston and Savannah Railroad at its most vulnerable point, or a raid to collect cotton and negroes wheresoever most accessible. He is known to be more fussy than dangerous, and addicted to predatory excursions.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 13th, 1862.

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., C. S. A., Richmond, Va.:

General,—The bearer, Captain F. D. Lee, Provisional Engineer, has submitted to me the plan of a torpedo-ram for the defence of this harbor, which meets my hearty approbation, as offering altogether the most practicable means that I have yet seen of a successful encounter with the formidable ironclad gunboats of the enemy. This plan having been brought to the notice of the authorities of the State of South Carolina, they, with their characteristic promptness, have placed at my disposition the sum of fifty thousand dollars for the immediate construction of such a ram as Captain Lee proposes.

Practical builders express the belief that they can build it for the sum appropriated; but as I am aware of the difficulty of estimating with the least accuracy the cost of such work at this juncture, I have concluded to send Captain Lee to submit the details of his plan to the War Department, and if necessary to the Navy Department, with the hope that the co-operation of the Confederate Government may be secured in the construction of the one about to be begun by this State; also that the plan will meet with such favor as to lead to the construction of similar rams for other scenes of operation.

I cannot doubt that rams properly built, according to the plan of Captain Lee, would be far more effective than gunboats of the present construction, three times as large and costly, with the other important advantage of being built in one-third of the time required for rams of the present models. Time, indeed, is now of vital importance in preparing for the safety of this city and port; and should the plan which Captain Lee will submit be approved by the Department, and authority be given to use the materials already collected here, I feel assured I can have the work done with such vigor as

to have a ram ready for service in time to render signal aid in holding this port for the Confederate States. Were some of these rams built at the same time in the Yazoo River, they could dash out and clear the Mississippi River, and aid materially in the recapture of New Orleans. If effective here, others would be equally efficient at Port Royal, Savannah, and in the James River.

Let me bespeak for Captain Lee the consideration due to his zeal, intelligence, and capacity as a practical Engineer.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 14th, 1862.

Brig.-Genl. S. R. GIST, Comdg. First Mil. Dist.:

General,—I am instructed by the Commanding General to direct you to hold in readiness about 2000 infantry of your command for detached service, at a moment's notice, to which end they will keep three days' cooked rations in haversacks, forty rounds of ammunition in cartridge-boxes, and a reserve supply of sixty rounds of ammunition, and two days' subsistence, ready for transportation. These troops will be expected to move in light marching order, unencumbered with unnecessary baggage. The General Commanding regards it as prudent that the officers should be cautioned not to permit the cooked rations to grow stale; they must be consumed and replaced by fresh provisions from day to day. The service anticipated will be in the Third Military District, and hence the movement will be by rail as far as McPhersonville.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff, Asst. Adjt.-Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 14th, 1862.

Brig.-Genl. H. W. MERCER, Comdg. Dist. of Ga., Savannah, Ga.:

General,—There are indications that the Abolition Commander at Port Royal may undertake some raid into the Third Military District. In view of the possibility of such an event, the Commanding General has arranged to reinforce Colonel Walker sufficiently to repel and punish the attempt, if made. I am instructed, therefore, to direct you to hold in readiness about two thousand (2000) infantry of your command for detached service, at a moment's notice, to which end they will keep three days' cooked rations in haversacks, forty rounds of ammunition in cartridge-boxes, and a reserve supply of sixty (60) rounds of ammunition, and two days' subsistence ready for transportation.

1st. The General Commanding regards it as prudent that the officers should be cautioned not to permit the cooked rations to grow stale; they must be consumed and replaced by fresh provisions from day to day.

2d. These troops will be expected to move in light marching order, unencumbered with unnecessary baggage.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff, A. A. G.

RICHMOND, Oct. 14th, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

President Young has been appointed a depositary by Mr. Boston. You may therefore leave the money in Young's hands, upon his consenting to receipt for it as the depositary of the Treasury Department.

G. W. RANDOLPH, Secy. of War.

RICHMOND, Oct. 15th, 1862.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

The Secretary of the Treasury desires to have the coin turned over to T. S. Metcalf, the Government depositary at Augusta. You will dispose of it accordingly.

GEORGE W. RANDOLPH, Secy. of War.

AUGUSTA, Oct. 18th, 1862.

Genl. JORDAN, Chief of Staff:

After an unavoidable delay I have turned over the coin to Mr. Metcalf, taking receipt, and await orders.

A. G. RICE, A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 18th, 1862.

Judge THOMAS BALTZELL, Charleston, S. C.:

Dear Sir,—I have no hesitation in saying, upon the information communicated to me by you relative to the present condition of the railroads in Florida, that the completion of the one from Thomasville to Bainbridge, on the Flint River (thirty-six miles), and of the branch from Groversville to the Tallahassee Railroad (sixteen miles), would add greatly to the military facilities for the defence of Middle Florida, by enabling troops from the interior of Georgia, or oriently of Savannah, to be sent rapidly to any point in that part of the State which might be threatened by the enemy.

I remain, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

[Memorandum.]

SAVANNAH, GA., Oct. 20th, 1862.

I visited this day the defensive works on the river below the city, and the obstructions—the latter are considered complete by the officers in command.

1. Fort Jackson, three miles below the city and one and a quarter above obstructions, is a very weak work, mounting two 8-inch columbiads, seven 32-pounders, one 18-pounder—10 guns. Its masonry walls are almost entirely exposed to the enemy's fire, and its flanks and gorges closed by barrack walls boss-holed. It is entirely under command of a work at Caustine's Bluff, one and one-eighth miles in its rear, and is defective in many respects—moreover, its armament is composed of too light calibre. I have ordered two traverses in this work, and one of its parapet guns to be put on the covered way, and a useless 18-pounder removed to the lines.

2. Battery Lee, near and just below Fort Jackson, is a water-battery of three 10-inch mortars, two 10-inch columbiads, three 8-inch columbiads, one

42-pounder, and one 32-pounder—in all, seven guns. A good position, but its rear is entirely open to Caustine's Bluff, about one and a quarter miles off. If the latter were occupied by an enemy with rifled or heavy guns, both of those works could not be held more than one or two hours. The magazines of Battery Lee are worse than useless, being so damp (or wet, rather) that powder cannot keep in them. This must be remedied forthwith by draining its site thoroughly into the river, by means of ditches, levees, and a flood-gate.

I then visited Lawton's Battery of seven guns (two 10-inch columbiads, two 8-inch columbiads, one 42-pounder, one 32-pounder, and one 32-pounder, rifled), across the river and a little above Fort Jackson. It is not entirely completed, but appears to have good traverses between every gun. Its new magazine is not yet constructed; the old one is small, and quite damp.

I then visited the Naval Battery, on a small island not far from Lawton's Battery. It has nine guns (seven 32-pounders, two 24-pounders, Blakely); it is unprovided with sufficient traverses, and can be enfiladed from beyond the obstructions. I have ordered one of its guns to be removed, and a large traverse constructed in its place.

The magazine is in as bad condition as at Lee's Battery. The defect will have to be remedied in the same manner. But the site of all these batteries is so low and marshy that no proper magazine can be constructed without setting beneath the material surface of the ground, unless built on piles. Instructions to that effect have been given to the Chief District Engineer, Captain McCready.

On a small island near the city there is a small three-gun battery (three 32-pounders, Hutchinson Island Battery), enfilading the river and Screven's Causeway, on the South Carolina side; it occupies an advantageous position, but apparently low and damp.

SAVANNAH, Oct. 21st, 1862.

I this day visited, with Brigadier-General Mercer, Colonel Gonzales, Chief of Artillery, and Captains Echolls and McCready, Engineers, the line of outworks commencing with Caustine's Bluff, on St. Augustine's Creek, four miles south of Savannah. It is an open battery of six guns (two 8-inch calibres, four 32-pounders), on a position commanding the navigation of the creek, at that point about 300 yards wide. Vessels drawing sixteen feet of water can navigate it. The distance of Caustine's Bluff Battery from the obstructions in Savannah River is about two miles, and one mile from obstructions in St. Augustine Creek. This battery is enfiladed by Ostland Island, about 700 yards off, and taken in rear by Whitmarsh Island, about 3300 yards off.

I have ordered its traverses to be lengthened sufficiently; also door of magazine properly protected; and those islands cleared, to see movements of the enemy.

There are no guns bearing up the St. Augustine Creek. This is a defect which must be remedied. I have ordered a three-gun battery to be constructed at Greenwich Bluff, an advantageous position, about one mile up from Caustine's Bluff. There is also a three-gun battery on bluff north of Caustine's Bluff, commanding low ground between the latter and Fort Jackson. Caustine's Bluff is a most important position, which, falling into the hands of the enemy, would

completely command the rear of Fort Jackson and Battery Lee at the short rifled gun range of one mile and one-eighth.

I will here remark that an unfortunate mistake was made in locating the obstructions and defences at Savannah River. The two are too far apart—one mile and one-eighth—and those defences are entirely under the control of batteries placed by an enemy on bluffs from Fort Boggs to Caustine's Bluff, so that, if any one of the lines of outworks was to fall into his hands, the series of them would necessarily have to be evacuated, and the enemy would then have the way open to establish the batteries already referred to commanding the defences on the river.

I then visited the battery of twelve guns (two 8-inch columbiads, two 42-pounders, seven 32-pounders, one 24-pounder, rifled, two 8-inch navy guns) at Thunderbolt, on St. Augustine Creek, above Caustine's Bluff, about six miles to the southwest of Savannah. This is naturally a strong position, with good traverses between the guns, to prevent enfilade fire from Liberty Island, about one and a quarter miles off. Excepting the two extreme guns, which are not yet sufficiently protected, several of these guns are also exposed to rear fire from the Isle of Hope, about two miles off in a southwest direction.

The front of the battery is exposed to direct fire of Whitemarsh Island, about three-quarters of a mile off in a southeast direction. The woods on this and Liberty Island have been ordered to be cleared. Should the enemy put strong and numerous batteries on those three islands, the battery at Thunderbolt might be made untenable. It is also liable to the objections already referred to, relative to Caustine's Bluff, of being turned, in case any of the other outworks should fall.

SAVANNAH, *Oct 22d*, 1862.

I went this day to visit the battery at Beaulieu, of eight guns (two 42-pounders, five 32-pounders, one 12-pounder, rifled), twelve miles from Savannah, with a fine road leading to it. It is a good position, commanding the Vernon River. The guns are well protected from enfilade fire by heavy traverses, and the whole battery is in a very fine condition. The magazines appear to be quite dry. Several of the guns are without elevating-screws, which must be furnished.

I visited also the Isle of Hope Causeway, connecting the latter island to the main-land, with a very fine road to Savannah, only about eight miles from the latter place. This is a very important line of communication, and one by which all the outer works can be turned, and the causeway should be commanded by a battery for two guns (siege 24-pounder howitzers, on each side of it); at present only a rifle-pit has been established, with a position for a field-gun.

SAVANNAH, *Oct. 24th*, 1862.

I visited to-day the battery at Genesis Point, nine miles below the Savannah, Albany, and Gulf Railroad, and twenty-five miles from the city. It commands the Great Ogeechee. It is armed with seven guns (one 8-inch columbiad, one 42-pounder, and five 32-pounders). This position is a strong one, which, I am informed, cannot be turned or flanked. The armament is too light; two or more heavy or rifled guns should be sent there immediately. A row of piles

has been driven across the river at this point. Vessels drawing thirteen feet of water can reach the important railroad bridge across the Great Ogeechee. The traverses in this battery are too weak and too low; they must be raised, and the magazine better protected. The hot-shot furnace is badly located and arranged; it must be reconstructed properly. There is here besides one light battery of eight pieces.

From this point I could see Coffee Bluff, on the Little Ogeechee, about twelve miles from Savannah, to which there is a fine and straight shell-road.

That is an important position which is not fortified, being protected only by one light battery of six guns and one rifled 6-pounder.

This bluff, however, does not command a branch of the Little Ogeechee (Grove River), which empties into it a short distance below the bluff, but Roseden Island, I am informed, commands both, and should be at once fortified and armed with five or six guns. Heavy vessels, drawing fifteen feet of water, I am told, can get up to the Savannah, Albany, and Gulf Railroad bridge, which is quite a long one. A row of piles has been driven across the river—one mile and a half below said bridge—but is not protected by any works or guns.

Grove River is commanded by a light battery of six pieces and one 18-pounder at Stave's Landing, without, however, any parapet to protect the guns; the same is the case at Coffee Bluff.

SAVANNAH, Oct. 27th, 1862.

I passed in review to-day about 4000 men, of troops (infantry, artillery, and cavalry) stationed at and in the vicinity of the city; they looked remarkably well, and moved very steadily.

SAVANNAH, Oct. 28th, 1862.

I visited this day the interior line of defences, which are about two-thirds finished. The part finished is too strong for the object in view, and the work should have been more equally distributed, for a portion of the most important or exposed part is still unfinished—the part corresponding to the left flank of the lines—*i. e.*, from Fort Mercer to Fort Boggs; the latter work is too elaborately finished where completed.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

SAVANNAH, GA., Oct. 21st, 1862.

Hon. W. PORCHER MILES, M.C., Richmond, Va.:

Why should not Governors of Southern States offer to meet those of North-west States, at Memphis, under flag of truce, to decide on treaty of peace, to be submitted to both Governments? Has anything been done for Soulé? Offer Mitchell a position on my staff, if he can get a commission.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

N. B.—A copy of the first part of the message sent to Governors Brown, Milton, and Pickens.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, TALLAHASSEE, Oct. 21st, 1862.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Savannah, Ga.:

I should be pleased for the Governors of the Southern States to meet those of the Northwestern States at Memphis for the purposes suggested by you. I will be ready at any moment.

JOHN MILTON, Gov. of Fla.

COLUMBIA, *Oct. 22d, 1862.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

* * * Meeting of Governors good suggestion, and will see if we can get a place for it. * * *

F. W. PICKENS.

SAVANNAH, GA., *Oct. 22d, 1862.*

Col. C. T. COLCOCK, Grahamville, S. C. :

Make a reconnoissance with disposable force towards Bee's Creek, to ascertain position and movements of the enemy, and, if possible, make a dash at him.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

SAVANNAH, GA., *Oct. 22d, 1862.*

Brig.-Genl. THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff, Charleston, S. C. :

Send reinforcements to Pocotaligo or to Salkehatchie Bridge, to report to Colonel Walker ; also one operator with the troops.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Oct. 22d, 1862.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Savannah, Ga. :

Have ordered the forces here and at Adams's Run (previously directed to be held in readiness) to move, to reinforce Walker at Pocotaligo. Walker reports enemy in possession of railroad at Coosawhatchie. Let me know where you are.

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

SAVANNAH, GA., *Oct. 22d, 1862.*

Col. C. T. COLCOCK, Grahamville, S. C. :

Troops are being sent to-night to support Colonel Harrison or to cut off retreat of enemy on Bee's Creek ; circumstances must decide. Wait to act with them, but send scouts towards Bee's Creek.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

SAVANNAH, GA., *Oct. 22d, 1862.*

Col. W. S. WALKER, Pocotaligo, S. C. :

Would it not be preferable to send the two additional regiments and one battery with Colcock's cavalry to cut off enemy's retreat at Bee's Creek ? Reinforcements are being sent you from Charleston. Answer.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Col. W. S. WALKER, Pocotaligo, S. C. :

The two additional regiments and batteries left here before your telegram was received. They are at your disposal on the road.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

RICHMOND, *Oct. 22d, 1862.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Confederate Government has no control over Governors, nor would the latter now be able to effect anything. We must fight it out. Have not seen Mitchell. I am trying to get the three (3) months' subsistence you have asked for. Commissary Northrop is unwilling to consent to so much, on ground that he has not enough at other points. Secretary is willing to give for a month or six weeks.

WM. PORCHER MILES.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Genl. JORDAN :

A column of the enemy are marching up from Mackay's Point; force not yet known.

Col. W. S. WALKER.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

The enemy's gunboats are going up Bee's Creek; they are probably aiming at Coosawhatchie. Perhaps they will land at Bee's Creek Landing, which they have not reached yet.

Col. W. S. WALKER, Comdg.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Brig.-Genl. JORDAN :

Thirteen of enemy's vessels are off Mackay's Point. Two companies have already landed. Also landing at Seabrook's Island.

W. S. WALKER, Col. Comdg.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 22d, 1862.

General,—Our line has failed south of Pocotaligo. The operator at that place supposes the Federals have gained the railroad at Coosawhatchie, and have destroyed our line. We have connection *via* Augusta with Savannah and Hardeeville.

Respectfully, J. W. KATES.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 22d, 1862.

The enemy have possession of Coosawhatchie. Hurry on reinforcements.

W. S. WALKER.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Brig.-Genl. JORDAN :

I have retired to old plantation, one mile from the station. If compelled I shall fall back to Saltketcher Bridge.

W. S. WALKER, Col. Comdg.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

I have retired to the junction of the Mackay's Point road and the road between Pocotaligo and Coosawa. Several of our men killed and wounded. The force of the enemy engaged is not very heavy. I do not know what reserves they may have.

Col. WALKER.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Brig.-Genl. JORDAN :

Reinforcements of infantry and artillery from Savannah should be sent at once to Grahamville; those from Charleston to Pocotaligo. Both points are threatened in force.

W. S. WALKER, Col. Comdg.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Brig.-Genl. THOMAS JORDAN :

When the reinforcements arrive I shall direct one-half to move on enemy's flank. I am at Old Pocotaligo. I believe I can hold my position, and that the enemy will be beaten.

W. S. WALKER.

CHARLESTON, Oct. 22d, 1862.

General,—A train has just reached Pocotaligo from Adams's Run with reinforcements. The men are double-quickening to the scene of action. Fight still progressing at Coosawhatchie.

J. W. KATES.

Genl. JORDAN, A. A. G.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

I have driven the enemy back from Old Pocotaligo. I shall advance in pursuit of them.

W. S. WALKER, Col. Comdg.

To Genl. THOMAS JORDAN :

General,—This is a copy of a message I just received for General Beauregard at Savannah.

Very respectfully,

DAVID O'KEEFE, Telegraph Operator.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

The enemy have been repulsed in their attempts both at Coosawhatchie and Pocotaligo. They have left their dead and wounded on the field, a number of rifles and knapsacks. I have sent two companies cavalry in pursuit. Our loss is comparatively small.

W. S. WALKER, Col. Comdg.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Genl. JORDAN :

Although the enemy have been defeated at both points and driven to their gunboats, there are indications of a renewed attack to-morrow. Send me to-night what reinforcements you can.

W. S. WALKER, Col. Comdg.

CHARLESTON, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg. :

Hagood and Gist will be on the spot with their forces before dawn; troops moving rapidly.

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

GRAHAMVILLE, Oct. 22d, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

I have just heard from Coosawhatchie. We still hold it. The bridge is safe, and the enemy have retired to their gunboats, which are still in the river. We have every reason to believe that the Georgia regiments are safe, although we have not heard directly from them. Do send us all the reinforcements that you can.

C. J. COLCOCK, Col. Comdg.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 23d, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

The enemy are in full retreat. I do not wish the two additional regiments.

W. S. WALKER.

Send back the troops ordered to your support as soon as you shall think their presence no longer necessary.

G. T. B.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 23d, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

After a consultation with Colonel Walker I have directed the Savannah troops to return as soon as transportation can be sent, and the other troops to return to their post, except 46th Georgia Volunteers and 26th Georgia Volunteers, which will remain for a day or two longer. A reconnoissance discloses seven gunboats still at Mackay's Point, but no traces of the enemy on land.

S. R. GIST, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 23d, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

I have arrived here with two strong regiments. No indications of any attack. Colonel Walker reports that they have retreated. I will scout and find out. No more troops wanted.

S. R. GIST.

Consult with Colonel Walker when to return to Charleston.

G. T. B.

Telegram from Savannah, Oct. 23d, 1862.—Received same day at Richmond.

Genl. S. COOPER:

The Abolitionists attacked in force Pocotaligo and Coosawhatchie yesterday; they were gallantly repulsed to their gunboats at Mackay's Point and Bee's Creek Landing, by Colonel W. S. Walker, commanding troops sent from here. Enemy had come in thirteen transports and gunboats. Charleston Railroad is uninjured. Abolitionists left their dead and wounded on the field. Our cavalry in hot pursuit.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 24th, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

The enemy's gunboats have entirely left Mackay's Point. The emergency which called for the infantry support has passed. I think, however, that at least two hundred infantry with long-range rifles should be stationed with me.

W. S. WALKER, Col. Comdg.

POCOTALIGO, Oct. 26th, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

General,—Your complimentary telegram was read to the troops on parade, with rousing cheers.

Col. W. S. WALKER.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 31st, 1862.

Hon. S. R. MALLORY, Sec. of Navy, Richmond, Va.:

Sir,—On my return yesterday from Savannah I found here your letter of the 20th instant. I thank you for the prompt and favorable support you have given me, in the desire to construct one of Captain F. D. Lee's marine "torpedo-rams," which, I think, is destined ere long to change the system of naval warfare; for it is evident that if ships are constructed invulnerable above water, they must be attacked under it, where most vulnerable. I confidently believe that with three of these light draught "torpedo-rams," and as many

ironclad gunboat-rams, this harbor could be held against any naval force of the enemy, who could never bring here sea-worthy ironclad gunboats or steamers of light draught that could withstand the destructive effects of our harbor rams. The same means can also be used (with one less of each class) for Savannah and Mobile.

I wish it understood, however, that I never desired to remove the construction of that "torpedo-ram" from the competent naval officer in command of this station; all that I desired was, to see it afloat and ready for action as soon as possible.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

POCOTALIGO, Nov. 29th, 1862.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

The following additional fleet is reported as sailed from Fort Pulaski to-day: four steamers, one river steamboat, one large sailing ship, one schooner under way, outward-bound, and ten or fifteen schooners at anchor.

W. S. WALKER, Brig-Genl.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXVIII.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 3d, 1862.

Capt. D. N. INGRAHAM, C. S. N., Comdg. C. S. naval forces, Charleston, S. C.

Captain,—You will greatly oblige me by furnishing, on the requisitions of Dr. Cheves, three hundred pieces of gunboat plating, from two to three feet long, for use in connection with the boom.

Let me also suggest that the three ships in the harbor might be arranged with port-holes and "quaker-guns" or "dummies," and anchored near the line of boom, apparently for its defence.

The dummies were found quite effective in retarding the enemy's movements at Centreville and the Potomac River.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

RICHMOND, Nov. 17th, 1862.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Secretary immediately authorized the casting of the 15-inch gun. Hope to get some more 10-inch soon. Randolph's resignation is a great loss to us. He took deep interest in your defences.

WM. PORCHER MILES.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 29th, 1862.

Genl. S. COOPER, Richmond, Va.

Enemy's ordinary fleet reported to have left Hilton Head, probably for an expedition on coast, or for the North. If the latter, it indicates Burnside's operations. Will telegraph further when more is known here.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Nov. 29th, 1862.*

Brig.-Genl. W. H. C. WHITING, Wilmington, N. C. :

Enemy's fleet reported to have left Hilton Head. Look out for it.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Nov. 29th, 1862.*

Brig.-Genl. J. HAGOOD :

Be on lookout; enemy's fleet has left Hilton Head. Issue three days' provisions to movable troops. Look to ammunition and haversacks.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

[Copy of above sent to General Trapier.]

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Nov. 29th, 1862.*

Brig.-Genl. H. W. MERCER, Savannah, Ga. :

Be on lookout; enemy's fleet has left Hilton Head. Issue three days' provisions to movable troops. Collect cars to transport one regiment at a time. Look to ammunition and haversacks.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Nov. 30th, 1862.*

Brig.-Genl. W. S. WALKER, Pocotaligo :

Please inform me of appearance of enemy's fleet at Hilton Head. If all be quiet, resume normal condition of troops.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Nov. 30th, 1862.*

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Richmond, Va. :

Destination of Hilton Head fleet not yet known. About ten vessels from here also gone. Received last night following from Savannah: "Four steamers, one river steamboat, one large sailing ship have sailed during the day; ten or fifteen schooners at anchor." Departure of so many heavy vessels may indicate Wilmington or Mobile.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 2d, 1862.*

Major D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc. :

Sir,—You will at once adopt all necessary measures for the immediate excavation of a channel, thirteen feet in depth at high-water, in the Wappoo Cut, for the passage of gunboat-rams from the Ashley to the Stono, in order that they may operate in either river, according to circumstances. We will thus be enabled to retake and hold possession of Cole's Island, thereby doing away with the necessity of keeping as large a force on James Island as is now required for the protection of this city from an approach of the enemy in that direction. According to the best information, the whole length of the excavation will be about 1000 by about $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet in width, or 7000 cubic yards in all.

I desire the whole matter to be done as quietly as possible, in order not to awaken the suspicions of the enemy's gunboats in the Stono. We may then have the opportunity of taking them, and then of re-opening our inland water com-

munications with Port Royal; or we may obtain stronger engines for our iron-clad gunboats and rams here.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 2d, 1862.

Major J. J. POPE, Chief of Ordnance, etc.:

Major,—The General Commanding directs that you will send to Colonel Colcock, at Ocean Landing, one 12-pounder rifled gun, one siege-carriage, from White Point Battery, and one 24-pounder bronze field-howitzer (Austrian gun), from the Arsenal, with one hundred rounds of ammunition, and implements, etc., complete for each gun.

And to General Walker, at Pocotaligo, for the works at Elliott's, one 12-pounder smooth-bore, from under the shed near District Headquarters (when mounted on a siege-carriage), and one 24-pounder bronze field-howitzer (Austrian gun), from Arsenal, with one hundred rounds of ammunition, and implements, etc., for each gun.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN M. OTEY, A. A. Genl.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 2d, 1862.

Genl. S. COOPER, A. and I. G., Richmond, Va.:

The usual fleet is reported to have returned to Port Royal.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 7th, 1862.

Dr. JOHN CHEVES, in charge of boom construction in Charleston Harbor:

Dear Sir,—The Commanding General, in consequence of the report of the Board made on the 22d ult., instructs me to direct the cessation of all future work on the boom for the obstruction of the entrance into the Harbor of Charleston.

You will please turn over to Captain Echols, Civil Service Engineers, the material employed or collected for the construction of the boom.

The Commanding General desires you to continue in charge of the torpedoes being constructed for the entrance of the harbor.

I am further instructed to convey to you the thanks of the Commanding General for the zeal and indomitable industry displayed by you in the construction of the boom, in the face of so many difficulties and lack of resources.

Please have all the accounts connected with the boom construction made up as soon as practicable, and report the aggregate of expenditures under the special heads of Materials Purchased, Labor, Miscellaneous.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 8th, 1862.

Major D. B. HARRIS, Chief of Engineer Department, S. C., Ga., and Fla. :

Major,—The Commanding General directs that General Raine's submarine batteries shall be located in the following manner, to wit: below Simon Bluff, in the Wadmalow; below Grimball's, in the Dawhee; and in the South Edisto River, opposite Aiken's Mill; or at some other convenient and fit place below the obstructions in the Pon Pon River.

You will also construct a magazine at Summerville for ordnance stores, to be stored in case of an emergency or necessity.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 8th, 1862.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc. :

General,—I am instructed by the Commanding General to inform you that Major Harris reports the two redoubts in rear of Fort Pemberton as ready for their armament, to wit: one 24-pounder on siege-carriage, from the *crémaillère* line, and one 24-pounder in *barbette*, from Fort Moultrie or Castle Pinckney.

The General requests that you have them sent to their positions as soon as practicable, without calling on the Ordnance Department, if it can be avoided.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN P. O'BRIEN, Capt., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 8th, 1862.

Major D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc. :

Major,—The Commanding General wishes the battery at Church Flats to be converted at once into a small enclosed work, to hold two 12-pounder smooth-bore guns (now at the Rantowles Battery), an 18-pounder gun, already ordered to it, and two 6-pounder (light) pieces, to be transferred to it and placed in position on the land front.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 11th, 1862.

Capt. THEODORE MORENO, Engineer Corps, Columbus, Ga. :

Make battery at "The Narrows" for three guns, and put two 32-pounders, from Fort Gaines, in place of the 18-pounder intended for that battery.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 12th, 1862.

Genl. S. COOPER :

10th inst. Banks's fleet, with about 10,000 men, left suddenly its southern course and made directly for Cape Lookout. This is reliable.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 13th, 1862.*

Brig.-Genl. J. HAGOOD, Adams's Run, S. C. :

These seven companies of McCulloch, 16th South Carolina Volunteers, at Adams's Run, and the seven of Nelson's battalion, at same place, hold in readiness for transportation, with four days' cooked provisions, with forty rounds of ammunition in cartridge-box, and sixty in reserve; in light marching order, with cooking utensils, and two tents per company, and two for field and staff of each battalion. Repeat message.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 13th, 1862.*

Brig.-Genl. H. W. MERCER, Comdg. Dist. Ga., Savannah, Ga. :

Hold about 2500 infantry, including Screvens's battalion, in readiness for transportation to this place, with four days' cooked provisions, with forty rounds of ammunition in cartridge-box, and sixty in reserve; in light marching order, with cooking utensils, and two tents per company, and two for the field and staff of each regiment or battalion. Repeat message. Have transportation ready.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 13th, 1862.*

Brig.-Genl. W. H. C. WHITING, Comdg., etc., Wilmington, N. C. :

In case of necessity I hope to have an efficient force to support you. Let me know in time your wishes. Repeat message.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 14th, 1862.*

Genl. G. W. SMITH, Petersburg, Va. :

Orders given, and movement will begin at nine o'clock this morning.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 14th, 1862.*

Brig.-Genl. W. H. C. WHITING, Wilmington, N. C. :

Troops will be sent as soon as possible. More than eighteen hours lost by not receiving answer to despatch of last night until now.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 14th, 1862.*

Brig.-Genl. W. H. C. WHITING, Comdg., etc., Wilmington, N. C. :

General Gist's command moving to your assistance, nine o'clock to-night.

THOMAS JORDAN.

WILMINGTON, *Dec. 15th, 1862.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

General Smith telegraphed me as follows from Goldsboro' : "I arrived here about three P. M. Evans is about six miles this side of Kinston, at Falling Creek. He estimates the enemy at thirty thousand. It is stated by scouts that the enemy are constantly receiving reinforcements." Have you anything more definite about Banks's fleet and forces? Can you come up in the morning with-

out inconvenience? Am I at liberty to forward any of your troops to G. W.? He asks me, if I have more, to send them on.

W. H. C. WHITING.

GOLDSBORO', Dec. 15th, 1862.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Telegram No. 1.—The telegraph with Evans is cut off. My latest information he was at Falling Creek, six miles this side of Kinston. Our troops behaved admirably in the engagement of yesterday. The enemy are now estimated at thirty thousand, and scouts report that reinforcements are constantly arriving from Newbern. If Banks's forces are uniting with Foster we will need more troops from you. I consider all geographical lines rubbed out, and assure you that if you come over with your troops no one will be more glad to see you than myself.

G. W. SMITH, Major-Genl.

RICHMOND, Dec. 16th, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD, Charleston, S. C. :

A telegram from General Smith confirms the visit of the enemy (some five hundred cavalry) to the Mount Olive Station, on the Weldon and Wilmington Railroad. The burning of a turpentine store there, the cutting of the telegraph wires, and some injury—extent not known—to the railroad track. There was serious fighting at White Hall Bridge, resulting in the enemy's being driven back with great loss; while ours was not so.

Reinforcements had not arrived either from here or from you. Cavalry much needed. Reinforcements from here must have reached him before this hour.

JAS. A. SEDDON, Secty. of War.

C. S. A., WAR DEPARTMENT,
RICHMOND, Dec. 18th, 1862.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Charleston, S. C. :

Without reinforcements from you, General Smith's forces will be six thousand of Confederate troops.

JAS. A. SEDDON, Secty. of War.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 21st, 1862.

8.30 P. M.

Genl. S. COOPER, A. and I.-G., Richmond, Va. :

General Whiting calls urgently for one 10-inch gun. Send him first one intended for this place.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

SAVANNAH, Dec. 21st, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

I have just received the following despatch from Colonel Clinch, commanding south of the Altamaha: "The Abolitionists have abandoned St. Simons. Gunboats all have left for Charleston, which they expect to attack by land. So says an intelligent negro who has escaped."

N. W. MERCER, Brig-Genl. Comdg.

RICHMOND, Dec. 25th, 1862.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

I hear again from L. Heylinger as follows: "The British ships-of-war *Mel-*

pomene, *Cadmus*, and *Petrel* have been sent to Charleston, to watch proceedings. I learn again the attack is to be made on Charleston in Christmas week.

JAS. A. SEDDON, Secy. of War.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 23th, 1862.

Brig.-Genl. W. H. C. WHITING, Wilmington, N. C.:

War Department informs me Charleston will be attacked this week; must therefore recall my troops. After departure of 46th Georgia sent regiment of troops from Savannah; then a Carolina regiment, and so on. Select between 42-pounder and 10-inch columbiad from Richmond, and send other gun here.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIX.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Jan. 3d, 1863.

To the PRESIDENT OF THE NORTHEASTERN RAILROAD:

Dear Sir,—The movements of the enemy may make it of vital importance to the defence, not only of the lines of communication through North Carolina, but the safety of this city and harbor, that a considerable number of troops shall be concentrated by railroad with the utmost possible celerity at threatened points; to which end I am instructed to invoke a preparation for contingencies on the part of the lines hence to Wilmington, which will enable the officers of the roads to work them more effectively than during the movements to and fro of Brigadier-General Gist's command.

It is believed that by conference and arrangements between the proper officers of the two roads material results may be effected. Delays occurred from the want of persons (or pilots) to run the engines beyond Florence. An ample number of pilots should be at once trained or otherwise provided for an emergency.

There was a deficiency of wood at the stations to meet the increased number of trains per day. Wood should at once be properly accumulated, to obviate the possibility of such a mishap hereafter.

It may be that troops will be required here from North Carolina, for the enemy, once afloat, may be landed almost at will, and strike at any vulnerable point; therefore the Commanding General feels that he cannot too earnestly call on all railroad officers to exert their utmost energies, at this juncture, to place their several roads in the most efficient condition possible for the transportation of troops with the least delay practicable.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Jan. 7th, 1863.

M. L. BONHAM, Governor of the State of S. C., Columbia:

Dear Sir,—I deem it my duty to acquaint you that the enemy is reported to be assembling in heavy force at Newbern, North Carolina, as is supposed, with

a view to move on both Wilmington and Weldon at the same time. These operations, if successful, will cut off our communication with Virginia and the seat of Government. Charleston and Savannah may, however, be the real points of attack; or if not, after the accomplishment of the enemy's purposes, with respect to Wilmington and Weldon, would assuredly become the objects of a most formidable expedition. Timely preparations, therefore, should be made for such a contingency, and all the available defensive resources of your State should be held in readiness. Every fighting man in South Carolina and Georgia should be ready to spring to arms to encounter the invader, and these Abolition mercenaries should meet with such a reception as should make them rue forever the day the attempt was made. From the seaboard to the mountains the alarm should be sounded, to call all men within our borders to be ready to march at the first signal to defend their country and the homes of the dauntless patriots now absent in arms in Virginia and Tennessee. On that day, it is hoped, under the inspiration of the occasion, there will be found neither laggards nor cowards.

I shall be pleased to be informed, as soon as convenient, to what extent I may be able to rely on assistance in such an emergency as I have indicated.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Feb. 2d, 1863.

Capt. W. J. HARTSTEIN, C. S. N., Charleston:

Captain,—Please report to Brigadier-General Ripley to take command of the steamer recently captured from the enemy. Communicate the fact to Captain Lee.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

General Beauregard's Endorsement on General Ripley's Report of the Capture of the steamer Isaac Smith.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Feb. 6th, 1863.

On or about the 20th ultimo I ordered General Ripley to have preparations made to surprise the enemy's gunboats in the Stono, by means of boats or barges, with muffled oars. Shortly after he reported that probably it might be preferable to put eight or ten guns suddenly in position on the west side of the Stono during the night, so as to cut off the gunboats when they came up the river. This proposition was approved by me, provided the ground afforded cover for such a mode of attack. He offered to send Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Yates to make the necessary reconnoissances. This excellent officer went, and reported favorably on his return. I then ordered the attack to be made with as many rifled siege-guns and guns from the siege-train as could find cover there from view, properly supported by infantry, guarding the approaches from Edisto with cavalry. I ordered also three rifled 24-pounder guns to be put in position at or about Grimball's, and two more at or about Battery Island (both positions

situated on the east side of the Stono), to assist in the attack, taking advantage of whatever shelter those localities afforded, the expedition to take place as soon and as secretly as practicable. I left its details to General Ripley, and well has he, Colonel Yates, and all who took part in it, executed my instructions. The vessel has been secured, and will be speedily repaired and ready for service as a guard-boat in this harbor. She is said to be very fast. Her armament will be much reduced, and the guns taken from her will be most usefully employed here and at Savannah. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 1st, 1863.*

PRESIDENT OF CHARLESTON AND SAVANNAH RAILROAD:

Sir,—For a successful defence of the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, with the limited number of troops at our disposal, rapid concentration at any threatened point is essential, and to effect this I am instructed by the Commanding General to represent to you the importance of placing at the disposition of General Walker, at Pocotaligo Station, a train of cars capable of carrying a thousand men.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 2d, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc.:

General,—The Commanding General desires to know whether the works on the Stono, in St. Andrew's Parish, are properly garrisoned—or will be—when Clingman's brigade shall have been sent to Savannah?

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 4th, 1863.*

Major H. C. GUERIN, Chief of Subsistence:

Major,—In reply to yours of the 3d inst. I am instructed to inform you that the aggregate, present and absent, of the troops in the State of South Carolina is twenty-five thousand. Adding fifty per cent for emergencies, and three thousand negroes, you will be enabled to make a proper estimate.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

Report of Major D. B. Harris, Chief-Engineer, of the Gunboat attack on Fort McAllister, Georgia, March 3d, 1863.

SAVANNAH, GA., *March 9th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff:

General,—In compliance with my instructions Captain (John) McCrady has made a report in detail of the engagement of the enemy with the battery at Genesis Point (Fort McAllister), on the 3d instant, which I have the honor to

hand you herewith. This interesting report is based chiefly upon information furnished by Assistant-Engineer J. W. McAlpin, to whose admirable conduct on this and previous attacks upon Fort McAllister I respectfully invite the attention of the General Commanding.

I have visited the battery since the engagement, and found it in good condition in every respect. It would appear that the ironclads are not such formidable monsters after all, particularly against sand-batteries. Where crushing effect is desired, as against vessels and brick and other walls, the 15-inch shell and solid shot could be used to advantage; but for the reduction of sand-batteries the same amount of metal thrown from 8 or 10 inch guns in the same time would, I think, have treble the effect. The firing of the ironclads was not as accurate as it should have been under the circumstances. The firing of our battery having been directed against one of them alone, the others ought to have fired with all the deliberation and care requisite to insure accuracy. I am, therefore, at a loss to account for their wild firing. The mortars were fired at a distance of at least two and a half miles, without, as usual, any damaging effect upon the battery. I am fully persuaded the turret No. 1 (*Montauk*) was injured during the engagement. The result of this engagement ought to make us feel quite comfortable. When the grand affair with which the Abolitionists have been so long threatening us shall come off (if it ever does) I am sure our sand-batteries will give a good account of themselves. Mr. McAlpin thinks the ironclads did not pass over the torpedoes in the river. I directed an examination to be made, to ascertain if they are in the position in which they were anchored in the stream.

I have the honor to be, General, yours, very respectfully,

D. B. HARRIS, Major, and Chief-Engineer.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 18th*, 1863.

Brig-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—In view of the possible contingency of a night reconnoissance by the enemy on Morris or even Sullivan's Island, it is the wish of the General Commanding that you should so dispose your cavalry, for a time at least, that you may be able to place more cavalry to watch the beach, at night especially, of the former island.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 22d*, 1863.

Col. JOSEPH YATES, Comdg., etc., etc., Georgetown:

Colonel,—Events have induced the Commanding General to change his views, and to direct you to remain in your present command until further orders, and to arrange and carry out the meditated operations against the hostile steamers in Winyaw Bay with Lee's torpedo device.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 23d*, 1863.

D. B. HARRIS, Major, and Chief of Engineers :

Major,—The Commanding General wishes the obstructions of Wappoo Cut to be completed as soon as possible.

He desires you likewise to examine the "Battery" wall, at White Point, to determine whether it is solid and strong enough to resist such projectiles as the enemy may be provided with, should they push into this harbor.

Further, inform these Headquarters whether or not the bridge over Rantowles Creek, opposite Bulow's, is in a serviceable condition. If it is not, the Commanding General desires to have it made so at once.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 23d*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Charleston, S. C. :

General,—I am instructed by the Commanding General to say that it is his wish that you have a thorough understanding with Flag-officer Ingraham as to the proposed method of attack by the small boat flotilla, in order to avoid firing into them.

He also wishes you to obtain such information as will enable us to procure wood and coal, at the shortest notice possible, for the use of the *Stono*, should that steamer be transferred back to the army.

I am also instructed to direct you to guard well the "New Bridge," especially against fire, to prevent which, either by accident or design, the greatest precautions must be taken.

Very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

JOHN F. O'BRIEN, Capt., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 29th*, 1863.

HUTSON LEE, Major, and Chief Quartermaster, Charleston, S. C. :

Major,—The Commanding General, in view of demonstrations of the enemy in this vicinity, threatening operations against this position, by land and sea, is obliged to require the several railroads to hold at your disposition enough cars and locomotives for the rapid transportation to this point of at least 6000 men by the Northeastern Railroad, and say 10,000 by the Savannah and Charleston Railroad. You will therefore make the necessary arrangements to this end.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXX.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 4th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Charleston :

General,—The Commanding General desires that you should at once place in position, at the Cummings's Point Battery, another heavy gun—either a 10-inch

columbiad or a 42-pounder rifled piece—which you will please remove from such other position as, in your opinion, may be least advantageous, as, for example, Forts Sumter or Ripley.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 5th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. S. R. GIST, Comdg., etc., etc., James Island :

General,—The movable column from Savannah has been ordered to halt two miles and a half from the New Bridge. The Commanding General desires that you will have an officer at that point to receive and locate the command, and to give it such information as may be requisite.

The Savannah siege-train has also been ordered to report here, and you will please designate the position for its batteries, say two or three, of four guns each.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 5th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist. :

General,—There will be three mortars here from Savannah to-night which the Commanding General desires to be in position as soon as possible ; to wit : one at battery this side of the New Bridge, one at White Point Battery, and the other at Battery James. An officer should be detailed specially to see that no time is lost in getting these mortars in place after their arrival.

The Citadel Cadets will be ordered to take immediate charge of the New Bridge Battery.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 6th*, 1863.

Major H. C. GUERIN, Chief of Subsistence, Charleston :

Major,—I have to acquaint you that some 2500 troops have arrived within the limits of the First Military District, from Savannah, for which it will be necessary that you shall make the proper provision.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 7th*, 1863.

Capt. F. D. LEE, C. S. Engineers, Charleston, S. C. :

Captain,—I am instructed by the General Commanding to direct that, in case it becomes necessary, you will blow up the torpedo-gunboat under your charge, instead of destroying it by fire.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CLIFTON H. SMITH, A. A. G.

*Return of Guns and Mortars at Forts and Batteries in Charleston Harbor
Engaged with the Ironclads, April 7th, 1863.*

FORT OR BATTERY.	10-inch Columbiads.	9-inch Dahlgrens.	7-inch Brookes.	8-inch Columbiads.	42-pounders, Rifled.	32-pounders, Rifled.	32-pounders, Smooth.	10-inch Mortars.	Grand Total.
Fort Sumter	4	2	2	8	7	1	13	7	44
Fort Moultrie	9	...	5	5	2	21
Battery Bee	5	1	6
Battery Beauregard	1	...	1	2
Battery at Cummings's Point	1	1	2
Battery Wagner	1	1
Total	10	3	2	19	7	8	18	9	76

Return of Casualties in Action.

FORT OR BATTERY.	Killed.	Wounded.				Grand Total.	Remarks.
		Mortally.	Dangerously.	Severely.	Slightly.		
Fort Sumter	1	4	5	Splinters from traverse.
Fort Moultrie	1	1	Fall of flag-staff.
Battery Wagner	3	2	3	8	Explosion of ammunition-chest.
	3	1	...	3	7	14	

Return of Ammunition Expended in Action, April 7th, 1863.

BATTERY OR FORT.	Shot, Round.				Shell, Round.	Shot, Rifle.				Bolts, Rifle.	Tubes.	Powder.
	10-inch Columbiads.	8-inch Columbiads.	9-inch Dahlgrens.	32-pounders.	10-inch Mortars. 8-inch Columbiad, Incendiary.	7-inch Brookes.	42-pounders.	32-pounders.	32-pounders, Shell.	32-pounders.	Friction Tubes.	Pounds of Cannon Powder Used.
Fort Sumter	120	270	54	100	40	86	140	21	1047	7,620
Fort Moultrie	339	..	243	51	5	38	192	1200	7,375
Battery Bee	225	58	350	3,940
Battery Wagner	22	27	132
Battery Beauregard	64	45	7	41	157	1,155
Battery at Cummings's Point	40	..	26	73	860
Fort Johnson	2	2	11
Total	385	731	80	343	93	5	86	140	88	45	233	21,093

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 8th, 1863.*

Captain W. F. NANCE, A. A.-Genl.:

Captain,—Hold two hundred men of Colquitt's regiment in readiness to be sent to Fort Sumter, to relieve the garrison until another attack shall appear as imminent.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

CONFEDERATE STATES ENGINEERS' OFFICE,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 9th, 1863.*

Major D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer Department:

Major,—I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement between Fort Sumter and the enemy's ironclad fleet, on the 7th of April, 1863, at 3 o'clock P. M., lasting two hours and twenty-five minutes.

The incidents which transpired during the engagement are based upon information received from the officers in charge of the works, but more particularly from the observations of Colonel Rhett, commanding Fort Sumter, and Lieutenant S. C. Boyleston, Adjutant, First Regiment South Carolina Artillery, who made special observations during the whole action; the remainder from personal inspection afterwards.

Forts Sumter, Moultrie, batteries Bee, Beauregard, Cummings's Point, and Wagner, were engaged. The fleet consisted of the *Ironsides*, supposed armament sixteen guns; the *Keokuk*, two stationary turrets, carrying one gun each; and seven single revolving turreted vessels, carrying (supposed) two guns in each, presumed to be the *Montauk*, *Passaic*, *Weehawken*, *Patapsco*, *Nahant*, *Catskill*, and *Nantucket*, which took position from nine hundred to fifteen hundred yards from Fort Sumter.

They steamed up main ship-channel towards Fort Moultrie, in line of battle, as follows: four single turrets, *Ironsides*, three single turrets, and *Keokuk*, following one after the other at intervals of about three hundred yards; the foremost one moving slowly, and carrying on her prow the "devil," or torpedo-searcher, a description of which will be sent you. When within twenty-two hundred yards, Fort Moultrie fired the first gun upon her, near buoy No. 3, then distant about fifteen hundred yards from Sumter, which had previously trained her battery of barbette guns upon the buoy, and opened fire by battery, when she reached that position, at three minutes past three o'clock.

The first turret opened fire at five minutes past three, and moved backward, thus developing their manœuvre of attack. At this moment the engagement became general. The second turret passed the first, fired, moved backward; the first moved forward, passed the second, fired, and backed, then retired from action; the other turrets manœuvring in the same relative manner, each time nearing or receding a little from the fort, in order not to present a permanent target.

The *Ironsides*, when at seventeen hundred yards from Moultrie and two thousand from Sumter, stopped, discharged a battery at the former, when Sumter concentrated a heavy fire upon her; numbers of shot were seen to strike her,

and several to penetrate: three, at least, in her wooden stern. Deeming two thousand yards too close quarters, she retired out of range, supposed injured, in favor of less prominent and more formidable imps, after an engagement of forty-five minutes. The *Keokuk*, at five minutes past four, defiantly turning her prow directly towards Sumter, firing from her forward turret gun, the batteries of Sumter, Moultrie, Bee, and Cummings's Point were concentrated upon her, her turrets receiving numbers of well-directed shots; several, apparently penetrating, showed evidence of considerable damage. When within nine hundred yards she was struck, supposed by a wrought-iron bolt (one hundred and seventeen pounds) from a 7-inch Brooke rifle, *en barbette*, near her bow, penetrating and ripping up a plating about six feet long, and two and a half wide, which ended her career; she stopped, seemed disabled for a few minutes, then turned to the channel, and proceeded towards the bar at forty-five minutes past four. She sank off the south end of Morris Island, at half-past eight o'clock, the following morning. Her smoke-stack and turrets are now visible at low-water. From her wreck floated ashore a book, a spy-glass, and pieces of furniture bespattered with blood, and small fragments of iron sticking in them.

The firing of the turrets was timed; they discharged generally at intervals of ten minutes; the engagement lasted two hours and twenty-five minutes. Allowing six of them constantly engaged, they delivered eighty-seven shots; one fired twice, and retired; the *Keokuk* fired three or four times, and the *Iron-sides* about seventeen—making the total number fired by the enemy about one hundred and ten, which were principally directed at Sumter. Her walls show the effect of fifty-five missiles—shot, shell, and fragments; the carriage of a 10-inch columbiad on the western face was completely demolished by a shot coming over the parapet; a 42-pounder rifle, on the northeast face, dismounted by breaking a traverse-wheel—both soon remounted in position; four small holes knocked in the roof of the eastern quarters by grazing shots; an 8-inch columbiad burst on the eastern face, throwing the chase and half the reinforce over the parapet, the other half over the quarters in the parade, demolished the carriage, but did no other damage; nearly all the window-panes and some of the sashes in the fort were broken by concussion.

The accompanying table of effects of shot, and sketches of the elevations of the faces, show the points of impact, the kind of projectile used, so far as could be ascertained by inspection, and found; they were principally 15-inch shell and 11-inch shot. The nature of the material against which they were projected, crumbling generally without retaining an impression, precludes any positive information as to their exact kind or calibre; only a few were evident. To the best of my judgment, according to the effect, eight 15-inch shells struck the faces; two of these penetrated the wall of the eastern face just below the embrasures in the second tier, next to the east *pass-coupé*, not seriously damaging the masonry; one, exploding in the casemate, set fire to some bedding; the other passed through a window and burst in the centre of the fort. Several exploded in contact with the wall, by which the principal craters appear to have been formed; one passed over the parapet into the quarters on the western side,

exploded, damaging several walls; five 11-inch shot struck the faces, one penetrating near one of the same embrasures pierced by the 15-inch shell, broke through and entered the interior wall of the quarters; only one impression represented any appearance of a rifle projectile. One 15-inch solid shot, one 15-inch hollow shot, several 15-inch shells and 11-inch shot were found in and around the fort; fragments of 15-inch shells were picked up on the outside; the berme, being very narrow and sloping, prevented any means of ascertaining by the bodies themselves their kind, all being precipitated into the water after striking. It is reported, also, that several shrapnel were fired over the barbette guns of Sumter. Some of the shells which exploded in contact with the wall may probably have been percussion rifle-shells, as some of the turrets are known to carry 8-inch rifles; but no fragments were found, nor do any of the officers report indications of rifle projectiles, by sound or otherwise, with but one exception. The commanding officer of Battery Wagner reports one, by sound, to have passed over, fired by the *Ironsides*. Nine shots were fired at Moultrie, at distances—of turrets, 1300 yards; of *Ironsides*, 1700 yards. An 11-inch shot struck down the flag-staff at thirty-seven minutes past three, passed through the roof of the quarters, penetrated the wall of the ordnance storehouse—about two feet thick—and dropped in the room; another struck the glacis and ricocheted over the fort; a third—a 15-inch shell—burst at the water's edge, a fragment of which was found; the others passed over. Five shots were fired at Battery Bee, without effect, at a distance of about 2000 yards; one fell behind the breakwater; another passed along the front of the battery and burst; the others passed over. Six or seven were fired at Battery Beauregard, at a distance of 2000 yards, without effect; two 11-inch shot were found. Two were fired at Cummings's Point without effect—one, at 1200 or 1300 yards, from the *Ironsides*; the other, at 1400 to 1500 yards, from a turret. Four were fired at Battery Wagner; one from the *Ironsides* sounded like a rifle-shot passing through the air; one grazed the top of the traverse, and another exploded over the battery, sending a fragment into a traverse.

A single turret, which fired her two guns simultaneously, ceased to fire one of them at about four o'clock, half of the port being closed the remainder of the action; cause not visible. They were frequently struck upon their decks, and several shot were seen sticking in the hull of one of them; and from another steam issued when struck upon it. A cast-iron bolt (rifle forty-two) struck a bevelled plate or guard around the base of the turret, which curved and turned one end up.

The projectiles generally broke in pieces, as could be seen by fragments falling in the water, or bounded from the vessel. One, after striking, was observed to drop and rest at the foot of the turret. Several of the smoke-stacks were penetrated.

A lookout appeared on the top of one of the turrets, apparently observing the effect of the shot; at the flash of a battery from Moultrie he instantly disappeared.

The casualties are slight. At Sumter five men were wounded by fragments of masonry and wood. One of the negroes engaged at work at the fort, who

was sitting on the berme of the western face, was wounded by a brick knocked from the parapet and falling upon his head.

At Moultrie one man was killed by the falling of the flag-staff when shot away.

At Battery Wagner an ammunition-chest, in the angle of the parapet and traverse, in the chamber of the 32-pounder, exploded from the blast of the gun, killing three men, mortally wounding one, slightly wounding Lieutenant Steadman, in charge of the gun, and three men; blew them about twenty feet, cracked the traverses, threw the shot from the pile of balls in every direction, and slightly damaged the châsis.

I arrived at Fort Sumter about two o'clock at night, after the engagement, and found Mr. E. J. White, of the Engineer Department, busily engaged building in the casemates, first and second tiers, behind the damaged walls, with sand-bags. Several of them were completed and considerably strengthened. This work was continued all night and the next day by the garrison and the fifty negroes who had been employed at the fort, and remained during the engagement. On the following morning the fleet lay inside the bar, in the same line of battle in which they approached—the first one about two miles and a half from Sumter, and one and a half miles from Morris Island. Men were visible all day on the turret of one, hammering, evidently repairing her plating. Wind-sails were set, indicating that their quarters, even at this season of the year, were uncomfortable and badly ventilated. About noon one of the turrets went south, probably to Port Royal, for repairs or for the security of that place against our ironclads from Savannah.

The *Ironsides* has kept up a full head of steam since the engagement, as can be seen by her constantly blowing off. Three holes are distinctly seen in her stern, two just above the water-line.

The "devil" floated ashore on Morris Island; the cables by which it was attached to the turret's bow were cut away. It is probable that the "devil," becoming unmanageable, was the cause of the turret retiring early from the action—it being a massive structure, consisting of two layers of white-pine timbers, eighteen inches square, strongly bolted together; a re-entering angle twenty feet deep, to receive the bow of the vessel, fifty feet long, twenty-seven feet wide; a layer of bevelled timbers on the front forming a bow, seven heavy iron plates, through which passed chains directly down and over the sides, through hawser-pipes; to these were attached grappling-irons with double prongs, suspended underneath, at the sides and bow; in the countersinks of the plates were loose iron rollers, apparently to facilitate the drawing of the chains through the holes over them, when the grapplings took hold, to drag up to the "devil" whatever he may catch with his hooks.

The colors of the six turrets remaining on the 8th are as follows: First turret, lead-color; stack, lead-color; top of stack, red with black ring. Second turret and stack, black. Third turret, black; stack, white; top, green. Fourth turret, black; stack, black; top stack (1-3), lead-color. Fifth turret and stack, lead-color. Sixth turret and stack, black.

The hull of the turret in running trim stands about two feet above water-

level, carrying a whistle, stove-pipe, and stanchions for swinging a small boat on deck, with a light railing around it. When cleared for action she is submerged almost to the water-level—the other articles all removed flush with the deck. The issue of steam from the deck, several times observed, if not from injury, is probably from the blow-off pipe, taken down flush, as she cannot carry it, as other vessels, on her sides.

I accompany the report with a sketch of the battle-ground, showing the relative positions of the forts and fleet; one of the faces of the fort, showing parts damaged; one of the *Keokuk*; one of a turret submerged for action; and one of the “devil.”

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. ECHOLS, Major Engineers.

Official.

G. THOMAS COX, Lieutenant Engineers.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 9th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist.:

General,—It is noticed in a report of Lieutenant W. H. Carlisle, commanding picket-guard, that “the enemy can be distinctly observed on” Little Folly Island in considerable force—at least eight companies of infantry. * * *

The Commanding General therefore directs that you give special attention to the east end of Morris Island, to prevent the crossing of the enemy, in small or large numbers, from Folly Island—otherwise Fort Sumter might run great danger from batteries of long-ranged, heavy rifled guns, placed on the northern extremity of Morris Island.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 9th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—Indications make it necessary to be prepared for a movement of the enemy from the quarter of Bull’s Bay. You are therefore desired to hold Brigadier-General W. H. F. Walker’s command (including batteries), except one regiment, in readiness for movement at a moment’s notice to Mount Pleasant, with three days’ provisions.

At the same time have Colquitt’s regiment held ready, likewise, to move to the same point.

It is the desire of the Commanding General that this order should be given to the troops in question as soon as possible.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 9th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Charleston:

General,—The Commanding General directs that you order one of the regi-

ments of the brigade of Brigadier-General W. H. F. Walker forthwith for duty in Christ Church Parish.

I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obedt. servt.,
 CLIFTON H. SMITH, A. A. G.

Report of the Part taken by Fort Moultrie in the Action of the 7th of April.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT MOULTRIE, S. C., April 13th, 1863.

First-Lieutenant W. E. HANE, Adjutant of forces on Sullivan's Island:

Sir,—I have the honor to submit the following statement of the part taken by this fort in the action with the ironclad fleet of the Abolitionists on the 7th of this month.

On the 5th the attacking fleet, consisting of eight turreted gunboats and the steam-frigate *Ironsides*, crossed the bar and took a position about three miles and a half or four miles from this fort. On the 7th it advanced in the direction of the harbor, one of the turreted boats some distance in advance. As soon as the leading boat came within range I reported the fact to the Brigadier-General commanding, and received orders from him to commence the action. Thinking it was the object of the enemy to run by Fort Sumter, I permitted the firing to be rapid at the commencement, using every precaution, however, to encourage deliberation in aiming. The boats engaged were at all times, during the action, within range of the guns of this fort. About three-quarters of an hour after the first gun was fired the frigate *Ironsides* steamed up to within sixteen hundred yards and took a position apparently with a view of taking a prominent part in the action. All the guns that could be brought to bear were trailed upon her and fired, and she in a few minutes afterwards moved out of range. The fire was generally directed upon the boat in advance, and, I think, with some effect. Shots were seen to strike frequently, many of them breaking to pieces. The guns engaged were manned by Companies A, E, F, and G, 1st South Carolina Infantry, commanded respectively by Captains T. A. Huguenin and R. Press Smith, First-Lieutenant Erwin, and Captain B. S. Burnett. The mortars, by Companies F and K, Captain C. H. Rivers, were fired with creditable accuracy. Officers and men performed their duties with spirit and celerity. During the action the flag-staff was cut down by a shot from the enemy, which, in falling, struck Private Lusby, Company F, 1st South Carolina Infantry, causing his death in a few minutes. This was the only casualty of any importance. One gunner, Private Harrison, Company G, lost a finger by some inadvertence in running a gun into battery, but returned to his post after getting his wound dressed. When the flag was struck down Captain W. H. Wigg, A. C. S., promptly placed the regimental flag in a conspicuous place upon a traverse. Captain W. H. Wardlaw, A. Q. M., and Lieutenant and Adjutant Mitchell King and First-Lieutenant D. G. Calhoun were likewise prompt in placing the battle and garrison flags in conspicuous positions. Major T. M. Baker, 1st South Carolina Infantry, was wherever his services would be most useful. The ordnance officer, Second-Lieutenant Thomas Williams, was at his post at the magazine. Much credit is due to him for the good condition of the gun-carriages and the ordnance stores. I have already submitted a report of

the amount of ammunition expended. The guns engaged consisted of nine 8-inch columbiads, five 32-pounder rifled and banded guns, five smooth-bore 32-pounders, and two 10-inch mortars.

I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WILLIAM BUTLER, Col. 1st S. C. Infantry, Comdg.

Report of Colonel Alfred Rhett of Engagement of 7th of April between Ironclads and Fort Sumter, etc.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST SOUTH CAROLINA ARTILLERY,
FORT SUMTER, April 13th, 1863.

Captain WILLIAM F. NANCE, A. A. G., First Mil. Dist., S. C.:

Captain,—I have the honor to make the following report:

The Abolition ironclad fleet, consisting of the frigate *New Ironsides* and eight monitors, appeared in sight on Sunday morning, April 5th, inst., crossed the bar the same evening, and anchored in the main ship-channel.

At 2 o'clock P. M., April 7th, inst., the whole ironclad fleet advanced to the attack in the following order, viz.: four monitors were in the advance, led by the *Passaic*; the *Ironsides* came next, followed by three other single-turreted monitors; and the *Keokuk*, a double-turreted monitor, bringing up the rear.

At thirty minutes past 2 P. M. the long-roll was beaten, and every disposition made for action.

At fifty-five minutes past 2 P. M. the garrison, regimental, and Palmetto flags were hoisted, and saluted by thirteen guns, the band playing the national airs.

At 3 o'clock P. M. the action was opened by a shot from Fort Moultrie. At three minutes past 3 P. M., the leading vessel having approached to within about 1400 yards of the fort, she fired two shots simultaneously—one a 15-inch shrapnel, which burst; both passed over the fort. The batteries were opened upon her two minutes later, the firing being by battery. The action now became more general; and the four leading monitors taking position from 1300 to 1400 yards distant, the fire was changed from fire by battery to fire by piece, as being more accurate. The fire by battery was again resumed as occasion offered. The *Ironsides* did not approach nearer than 1700 yards. The whole fire of the batteries engaged was concentrated on the *Passaic* for thirty minutes, when she withdrew from the engagement, apparently injured. The other ships, each in turn, received our attention. The fire of both Fort Moultrie and this fort being now directed against the *Ironsides*, she immediately withdrew out of effective range. The other turreted monitors came under our fire in like manner as the preceding, slowly passing in front of the fort in an ellipse, one only, the last, approaching to about 1000 yards.

At five minutes past 4 P. M. the *Keokuk* left her consorts and advanced, bow on, gallantly to within 900 yards of our batteries. She received our undivided attention, and the effect of our fire was soon apparent. The wrought-iron bolts from a 7-inch Brooke gun were plainly seen to penetrate her turret and hull, and she retired in forty minutes, riddled, and apparently almost disabled.

At twenty-five minutes past 5 P. M. the whole fleet withdrew. The iron-

clads had been under our fire for two hours and twenty-five minutes. The *Keokuk* has sunk, one monitor was towed south on the morning of the 8th April, instant, several were apparently injured, and the fact has been demonstrated that ironclads of the monitor class are not invulnerable. * * *

For the effect of the fire of the enemy upon the fort I would respectfully refer to the report of Engineer.

One 8-inch columbiad, old pattern, chambered gun, exploded. This gun was being fired at about one degree elevation, and it is my opinion that its bursting was caused by the shot rolling forward when the gun was run into battery. In firing at low degrees of elevation and at depression sabot-shot should be used.

One 42-pounder rifled gun was dismounted by recoil and temporarily disabled. One 10-inch columbiad was disabled by having the rear transom of its carriage shot away. Both guns were again ready for action in a few hours.

The garrison flag received a shot through the union. The regimental flag was much torn by fragments of shell.

The garrison, consisting of seven companies 1st South Carolina Artillery, was disposed of as follows, viz. :

1st. Captain D. G. Fleming, with Company B, seventy-eight men, in command of east parapet battery, assisted by Lieutenants F. D. Bake and Iredell Jones. Lieutenant J. M. Rhett, Company A, although on sick report, was assigned temporarily to Company B.

2d. Captain F. H. Harleston, with Company D, seventy-four men, in command of northeast parapet battery, assisted by Lieutenants McMillan, King, and W. S. Simkins.

3d. Captain J. C. King, with Company F, in command of northwest parapet battery, assisted by Lieutenants A. S. Gilliard, John Middleton, and W. H. Johnson.

4th. Captain J. C. Mitchell, with Company I, seventy-eight men, in command of west parapet battery, assisted by Lieutenant J. S. Bee.

5th. Captain J. R. Macbeth, with Company E, seventy-seven men, in command of mortar battery and east casemate battery, assisted by Lieutenant J. J. Alston.

6th. Captain W. H. Peronneau, with Company G, seventy-seven men, in command of northeast casemate battery, assisted by Lieutenant E. S. Ficklin.

7th. Captain C. W. Parker, with detachment Company C, fifty-five men, and detachment Company E, in command of northwest casemate battery, assisted by Lieutenants G. E. Haymworth and K. Kemper.

8th. Lieutenant H. Grimbail, with regimental band, fifteen men, in command of second tier casemate battery.

9th. Lieutenant Clarkson, with detachment of twenty-five men of Company B, Charleston Battalion, posted in second tier of casemate as sharpshooters.

Lieutenant-Colonel Yates, having reported for duty on the morning of the 7th of April, was assigned to the immediate command of the parapet batteries. The casemate batteries were under the immediate command of Major Ormsby Blanding.

The following is the number of guns brought into action : Two 7-inch Brooke guns, four 10-inch columbiads, two 9-inch Dahlgrens, four 8-inch columbiads,

four 8-inch navy-guns, seven banded and rifled 42-pounders, one banded and rifled 32-pounder, thirteen smooth-bore 32-pounders, seven 10-inch sea-coast mortars.

The following were the officers of the staff: Lieutenant S. C. Boyleston, Adjutant; Captain T. M. Barker, Assistant Quartermaster; Captain S. P. Ravenel, A. C. S.; Reverend N. Aldrich, Chaplain; Sergeant-Major, C. P. Grunshig, and Quartermaster-Sergeant, William Nicoll. Lieutenant Charles Inglesby was Officer of the Day; Lieutenant J. G. Heyward was Officer of the Guard; Lieutenant E. P. Ravenel was Acting Ordnance Officer, assisted by Lieutenant James B. Heyward, Lieutenant of Ordnance.

The Medical Department was under charge of Surgeon M. S. Moon, assisted by Assistant-Surgeon Samuel Muller.

Mr. Edward White was present as Acting Engineer Officer.

The members of the Signal Corps were: T. P. Lowndes, Arthur Grimball, and Joseph W. Seabrook.

Several officers of General Ripley's staff were present during the engagement, and, in the absence of General Ripley, tendered their services to me.

Captain Benjamin Read, Assistant Adjutant-General, Colonel Edward Manigault, and Colonel St. Clair Dearing were present, having tendered their services also.

Mr. Lacoste also was present and rendered efficient service. * * *

For expenditure of ammunition I would respectfully refer to enclosed report of Ordnance Officer.

For a list of casualties I would also refer to enclosed Surgeon's report.

At 9 o'clock A. M., April 8th, the *Keokuk* was seen to sink near Morris Island beach, where she now lies.

Respectfully submitted.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., April 13th, 1863.

Capt. J. R. TUCKER, Comdg. Naval Forces afloat, Charleston, S. C.:

Captain,—Our intention of attacking the enemy's ironclads last night having been disappointed by the departure of the monitors for the south, I beg to propose that we should attempt to destroy the *Ironsides*, just outside of the bar, and raise the blockade as follows: To-night, or as soon as practicable, to move out with four or five of our harbor steamboats and blockade-runners (burning anthracite coal, to avoid making smoke), and having each in tow four of the spar-torpedo row-boats; these must be followed by the two gunboats, at a proper distance.

So soon as the first line of steamers shall have arrived close enough to distinguish well (without themselves being seen) the lights of the blockaders, the torpedo-boats must be cast loose—the two first on the left, to attack the first light in that direction, the next two the second light, the third two the third light, etc., towards the right—thus using them as skirmishers in battle. Immediately after their charge, the two gunboats should follow, making directly at once for the position of the *Ironsides*, sinking the latter as soon as practicable.

The small boats will make for the nearest point of shore immediately after their attack, and then retire to the protection of the forts. The two gunboats will remain outside long enough to effectually raise the blockade in such a way that it cannot this time be gainsaid. They should not, however, remain long enough to be overpowered, by the return of the enemy's monitors.

With proper precautions in the details of this expedition, I have no doubt, Captain, of its entire success.

General Ripley, commanding the district, will furnish you all the assistance in his power.

I remain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

OFFICE OF CHIEF-ENGINEER, CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 23d*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff:

General,—In compliance with instructions Major Echols has made a report in detail of the engagement, on the 7th instant, of the enemy's ironclad fleet with the forts and batteries commanding the outer harbor of this city, which I have the honor to hand you herewith.

This report is based upon information derived from the commanding officers of the forts and batteries engaged in the fight, and upon an examination, in company with myself, of those works on the 8th and 9th instant.

The fire of the enemy was directed chiefly against Fort Sumter, at a distance of from nine to fifteen hundred yards. The injuries to the fort, of which the tables and drawings accompanying Major Echols's report give an accurate description, were not of a character to impair its efficiency. The crushing effect of the enemy's heavy missiles was less than I had anticipated. The chief damage was probably caused by the explosion of shells against and in the walls of the fort.

The manner in which the fort withstood the bombardment is a matter of congratulation, and encourages us to believe that the repairs that have been made, and the measures now in progress to strengthen and protect its walls, will enable the fort to withstand a much more formidable bombardment with like good results.

Of the other works engaged, none of which attracted much of the enemy's attention, only one—Fort Moultrie—received any damage, and that was very trivial.

Fort Moultrie, Battery Wagner, and Cummings's Point Battery fired upon the fleet at a distance of from twelve to fifteen hundred yards; Batteries Bee and Beauregard at a distance of from sixteen hundred to two thousand yards—too far, in the case of the latter-named batteries, for useful effect against ironclads.

Our batteries were admirably served by our skilled artillerymen. Much of the rapidity and accuracy with which our heavy guns were fired was due to the use of Colonel Yates's traverser, with the merits of which the General Commanding has been fully impressed.

Our batteries discharged about twenty-two hundred shot of all sorts; the enemy's fleet about one hundred and ten, chiefly 15-inch shell and 11-inch solid shot, not less than eighty of which were directed at Fort Sumter.

The sinking of the *Keokuk*, and the discomfiture of other ironclads, has established their vulnerability to our heavy projectiles at a range, say, of from nine to twelve hundred yards.

It appeared on an examination of the wreck of the *Keokuk*, on the 16th instant, by Lieutenant Boyleston, confirmed in the main by my own observations on the 19th instant, that her turrets, within four and a half feet of their tops, had been pierced by four 10-inch shot and one 7-inch rifle shot, and a wrought-iron Brooke bolt had penetrated seven-eighths of its length and stuck in the plating. Several severe indentations were also observed, near which the plates were warped and the bolts broken or started. The top of the smoke-stack (of sheet-iron) was very much torn, and the bottom of it (of similar structure to the turrets) pierced by a 10-inch shot. The vessel having sunk in thirteen feet of water, prevented an examination of the lower portions of her turrets, or of her hull, which, no doubt, were served in like manner. From this it would appear that the 10-inch shot are just as effective at the distance, say, of nine hundred yards as the 7-inch Brooke bolts against such structures as the turrets of the *Keokuk*.

The result of this engagement is highly gratifying, and increases our confidence in our ability, with good batteries of suitable guns, to contend successfully with vessels of the monitor class. The enemy's evident and just dread of torpedoes, as evinced in his preparation for their explosion by the "devil," or torpedo-searcher, should induce us to multiply our defences of that character in whatsoever manner they can be made available.

I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfully,

D. B. HARRIS, Major, and Chief of Engineers.

Official.

G. THOMAS COX, Lieutenant Engineers.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 23d*, 1863.

Capt. J. R. TUCKER, Comdg. Naval Forces afloat, Charleston, S. C.:

Captain.—Your two letters of this date have been received. I regret much to hear of the condition of the *Chicora's* boilers, and of the orders detaching from your command the officers and men of the "special expedition" to return to Richmond, Virginia. I am most particularly of the opinion that their services may be required here so long as the enemy's six ironclads remain in North Edisto; for they no doubt intend, if not to attack Charleston, to prevent any endeavor being made to raise the *Keokuk*. Should they cross over the bar for that purpose and remain one night inside, I hope we may then be able to try upon them the efficiency of Lee's spar-torpedoes, in which, I am free to confess, I have the utmost confidence.

I would respectfully suggest that those "officers and men" should be retained here until the further wishes of the Navy Department can be obtained.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

General Beauregard's Report of the Action of 7th of April, 1863.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., May 24th, 1863.

Genl. S. COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

General,—I have the honor to transmit with this the report of Brigadier-General Ripley, commanding the First Military District, South Carolina, of the battle of the 7th ultimo, together with the reports of his subordinate officers, and of Majors D. B. Harris and W. H. Echols, Provisional Engineer Corps.

The accumulation of the enemy's troops, transports, and ironclad vessels at Port Royal during the months of February and March, and subsequently in the North Edisto and Stono rivers, having convinced me that the long-threatened attack on Charleston was immediately impending, every possible precaution was at once made for the exigency, including the concentration at strategic points in this vicinity of all available troops for the defence of the several land approaches to the position, and provisions for the further and rapid concentration upon this point of forces from other of the military subdivisions of the Department.

On the 5th of the month the enemy's ironclads, of the monitor class, appeared and anchored off the bar, which they crossed on the following day, accompanied by the ironmailed frigate *New Ironsides*, bearing the Admiral's pennant. On the 7th of April, in the afternoon, the enemy moved forward to the attack, in single file—seven single-turreted monitors—to wit: *Weehawken*, *Catskill*, *Montauk*, *Nantucket*, *Passaic*, *Nahant*, and *Patapsco*, the *Keokuk* (with two fixed turrets), and the *New Ironsides*—the *Weehawken* leading, the *New Ironsides* fifth in the order of battle. By 3 o'clock P. M. the head of the line had come within easy range of Forts Sumter and Moultrie, and Batteries Beauregard, Bee, and Cummings's Point and Wagner; a few minutes later the first gun was fired from Fort Moultrie, and soon the engagement became general.

On our side seventy-six guns of various calibre, including nine mortars and fifteen smooth-bore 32-pounders, were brought to bear on the fleet, which carried thirty-two guns of the heaviest calibre ever used in war, to wit: 15 and 11 inch Dahlgren guns, and 8-inch rifle-pieces. The *Weehawken* in advance, provided with a contrivance for catching and exploding torpedoes, was soon compelled to retire before the iron storm it encountered. The *New Ironsides*, at the distance of seventeen hundred yards from Fort Sumter, was frequently struck, and was next forced to fall back out of range, evidently injured. The *Keokuk* having, meantime, approached to about nine hundred yards of Fort Sumter, was quickly riddled, her guns silenced, and she was withdrawn from the fight vitally crippled. The remaining monitors, six in number, with twelve guns, maintained their fire until twenty-five minutes after 5 P. M., when they, too, retired out of range of our batteries and came to anchor, four of them *hors de combat*, and one of them, the *Passaic*, so disabled as to make it necessary to send her under tow at once to Port Royal.

On the following morning the full extent of the injury done to the *Keokuk* was shown, as she sunk at her anchors in the shallow water off Morris Island.

Her armament, two 11-inch Dahlgren guns, two United States flags, two pennants, and three signal-flags, have since been taken from her, and the former are now in position for effective service—substantial trophies of the affair. The *New Ironsides* and six monitors remained at anchor within the bar, but out of effective range of any of our works, until the afternoon of the 12th of April—their crews and a corps of mechanics visibly and actively employed repairing damages, and apparently preparing to renew the attack; then weighing anchor they all recrossed the bar, the *New Ironsides* to resume her position as one of the blockading fleet, and the monitors (four of them in tow) to return to Port Royal. For the details of this conflict I beg to refer you to the several reports herewith submitted, but it may not be amiss to recapitulate some of the salient results. * * *

To the professional resources, skill as an artillery officer, intelligent and indefatigable zeal and assiduity of Brigadier-General Ripley, commanding the First Military District, and specially charged with the defence of the harbor, much is due for the completeness of the defence, and the proud results of the 7th of April. He was ably seconded by his subordinate commanders, whose services he has fitly noticed in his own report. To Colonel A. J. Gonzales, Chief of Ordnance and Artillery, and Major D. B. Harris, Chief-Engineer, and Major W. H. Echols, Provisional Engineer Corps, and their several assistants, I return my thanks for valuable services in their respective departments.

I have also to record my obligations to the Hon. William Porcher Miles, representative in Congress, for constantly exerted services in securing for the defence of Charleston so many of the heaviest guns wielded so effectually.

The Confederate States ironclad ships *Palmetto State* and *Chicora*, under the command of Captain J. R. Tucker, C. S. N., as soon as the enemy advanced to the attack took their positions (previously arranged), ready to perform their part in the conflict at the opportune moment.

On the day after the combat Flag-officer Lynch, C. S. N., arrived here from North Carolina, with an effective detachment of sailor artillerists, to tender service in any battery. He was assigned to a most responsible position—Cummings's Point Battery—but was in three days thereafter recalled by the Navy Department.

The flags and trophies sent herewith were taken from the wreck of the *Keokuk*, by Lieutenant W. T. Glassell, C. S. N. The more material trophies, two 11-inch Dahlgren pieces, now in battery, were recovered, under the supervision of General Ripley, by the mechanical resources and energy of Mr. Adolphus Lacoste, employé of the district ordnance department, assisted by parties from the garrison of Fort Sumter, under command of Lieutenant S. C. Boyleston and Lieutenants J. M. Rhett and K. Kemper, First South Carolina Artillery.

The enemy's land-forces, collected in considerable strength on Seabrook Island, and in the transports in North Edisto River, and on Folly, Cole's, and other islands about the mouth of the Stono River inlet, made no attempt to co-operate actively with the naval attack.

In conclusion, I shall avail myself of the occasion to give as my opinion that the best, the easiest way to render Fort Sumter impregnable would be to arm,

conformably to its original plan, both tiers of casemates and the barbette, with the heaviest guns, rifled or smooth-bore, that can be made.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXXI.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., *May 4th*, 1863.

Brig-Genl. JOHNSON HAGOOD, Comdg. Second Mil. Dist., Adams's Run :

General,—The Commanding General directs that you hold your strongest regiment of infantry subject to the orders of Brigadier-General Gist, and in readiness to move for service beyond the limits of the Department. Another regiment (one of Evans's brigade) has been directed to report to you.

It is the desire of the Commanding General that the regiment shall be as well equipped and supplied in all respects as possible, before it may leave your command.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., *May 10th*, 1863.

Brig-Genl. J. HAGOOD, Comdg. Second Mil. Dist., Adams's Run :

General,—In consequence of a telegram from the War Department, ordering 5000 additional men to General Pemberton, the Commanding General has found it necessary to countermand his order of the 9th inst., and to recall the troops that were ordered to report to you, with a view to carry out the suggestions contained in your communication of the 8th inst.

The Commanding General directs, however, that you will retain Preston's battery, and support the naval expedition against the enemy's ironclads in North Edisto, as originally ordered.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., *June 1st*, 1863.

Major H. C. GUERIN, Chief of Subsistence :

Major,—In reply to your communication of 30th May, I am instructed by the Commanding General to say that the number of troops in the State of South Carolina for which estimate of provisions should be made will be 10,000.

I have the honor to be, Major,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CLIFTON H. SMITH, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *June 2d*, 1863.

Major HUTSON LEE, Chief Quartermaster, Charleston :

Major,—The troops will halt at Green Pond. Please report when the infantry shall have left the Savannah Railroad Depot.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *June 2d*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Military Dist., Charleston, S. C. :

General,—Please instruct the commanding officer of the infantry force to halt it, and all other troops sent from yours and the Second Military District, at Green Pond ; to assume command there, if the senior, and to operate according to the state of affairs developed at this time, until he can receive orders direct from General Walker.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *June 2d*, 1863 : 8 P. M.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist. :

General,—In reply to your note—6.10 P. M., of this date—I have to say, that the substance of General Walker's information is merely that the enemy had come up to Combahee Ferry, had burned the pontoon-bridge there, the houses on the river-side, and had landed a party of several hundred at Field's Point, which had made a demonstration, as if destined to advance into the interior.

As yet I have not felt called upon to make any suggestions to General Haggood. He has been directed to send Shultz's battery to Green Pond, where General Walker has gone in person.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *June 2d*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist. :

General,—General Walker says enemy advancing from Field's Point, and suggests that an infantry force and section of artillery should be sent as soon as possible to Ashepoo Bridge. Of course there are not troops enough available in the Department to hold the line of railroad, if the enemy aim seriously at its possession ; but as this may be a mere raid, which may be foiled, it will be but proper to send all disposable infantry from Sullivan's Island, and a section of Preston's or some other battery, without delay—say with ten days' rations.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

P. S.—Colonel Gonzales can furnish a section of guns from his field-train.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *June 27th, 1863.*

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., etc., etc.:

General,—Inasmuch as the movements and operations of the enemy on the Mississippi River must render it impossible and unnecessary to send any more heavy guns there for the present, I am induced to renew my application for additional 10-inch columbiads and 7-inch rifled guns of Brooke's pattern that can be supplied by the works in Richmond, for the armament of Fort Sumter, and the works on Sullivan's and Morris islands.

I am informed that two Brooke 32-pounders, intended for Vicksburg, are lying on the wharf at Mobile. Could they not be ordered here until required on the Mississippi? Major-General Hunter has been relieved of the command of the Federal troops in this Department by Brigadier-General Gillmore, the officer who conducted the operations that resulted in the reduction of Fort Pulaski. I have the orders of both officers on the occasion of the change.

At present three of the enemy's ironclads are in the North Edisto and two at Hilton Head, leaving one still in Warsaw Sound. The troops on Folly and other islands about mouth of Stono are under command of Brigadier-General Vogdes, an artillery officer, as you will remember, of the regular service; his command is certainly not less than six regiments. There is about a brigade of 2000 men on Seabrook Island, North Edisto. Nothing is positively known of the enemy's land-forces at Hilton Head.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 4th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. A. GILLMORE, Comdg. U. S. Forces, Port Royal, S. C.:

General,—In the interest of humanity it seems to be my duty to address you, with a view to effecting some understanding as to the future conduct of the war in this quarter.

You are aware, of course, of the fact that on or about the 2d ultimo an expedition set on foot by your predecessor in command, Major-General Hunter, entered the Combahee River, in South Carolina, seized and carried away a large number of negro slaves from several large plantations on that stream. My present object, however, is not to enter upon a discussion touching that species of pillaging, but to acquaint you formally that more than one of the large plantations thus visited and ravaged were otherwise and further pillaged, and their private dwellings, warehouses, and other buildings wantonly consumed by the torch. All this, be it observed, rendered necessary by no military exigency; that is, with no possible view to the destruction of that which was being used for military purposes, either of offence or defence, or in near vicinage to batteries or works occupied by your adversary, or which, if left standing, would endanger or in any military way affect the safety of your forces or obstruct your operations, either present or future; and, finally, the owners of which were men not even bearing arms in this war.

A day or two later another expedition burned about two-thirds of the village

of Bluffton, a summer resort of the planters of the sea-coast of South Carolina, an undefended and indefensible place. The best houses were selected for destruction, and for the act no possible provocation may be truthfully alleged.

Later yet—the 11th of June—the village of Darien, in the State of Georgia, was laid waste by your soldiers, and every building in it burned to the ground, except one church and three small houses; there, as at Bluffton, no defence having been made or any act of provocation previously committed, either by the owners of the desolated place, or by the soldiers of the Confederate States, there or in any part of this Department.

Again, as far back as the last of March, when evacuating Jacksonville, in East Florida, your troops set on fire and destroyed the larger part of that town, including several churches; not, assuredly, to cover their embarkation, but merely as a measure of vindictive and illegitimate hostility.

You have, of course, the right to seize and hold our towns and district of country, if able to do so—that is, to exercise for the time the privilege of “*eminent domain*,” but not to ravage and destroy the houses or other property of the individuals of the country. The “*eminent domain*” and the property of the Government are legitimate objects of “*conquest*,” but private property and houses, movable and immovable, are not. You may appropriate the spoils of the battle-field, or the booty of a camp which you have captured, or even in extreme cases, when aggravated by an improper defence, may sack a town or city carried by storm. But the pillage of the open country and of undefended places has long ago been given up as a usage or legitimate measure of war. At most “*contributions*” can be levied upon and collected of the people, and these even, says Vattel, must be moderate, if the general who resorts to them wishes to enjoy an “*unsullied reputation*” and “*escape the reproach of cruelty and inhumanity*.”

You may, indeed, waste and destroy provisions and forage which you cannot carry away, and which if left would materially assist the operations of your enemy. But Vattel prescribes that even this must be done “*with moderation*” and according to the exigencies of the case. Those who tear up the vines and cut down the fruit-trees are looked upon as savage barbarians, unless they do it with a view to punish the enemy for some gross violation of the laws of nations.

You cannot legitimately devastate and destroy by fire or ravage the country of your enemy, except under the stress of stern necessity—that is, as measures of retaliation for a brutal warfare on his part. If you do so without an absolute necessity, such conduct is reprobated as the “*result of hatred and fury*”—“*a savage and monstrous excess*” Vattel terms it.

Ravaging and burning private property are acts of “*licentiousness*” unauthorized by the laws of war, and the belligerent who wages war in that manner must justly, says Vattel, be “*regarded as carrying on war like a furious barbarian*.”

The pillage and destruction of towns, the devastation of the open country, setting fire to houses, the same publicist expressly declares to be measures “*no less odious and detestable*,” when done “*without absolute necessity*.”

This, Vattel expressly says, is equally applicable to the operations of a civil war, "the parties to which are bound to observe the common laws of war." Even the Duke of Alva was finally forced to respect these laws of war in his conduct towards the confederates in the Netherlands.

Wharton is no less explicit than Vattel on all these points. He declares that private property or land can only be taken in special cases; that is, when captured on the field or in besieged places and towns, or as military contributions levied upon the inhabitants of hostile territory. (See "Law of Nations," p. 395.)

The pages of the American publicist furnish the most striking condemnation of the acts of your soldiery on the Combahee, and at Jacksonville, Bluffton, and Darien, in connection with the burning by the British of Havre de Grace, in 1813, the devastations of Lord Cochrane on the coast of the Chesapeake Bay, and in relation to some excess of the troops of the United States in Canada.

The destruction of Havre de Grace was characterized at the time by the Cabinet at Washington as "manifestly contrary to usages of civilized warfare." That village, we are told, was ravaged and burned, to the "astonishment" of its unarmed inhabitants at seeing that they derived no protection to their property from the laws of war.

Further, the burning of the village of Newark, in Canada and near Fort George, by the troops of the United States, in 1813, though defended as legitimate by the officers who did it, on the score of military necessity, yet the act was earnestly disavowed and repudiated by the Government of the United States of that day. So, too, was the burning of Long Point, concerning which a military investigation was instituted. And for the destruction of St. David, by stragglers, the officer who commanded on that occasion was dismissed the service, without trial, for permitting it. (Wharton on the "Law of Nations," p. 399.)

The Government of the United States then, under the inspiration of Southern statesmen, declared that it "owed to itself, and to the principles it ever held sacred, to disavow any such wanton, cruel, and unjustifiable warfare," which it further denounced as "revolting to humanity and repugnant to the sentiments and usages of the civilized world."

I shall now remark that these violations of long and thoroughly established laws of war may be chiefly attributed to the species of persons employed by your predecessor in command in these expeditions, and should have been anticipated, in view of the lessons of history—that is, negroes, for the most part, either fugitive slaves or who had been carried away from their masters' plantations. So apparent are the atrocious consequences which have ever resulted from the employment of a merciless servile race as soldiers, that Napoleon, when invading Russia, refused to receive or employ against the Russian Government and army the Russian serfs, who, we are told, were ready on all sides to flock to his standard, if he would enfranchise them. He was actuated, he declared, by a horror of the inevitable consequences which would result from a servile war. This course one of your authors, Abbott, contrasts to the prejudice of Great Britain, in the war of 1812 with the United States, in the

course of which were employed "the tomahawk and the scalping-knife of the savage" by some British commanders.

In conclusion it is my duty to inquire whether the acts which resulted in the burning of the defenceless villages of Darien and Bluffton, and the ravages on the Combahee, are regarded by you as legitimate measures of war, which you will feel authorized to resort to hereafter.

I enclose two newspaper accounts, copied from the journals of the United States, giving relations of the transactions in question.

Respectfully, General, your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

FORT SUMTER, Sept. 10th, 1863.

Extract from Major S. D. Elliott's Journal, as Kept at Post.

* * * Everything very quiet yesterday and last night.

A flag of truce from the enemy's fleet received at about 9 o'clock A. M. in reference to the prisoners.

Another flag was received at 4 o'clock P. M., bringing baggage belonging to the captured officers and conveniences for the wounded.

A flag was sent from this post to the fleet at about six o'clock, bearing despatches from General Jordan, and the bodies of their dead.

The prisoners, except the wounded, were sent to the city last night.

The ironclads, four monitors, and twenty-two other vessels inside the bar.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., July 13th, 1863.

Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chf.-Eng., Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla., Charleston, S. C.:

Colonel,—In view of the operations of the enemy on Morris Island, and our inability to dislodge him by a *coup de main* with infantry—with our limited means, and from other obstacles—it has become necessary to throw up a work on Shell Point with the utmost celerity which shall sweep the front of Battery Wagner with at least the fire of one 10-inch columbiad and a Brooke rifled piece. This work, therefore, you will place under construction, in charge of an energetic officer, with orders to push it forward with all possible despatch. There must be also provided shelter for an infantry support of two companies, and positions for three 10-inch mortars.

The columbiad and Brooke gun will be arranged on traversing-carriages, and the work must be carefully protected from enfilade from Morris and Black islands. Further, the 10-inch columbiad at Fort Johnson must be so arranged as also to command the front face of Battery Wagner.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., July 13th, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., S. C., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—As was determined, in the conference with you this afternoon, in

view of the operations of the enemy on Morris Island, the Chief-Engineer has been instructed to construct at once a battery on Shell Point, James Island, for one 10-inch columbiad and one 6.40-inch Brooke rifled gun, on traversing-carriage, with provisions for three 10-inch mortars.

The 10-inch columbiad at Fort Johnson will also be so arranged as to command or sweep the front of Battery Wagner.

In the same connection the 10-inch columbiad, now in hands of Chief of Ordnance, ready for service, will be added to the armament of Fort Moultrie; and you will also increase the armament by two 10-inch columbiads, to be removed as soon as practicable from Fort Sumter, their places to be supplied by "dummies," which Major Hutson Lee has been directed to have made.

The 10-inch columbiad recently received will be mounted in the Shell Point Battery, when a carriage shall be provided.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 13th, 1863.*

Lieut.-Colonel JNO. R. WADDY, Chief of Ordnance, Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla.,
Charleston, S. C.:

Colonel,—The 10-inch columbiad already provided with carriage, etc., will be sent to Fort Moultrie, and the one as yet without carriage will be placed in a new work at Shell Point, just ordered to be constructed.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 14th, 1863.*

Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chf.-Eng., Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla., Charleston, S. C.:

Colonel, — Upon reflection it is better not to destroy anything about the Marsh Battery, as we may still complete it, after having finished the Shell Point Battery.

Instead of constructing those two field batteries near Legare's, for two pieces each, make them large enough for four pieces, to be supported by rifle-pits and four companies of infantry to each battery.

Afterwards we will construct in that vicinity one or two mortar-batteries against Black Island.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 15th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., S. C., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—The Commanding General directs that General Hagood be instructed to open fire on Black Island without delay, from Secessionville, with as many guns as can be brought to bear on that island. The 24-pounder rifled

piece at Fort Pemberton will also be sent to the redoubt nearest Secessionville, for the same purpose, as soon as ready for service.

These orders, it is desired, shall be communicated to General Hagood by telegraph.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 15th*, 1863.

Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chf.-Eng. Dept., S. C., Ga., and Fla., Charleston, S. C.:

Colonel,—The General Commanding directs me to instruct you (as already verbally informed) to alter the two mortar batteries at Fort Johnson into gun batteries for one heavy rifled gun or 10-inch gun in each.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. N. T. BEAUREGARD, A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 15th*, 1863.

Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chf.-Eng., Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla., Charleston, S. C.:

Colonel,—In addition to the works ordered in my communication of yesterday's date, the Commanding General further directs that the gorge-wall of Fort Sumter be strengthened by means of wet cotton-bales, filled in between with wet sand, and kept moist by means of tubes or hose from the upper *terre-plain*.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 15th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Commanding First Mil. Dist., S. C., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—The force on Morris Island, in the opinion of the Commanding General, is larger than is necessary for any military operations now practicable in that quarter—larger than is necessary to defend the works from assault—and so large as to be exposed unnecessarily to the heavy batteries which the enemy may soon open upon us. Therefore you may reduce that force to a command competent simply to hold the works against an attempted *coup de main*. This command you will please relieve at least once in forty-eight hours by fresh troops.

The Commanding General finds it necessary that General Clingman shall have a command on James Island—for example, the one held when in the Department before, to wit: the western lines on James Island—leaving General Hagood to command the eastern, with General Colquitt as second in command. This is not to interfere with an attack to-night, which will be carried out by General Hagood, as already arranged.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 15th, 1863.*

Lieut.-Col. JNO. R. WADDY, Chief of Ordnance, Depart. S. C., Ga., and Fla.,
Charleston, S. C.:

Colonel,—The Commanding General directs the immediate preparation of the following platforms: say, ten for 32-pounder rifled guns; ten for 42-pounder rifled guns; fifteen for 10-inch columbiads; and carriages and chassis for six 10-inch columbiads.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 15th, 1863.*

Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chf.-Eng., Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla., Charleston, S. C.:

Colonel,—The General Commanding directs me to instruct you to have Shell Point Battery constructed for three guns, instead of two, as at first contemplated, provided it can be accomplished. Also to ask that a copy of General Beauregard's letter of yesterday morning be furnished him for his files.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. N. T. BEAUREGARD, A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 15th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Commanding First Mil. Dist., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—The Commanding General suggests that several hundred rice and other casks shall be furnished the troops on Morris Island, for the construction of "rat-holes." It will be well also, he thinks, to send to Savannah, Augusta, Wilmington, etc., for at least one thousand empty casks. A high lookout should be constructed at or about Fort Johnson, for the purpose of keeping a close watch on the enemy's movements from that point.

The Commanding General further desires that hulks or other obstructions shall be sunk or established in the creeks west of Morris Island and north of Sullivan's Island, and that a good line of communication must be opened from the latter island to the city, *via* Christ Church Parish, and across Cooper River.

The Commanding General further suggests that, in the event of a protracted siege, it may be very difficult to supply the batteries with ammunition, or even procure any from the Arsenal; he therefore desires you to instruct your ordnance officers to make timely arrangements for an ample supply of ammunition, for the possible wants of all the guns of different calibres, in the First Military District.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 15th, 1863.*

Major H. C. GUERIN, Chief of Subsistence, State of S. C., Charleston, S. C.:

Major,—The Commanding General directs me to say that you will throw

and keep on Sullivan's Island the material part of the rations for 5000 men for thirty days. On James Island, in consequence of the inadequacy of proper store room or shelter, you will place and maintain a supply for, say, 5000 men for fifteen days, with a reserve supply in the city, to be sent there in case of emergency, of the same amount.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 16th, 1863.*

Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chf.-Engr., Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla., Charleston, S. C. :

Colonel,—The Commanding General directs me to say that he wishes the batteries on James Island (about Legare's), bearing on Black Island, to be increased by at least twenty (20) guns, on siege-carriages. This work should be pushed forward night and day, as indeed at Shell Point and all other works under construction about the harbor, so soon as the force of negro labor may be sufficient.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 16th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., S. C., Charleston, S. C. :

General,—The Commanding General wishes Colonel Rhett, or the commanding officer at Fort Sumter, instructed on the following points, to wit :

Several guns of that work shall always be kept loaded and carefully trained, at night, on the creeks near Battery Wagner, and Marsh and Shell Point batteries.

Should events oblige us to abandon Fort Sumter, not one heavy gun must be left in serviceable condition, to be turned against our own works.

The commanders of Batteries Gregg and Wagner you will please instruct to the same effect, and every proper measure calculated to that end must be provided for an emergency.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 17th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., S. C., Charleston, S. C. :

General,—The Commanding General thinks, as a measure of precaution, to prevent the possibility of the enemy landing at night a force on Sullivan's Island, it would be well to throw there an additional regiment from James Island, where at present so large a force is scarcely required.

I am further instructed by the Commanding General to suggest that the reliefs at Morris Island might remain three days, instead of forty-eight hours, as previously arranged, the men taking with them the required number of cooked rations.

He also thinks it advisable to send to-day to Fort Wagner one 8-inch colum-

biad, or a 32-pounder rifle, to replace the one exploded; it should be mounted to-night, if practicable, on account of its moral effect on the garrison.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 18th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., S. C., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—It is the wish of the Commanding General, in the event we are obliged to abandon Morris Island, that Brigadier-General Taliaferro shall transfer his headquarters to Sullivan's Island, where, meantime, about the force of a brigade of infantry should be placed, to be employed in the defence of that island, under either Brigadier-General Clingman or Colquitt.

The subsistence stores on Sullivan's Island, not sheltered by bomb-proofs, should be removed and stored, as far as practicable, out of range from Morris Island.

All houses on that island which are in the way you will please have torn down, using the material for any defensive purposes which may be found practicable, especially shelters against fire of the enemy for the infantry supports. Please give your attention to all practicable means of securing the deliverance, in extremity, of all the force from Morris Island, to which end boats, barges, and flats should be collected and kept in serviceable condition, at or near Fort Johnson.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 20th, 1863.*

Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON, Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:

Sir,—Your letter of the 12th inst. was handed to me some days ago, but my incessant occupation with the current duties of my position at such a juncture has not allowed me time for the preparation of such an answer as would give the Department any very clear knowledge of the details of the occurrences on Morris Island.

A full report will be made as soon as subordinate officers shall have placed these Headquarters in official possession of the facts connected with their operations, and until then I must ask the patience of the Department, especially since the service and thoughts of all here are really necessary for the efficient discharge of the momentous duties intrusted to us.

Preliminary to that report, it may be of interest, however, to write somewhat less formally and generally of affairs here than in a battle report.

The enemy having gained a lodgment on Morris Island, it was at once considered whether he could be dislodged when reinforcements had been received, and decided to be impracticable, for reasons that will be exhibited in a special paper hereafter. It next became the question to determine what modifications in the system of defence must necessarily be introduced—first, by the lodgment already gained on Morris Island; and secondly, in case the whole island fell into the enemy's hands.

It was decided to prepare to make the stoutest possible defence of the works, one after the other, and in every possible way prolong our possession, to gain time to surround the enemy with such a fire as to make the island of little use to him as a place of offence against Fort Sumter, and to make other modifications of our defensive works to meet new conditions of attack.

The contest, therefore, is now purely one of military engineering (especially since the uncommon slaughter which resulted from the two efforts, so signally foiled, to carry Battery Wagner), involving three elements essential to success—time, labor, and long-range guns, with sufficient and proper ammunition.

Well aware of the pressure on the limited resources of the War Department, both of men and material, I endeavored to employ and handle my own to the best advantage to meet and repel the attempt by way of Morris Island, as soon as the point of attack was clearly revealed. For only when that discovery was made could I venture to concentrate here the small, widely-scattered infantry force at my disposition. This I did, but meantime, as reported, the enemy had assailed and carried our positions south of Battery Wagner, for the want of troops to effectually oppose them, for the lack of works of proper size and strength, and suitable armament, as I have always feared must be the result, if that method of attack were seriously resorted to by an officer of capacity, with the immense resources of the United States at his disposition.

Charleston, it is proper to say, was assailable from three quarters: first, through James Island, *via* the Stono, left open by the abandonment of Cole's Island; secondly, by Morris Island, also left exposed by yielding Cole's Island; thirdly, by Sullivan's, *via* Long Island.

The first point, being regarded as vital to the defence of the harbor and city, was guarded by 1184 infantry, 1569 artillery, and 153 cavalry, or 2906 men of all arms, instead of the force estimated heretofore, to wit, 11,500; the second point was occupied by 612 infantry, 289 artillerists, and 261 cavalry, or 1162 men, in lieu of about 3000 men of all arms; and the third point by 204 infantry, 726 artillerists, and 228 cavalry, or 1158 men, instead of at least 3500 men of all arms; while, in the City of Charleston, a small reserve of 870 cavalry, artillery, and infantry was maintained as a guard, and ready to be thrown, in an emergency, wherever the enemy might develop his point of attack, but principally to reinforce James Island.

Leaving a force on Folly Island, after the attack in April, the enemy gave only occasional evidences of any intention to resort to the Morris Island way of attack, until a day or two before the south end of the island was carried, and at which time the defences on Morris Island consisted of Battery Wagner, an excellent work, located by General Pemberton, to play the important part it is now doing so well—that is, as a defence against an approach by land; and Battery Gregg, built as an additional defence to the mouth of the harbor, and to command the gorge of Battery Wagner, located by my orders, and erected by the lamented Captain Cheves.

These batteries were nearly completed, lacking, however, certain heavy guns, most material to the perfection of their armaments. In addition, certain batteries and infantry epaulements, projected, but delayed from want of labor,

were under construction at the southern extremity, and at other points near Morris Island, as counter dispositions to the demonstrations of the enemy on Folly Island.

The force of the enemy may be set down as at least four brigades, of 2500 men each, or a total of some 10,000 men, with ample means of transportation and every appliance of war, supported by the guns of a powerful and numerous fleet.

Making a strong demonstration against James Island, filling the Stono with gunboats and troops, and occupying Battery Island in force, the enemy, at the same time, vigorously attacked the small force available for defence of the south end of Morris Island with his main force, under cover of a powerful battery of long-range guns placed in a battery thrown up on the north end of Little Folly Island. He soon overpowered the small force and weak batteries which alone could be opposed to his offensive movements at the time, and drove our troops out of their works, back to the shelter of Battery Wagner. Nor could any effort be made to dislodge him before the arrival of reinforcements, by which time he had so firmly established his naturally strong position as to make any offensive attempt desperate and impracticable; that is, without the support of a strong naval force.

It may be asked, why was not this catastrophe guarded against? To which I have to say, generally, that stronger works could not be erected, for lack of labor, though every effort was exhausted to secure negroes from the day I took command of the Department up to the 1st of July, 1863.

Further, I have not been able to get the armament essential for such works; and besides, as before said, I did not have a garrison sufficiently strong for Morris, James, and Sullivan's islands at the same time.

The holding of the position was secondary to that of James Island, which must first be secured beyond peril, if possible, of surprise and capture. But my reports to the War Department are full of these details, showing the relative positions and value of these approaches to and defences of Charleston; in fact, all the information necessary for a correct appreciation and comprehension of the state of affairs here.

I shall, of course, allow no opportunity to pass for annoying the enemy, and shall make every effort to anticipate and foil my adversary, and, if practicable, dislodge him from his present position. Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXXII.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 22d, 1863.*

Major H. C. GUERIN, Chief of Subsistence, etc., etc.:

Major,—It is the direction of the Commanding General that rations for ten thousand (10,000) men for two (2) months shall be kept in the city or its imme-

diate vicinity. It is possible that there may be accessions to the number of troops at present here, and it is his wish that you shall take steps to procure such a further supply of provisions as may be necessary to meet the emergency.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
 THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
 CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 22d*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—I consider it advisable not to open fire with the works about Shell Point until entirely completed; otherwise the return fire of the enemy will compel us to work upon them only at night, thereby delaying them.

A vigorous and constant fire with guns and mortars should be kept up on the enemy's works (especially at and about Vinegar Hill) from Wagner, Gregg, and Sumter. No way of annoying them should be omitted; even sorties at night to fill up their rifle-pits, spike their guns, etc., should be resorted to whenever the night will favor such operations.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
 G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
 CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 24th*, 1863.

Lient.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc., etc.:

Colonel,—It is the wish of the Commanding General that the work on the Sullivan's Island Batteries, Simkins (Shell Point), Cheves, and Haskell (Legare's), shall be pushed forward, night and day.

To do the work on hand the negroes must be divided in two parties, and these again subdivided into reliefs, as also the Engineers.

Should there be a scarcity of laborers, the batteries below Battery Haskell may be delayed for the present.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
 THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
 CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 24th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General,—Your notes of this date, communicating the fact of the damage inflicted on the work and armament of Battery Wagner, have been laid before the Commanding General, who wishes General Taliaferro informed that that work must be held and fought to the last extremity consonant with legitimate warfare.

Meantime, the garrison may be assured that every proper preparation will be made to withdraw them when their longer maintenance of the position shall be fruitless; and, to secure that end, you will make all necessary arrangements.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
 THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 24th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General,—The batteries designed to render Batteries Wagner and Gregg untenable by enemy, if reduced, not being completed, it has become exigent that these last batteries shall be held to the last extremity. Wagner, being under guns of Sumter and Gregg, should be held by infantry and siege-guns alone, until its parapets and bomb-proofs are destroyed, and no longer afford shelter against artillery. The General regards it almost improbable that another assault will be attempted.

Furthermore, the evacuation of Wagner does not necessarily involve immediate abandonment of Gregg, which, with reduced garrison, and with sharpshooters filling the sand-hills between it and Wagner, may be held for several days longer.

When obliged to quit either work the guns must be thoroughly disabled, by spiking, knocking off trunnions, cutting and burning carriages and bomb-proofs, and by blowing up the magazines and parapets.

In view of the great improbability of an assault, may it not be well to reduce the garrison to a minimum to-morrow morning, just about two o'clock?

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 24th*, 1863.

Lient.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc.:

Colonel,—Examine condition for resistance of Battery Wagner, and report in person as soon as possible. Explain to General Taliaferro that we must fight the fleet with sand—that the battery originally was only meant to defend against land approach. The battery must be held as long as possible; even twenty-four hours are important.

Respectfully, etc.,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 24th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General,—The Commanding General desires five of the 8-inch naval guns, now in the casemates at Fort Sumter, to be sent, *via* Fort Johnson, to the new battery on James Island designated as Battery Cheves; also another from Battery Haig, on Stono, with the necessary amount and species of ammunition.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 25th*, 1863.

Lient.-Col. and Chief-Engineer D. B. HARRIS, etc., etc.:

Colonel,—It is the wish of the Commanding General that two batteries for two columbiads each shall be constructed between Fort Moultrie and Battery Beauregard, Sullivan's Island.

He also wishes you to determine what new batteries for 24-pounders or 32-pounders may be required between Batteries Beauregard and Marshall, to be constructed by Clingman's brigade, after consultation with General Ripley, the object being to replace the fire of Fort Sumter, which was liable to be silenced sooner or later by the Federal batteries being erected on Morris Island.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 25th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General,—The Commander of the forces is of opinion that it will be judicious to reduce the command in occupation of Morris Island to twelve hundred (1200) men, of which only the minimum garrison should be kept in Battery Wagner during the day. Should this accord with your views, you will please give the proper orders in the premises.

May it not be well to place several of the mortars now in Fort Sumter in the parade of that post, for the purpose of shelling Morris Island?

The fire at Fort Sumter, and Batteries Gregg and Simkins (Shell Point), the Commanding General thinks, should be concentrated on the field included between Battery Wagner and the Graham House, day and night—that is, say one gun, from the batteries collectively, at least every ten minutes, or possibly every five minutes, during the night. Each battery should be informed from District Headquarters of the exact range from thence to Batteries Gregg and Wagner respectively, and must mark plainly the direction of each piece, so that, at night, there may be no difficulty in getting the range with accuracy and celerity.

A rifle-pit, if not already thrown up, should be made from Battery Gregg to high-water line on its right and left flank.

It is thought that some of the firing from Battery Gregg is not as accurate as could be secured with more deliberation. Please caution the zealous and active young officer in command there on this point.

The Commanding General particularly desires to know what guns have already been removed from Fort Sumter since the 10th inst., and to what points transferred.

He also desires hereafter a daily report as to the removal and disposition of Fort Sumter guns.

The batteries on Sullivan's Island ought to be armed and ready for action as soon as possible.

Respectfully, General, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 27th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General,—Colonel Frederick states that he receives so many contradictory reports as to the effect of the fire from the batteries under his direction, that he is unable to give proper instructions for the correction of inaccurate aim and inef-

fective fire. This may be remedied, in the opinion of the Commanding General, by making it the duty of some officer at Fort Sumter to observe all shots fired at the enemy on Morris Island from Batteries Simkins and Cheves (when ready), and from Fort Johnson, and to communicate the effect by signal direct to Colonel Frederick, at Fort Johnson.

The mortar fuses used at Battery Simkins appear to be too short. If not already corrected, please have them remedied as soon as possible.

It is regarded as essential that there should be constantly on Morris Island an efficient local staff, especially an ordnance officer and quartermaster and commissary of the most active and intelligent character. This may be best secured by detailing two of each department to alternate with each other every five days. Their habitual station will be Cummings's Point, but they will be expected to visit both batteries frequently, and to be responsible for the efficiency of their respective departments at each post.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 27th*, 1863.

Capt. JOHN R. TUCKER, C. S. N., etc., etc.:

Captain,—Will it not be possible for you to place your two ships—the iron-clads—in a position immediately contiguous to Cummings's Point—that is, at a point within one and a half miles—your maximum range, as I understand—of the enemy's nearest line of land-batteries, whence, with your Brooke and other guns, you can take part in the operations against those batteries, and materially strengthen our means of defence and hold on Morris Island?

Doubtless the ironclad vessels of the enemy would attempt to drive you away, and you might possibly have to retire, but not without forcing them to be brought under the heavy guns of Battery Gregg and the batteries on Sullivan's Island, as also of Fort Sumter. An important diversion would be effected at least, and it is presumed you could always retire in time to avoid serious consequences from an unequal conflict.

The question for determination would appear to be, whether there is water enough at any point near enough to Cummings's Point to enable you to take up a position within 2600 yards of any battery of the enemy on Morris Island, and this can only be determined definitely, I apprehend, by soundings, which I hope you will have made without delay.

The time to take the position, if practicable at all, would be as soon as the enemy begins a serious bombardment again of Battery Wagner, which may be anticipated at any moment.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 28th*, 1863.

Lient.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc., etc.:

Colonel,—The Commanding General desires the empty gun chambers and passages at Battery Gregg to be converted into bomb-proofs.

Filled sand-bags must likewise be held in readiness there, and in Batteries Wagner and Simkins, for repairs.

The sand-slopes at Battery Simkins will be coddled as soon as possible, as a preservation against the effects of the wind.

The channel at the west end of Sullivan's Island must be obstructed as far as practicable with the old boom and torpedoes, to prevent monitors from taking positions in that quarter, whence to take in reverse or enfilade Battery Bee.

Boats and flats should be collected in safest place in the creek in the rear of Sullivan's Island, to establish communication with Christ Church Parish, in case the bridge shall be destroyed.

Lookouts or observatories should be erected in Batteries Cheves, Haskell, and Ryan, to watch effect of practice.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *July 28th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General.—The Commanding General directs that the six (6) 8-inch columbiads to be removed from Fort Sumter shall be distributed as follows: one in Battery Simkins; one in Battery Haskell; two in Battery Cheves; and two in the battery east of Moultrie.

The five (5) 8-inch naval shell-guns from Fort Moultrie he directs to be mounted in Battery Cheves.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 1st*, 1863.

Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc., etc.:

Colonel.—The Commanding General instructs me to direct you to place in front and in the ditches of Battery Wagner *trous de loups*, and also boards with sharp nails or spikes in the bottom of the ditches above referred to, as already verbally instructed by the General Commanding.

Very respectfully, Colonel, your obedient servant,

CLIFTON H. SMITH, Assist. Adjt.-Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 2d*, 1863.

Capt. J. R. TUCKER, etc., etc.:

Captain.—In reply to your request for my opinion whether the private steam-vessels which have been seized by you "can render more important service by going abroad than by being retained for the defence of the harbor," I have to say that I am convinced the time for their effective employment for the defence of this harbor is now, in some effort to destroy at night the *Ironsides* and other ironclad vessels of the enemy, which are being formidably used for the reduction

of our works on Morris Island. If they are not speedily applied to that end, or cannot with sufficient hope of success to warrant or induce the attempt, but are to be held in the inner harbor, only to be resorted to in the last extremity against ironclads that shall have overpowered our outworks and reduced or passed Forts Sumter and Moultrie, then I am clearly satisfied their further retention as a means of defence is useless, and that it will be far better to release them at once, as requested by the Quartermaster's department, to be sent abroad for military supplies.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 2d*, 1863.

Lient.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc., etc.:

Colonel.—The Commanding General directs that a battery for two 24-pounders be thrown up between Battery Beauregard and the new Middle Battery, in Sullivan's Island, and that another shall be erected between the latter battery and Battery Marshall for two 32-pounders.

Two columbiad platforms in mortar batteries at Fort Johnson will be taken up and transferred to some point at which they may be needed, and their places supplied by platforms for barbette guns.

Have any of the star-torpedoes been sent afloat in the Stono? If not, what is the obstacle to its being done?

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 3d*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General.—The Commanding General directs me to say that he wishes one banded and rifled 32-pounder sent to-night to Battery Wagner, to be mounted in place of the one which was bursted some time ago. Also one mortar to be sent from Fort Sumter to Battery Gregg.

He also desires that you should furnish Fort Sumter and Sullivan's Island at once with everything in the way of provisions, ammunitions, etc., that may be required for their prolonged defence; for should the north end of Morris Island fall into the hands of the enemy, little if any intercourse by water could be kept up with those posts. For the same reason he calls your attention specially to the immediate necessity of transporting to Sullivan's Island all the guns and ammunition which can be spared from Fort Sumter. These matters cannot be attended to with too much expedition.

The movement of troops to Morris Island the General wishes so conducted that for the present there shall not be less than two regiments of infantry so located at night on Sullivan's Island as to prevent any surprise. The habitual force on Morris Island he desires reduced to one thousand men.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 3d*, 1863.

Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc., etc.:

Colonel,—The Commanding General wishes six floating torpedoes to be carried down Light-house Inlet, at night, and let loose as near the enemy's vessels as practicable. Colonel L. M. Hatch is a gentleman who, if provided with boats and torpedoes, could attend to the execution of this order, and would probably undertake it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 4th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General,—In a recent visit of the Commanding General to Morris Island and Fort Sumter he noticed the following matters, to which he directs me to call your attention, and desires that you carry out his views in regard thereto.

Battery Gregg is in want of many small things, such as fuse-gauges, etc., and more particularly of shells, for which things requisitions have been made, but never filled.

At Battery Wagner the system and order are not as they should be, especially in the ordnance department. Staff-officers relieving each other do not leave a return of property in their keeping, but start off without turning over anything. This should be remedied—all officers remaining at the post until they shall have turned over all property or instructions to their successors. The general officers there have heretofore kept no book of orders to transmit to their successors. The General wishes you to have one prepared and sent forthwith to Morris Island of all back orders, which henceforth will be regularly kept up and turned over to the commanding officer who relieves. This book he wishes an inspector to examine weekly. The battery is often short of ammunition and provisions. An ample supply of both should always be kept on hand. The General wishes ten days' provisions for twelve hundred men kept constantly on hand at the post. He thinks it advisable that you should visit Morris Island at least once or twice each week, and directs that one of your staff-officers be sent there at least as often as every other night, to report on any irregularities he may observe.

The General advises the removal of the two 8-inch columbiads from the east face of Fort Sumter, to make room for traverses, and the placing there of the 7-inch Brooke gun from the northeast salient angle—the latter gun to be replaced by the 10-inch columbiad now next to it. A 42-pounder on the northeast face, near another 10-inch columbiad, should be removed to the Bee batteries, so as to allow room for the protection from Morris Island fire by traverses in rear of the two 10-inch columbiads already referred to. The 10-inch columbiad at the northwest salient should also be protected from the same direction by a traverse.

The two rifled 32-pounders now in casemates should be mounted at once on

the south face in place of two 24-pounders, which should be sent to the city for banding and rifling.

The mortars on the gorge should be lowered to the parades, the arches being too weak to withstand the shock of heavy charges; three only should be kept at Sumter, and the others not already disposed of (if any) should be sent to Battery Simkins or Sullivan's Island. The 8-inch columbiad removed from the northeast face he wishes sent to Batteries Bee or Fort Moultrie.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 4th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General,—The enemy have a picket, it appears, at night in the Marsh Battery Creek, at or near the battery, for the purpose of observing and reporting when our steamers are at Cummings's Point. The Commanding General desires to prevent this if possible, and thinks it may be best done by the navy—to which end he wishes you to see and, if possible, arrange with Captain Tucker for this service.

The mouths of all the creeks debouching in the cove between Morris Island and Shell Point (Battery Simkins) should be watchfully picketed at night, and, if practicable, the enemy's pickets just alluded to should be surprised and captured.

A boat picket thrown out from Legare's Point, in the creek, might also be effective.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 6th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General,—After reading your letter of this date, touching the number of troops, etc., on Morris Island, the Commanding General is induced to say that he regards a force of one thousand men as quite sufficient. However, it will be but a proper precaution to be ready to throw there a larger force, in event of danger of assault.

Colonel Keith, in his report, regrets that he was unable to fire at the monitor on the night of the — instant, which had come within some one thousand or twelve hundred yards of Battery Wagner. It is not the wish of the Commanding General that the 10-inch guns in that work should be hastily unmasked, at a range as distant as a thousand yards; it were best to reserve them for use against ironclads which may come as close as was done by the *Ironsides* recently. Please give the orders to insure rigid adherence to these views of the Commanding General.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 8th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General,—The Commanding General wishes you at once to organize day and night working-parties at Fort Sumter, to put up the sand-bag chemise of the gorge-wall, the interior traverses, merlons, and embrasures he has ordered; he desires that not an hour should be lost in executing those improvements, on which depends the safety of Sumter.

Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, Engineer, has been directed to construct a covered way between Batteries Gregg and Wagner, and the Commanding General wishes you to furnish him any facility in your power for its speedy completion.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 9th*, 1863.

Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc., etc.:

Colonel,—I am instructed to communicate the following views and wishes of the Commanding General for your guidance.

The existing defensive lines on James Island, with a trace of seven miles, reaching from Fort Pemberton to Secessionville, as I always feared, are so defective that it has become clearly injudicious to expend much more labor on them. You will, therefore, now that we can command labor, lay out and erect a shorter line, beginning at Secessionville and resting on the Stono at Dill's house—that is, about two miles and a half in extent—and which may at first be made up of four (4) redans, which should be converted into redoubts, or lunettes with closed gorges, disposed from one-half ($\frac{1}{2}$) to three-quarters of a mile apart, and connected with *crémaillère* lines.

The first (1st) of these redans, from Secessionville, should be armed with three (3) guns; the second (2d) with four (4); the third (3d), on the Stono, with six (6); and the fourth (4th), also on the Stono, with four (4) guns—all of which will be transferred from the present lines, and from Fort Sumter or other forts, as they may be best spared.

The two works on the Stono must be heavily armed, while the river should be obstructed to the utmost extent practicable with torpedoes, extending below the work, if practicable, a mile and a half.

The scarp-wall at Fort Sumter over the new gate-way will be supported in the way verbally indicated by the Commander of the forces.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 12th*, 1862.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General,—The Commanding General desires that the expedition for the seizure of Black Island shall take place on the same night (Friday), when an effort will be made to put torpedoes afloat in Light-house Inlet. Colonel

Simonton should confer with Major Elliott, who has charge of the torpedo operations.

As soon as possible it will be prudent to fill in the parade at Fort Sumter with sand, as precaution against the effect of shell on the ground as now standing.

A fire-engine and proper amount of hose, etc., should be procured from the city authorities to be kept in Fort Sumter.

It has been suggested that it were judicious to paint our guns and carriages on Morris Island and elsewhere a sand or neutral-tint color. This the Commanding General approves.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 14th*, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:

General,—I am instructed to say that the two 32-pounder rifled pieces sent to Fort Johnson from Fort Sumter will be required for the new works on the new defensive line from Secessionville to the Stono. The 32-pounder (not rifled) now in Redoubt No. 1 will likewise be transferred to the same works.

The 10-inch columbiad directed yesterday to be put in battery on Sullivan's Island, east or west of Fort Sumter, the Commanding General authorizes to be sent to the battery near the old tower on James Island, unless it shall have been transported as previously indicated.

The Engineers will be directed to prepare positions for two additional guns at or near Fort Johnson, to bear on the harbor—that is, for a 10-inch columbiad and the 8-inch rifled piece which you report as nearly finished.

Lieutenant Vanzandt, naval ordnance officer, upon direct application to him, will, by Commodore Ingraham's instructions, afford assistance, with skilful hands, in putting down the circle for the treble-banded gun.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 15th*, 1863.

His Excellency M. L. BONHAM, Governor, etc., etc.:

Sir,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 12th inst. on yesterday, bringing again to my notice that the Sovereign Convention of the State of South Carolina had, on the 8th of January, 1862, declared it to be "the sense of the people of South Carolina, assembled in Convention, that Charleston should be defended at any cost of life or property; and that, in their deliberate judgment, they would prefer a repulse of the enemy, with the entire city in ruins, to an evacuation or surrender on any terms whatever;" and further, that you were informed that, the attention of my predecessors in command having been called to this subject by the Governor and Council, General Lee had directed "that Charleston should be defended to the last extremity,

and, if necessary, the fight should be made from street to street and from house to house."

You are entirely right in your belief that I propose to defend the city to the last extremity, in accordance with the patriotic wishes of the people of South Carolina and the instructions of my superiors.

I agree that non-combatants, as far as practicable, should be removed in time to avoid the possibility of any serious obstruction to or injurious effect on the defence by their presence, and trust that the proper authorities will be able to effect that desirable object; but I am unable to set any day after which summary measures, in my judgment, may be proper to secure the removal of all not useful in the defence.

At my instance, early in July the Mayor of the city, by proclamation, called on non-combatants to quit the city during the operations of the enemy for its reduction. Many left, but in a very few days began to return. I then took measures to prevent this by issuing an order to the railroads to refuse a return passage. The operation or effect was to overwhelm my office and engross precious time with the consideration of urgent applications for permission to return, until I was forced to withdraw virtually the interdict; and such have been the results of every previous effort to induce non-combatants to leave and remain out of the city, that I fear no effort to that end will be successful until it may be too late.

I will, however, be happy to do what I can to assist the Commission, or other State or city authorities, in removing all who, by reason of age, sex, or infirmity, may be incapable of taking part in the defence of the city.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 16th*, 1863.

Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc., etc.:

Colonel,—I am instructed to direct the following work to be done by your department of the Staff:

To arrange the batteries at Fort Johnson, with platforms, etc., for two additional 10-inch columbiads, in lieu of the 32-pounder rifled and two 32-pounder smooth-bores now there, but which will be transferred to the new advanced lines.

Prepare positions for platforms at once for three (3) 10-inch columbiads near the Martello Tower, James Island.

Place two platforms for 10-inch columbiads in Battery Glover.

Add a small redan for one or two guns in each interval between the large redan or lunettes of the newly ordered line to the Stono, and which subsequently will all be connected together by *crémaillère* lines, with openings properly arranged for the free passage of troops.

At the earliest day practicable the Commanding General desires his orders to be executed for the construction of covered ways between Batteries Gregg and Wagner, and from Fort Johnson to Battery Simkins.

It was observed by the Commanding General that the laborers appeared to

be too much crowded in the works inspected by him. This should be avoided as far as possible, and it may be well to impose tasks.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 16th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Charleston, S. C. :

General,—As you were informed yesterday, it is the wish of the Commanding General that one of the mortars at Fort Sumter should be transferred with the utmost despatch to Battery Gregg; the other two he wishes, as soon as they cannot be used advantageously in Fort Sumter, to be removed to Battery Haskell.

It will be prudent to see that every gun not actually required for the defence of Fort Sumter, and the new relations of that work to the general defence of the harbor, shall be removed without loss of time; some of them (heavy guns) should go to Castle Pinckney as soon as that work shall be properly strengthened by sand-bags. The other heavy and light pieces should be distributed, as already indicated, between the works on Sullivan's and James islands; some of the light guns to be transferred to the city.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 17th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., S. C., Charleston, S. C. :

General,—Order the long-range guns in Battery Haskell to open at once on enemy's works on Morris Island, especially his battery of heavy guns used against Fort Sumter.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 17th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., S. C., Charleston, S. C. :

General,—All the heavy guns that have been disabled in Fort Sumter to-day, by being dismounted, the Commanding General wishes you to have removed without delay to other works—that is, to Sullivan's Island and to Fort Johnson.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 18th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., S. C., Charleston, S. C. :

General,—Lieutenant-Colonel Kemper, it appears, is confined to the command of the light artillery under General Hagood. The Commanding General prefers that he should, as an assistant to the Chief of Artillery, have the command

of all the light artillery on James Island, and be responsible for its discipline and efficiency. Please give the necessary orders to that end.

Major Elliott will also be ordered to report to Brigadier-General Taliaferro for assignment to command of such heavy artillery as may be without proper commander.

The south end of the quarters at Fort Moultrie next to the guns should be torn away and removed without delay, otherwise the battery may be made untenable.

The Chief-Engineer will be instructed to examine Fort Moultrie, to determine what additional traverses shall be constructed in that work. The Commanding General is convinced one well-protected gun is worth ten exposed to a flank fire, and is keenly solicitous that all should be done to guard against such an event. Therefore it will be necessary to remove some guns, probably, to make room for the traverses which the Chief-Engineer may wish to throw up. In that event no time must be lost in taking the guns down when the Engineers are ready to do the work. Colonel Butler should be instructed to confer with Colonel Harris touching the guns to be displaced.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 18th, 1863.*

Lient.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chf.-Eng. Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla., Charleston, S. C.:

Colonel,—The Commanding General directs that you will repair to Fort Sumter as soon as practicable, to examine the damage done that work, and to recommend such repairs as are deemed advisable. You will also determine with Colonel Rhett what heavy guns should be transferred from Fort Sumter to the batteries at Fort Johnson and near the Martello Tower. These guns are to be removed to-night, if possible.

The General further directs that you will select a competent officer of your corps to inspect Captain Gray's torpedoes which are already made and ready for use.

You will also cause additional torpedoes to be placed in the Ashley River, and the mouths of Dill's Creek and Wappoo Cut, if the steamers to be used for this purpose are not indispensable for the supply of the troops on James Island.

Further, the General directs that you will close the opening through the rope obstructions near Fort Sumter, if practicable, and have a new opening made near Moultrie. The houses near the batteries on James Island must be torn down.

In conclusion, the General directs that you will construct two more sunken positions for heavy guns, near the Martello Tower (making five there in all), and also a work at the old mortar battery near Mount Pleasant, to cover Hog Island Channel, the inner harbor, and the bridge to Sullivan's Island.

Lieutenant G. Young will be ordered to report to you to take charge of the harbor torpedoes, in addition to his other duties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CLIFTON H. SMITH, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 19th, 1863.*

Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chf.-Eng., Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla., Charleston, S. C.:

Colonel,—Castle Pinckney must now be put in a condition, as soon as practicable, to become an effective part of the interior lines; to which end all labor and filled sand-bags and other material should be diverted from Fort Sumter that cannot be applied there (evidently to prolong its defence to any material extent), and used for traverses and a protection to the scarp-wall of the former work.

Fort Moultrie should be supplied amply with empty sand-bags, for the building of traverses, now and hereafter.

The covered way between Fort Moultrie and Battery Beauregard must be put in effective condition as soon as practicable.

Construct a battery for two 10-inch columbiads near the new wharf on James Island.

Three platforms for columbiads will be sufficient for the present in the battery near the Martello Tower, and the same number at the battery ordered near the wharf at Fort Johnson.

Have as many torpedoes prepared as possible to be set afloat, should the enemy force his way into the harbor.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C. *August 20th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

General,—Please be particular to see that as many shot-guns, with buck-shot ammunition, shall be sent to Battery Wagner without fail, to be held in readiness for an attempt to storm the place.

The Commanding General wishes every effort made to keep the batteries on Morris Island supplied with proper ammunition.

Has a new columbiad carriage been sent to Battery Gregg?

Order Colonel Butler, by telegraph, to confer with Colonel Gilmer, Chief-Engineer, C. S. A., and Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, Chief-Engineer Department, now on Sullivan's Island, in order to determine what 8 or 10-inch columbiads can best be removed from any Sullivan's Island work to the new battery to be established at Mount Pleasant.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 21st, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

General,—The Commanding General desires you to order, by telegraph, Colonel Rhett, at once, to protect, by all possible means (and thoroughly), the extreme gun on the right of the east and northeast faces; also to remove the

next gun in each case, and place instead a heavy sand-traverse, and so on, successively, to the left, so as to have an effective traverse alternating with the guns.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 21st, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc. :

General,—Henceforth the Commanding General directs that only the best troops be sent to Morris Island, twelve hours' notice being given them, in order that they may prepare provisions, etc. The General directs me to communicate the following for your information.

The Engineers have been instructed to protect Battery Beauregard, by efficient traverses, from a reverse fire from Cummings's Point, in case the latter place should fall into the hands of the enemy. They have also been directed to prepare new batteries near Fort Johnson for the guns and mortars of Battery Simkins, if rendered untenable, and to at once close up the opening in rope obstructions near Fort Sumter, reopening one near Moultrie.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G.

SUMTER, *August 16th: 8 P. M.*

Extracts from Colonel Rhett's Journal of the Defence of Fort Sumter.

Forty-eight shot fired this afternoon; four passed over, ten struck inside, and ten struck outside; two shot struck parapet above *terre-plein*; one passed through—the other a bulging shot. The pintle of one 24-pounder has been loosened by a shot on outside below *terre-plein*.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *August 17th: 7.30 A. M.*

The enemy opened with a 200-pounder from this side of Graham's House, and another gun, I suppose a 100-pounder. From two 200-pounders under the hill also. They have hammered the fort a good deal, and the trunnion of a rifled 32-pounder has been knocked off. The *Ironsides* and two monitors are backing in.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *August 17th: 12.50 P. M.*

Do send Wragg down. Doctor Moore is sick. We have stopped firing. The *Ironsides* and monitors have drawn off. The upper batteries have slackened fire. Six hundred and twelve shot and shell have struck and passed over us. One man—Company F—slightly wounded since last report. All the guns, except one 8-inch and one 10-inch gun on northwest front, disabled.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *August 18th.*

* * * From 5 A. M., August 17th, to 5 A. M., August 18th, 948 shot and shell were fired, 445 of which struck outside, 223 inside, and 270 passed over. The

western magazine has been traversed to a thickness of ten feet, and in height equal to first story. The second floor of eastern magazine has been covered with four feet of sand, and the same floor of the western with eighteen inches. One 32-pounder had trunnions shot away on northwest face, two 10-inch columbiads, one 9-inch Dahlgren, one 8-inch columbiad, and two 42-pounders were disabled; the two latter guns were taken to the parade to be shipped. The casualties for the day were one killed and seventeen wounded.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *August 18th*: 9 P. M.

The enemy again opened fire heavily at daylight. All the guns on the gorge have been disabled, except two 32-pounders, rifled, and one 24-pounder. Both guns on west face have been disabled. All the guns on northwest face unserviceable. Two 10-inch guns, Captain Harleston's battery, disabled. Brooke gun, southwest angle, carriage disabled. The enemy ceased fire at about 7 P. M.; 785 shells have been fired: 317 inside, 189 over. Casualties: Stewart, coxswain, seriously; Corporal Bennett, Company B, slightly. The wall of northwest face I think more seriously damaged, perhaps, than gorge-wall. The gorge-wall seriously damaged; will probably be breached to-morrow.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *August 19th*: 12.10 P. M.

The width of twenty feet of the gorge-wall has fallen, and two-thirds will probably be down to-morrow, and light is showing through three or four of the casemates of gorge-wall. One mortar dismounted, and bed torn and broken. Seven casemates on west face are shattered, three pieces [piers] shot away, and three more shattered on second tier; the same for first tier. A good part of *terre-plein* has fallen in. One killed and four wounded; 762 shots to-day: 398 struck outside, 236 inside, and 128 over.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *August 19th*: 9.50.

We need all the garrison we have to hold the fort, and are short of officers. The firing this morning is the heaviest, and the walls are seriously damaged. One killed and four wounded this morning. All gorge guns useless. Middleton went to town last night.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *August 20th*.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

The enemy kept up to-day on Fort Sumter a heavy and continuous fire, increasing perceptibly towards the afternoon; 879 projectiles were thrown: 408 struck outside, 296 inside, and 175 over. The greater portion of the gorge-wall has fallen, the *débris* from the upper revetting, in a manner, the lower rooms. The northwest *terre-plein* has also in a great degree fallen in, and the wall has been breached in several places. Some large holes have been made in the northwest scarp-wall by reverse firing to-day; six upper and three lower

embrasures shattered. East scarp-wall damaged very slightly. Southeast *pan-coupé* battered under traverse, and one-half of the parapet in its front has fallen. East magazine reinforce stone-work slightly damaged, and now covered by rubbish from upper part, which is half gone.

The worst effect to-day is, that some seven feet of arch, and rampart for length of thirty feet along east half of gorge, have been demolished. The following engineer work was done at Sumter, viz., hospital traverse completed, strengthened revetement to west magazine, threw over traverse from gorge-wall, started traverse in rear of three-gun battery, and packed four rooms east of gorge with sand.

One heavy 10-inch columbiad on east face, and one rifled 42-pounder north-east face, were disabled. The flagstaff is also disabled, and flag twice shot away during the day; 9000 pounds of powder and quantities of shot and shell, implements, etc., 120 barrels pork, and 75 barrels flour were shipped from the fort.

One negro died from disease of the heart. Captain Gaillard and Private Donnelly, Company K, slightly wounded.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *August 21st*, 1863: 8.45 P. M.

The firing ceased at 7 P. M. It has been very heavy all day. Since 5 A. M. 923 shots were fired: 445 struck outside, 259 inside, 219 passed over. The eastern face has been pretty well battered. One 10-inch columbiad, and — 8-inch columbiads, east face, and two rifled 42-pounders, northeast face, were disabled; seven serviceable guns are now on parapet.

Private Thomas Powers, Company B, wounded severely; leg amputated above knee. Privates H. Robinson and William Dumphries, Company H, slightly; Corporal O'Neill and Private Goggins, Company R, slightly. Two negroes—Daniel, slave of Mr. Purvis, and Isaac, slave of Marmins—dangerously wounded. Flagstaff shot down four times.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *August 23*

Record of Shots Fired at Fort Sumter, from August 16th to 23d, 1863.

Date.	Struck outside.	Struck inside.	Missed.	Total.	Remarks.
August 16....	30	10	8	48	No record of projectiles fired was kept prior to the 16th instant. The first 200-pounder shots were fired on the morning of the 12th instant.
" 17....	445	233	270	948	
" 18....	452	244	180	876	
" 19....	408	241	131	780	
" 20....	408	296	175	879	
" 21....	445	259	219	923	
" 22....	203	216	185	604	
" 23....	309	225	158	692	
	2700	1724	1336	5750	

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, MORRIS ISLAND, S. C.,

August 22d, 1863: 9 P. M.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg. Confederate Forces, Charleston, S. C.:

Sir,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, complaining that one of my batteries has opened upon the City of Charleston, and thrown "a number of heavy rifled shells into the city, the inhabitants of which, of course, were asleep and unwarned."

My letter to you demanding the surrender of Fort Sumter and Morris Island, and threatening, in default thereof, to open fire upon Charleston, was delivered near Fort Wagner at 11.15 o'clock A. M. on the 21st instant, and should have arrived at your headquarters in time to have permitted your answer to reach me within the limit assigned—viz., four hours. The fact that you were absent from your headquarters at the time of its arrival may be regarded as an unfortunate circumstance for the City of Charleston, but is one for which I clearly am not responsible. This letter bore date at my headquarters, and was officially delivered by an officer of my staff.

The inadvertent omission of my signature doubtless affords ground for special pleading, but it is not the argument of a commander solicitous only for the safety of sleeping women and children and unarmed men. Your threats of retaliation for acts of mine, which you do not allege to be in violation of the usages of civilized warfare, except as regards the length of time allowed as notice of my intentions, are passed by without comment. I will, however, call your attention to the well-established principle, that the commander of a place attacked, but not invested, having its avenues of escape open and practicable, has no right to expect any notice of an intended bombardment other than that which is given by the threatening attitude of his adversary. Even had this letter not been written, the City of Charleston has had, according to your own computation, forty days' notice of her danger.

During that time my attack on her defences has steadily progressed; the ultimate object of that attack has at no time been doubtful. If, under the circumstances, the life of a single non-combatant is exposed to peril by the bombardment of the city, the responsibility rests with those who have first failed to remove the non-combatants or secure the safety of the city, after having held control of all its approaches for a period of nearly two years and a half, in the presence of a threatening force, and who afterwards refused to accept terms upon which the bombardment might have been postponed.

From various sources, official and otherwise, I am led to believe that most of the women and children of Charleston were long since removed from the city; but, upon your assurance that the city is still "full" of them, I shall suspend the bombardment until 11 o'clock P. M. to-morrow, thus giving you two days from the time you acknowledge to have received my communication of the 21st instant.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Q. A. GILLMORE, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXXIII.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., August 24th, 1863.

Commander J. R. TUCKER, Flag-officer, etc., Charleston, S. C. :

Sir,—The condition of Fort Sumter—its inability to offer further substantial reply with heavy ordnance to the enemy's fleet—makes it in place for me to acquaint you formally with the fact, and to ask you to take up a position with the three ironclad vessels under your command between Batteries Bee and other works on Sullivan's Island and Fort Sumter, for the purpose of assisting in protecting the latter, and in preventing the United States ironclads from passing into the harbor. It is believed you can take such a position under Fort Sumter as would shelter you from a flank fire from enemy's land batteries.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

General Beauregard's Indorsement on Colonels Gilmer and Harris's Report of the Condition of Sumter on the 24th of August, 1863.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., August 26th, 1863.

The opinion of Colonel Gilmer and Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, of the Engineers, is approved. Fort Sumter must be held to the last extremity—i. e., not surrendered until it becomes impossible to hold it longer without an unnecessary sacrifice of human life. Evacuation of the fort must not be contemplated an instant without positive orders from these Headquarters.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

SUMTER, August 24th, 1863.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

During the day our batteries more or less engaged those of the enemy. At 9 A. M. there were seventeen vessels off bar, including *Ironsides* and four monitors; 150 shot and shell fired at fort to-day: 112 struck outside, 14 inside, and 24 missed. One 11-inch Dahlgren, east face, the only gun serviceable. Fire of enemy to-day principally on southeast *pan-coupé* and east scarp. The former had its lower casemates and embrasures breached, the latter a large displacement along its entire length, with one or two penetrations in lower casemates. During the night working-parties were employed filling with sand-bags four penetrations at lower embrasures on southeast *pan-coupé* and east scarp, also strengthening west magazines and repairing traverses on east barbette. Eleven thousand pounds of powder removed from east to west magazine. No casualties to-day in the fort.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, August 26th, 1863.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

No great increase of damage outside or inside the fort to-day. One hundred and thirty shots fired. No casualties.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, August 26th, 1863.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

August 25th.—One hundred and seventy-five shot and shell fired at fort to-day: 62 struck outside, 36 inside, 77 missed. Fire to-day more destructive inside than out. Northeast casemates more or less damaged by reverse fire. East magazines uninjured. The shock of the 10-inch Parrott shell is very great. Engineer work in interior rapidly proceeded; 12,000 pounds of powder, 5 boxes of port-fire, 7200 priming-tubes, 1 box paper-fuses, assorted, 50 Brooke bolts, 50 10-inch solid shot, 50 10-inch shell, 20 rifle shell, about 50 damaged muskets, sponges, rammers, and iron hand-spikes shipped on steamer *Spaulding*. Companies C and F left fort last night for duty with Lieutenant-Colonel Yates, at Fort Johnson. They were replaced by 150 men, of two reserved regiments, of Colquitt's brigades, under command of Captain G. W. Wharthen. No casualties. Land-batteries commenced firing at 6 A. M., firing slowly.

A. RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, August 27th, 1863.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

August 26th.—The entire day 130 shot and shell were fired at fort: 45 struck outside, 45 inside, and 40 missed. Fire to-day slack and inaccurate; damage not very perceptible. Most of the holes stopped on the outside are undisturbed, and but one or two new ones made on east scarp, southeast *pan-coupé*, and east magazine. * * * A large quantity of 10-inch mortar shells was shipped during night. Garrison at work all night. No casualties to-day. Embrasures to casemates being bricked up.

A. RHETT, Col. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., August 27th, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

General,—The Commanding General directs me to say that the commanding officer at Fort Sumter must be instructed that the position shall be held and defended to the last extremity, and not surrendered until it cannot be longer held without an unnecessary sacrifice of life. It will only be evacuated under explicit orders from these Headquarters.

Remove all powder except two hundred (200) rounds for each of, say, three guns, which it is hoped may be mounted and kept serviceable. No efforts should be spared to remove as many projectiles as possible of the most valuable sort.

As previously directed, the number of negroes must likewise be reduced as much as may be compatible with the labor to be done, to insure our holding the position.

A four weeks' supply of provisions, for the garrison and employés, should be placed in store in the fort.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

SUMTER, August 28th.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

August 27th.— * * * Working parties finished heavy traverse over 42-pounder rifle gun, east barbette battery ; repaired others on same. Discharged steamer *Etiwan*, bringing five hundred bags of sand from Sullivan's Island.

About four hundred 10-inch shot and shell, one parapet gin, one lot sabots, tin straps, brass fuses, blocks, one box bridge-sights, six boxes 9-inch Dahlgren shell, one 9-inch Dahlgren gun, one lot axles, wheels, etc., for columbiad carriage, one lot of elevating-screws, were shipped at 4.30 A. M. by steamer *Etiwan*.

The 9-inch Dahlgren mentioned above and 10-inch columbiad on northwest *pan-coupé* thrown over the parapet during the night by Mr. Fraser Mathews. Completed bricking up of casemates, embrasures, lower tier. Garrison at work all day and night. No casualties.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, August 29th, 1863.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

August 28th.—The entire day six shots were fired : three struck outside, and three missed.

No increase of damage to works.

Working parties during night completed traverse on parade at entrance to magazine and hospital, southwest angle ; also repairs and improvements to east barbette battery.

By steamer *Etiwan* were shipped the following ordnance stores : four hundred 10-inch mortar shell, fifteen hundred paper fuses, one box of taps of brass fuse-plugs, three damaged muskets, two elevating-screws, six boxes mortar-fuses, eighteen 8-inch columbiad incendiary shells, three 9-inch Dahlgren shells, prepared, three hundred pounds lead, one 10-inch columbiad, one sponge, eight boxes canister, one box implements, fuse extractors, etc., fragments of gin-legs, one box of fuse-plugs.

Mr. Fraser Mathews threw the 9-inch Dahlgren on southwest face over the parapet. Disabled in fall. Garrison worked day and night. No casualties.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., August 29th, 1863.

Lient.-Col. J. R. WADDY, Chf. Ord. Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla., Charleston, S. C. :

Colonel,—The Commanding General directs that the 10-inch columbiad brought up last night from Fort Sumter, and now on Commercial Wharf, be sent to Battery Wampler (between Martello Tower and Battery Glover). He also wishes you to see Commodore Ingraham, and offer him the 9-inch Dahlgren, brought up at the same time, for the use of the new gunboat, informing him of the accident which befell the piece in removing it from the fort.

Your attention is respectfully called to the fact that there are no howitzer shells at Battery Wagner. That these should be supplied as speedily as possible

is a matter of much moment, and the Commanding General directs that you make every possible effort to procure them forthwith.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G.

P. S.—Captain F. D. Lee has been directed to turn over to you the iron you requested.

J. F. O'B.

SUMTER, August 30th, 1863.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

Two 10-inch guns on east face have been disabled by fire to-day. I will throw them off as soon as it is dark. The only gun now left is the 11-inch gun.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, August 30th.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

The enemy opened fire to-day at 6.15 A. M. Damage to fort very great. One 10-inch columbiad muzzle shot off, and two disabled, leaving one gun in bar-bette serviceable; 11-inch Dahlgren gun on parapet badly shattered; traverse badly cut up; three breaches on east face, exposing sand fully. Three arches of rampart, on southeast face, fallen in on casemate containing commissary stores; one shot penetrated through the gorge-wall. Sergeant Shaffer and three men wounded.

A. RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, August 30th, 1863.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

August 29th.—There was no firing to-day. Company D left for Charleston, and a detachment of 27th Georgia Volunteers, fifty men, under Captain Bussy, arrived here. There are ready for shipment four hundred 10-inch mortar shell, ammunition chests, wheels, etc. One Brooke gun and one 42-pounder, rifled, were thrown over rampart. Former shipped last night. Garrison worked all day.

August 30th.—Firing began at 5 A. M., very rapidly. Casualties: Sergeant Shaffer, Company H, Private Laguire, Company B, 1st South Carolina Artillery; Private Van, Company A, 27th Georgia, slightly. Working parties engaged on second tier passage, traverse at west magazine, filling mess-room, and protecting from reverse fire of monitors; also filling hole on gorge, and aiding to dismount guns. An hour was lost by separating and sending away 61 hands; present force, 110.

A. RHETT, Col. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., August 30th, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—In consequence of the revelations of the United States gunboat *Ottova's* mail-bag it behooves us to be on the alert, and to be prepared for another such attempt as that which was made by Admiral Dahlgren on the 26th inst. (Wednesday night) to "pass the obstructions" and force his way into this harbor. The Commanding General has addressed Flag-officer Tucker on the subject, and he also desires you to see and arrange with that officer for a guard-boat (*Juno*, if possible), which shall be so placed at night as to secure timely

information of an advance of the enemy. He thinks that vessels prepared with light wood or resin should likewise be moored at proper points at night, to be set on fire and light up the harbor.

All the batteries on either side of the channel should be placed in condition, and held ready for immediate service. He further wishes those guns (10-inch and the Brooke piece) for Battery Wampler placed in condition for service with the utmost despatch, and supplied with the requisite ammunition. Opportunely forewarned, we must be forearmed and prepared at all points.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

SUMTER, *August 31st.*

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

August 30th.—The entire day 634 shot and shell were fired at this post: 322 struck outside, 168 inside, 144 missed. Shipped by steamer *Etiwan* large amount of ordnance stores. Garrison worked part of night. Casualties: Private A. E. Woolright, Company C, 28th Georgia Volunteers, and F. Ward, Company C, 28th Georgia Volunteers. Damage to fort most apparent inside. On east barbette battery two 10-inch columbiads, serviceable up to-day, had carriages broken; one 10-inch columbiad muzzle shot off and dismounted. Parapet all shaky, and partially demolished; traverse badly cut up; three arches, with ramparts on northeast front, cut away and tumbled in, burying some commissary stores; east scarp, near southeast *pan-coupé*, has large blocks knocked away from face of second tier of casemate arches, exposing segment of arch. One hundred men at work last night; repaired traverse on either side 11-inch gun; two 10-inch columbiads thrown over rampart.

August 31st: 2.30 A. M.—Fort Moultrie fired on steamer *Sumter* by mistake; sent out barges forthwith from fort and gunboats, and saved 600 officers and men, 20th South Carolina Volunteers and 23d Georgia Volunteers.

A. RHETT, Col. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 31st, 1863.*

Lieutenant-Colonel D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, Department S. C., Ga., and Fla., Charleston, S. C.:

Colonel,—The Commanding General directs that to-night you place a large number of torpedoes in front of the obstructions between Forts Sumter and Moultrie, principally from first works to half way across. You will also, as soon as practicable, place additional torpedoes in Hog Island Channel, towards Sullivan's Island Point; in Folly Island Channel, and in the Middle Channel east of Pinckney.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN F. O'BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 31st, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—The Commanding General directs me to communicate his wishes as follows:

1st. A list of the guns removed from Fort Sumter to other works since the 7th of April to date, and one of all guns that have burst, or been otherwise permanently disabled.

2d. That Castle Pinckney and Fort Ripley be well provisioned and supplied with ammunition, and that the orders heretofore issued relative to the provisioning and ammunitioning of Morris, James, and Sullivan's islands, and Christ Church Parish, if not already complied with, shall be at once executed.

3d. That you direct Colonel Rhett to use his sharp-shooters freely, in case of a night attempt on part of the enemy to destroy our rope obstructions; to this end he should have some of the best rifles and riflemen.

4th. As soon as the new harbor batteries on James Island west of Fort Johnson are furnished with guns they are to be supplied with ammunition and manned.

5th. All harbor batteries must be kept prepared to open fire any night, at a moment's notice, until further orders.

6th. That as soon as the remaining guns of Sumter are dismounted or rendered unserviceable the artillery company now there must be relieved by a company of infantry.

7th. That the carriages and châssis for heavy guns be removed from Sumter as soon and rapidly as practicable.

8th. That while active operations are going on you furnish a weekly report of operations in your district to these Headquarters.

I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,
JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 31st, 1863.*

Flag-officer J. R. TUCKER, Commanding Confederate States Naval Forces afloat,
Charleston Harbor, S. C.:

Sir,—Your two letters of this date have been received, and I hasten to say that it is my wish to turn over to you the torpedo-ram steamer, for any purpose or service for which you may regard it as suitable or available at this juncture, and until it may be found convenient and judicious to mail and arrange her as originally designed.

General Ripley will be directed to make all practicable arrangements in accordance with your views conveyed in your letter relative to your inability to furnish further aid in keeping up communications with Morris Island.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 31st, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—The Commanding General directs that the mortar at Battery Gregg be taken to-night to Battery Wagner, and there put in position.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G.

SUMTER, *Sept. 1st, 1863.**Extract from Journal Kept at Post.*

August 31st.—The entire day 56 shot and shell were fired at the fort: 34 struck outside, 5 inside, and 17 missed. Night force engaged in securing upper west magazine passage and casemate arches over hospital.

20th South Carolina Volunteers, 23d Georgia Volunteers, and Captain Mathews's company of artillery left for Sullivan's Island by *Chesterfield* at 8 P. M. No casualties.

A. RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *Sept. 1st: 12.40 A. M.*

I have got the men under cover all night.

A. RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *Sept. 1st: 2 P. M.*

The entire *terre-plein* on the northeast face, except the two casemates having commissary stores, have fallen in; two shots have gone into the commissary stores.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

SUMTER, *Sept. 1st.*

The effect of fire to-day very heavy. Three hundred and sixty-one shot fired: 166 outside, 75 inside, 120 over. Two shells struck in commissary stores, on the southeast face of the outside wall. *Pan-coupé* and next two arches have fallen. The rest of the wall is badly scaled, and in all probability will come down to-morrow as low as the first tier of casemates. We have not a gun *en barbette* that can be fired. Only one gun in casemate.

A. RHETT, Col. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 1st, 1863.*

JNO. S. MCDANIEL, Kingstree, S. C.:

Sir,—I regret that you have found planters so ready with excuses for not furnishing labor to defend Charleston. May God grant that, in seeking to avoid furnishing a fourth of their labor at this momentous juncture, they do not materially contribute to the loss of the whole.

If unable to find road commissioners who will loyally assist you in your duties, call on the planters to give you, in good faith, a list of their able-bodied male negroes between ages of eighteen and forty-five, and also a statement of what amount of labor they have severally furnished on the works in South Carolina. Every man in the district must be required to send one-fourth, including that already furnished. Should you find, after trial, that this does not work, take one-fourth, irrespective of former contributions, except from those who voluntarily furnished labor at my call last February and March.

Working on railroads cannot be taken as ground of exemption.

Negroes found in your district—refugees—of course must fare the same with others. Send back all negroes who have run away from the works.

I repeat as far as practicable impress the slaves of those who hitherto have not furnished labor.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

SUMTER, Sept. 2d.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

September 1st.—The entire day 382 shot and shell fired at fort: 166 struck outside, 95 inside, 121 missed.

At 11.40 P. M. six monitors and the *Ironsides* moved up and commenced shelling the fort. One hundred and eighty-five shot were fired, until 5 o'clock A. M.: 116 struck outside, 35 inside, 34 over. * * * Ordnance stores shipped by *Etiwan*. * * * Damage very great by day and night fire. On northeast face entire *terre-plein* has fallen in, except next northeast *pan-coupé*. Two shells burst in commissary stores. * * * Since monitor fire last night every casemate, upper and lower, has been more or less breached, in most of them exposing sand-bags. Three shells exploded in immediate proximity to western magazine, two so near to outer door of lower magazine passage, that, had the door been open, most serious consequences would have ensued. The third struck and brought up in sand-bag traverse at passage into hospital magazine; would otherwise have gone into hospital passage used for guard-room. Slightly wounded: Privates *Foshu*, Colonel Rhett's orderly; Brown, Company C; and Alexander, Company H, 27th Georgia Volunteers.

A. RHETT, Col. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 2d, 1863.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., Charleston, S. C.:

General,—It has been brought to the knowledge of the Commanding General, as a positive fact, that the supply of powder and the means of making powder have been diminished to a degree which makes it necessary to use the utmost economy in the expenditure of powder. I am therefore instructed to acquaint you with the state of the case, and to request you to give such instructions as will effectually prevent any waste. The batteries on Sullivan's Island last night, it is believed, threw away almost every pound of powder and iron discharged.

The fire of the enemy, mainly directed at Fort Sumter, was on their side an evident waste of ammunition and a useless expenditure of strength of the ordnance employed—that is, just such an employment of his formidable means of offence as we should desire. The batteries on Sullivan's Island will therefore be placed under such restrictions as shall effectually prevent them hereafter from firing at the ironclads at a range beyond that at which the *Keokuk* was perforated, on the 7th of April, 1863.

It is the wish of the Commanding General that battery commanders shall be made to understand distinctly what is expected in this matter.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

SUMTER, Sept. 3d.

Extract from Journal Kept at Post.

September 2d.—Thirty-eight shots fired at fort this day: 12 struck outside, 9 inside, and 17 missed. * * * No material damage. One shot penetrated scarp-wall.

opening daylight into magazine in southeast *pan-coupé*. Negroes worked all day repairing previous damage, and strengthening west magazine. * * * Garrison worked all day. Casemates on east face filled with sand-bags. Lieutenant John Johnson, Engineer officer, was relieved from duty at this post on account of aggravated condition of wound, and Lieutenant Hall, Engineer officer, reported for duty in his stead. Mr. William Mathews was also sent down to assist the latter. Mr. Fraser Mathews came last night for the purpose of taking off guns from berme, but in consequence of roughness of water was unable to do any work.

ALFRED RHETT, Col. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *Sept. 3d, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., S. C., Charleston, S. C. :

General,—The 32-pounder rifle-gun, brought from Fort Sumter several days ago, the Commanding General wishes transferred to the new battery under construction at Chisolm's Mill.

Two of the three 42-pounder rifle and banded guns to be taken out of Fort Sumter may be sent at once to Fort Johnson, and the third will be brought to the city for disposition.

The 11-inch Brooke gun, referred to in your letter of the 2d instant, will be dismounted and sent to the city for examination by Mr. Cameron and future orders.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *August 28th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc. :

General,—I am informed, to my utter surprise, that the Hon. Secretary of War is of the following opinion relative to the attack of the enemy on Morris Island on the 10th ult. * * *

You will please make to these Headquarters, at your earliest convenience, a full and detailed report on the subject, referring especially to the following points :

1st. Was not the presence of the enemy in force on Folly and Little Folly islands known ? And to what extent was his movements ascertained ?

2d. What measures had been adopted, ordered, or contemplated for the protection of the south end of Morris Island, including flanking batteries on Black Island, commanding crossing of Light-house Inlet, and at Marsh Point, to flank Morris Island in front of Wagner ?

3d. Why were not all those works constructed ? And, if constructed, could they have been armed ?

4th. Even with works on the south end of Morris Island, and the small force then available for its defence, could not the enemy have landed, with the assistance of their gunboats and ironclad fleet, a strong force on the beach north of Craig's Hill, during the night, cut off the retreat of the troops south of it, and then crossed, almost unmolested, Little Folly Inlet ?

5th. What works did the enemy construct on Little Folly Island up to July 10th? What calibre and number of pieces did he put in position?

6th. How long did it take him from the time he broke ground until he opened fire?

7th. What was about his force then on Little Folly and Folly islands, and on board of transports?

8th. What were your forces of infantry in the district, and how distributed? (See note A.)

9th. Could a better disposition have been made of them?

10th. What should have been the full force at each point for the proper defence of Morris, James, and Sullivan's islands? (See note B.)

11th. Do our means of transportation, and other circumstances of tide and locality, admit a rapid concentration of force from one point to the other?

12th. Which of those three lines of approach was most vital to Charleston?

13th. Might not the enemy have intended a feint on Morris Island, and then a rapid concentration on James Island?

14th. How long would it have then required him to take possession of it? And what would have been the result as to the safety of Charleston and its harbor, by establishing his batteries from Fort Johnson to Battery Glover?

15th. How could we have then maintained our communications with Sumter and Morris Island, his ironclads having command, meanwhile, of the outer harbor?

16th. Was it not a fortunate circumstance the enemy attacked Morris instead of James Island?

17th. From the apparent number of troops and vessels in North Edisto, about the 10th July last, was it not possible for the enemy to have concentrated his forces rapidly on James Island, and attempt to cross the Upper Stono, to march into St. Andrew's Parish?

18th. Was it not, then, necessary to guard also that line of approach?

19th. From the small force of infantry in the Second, Third, and Fourth Military Districts (see Note B), the difficulties and insufficiency of our means of transportation, could much assistance have been expected or derived from them?

20th. Were not the forces in the Second and Third Districts absolutely required where they were, to the last moment, to guard our important communication with Savannah?

21st. When did they get here, and how many?

22d. How much infantry force was in Georgia? (See Note A.)

23d. How many came from there?

24th. When did they arrive?

25th. Did not, in your judgment, these Headquarters do all that our restricted means permitted to be done to afford you all the aid possible from other districts? And, so far as you are aware, even from North Carolina, and from the Government itself, at Richmond? (See my telegrams on the subject, if you desire.)

26th. Did not these Headquarters object most strenuously to the last in

sending troops, in April and May, to the State of Mississippi, stating the enemy's force was still too great in this Department, and such a depletion would endanger Charleston or Savannah, or their communications with each other?

27th. Did not the War Department insist, on the contrary, that the enemy's forces had been greatly reduced, if not mostly withdrawn, to attack Mobile, or reinforce Banks on the Mississippi River?

28th. Was not the truth of this information doubted, if not denied, at these Headquarters?

29th. Were not ample calls made during the last six months for negro labor to construct all the works required for the complete defence of Charleston?

30th. Were those calls answered satisfactorily?

31st. With those works completed and armed, and the troops we had then in this district, would not Charleston have been safe until reinforcements could have been sent from other points for its prolonged defence?

32d. Should it fall, will it not be due entirely, first, to the want of troops on the 10th July last, and then of labor?

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

N.B.—Battery Wagner was located by General Pemberton, and nearly finished when I arrived here, in September, 1862. I strengthened it greatly by adding three heavy guns to its sea-face, where it had none; also, by traverses between its land guns, bomb-proofs, and closing its gorge, etc., etc. I then located and built Battery Gregg, at Cummings's Point, where I always intended, whenever practicable, to put a strong work, well armed, if the guns could be had. A good work southeast of Morris Island was also contemplated, with advanced rifle-pits, and a battery for a few field-guns, in embrasures, and well traversed.

G. T. B.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST MIL. DIST., DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, *August 29th, 1863.*

Brig.-Genl. THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff, etc., etc., etc.:

General,—In answer to the letter of General Beauregard of yesterday, I beg to say that I fear it will take more time than General Beauregard might desire for me to make a report which might be considered a full and detailed report of the circumstances which took place during the several months preceding the attack on Morris Island. I will, however, proceed to answer his interrogations as fully as possible, and make up any deficiencies when time is allowed.

To the 1st Question I would answer, that the presence of the enemy on Folly and Little Folly islands was known from the time that he landed, just before the attack of the 7th of April. His movements were ascertained by means of observations from Long, Battery, Black, and Morris islands, and reported upon almost daily. They consisted for some weeks in throwing up defensive works on Folly. The force was variously estimated at from three to six regiments; and as his defensive operations progressed his works across the neck of Folly were plainly observed and reported upon. They were about 3000 yards from Light-house Inlet.

To the 2d Question.—In the early part of March last the Commanding General, with me, visited Morris Island, and then determined and ordered the location of five guns—four shell-guns and one rifled 24-pounder—in detached batteries, to sweep the beach and crossing to Morris Island, from Little Folly. Some time afterwards it was determined to locate a battery in the marsh at the mouth of Vincent's Creek, to flank Morris Island in front of Wagner. It was also intended to place a battery on Black Island, to flank the crossing of Light-house Inlet.

The battery at Vincent's Creek was to have two or three guns of long range. A communication from James to Morris Island was also ordered.

To the 3d Question I would state, that these operations being under the Engineer Department, and in no way under my charge, I can only give my opinions. Some reasons why they were not completed were alluded to in my correspondence with the Headquarters of the Department of the 24th of May, 6th and 14th of June, and subsequently; but the prominent difficulties, as declared, was the want of labor and transportation.

After the failure of the attack by ironclads on the 7th of April, and they had retired, the works could have been armed with a certain class of guns taken from the closed casemates of Fort Sumter. Difficulties would have occurred with the carriages and ordnance stores. These guns, however, would not have answered for what was required for the armament at the south end of Morris Island or Black Island. Some guns reported to be of the class wished for having, as I understood, arrived from Europe at Wilmington, were asked for, and refused. As the enemy persisted in his occupation, although the works were not completed at the south end of Morris Island, the armament was increased by a captured 30-pounder Parrott, a light Whitworth, and three 10-inch sea-coast mortars. It was, I have understood, intended to have constructed bomb-proof and hospital arrangements at the south end of Morris Island; but they had hardly been commenced.

To the 4th Question.—In my opinion it would have been possible, had the works at the south end of the island been completed, and with the small force at our disposal, for the enemy by a bold dash from their ironclads and gunboats to have cut off the retreat of the troops south of Craig's Hill. Nevertheless, as it was intended that the whole beach should be swept with grape, and the landing is quite difficult, it is, in my opinion, doubtful whether he would have undertaken so hazardous an enterprise. He would probably have attempted to shell out the work at the south end directly; or, still more, so changed his point of attack; or, what is still more probable, had we been fully prepared, he never would have made it.

To the 5th Question.—Up to the 8th or 9th of July the enemy, as far as could be ascertained, had constructed no works on Little Folly except to shelter his pickets from our shells. An expedition had been organized to cross the inlet, drive in his pickets, and ascertain his works, as early as the 6th; but had been delayed by the weather and the character of our boats. His works, such as they were, were discovered on the 9th, and a scouting expedition, under Captain Haskell, on the night of the 8th reported a fleet of boats moored as if in

readiness to attempt a crossing. There is no doubt, from the character of the guns which he used—of which there were about thirty, of different calibres, from 30-pounder Parrotts down—that they had been placed on temporary platforms, behind the sand-hills for the most part. Any shot heavier than a 30-pounder Parrott fired on the 10th came from the gunboats, or from the works on Big Folly.

To the 6th Question.—The enemy was reported at work on the night of the 8th, and opened fire at about 5 o'clock on the morning of the 10th.

To the 7th Question.—From the best sources of information the enemy's force consisted of four brigades, one of which landed on James Island, besides the fleet—probably in all, say, 10,000 men.

To the 8th Question.—My force of infantry was in all 2462 effective: 1184 on James Island, 612 on Morris Island, and 204 on Sullivan's; and 462 in Charleston.

To the 9th Question.—I do not know that a better disposition could have been made; for, had we concentrated on Morris Island, the enemy would at once have turned to James Island. He might have gone to Sullivan's Island by way of Long Island, but having a foothold on James, and that being the most vital approach to Charleston, could he have taken our extended lines by a *coup de main* he would have selected that route. The opportunity would have been given him, had we reduced the small force of infantry on that island. Had I had the troops I should have thrown 2500 men on Morris Island to meet this attack. These would have been about as many as could have been advantageously used, and is about the fullest strength the garrison has been increased to at any one time since the 10th of July. James Island, under the circumstances, ought—the enemy having a position upon it—to have been watched by from 3000 to 5000 infantry, besides the cavalry and artillery. An estimate for defence must, of course, be made as against certain attacks, and while the enemy has transportation in abundance, with a powerful steam navy, both offensive and transport, while ours is deficient in both respects; and not sufficient for current service, he having the option which route to choose, we are compelled to guard all at once to such an extent as will prevent a complete surprise of some one of them. These remarks will, I think, answer the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th interrogatories. In answer to the 14th, 15th, and 16th, I think had we decreased our force on James Island by any number sufficient to have given positive strength to any other point, and the enemy had chosen and acted with as much *éclat* as he did at the south end of Morris Island, or at either of the two assaults on Battery Wagner, he could have penetrated our long, unguarded lines in a day, and obtained possession of the approaches to Charleston, which, if he chose to make use of them, would have at once cut off our communications with Morris Island and Fort Sumter. I consider it fortunate, under all circumstances, that, situated as we were, the enemy chose the Morris Island route.

To the 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th Questions I would answer, that there has been no time since the 15th of April that the enemy could not have thrown a force by the Edisto into St. Andrew's Parish, cutting our communications with Savannah, and threatening our city in that direction, rendering it necessary to

guard that approach, and also necessitating the retention of certain troops in that locality until the last moment, or until the enemy's attack had been fully developed. The forces in the Second, Third, and Fourth Military Districts have always been small; but, small as they were, they fully employed our means of transport when they had to be removed with rapidity.

To the 21st Question.—From the Second District, Nelson's battalion of 260 effectives arrived on the morning of the 10th July, and proceeded to Morris Island in time to reinforce the garrison after it had retreated to Battery Wagner. The Marion Artillery, 4 guns and 39 effectives, arrived on the 12th, and was placed on James Island. From the Third Military District a battalion of the 11th South Carolina Regiment, 400 effectives, arrived on the 12th of July, but soon had to return, to guard our communications with Savannah.

The 22d, 23d, and 24th Questions cannot be answered. According to my information there were 1795 effective infantry in Georgia. Of these, 1430 effectives arrived in detachments on the 10th, 12th, and 13th of July. Colonel Olmstead's command, composed of detachments of the 1st, 12th, 18th, and 63d Georgia regiments, 534 effectives, arrived on the 10th, and proceeded at once to Morris Island, and assisted in the repulse of the attack on the morning of the 11th.

To the 25th Question.—As soon as it was positively ascertained that the attack was imminent I believe that every available man was ordered to this point, and that requisitions were made for troops from North Carolina and other sources.

I reported the matter and the necessities personally to the Headquarters of the Department, and took the orders for the quartermasters to provide transportation. The troops reported to me as they came in, and were stationed without one moment's delay. Up to the 9th of July there had been no other appearances to indicate the enemy's positive intentions than previously. Nay, from intelligence received from Richmond, coupled with the incorrect accounts of the battle of Gettysburg, the cause of the arrival of transports in the Stono was questionable; and we knew not whether they brought troops or came to take those on Folly Island away. I know that strenuous objections were urged against sending the troops in April or May last from this Department, while the enemy was in force in our front, and while it was contemplated to dislodge him from his position; and it is also within my knowledge that the War Department had the opinion that the enemy's force had been greatly reduced. The truth of this opinion was questioned, and continued observations were made, resulting in the information that the enemy was still in our front in force—what, we had not the means of ascertaining, which could only be learned by the assistance of naval means. The naval officers had been applied to, but could not co-operate, on account of the defective character of their ironclads, and they had no other vessels. The above will answer the 26th, 27th, and 28th interrogatories.

Calls were made through the State authorities for labor for months previous to the attack; but, this subject not being under my charge or control, I can only state that I have always understood that they were not responded to satisfactorily. I know that the supply of labor was limited in the extreme, and the

weak garrisons were called on to supply certain deficiencies. My observations on this point can best be learned by a reference to my correspondence concerning the preparation of Morris Island for defence, alluded to heretofore, commencing May 24th, and continued. This is already at Department Headquarters.

To the 31st Question.—I believe, had the works for the defence of Morris Island been completed and armed, that with the troops of my command, with small reinforcements, we could have held the southern extremity of Morris Island until larger had arrived from other points; and if no other method of attack had been attempted, the chances in my mind were that his whole attempt would have been repulsed. As for the prolonged defence, I think it may be considered that the defence of our advanced works, Batteries Wagner and Gregg, and Fort Sumter, against two powerful assaults and open trenches of attack, armed with the most powerful modern artillery, for nearly fifty days, has been tolerably good already. I hope it will be prolonged still further, and successfully. Should Charleston fall, it certainly will be due to want of labor and troops; but the ultimate cause of an abridgment to the defence of Charleston is, in my mind, clearly attributable to the abandonment of Cole's Island. This situation, far stronger by nature than Battery Wagner, and well fortified by art, with a far heavier armament, approachable only by water by the enemy, and then by his light-draught vessels, with two approaches by water and two by land in our hands, which could be garrisoned by two thousand men, nearly all of whom were provided with bomb-proof shelters, without an attack, or the slightest demonstration of one, was abandoned. By this abandonment, against which I urged and advised in vain, the enemy obtained his *point d'appui*, and a convenient post, with the choice of two routes of attack—one by James and the other by Morris Island. The first led directly to the city, the other to its outer defences. The first was attempted, and was defeated by the gallantry of our troops at Secessionville, and the circumstance, somewhat fortuitous, and in nowise attributable to the commander who ordered the evacuation of Cole's Island, that the place was fortified, although some miles from that position. The second attack has been attempted, and has progressed thus far with a fearful loss of life to the enemy, and a considerable loss of material and fortifications to us. The loss of the whole garrison at Cole's Island, and the position, would have advanced the enemy no further than he was at any time during the last fifteen months; and, as I have said, the chances of its defence were good. Indeed, I believe it was stronger by itself than all the lines and works which have ever been projected for the defence of Charleston, and, if held, would have forced the enemy to make either a purely land or a purely naval attack, and these separated from each other by considerable distances. We were tolerably well prepared for either. Few men answered to repel the naval attack. Our advanced positions and the nature of the country would have compelled the enemy to give us time for the concentration of troops to repel the other.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. S. RIPLEY, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 4th, 1863.

Flag-officer J. R. TUCKER, Comdg. C. S. N. Forces afloat, Charleston, S. C. :

Sir,—The Commanding General, having to visit James Island with the President this morning, requested me to enclose for your information Major Morris's telegram, which is believed to be reliable in Richmond.

He directed me also to say that he hoped, in view of the possible contingency, it would suit your views to place one or two of your ironclads, at night, in position to fire between Fort Johnson and Cummings's Point, and between Fort Johnson and Battery Simkins, in case the latter work should be, unfortunately, carried.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXXIV.

Return of Troops and Guns in the Military Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, January 1st, A. D. 1864.

COMMAND.	COMMANDER.	EFFECTIVES.							GUNS.		
		Infantry.	Co. L. A. y.	Light Ar- tillery.	Co. H. A. y.	Heavy Ar- tillery.	Cavalry.	Total.	Artillery in Position.	Field Artil- lery.	Total.
1st Mil. Dist., S. C.	Brig.-Gen. Ripley...	3,112	3 s.	276	15	1,030	123	4,541	59	14	73
2d " " "	" " Robertson.	190	3	229	1,382	1,801	6	12	18
3d " " "	" " Walker...	1,847	6	616	1,677	4,140	..	21	21
4th " " "	" " Trapier...	596	1 s.	139	1	41	424	1,199	11	7	18
5th " " "	Colonel Rhett.....	1,245	0	339	131	1,715	12	..	12
6th " " "	Brig.-Gen. Wise.....	2,035	4	358	1	50	403	2,896	8	16	24
7th " " "	" " Taliaferro.	3,501	2	162	26	2,053	291	6,007	122	8	130
Dist. of Georgia...	" " Mercer.	1,242	5	336	35	1,745	1,200	4,523	186	15	201
" " Mid. Fla.	" " Gardner.	623	3	227	646	1,501	5	10	15
" " East " ..	" " Finegan...	664	2	101	451	1,246	..	8	8
Dept. S. C., Ga., Fla.	Gen. G. T. Beauregard.	*15,109	30	2,444	84	5,258	6,758	29,569	409	111	520

* Or these about 1754 men belong to the five (5) regiments of South Carolina six months State troops.

1st Mil. Dist., S. C. : Sumter, Sullivan's and Long Islands, Parishes of Christ Church and St. Thomas.

5th " " City of Charleston, to include lines on the Neck, Fort Ripley, and Castle Pinckney.

6th " " St. Andrew's, South of Ashley, and all the country to the east bank of North Edisto, from mouth to Graham's Ferry.

7th " " James Island.

2d " " Between western limits of Sixth District and the Combahee and Little Salkehatchee rivers, and the southern boundary of Barnwell District to the Edisto River.

3d " " Between western limits of Second District and Savannah River.

4th " " Bounded on southwest by Santee River, and northwest by boundary-line of North and South Carolina.

District of Georgia: State of Georgia, excluding defences of Appalachiecola and main affluents.

" Mid. Florida: Bounded by Suwanee and Choctawhatchee rivers, and defences of Appalachiecola and affluents.

" East " Portion of Florida east of Suwanee River.

NOTE.—1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th Mil. Dists., S. C., comprise the "defences of Charleston," S. C., and formed the 1st Mil. Dist., S. C., until the 22d day of October, 1863.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 11th, 1864: 8.30 A. M.*

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

Governor Milton telegraphs following: "Enemy's force at least five thousand strong; not force enough in State to prevent his passing through it. Colonel McLellan, West Florida, telegraphs for reinforcements. Immense loss of subsistence for armies and of property seems inevitable. We need at least five thousand additional troops." Have sent Governor Milton all I can spare without risking loss of Charleston or Savannah. Cannot two brigades be ordered from Northwestern Georgia or North Carolina temporarily?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 11th, 1864: 2 P. M.*

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

General Finegan reports enemy about to attack him near Lake City. Rapidity of movement indicates Tallahassee as the objective point—probably to form junction with forces from the Gulf. I have ordered two and a half additional regiments and one light battery to Florida to prevent loss of that State, but have much weakened thereby Savannah and railroad to that city. If one brigade could be sent here and another to Savannah, I would send immediately balance of Colquitt's troops to General Finegan. A prompt answer is desirable, as well as for two general officers I applied for few days since.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 12th, 1864: 11 A. M.*

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

General Finegan's success yesterday was very creditable, enemy's force being much superior to his own; his reinforcements had not yet reached him, owing to delays on roads. Losses not yet reported.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *May 18th, 1876.*

Mr. E. WILLIS:

Dear Sir,—In answer to your request, and also that it will be a pleasure to do anything in my power for General Beauregard, to give my old general the particulars of the fish torpedo-boat that struck the *Housatonic*. After the evacuation I took the contract of removing all the Confederate wrecks and obstructions. I claimed that the fish torpedo-boat was in my contract. Professor Mallefeil claimed that it was in his contract, and that he had the contract of lifting all the United States wrecks that were in Charleston Harbor. And I went to work to save the torpedo-boat, and I got on the top of her, and found out the cause of her sinking. The boat is outside or alongside of the *Housatonic*. She can be lifted any time our people wish. Mallefeil is bursted and out of the way. I have no more to say than that she can be saved, and my opinion is she is as good as the day she was sunk.

Yours, truly,

ANGUS SMITH, Sullivan's Island.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *May 18th, 1876.*

The fish-torpedo was brought by rail from Mobile. The main feature in her construction was, she could be submerged and raised at pleasure, and had sufficient air pumped in to last her crew some hours. After several trial-trips she was turned over to the navy, and a crew was placed on board. While lying at the wharf at Fort Johnson, with the man-holes off, a steamer passed, and the waves from her wheel filled the boat. The officer who was standing in the hatchway escaped, but the crew were unable to get out, and were all drowned. She was raised, and a volunteer crew went on board and went down under the United States naval receiving-ship *Mackinaw* to experiment in placing a torpedo; by some derangement of her lifting power she did not come up, and was not recovered for eight or ten hours. It is supposed some eight or nine men were drowned in her. The officer who planned and had her built then came on from Mobile, and obtained a volunteer crew to go with him to blow up one of the United States vessels off the bar; he was successful in destroying the *Housatonic*, but again she remained submerged. Whether she was sunk by one of the propeller blades, or the machinery again became deranged, no one knows. I think the latter was the cause. I have heard she has been found lying near the *Housatonic*, but cannot believe this, or she would have been raised, if only to rescue the bodies of the gallant fellows who went down in her.

From Comr. D. N. INGRAHAM.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 19th, 1864: 7.30 P. M.*

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

General Finegan reports ten regiments—at least one mounted—of enemy in his front. Am reinforcing Finegan to utmost practicable extent. It is essential to have them in immediate command of officer accustomed to handle troops in battle. General Hill has not arrived or been heard from. I propose to send General Taliaferro at once; he should be promoted—has earned it. I will go thither in due season. Resources of that section too large and vital to be lost. General Gilmer has been directed, as instructed, to repair at once to Mobile.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 26th, 1864.*

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

Telegram from General Anderson just received from Tallahassee. He is en route for East Florida. I will probably go there, nevertheless, if the enemy be still in force.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 26th, 1864.*

Major-Genl. J. PATTON ANDERSON, Lake City, Fla.:

Assume command of the forces in Florida. Troops now en route will form another brigade, which, with Finegan's, will give a division to General Gardner, if he feels able to take the field. I expect to be with you soon.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 26th, 1864.*

Brig.-Genl. W. M. GARDNER, Lake City, Fla.:

Announce that War Department has sent to command the troops in Florida Major-General J. P. Anderson, and transfer the command to him. He will assign you to a division.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 27th, 1864.*

Genl. S. COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

Prisoners report that it was the United States ship-of-war *Housatonic*, 12 guns, which was sunk in night of 17th instant by the submarine torpedo-boat, Lieutenant Dixon, of Alabama, commanding. There is little hope of safety for that brave man and his associates, however, as they were not captured.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

Report of General Joseph Finegan.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT EAST FLORIDA. IN THE FIELD,
TWELVE MILES FROM JACKSONVILLE, *Feb. 26th, 1864.*

Brig.-Genl. THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff, Charleston, S. C.:

General,—For the information of the Commanding General I have the honor to report that on the evening of the 7th February the enemy landed at Jacksonville, from eighteen transports and gunboats, a large force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, which was largely augmented by arrivals on the 8th instant.

On the receipt of this intelligence I immediately notified Lieutenant-Colonel McCormick, commanding an effective force of near 350 men of all arms at Camp Finegan, to guard against a surprise, advising him that I would join the command as soon as I had issued the necessary orders for collecting my widely scattered troops, and despatched telegrams and letters for reinforcements. On the 8th instant the enemy advanced from Jacksonville with great rapidity, in three heavy columns—cavalry in the advance. Artillery and infantry followed, under command of Brigadier-General Seymour. They approached Camp Finegan as the command there was in the act of retiring.

Their largely superior numbers deterred Lieutenant-Colonel McCormick, commanding, from attacking them, and in the darkness of the night he withdrew his command with caution and address, and joined me, at Camp Beauregard, near Ocean Pond, on the Olustee, on the 13th instant. The enemy, with celerity pressed on to Baldwin, capturing on their way five guns of company A and B, Light Artillery, which had been ordered to Baldwin; reached Baldwin at daylight on the 9th instant. Remaining a short time they continued on to Barber's the same night. At this point they were met, on the 10th instant, by two companies of cavalry under Major Robert Harrison, 2d Florida Cavalry, whom I had ordered to join me, and who with much gallantry checked their progress for several hours at St. Mary's Crossing, with but small loss to us and a considerable loss to the enemy.

On the 9th instant I removed all the Government stores from Sanderson, except fifteen hundred bushels corn, which was burned under my orders. On the 10th the enemy reached Sanderson; on the 11th instant they were within three

miles of Lake City. Here I had hastily collected, principally from the District of Middle Florida, a small force of 450 infantry, 110 cavalry, and two pieces of artillery. On the night of the 10th I placed this force in a favorable position, two and a half miles from Lake City, in the direction of the enemy. At half-past nine the enemy advanced upon us with a force estimated to be 1400 mounted infantry and five pieces of artillery. Here they opened upon us, fighting as infantry, and skirmished heavily with my advanced line. Discovering my position and its strength, and probably presuming my force larger than it was, they retreated to Sanderson, thence to Barber's, on the east bank of the St. Mary's, where they constructed field-works, and concentrated their whole force for a final movement on Lake City.

In the mean time I used every possible effort to gather reinforcements, and on the 13th moved to Ocean Pond, on Olustee, thirteen miles from Lake City, and occupied the only strong position between Lake City and Barber's. Here I had field-works thrown up, and for several days, with a force less than 2000 strong, awaited the enemy's advance.

In this time my command was increased by the arrivals of reinforcements, and I organized the command as follows: the 6th, 19th, 23d, 27th, and 28th Georgia regiments, infantry, and 6th Florida battalion, infantry, as the first brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General Colquitt, with the Chatham Artillery (four guns) attached. The 32d Georgia Volunteers, 1st Georgia Regulars, 64th Georgia Volunteers, 1st Florida battalion, and Bonaud's battalion, as the second brigade, under command of Colonel George P. Harrison, 32d Georgia Volunteers, with Guerard's light battery attached.

The Florida Light Artillery being held in reserve, I assigned Colonel R. B. Thomas, Confederate States Army, to duty as Chief of Artillery, and organized the cavalry into a brigade, under the command of Colonel C. Smith, 2d Florida Cavalry, my whole effective force being as follows: infantry, 4600; cavalry, less than 600; artillery, three batteries, twelve guns.

On the 20th instant the enemy advanced in three columns, since ascertained to have been twelve regiments of infantry (nine of white troops and three of black), estimated at 8000, and some artillery (number of guns unknown), and 1400 cavalry. At 12 M. the enemy were within three miles of my position. I ordered the cavalry, under Colonel C. Smith, 2d Florida Cavalry, supported by the 64th Georgia, Colonel Evans commanding, and two companies of 32d Georgia, to advance and skirmish with the enemy and draw them to our works. The remaining force was placed under arms and prepared for action. Apprehending that the enemy were too cautious to approach our works, I ordered General Colquitt, commanding first brigade, to advance with three of his regiments and a section of Gamble's artillery and assume command of the entire force, then ordered to the front, and feel the enemy by skirmishing, and, if he was not in too heavy force, to press him heavily. I had personally instructed Colonel Smith, commanding cavalry, to fall back as soon as infantry advanced, and protect their flanks. This movement was predicated on the information that the enemy had only three regiments of infantry, with some cavalry and artillery.

Perceiving that in this movement the force under Brigadier-General Colquitt's command might become too heavily engaged to withdraw without a large supporting force, and intending that if the enemy should prove to be in not too great strength to engage them, I ordered in quick succession, within the space of an hour, the whole command to advance to the front as a supporting force, and myself went upon the field. These reinforcements were pushed rapidly forward, and, as I anticipated, reached the field at the moment when the line was most heavily pressed, and at a time when their presence gave confidence to our men and discouragement to the enemy. I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkins, commanding 1st Florida battalion, and Major Bonaud, commanding Bonaud's battalion, to fall into line on the left in the direction of the enemy's heaviest firing. After I had ordered these reinforcements and they were some distance on the way to the front, and while I was myself on the way to the front, I received from Brigadier-General Colquitt, commanding in the front, a request for the reinforcements which had already been ordered. The engagement became general very soon after its commencement. The enemy were found in heavy force, their infantry drawn up in three supporting lines, their artillery in position, cavalry on their flanks and rear. I ordered Brigadier-General Colquitt to press them with vigor, which he did with much judgment and gallantry. They contested the ground stubbornly, and the battle lasted for four and a half hours. At the end of this time, the enemy's lines having been broken and re-formed several times, and two fine Napoleons and three 10-pounder Parrott guns, and one set of colors captured from them, they gave way entirely, and were closely pressed for three miles until nightfall. I directed Brigadier-General Colquitt to continue the pursuit, intending to occupy Sanderson that night; but, in deference to his suggestion of the fatigue of the troops, the absence of rations, and the disadvantages of the pursuit in the dark, and in consequence of a report from an advance cavalry picket that the enemy had halted for the night and taken a position (which was subsequently ascertained to be incorrect), I withdrew the order. During the continuance of the battle, also, after the enemy had given way, I sent repeated orders to Colonel Smith, commanding cavalry, to press the enemy on his flank, and to continue in the pursuit; but, through some misapprehension, these orders failed to be executed by him, and only two small companies on the left, and these but for a short distance, followed the enemy.

The enemy retreated that night, hastily and in some confusion, to Sanderson, leaving a large number of their killed and wounded in our possession on the field. Their loss in killed, both officers and men, was large; 418 of their wounded were removed by us from the field, and 400, or near that number, of their killed were buried by us; also nearly 200 prisoners were captured; several officers of high rank were killed, and others severely wounded. Their loss cannot be less than 2000 or 2500 men, five superior guns, one set of colors captured, and 1600 stand of arms; also 130,000 rounds cartridges (damaged by having been thrown into water), as appears by the report of the ordnance officer herewith enclosed. The victory was complete, and the enemy retired in rapid retreat, evacuating in quick succession Barber's and Baldwin, and falling back on Jack-

sonville. The enemy's forces were under command of Brigadier-General S. Seymour, who was present on the field. The conduct of Brigadier-General Colquitt entitles him to high commendation. He exhibited ability in the formation of his line, and gallantry in his advance on the enemy. I have also to speak most favorably of Colonel George P. Harrison, commanding the second brigade, who exhibited in the engagement all the qualities of a capable and efficient officer. Colonel R. B. Thomas, as Chief of Artillery, likewise rendered efficient service on the field. Colonel Evans, commanding the 64th Georgia Volunteers, and Colonel Duncan L. Clinch, commanding the 4th Georgia Cavalry, were wounded while bravely performing their duty. Lieutenant-Colonel Barron, of the 64th Georgia Volunteers, and Captain Camron, commanding, and Lieutenant Daney, of the 1st Georgia Regulars; also Lieutenant Holland, commanding detachment from conscript camp—all officers of high promise—were killed. Among the killed and wounded were many other officers and men who had distinguished themselves on other fields, for a detailed statement of whom, and for instances of individual merit, I refer to the reports of the brigade commanders.

Our loss in the engagement was 93 killed, and 841 wounded—a large proportion very slightly. In the opening of the engagement the cavalry, under command of Colonel Smith, skirmished with the enemy with spirit, and retired to the flanks, in obedience to their orders.

On the 22d instant, having repaired the railroad, so as to secure my supplies, I advanced the command to Sanderson, pushing the cavalry rapidly in the direction of the enemy, and from Sanderson to Barber's, and thence to Baldwin and to this place, twelve miles from Jacksonville, where my farther progress was arrested by orders from Brigadier-General Gardner, who had been directed to assume command, by whom I was here, for the first time, officially notified that the command had been transferred.

My efforts and those of my officers for the organization and concentration of a force adequate to meet the enemy's superior numbers, and to check them in their rapid advance, were incessant and arduous. I have the gratification of reporting to the Commanding General that while I continued in command they were successful. I transfer the army to my successor well supplied with forage and subsistence, well organized and armed, and deficient only in ordnance stores, for which timely requisitions were made, and which are now on their way. Very respectfully,

JOSEPH FINEGAN, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

Report of General Colquitt.

BALDWIN, FLA., Feb. 26th, 1864.

Capt. CALL, Asst. Adjt.-Genl.:

Captain,—I have the honor to submit the following account of the engagement of the 20th instant, near Ocean Pond:

Intelligence having been received of the approach of the enemy, I was instructed to take three regiments of my own brigade, with a section of Gamble's artillery, and proceed to the front, and assume command of all the forces which

had preceded me, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, under command of Colonel Smith, the 64th Georgia regiment, and two companies of the 32d Georgia regiment. Subsequently other troops were sent forward, and I was directed to call for such reinforcements as might be needed.

About two miles from Olustee Station I found the enemy advancing rapidly, and our cavalry retiring before them. I then sent forward a party of skirmishers, and hastily formed line of battle, under a brisk fire from the enemy's advance. The 19th Georgia was placed on the right, and the 28th Georgia on the left, with a section of Captain Gamble's artillery in the centre. The 64th Georgia and the two companies of the 32d Georgia were formed on the left of the 28th, and the 6th Georgia regiment was sent still farther to the left, to prevent a flank movement of the enemy in that direction.

Instructions were sent to Colonel Smith, commanding cavalry, to place his regiments on the extreme flank, and to guard against any movement of the enemy from either side.

The line of infantry was then ordered to advance, which was gallantly done, the enemy contesting the ground, and giving way slowly. Perceiving that the enemy were in strong force, I sent back for reinforcements and a fresh supply of ammunition. The 6th Florida battalion and 23d Georgia regiment soon arrived for my support. The 6th Florida battalion was formed on the right of the 19th Georgia, and in such position as to come in on the left flank of the enemy. The 23d Georgia was put on the left of the 64th Georgia. Colonel Harrison, coming up with the 32d and 1st Georgia Regulars, took position on the left, between the 23d and 6th Georgia regiments, and was instructed to assume the general direction of the left of the line.

The section of Gamble's artillery in the centre having been disabled by the loss of horses and limber, Captain Wheaton, who had early arrived upon the field with the Chatham Artillery, and had taken position on the right, was ordered to the centre to relieve Captain Gamble. This battery moved forward and took position under a heavy fire, and continued to advance with the line of infantry until the close of the action. Towards night, when Captain Wheaton's ammunition was almost expended, a section of Ginrood's battery, of Harrison's brigade, under Lieutenant Gignilleat, moved up and opened fire on the enemy, furnishing Captain Wheaton with part of his ammunition.

After our line had advanced about one-quarter of a mile the engagement became general, and the ground was stubbornly contested. With two batteries of artillery immediately in our front, and a long line of infantry, strongly supported, the enemy stood their ground for some time, until the 6th Florida battalion, on the right flank, and all the troops in front, pressing steadily forward, compelled them to fall back and leave five pieces of artillery in our possession. At this time, our ammunition beginning to fail, I ordered the commanding officers to halt their regiments and hold their respective positions until a fresh supply could be brought from the ordnance-wagons, which, after much delay, had arrived upon the field.

Major Bonaud's battalion came upon the field, followed soon after by the 27th Georgia regiment and the 1st Florida battalion. These troops were put in

position near the centre of the line, and a little in advance, to hold the enemy in check until the other command could be supplied with cartridges. As soon as this was accomplished I ordered a general advance, at the same time sending instructions to Colonel Harrison to move the 6th and 32d Georgia regiments (arrived) on the right flank of the enemy. The 27th Georgia regiment, under Colonel Zackry, pushing forward with great vigor upon the centre, and the whole line moving as directed, the enemy gave way in confusion. We continued the pursuit for several miles, when night put an end to the conflict. Instructions were given to the cavalry to follow close upon the enemy, and seize every opportunity to strike a favorable blow.

The results of the engagement in the killed, wounded, and prisoners of the enemy, and our own loss, will be found in the reports rendered directly to you.

The gallantry and steady courage of officers and men during this engagement are beyond all praise. For more than four hours they struggled with unflinching firmness against superior numbers, until they drove them in confusion and panic to seek safety in flight.

Colonel George P. Harrison, who commanded on the left, displayed skill, coolness, and gallantry. The commanding officers of the various regiments did their duty nobly. Colonel Evans, commanding the 64th Georgia, and Captain Crawford, commanding the 28th Georgia, both gallant officers, were wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Barrow, of the 64th Georgia, a brave and gallant officer, received a fatal shot while gallantly attempting to rally his men. Captain Wheaton, and the officers and men of his battery, are entitled to special commendation for their courage, coolness, and efficiency.

Captain Grattan, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant Colquitt, Assistant Department Commander; Major Ely, and Lieutenant Estill, of my staff, were active and conspicuous in every part of the field. My thanks are due to Lieutenant Thompson, 2d Florida regiment, and Mr. Sterling Turner, volunteer aids, for their gallant service. The names of those in the ranks entitled to be particularly mentioned may be furnished in a subsequent report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. H. COLQUITT, Brig.-Genl.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 1st, 1864.*

General SAMUEL COOPER, A. and Ins.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

General Beauregard left 28th ultimo for Florida. General Gardner, in command there, reports that General Gillmore is now in chief command; that he is being reinforced; has retired to Jacksonville, which he is fortifying; but appearances all indicate another attempt to advance in heavier force soon. Large number of transports reported at St. John's Bar with troops. We occupy Baldwin.

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 19th, 1864.*

General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Baldwin, Fla.:

I telegraphed you last night of orders received from Richmond of sweeping

away four regiments and eight companies of cavalry from your Department. It will be needless to apply then for delay of Miller's battalions. Some prominent Carolinians will interpose; but I doubt their success.

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

BATTLE OF OCEAN POND, FLORIDA.

Report of General Beauregard.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., *March 25th, 1864.*

To General SAMUEL COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., C. S. A., Richmond, Va.:

General,—In transmitting detailed reports of recent operations in East Florida I have to accompany them, for the information of the War Department, with the following.

The officer in observation at Foot Point of the enemy's fleet in the waters of Port Royal and Broad River having reported, on the afternoon of the 14th of January, that some thirty-five vessels, including an ironclad from Hilton Head, had gone to sea in the fog the day before, and probably with troops, as it was observed to be more quiet on the adjacent islands (less drumming and firing of small-arms) than usual, I gave Major-General Gilmer, at Savannah, immediate notification of the fact, with instructions to keep strict watch in the direction of Warsaw Sound and the Ossabaw. At the same time orders were given to the proper staff-officers to hold means of transportation by rail in readiness on the Charleston and Savannah Railroad. An increase of the tents of the enemy on Tybee Island was also reported. On the 16th of January I repaired in person to Savannah, in which quarter I apprehended some operations might be looked for. I remained in the District of Georgia, inspecting the troops and works, until the 3d of February, when, there being no indication of any movement of the enemy in that direction, I returned to Charleston, leaving with Major-General Gilmer orders to hold the 64th Georgia Volunteers, the 1st Florida battalion, and a light battery in readiness to be sent to Florida at short notice. * * *

General D. H. Hill having arrived at these Headquarters on the 28th ultimo, I left for Florida the same evening, although that officer was unwilling, for personal reasons, to assume the duty at once I had desired to intrust to him—the immediate command of the troops in the State of South Carolina; but he promised to repair to any point threatened or attacked by the enemy, and give the officer there in command the benefit of his experience and assistance.

On the 2d instant I reached Camp Milton, General Gardner's headquarters, in rear of McGirt's Creek, twelve or thirteen miles distant from Jacksonville, where I found our troops in position. The day preceding our advanced pickets had been thrown forward to Cedar Creek, within six or seven miles of Jacksonville. On the 3d Major-General J. Patton Anderson also arrived at Camp Milton, and assumed command on the 6th instant of the forces, now about eight thousand effectives of all arms.

In the mean time it had been ascertained from reliable sources that the enemy occupied Jacksonville with at least twelve thousand men; that the posi-

tion, naturally strong, had been much strengthened since the battle of the 20th ultimo, and that four or five gunboats in the St. John's effectually commanded the approaches to the place. Under these circumstances it was determined not to attempt to carry the position by assault, as, in effect, instructed by your telegram of the 4th instant. Everything indicates that the rout of the enemy at Ocean Pond or Olustee was complete; nevertheless, the fruits of the victory were comparatively insignificant, and mainly because of the inefficiency of the officer commanding the cavalry at the time, in consequence of whose lack of energy and capacity for the service no serious attempt was made to pursue with his command; while the exhaustion of the infantry, so gallantly and efficiently handled and engaged, and our want of subsistence, supplies, and ammunition, made an immediate pursuit by them impracticable.

Unless our present forces should be considerably increased, and amply supplied with means for a regular siege of Jacksonville, our operations in that quarter must be confined to the defensive; that is, to preventing the penetration of the enemy into the interior, either on the line towards Lake City or into the lower part of the State; to which end a position has been selected on the St. John's a few miles above Jacksonville for a battery of one rifled 32-pounder, three rifled 30, and one 20 and one 10 pounder Parrott, and two 8-inch siege howitzers, by which, with torpedoes in the river, it is expected transports at least can be obstructed from passing with troops beyond Jacksonville.

Cavalry pickets have been also established for the protection of the railroad to Cedar Keys from injury by raiding parties set on foot from the west bank of the St. John's.

I have for the present organized the force under General Anderson into three brigades, commanded, respectively, by Brigadier-Generals Finegan and Colquitt and Colonel George P. Harrison — three meritorious officers, the last two of whom have won promotion by their active participation in the combat of the 20th ultimo, at which, it is proper to say, Brigadier-General Colquitt commanded on the immediate field of battle. He has seen much service likewise in the Army of Northern Virginia.

The cavalry has also been organized into a brigade, under Colonel Robert H. Anderson; the four light batteries, of four pieces each, were placed under command of Lieut.-Colonel C. C. Jones, and two batteries of siege-guns (six pieces), present on the field, under Major J. L. Buist. It is hoped this arrangement will enhance the efficiency of the troops, who are in fine spirits and good condition.

Too much praise cannot be awarded to the brave officers and men who encountered and defeated twice their numbers at Ocean Pond, and I commend them to the notice of the Government; they are in all respects worthy comrades of those who, on other fields, have done honor to Southern manhood.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., March 28th, 1864: 11 h. A. M.

Major-Genl. J. F. GILMER, Comdg., etc., Savannah, Ga.:

Cavalry order must be obeyed, regardless of consequences. I have at present

no other cavalry to send you. Make best disposition of that you have left. Your telegram will be referred to War Department.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 2d*, 1864: 12 h. M.

Genl. SAML. COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

All quiet here. Enemy's forces reported gradually leaving Florida. Appear to be increasing in our front—probably returning to their former position preparatory to future operations.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 2d*, 1864.

Genl. SAML. COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

Major-General Anderson reports yesterday a large double-stack, side-wheel steamer is sunk in St. John's River, opposite mouth Doctoio Lake, fifteen miles above Jacksonville (Florida), supposed to be *Maple Leaf*, which exploded a torpedo at four (4) h. A. M. Torpedoes were laid by Captain E. Pliny Bryan, sent for that purpose from here.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 9th*, 1864: 11 h. A. M.

Genl. SAML. COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

I must ask immediate attention of Department to my telegram of the 23d ultimo.

My health requires I should apply for a leave, dependent, however, on operations of enemy; but I cannot make application without a competent major-general to replace me here.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 14th*, 1864.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Commander-in-chief, Richmond, Va.:

Am ready to obey any order for the good of the service. I believe Burnside's expedition is intended to cut off supplies from the South to Richmond and Lee's army. He will no doubt move in force.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 16th*, 1864.

Genl. SAML. COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

General Anderson reports another steam transport of enemy destroyed on St. John's River by a torpedo. Our scouts report Pilatka evacuated.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *April 19th*, 1864.

Genl. SAML. COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

Enemy still strong in our front. Should he withdraw large force to concentrate in North Carolina your suggestion can be carried out to extent of two brigades; but northwest portion of this State should be watched closely from expedition through North Carolina.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXXV.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, April 15th, 1864.

Repair with least delay practicable to Weldon, N. C., where instructions will be sent to you. S. COOPER, A. and I.-Genl.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Charleston, S. C.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., April 22d, 1864.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Commander-in-chief, Richmond, Va.:

Arrived this morning at 5.30. No instructions here. Please send them. In the mean time will give general direction to everything. Have not yet assumed command. Please send me a pocket-map of North Carolina. I have large ones. With Governor Vance's consent, will send slaves captured at Plymouth to Wilmington, to work on fortifications. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, April 22d, 1864.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

A staff-officer left here this morning to see and confer with you. Will send maps, if they can be procured. I suggest that all of Ransom's brigade remaining at Weldon join him immediately, and that part of Martin's be sent to hold Plymouth during Hoke's operations. Our movements should be rapid, so as to strike before the enemy can reinforce. The gunboat at Kinston is probably ready, and must get out soon, or will be caught by low-water and become useless for the whole season. BRAXTON BRAGG, Genl.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, 23d.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Orders were sent several days since assigning you to command of Department of North Carolina and Cape Fear. They include Virginia south of James and Appomattox rivers, and all of North Carolina east of the mountains. Will keep you posted in current reliable news. BRAXTON BRAGG.

Memoranda for General Bragg.

WELDON, N. C., April 23d, 1864.

Supposing this Department was to form a part of my former Department, I brought with me, or ordered to report to me here (before leaving Charleston), without further reference to the War Department, the following officers, who, I hope, will be allowed to remain with me:

Officers brought with me.

Captains John M. Otey and Alb. Ferry, Assistant Adjutant-Generals.

Officers ordered here.

Colonel D. B. Harris, Engineer; Majors Henry Bryan and Giles B. Cook, Assistant Adjutant-Generals, as inspectors.

Officers Required to Complete my General Staff.

1. CHIEF OF STAFF.

Brigadier-General Thomas Jordan, if his services can be obtained ; otherwise, Colonel G. W. Brent, or Major S. W. Melton, or Colonel George Williamson, who was assistant adjutant-general to General Polk at Corinth.

2. CHIEF OF ARTILLERY.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. Jones, now Chief of Artillery to General Mercer for the District of Georgia.

3. CHIEF OF ORDNANCE.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Waddy, now Chief of Ordnance, Department South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, as soon as he can be spared ; if he cannot, then Captain James Harding, in charge of a cap-factory near Savannah, or any good ordnance officer (of General Bragg's choice) who is intelligent, energetic, and prompt, and has system and order.

Lieutenant Edmund Mazyek, as assistant ordnance officer, now Chief of Ordnance to Brigadier-General Hagood, on James Island, Department South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.

4. INSPECTOR-GENERAL.

Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Roman, now Inspector-General, Department South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, as soon as he can be spared.

5. MEDICAL DIRECTOR.

Dr. R. L. Brodie, now Medical Director of Department South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, as soon as he can be spared.

Remarks.

I consider Colonel Roman and Dr. Brodie as indispensable. I should like to have them ordered to report to me as soon as they can be spared from their present duties.

Lieutenant-Colonel Roman is fully deserving of promotion to the rank of colonel ; he commanded with distinction the 18th Louisiana regiment at Shiloh, and has done excellent service in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, since he reported there in October, 1862.

Major Henry Bryan is also a most meritorious officer—zealous, intelligent, and brave, he is one of the most vigilant and searching inspectors I have yet seen ; nothing escapes his notice. He was wounded in Virginia, while assistant adjutant-general to Major-General Magruder.

Captain Otey is one of the best assistant adjutant-generals in the service—prompt, energetic, intelligent, zealous, methodic, and indefatigable in the discharge of his arduous duties. He has been one of my assistant adjutant-generals since Manassas, and should be made at least lieutenant-colonel. He is in charge of my office as assistant adjutant-general. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Memoranda of Orders.

WELDON, N. C., April 23d, 1864.

By order of the War Department (or his Excellency the President) I assume

command this day of the Departments of North Carolina and Cape Fear, to include all of North Carolina east of the mountains, and that part of Virginia south of James and Appomattox rivers.

This Department shall be known hereafter as that of North Carolina and Southern Virginia.* My headquarters will be located at Weldon until further orders. District Commanders will report directly to these Headquarters.

The prompt execution of orders, a mutual good understanding among all officers, and a cordial support of each other, are enjoined on all commanding officers as indispensable for success. Any violation of military discipline or disobedience of orders must be punished as soon as practicable; the names of all officers and soldiers who distinguish themselves in battle or otherwise must be sent at once to these Headquarters for transmission to the War Department.

The following officers compose at present the general and personal staff of the General Commanding. All orders transmitted through them must be obeyed accordingly:

1. Major Henry Bryan, A. A. G., Acting Inspector-General.
2. Major Cooke, A. A. G., Assistant Inspector-General.
3. Captain Otey, A. A. G., in charge of Adjt.-General's Department.
4. Captain Albert Ferry, A. A. G.
5. Colonel D. B. Harris, Chief-Engineer of Department.
6. Surgeon S. Choppin, Medical Inspector.
7. Major Willis, Chief Quartermaster.
8. Major Molloy, Chief Commissary.

PERSONAL STAFF.

1. Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm, A. D. C.
2. Lieutenant A. J. Toutant, Acting A. D. C.

G. T. B., Genl. Comdg.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., April 24th, 1864: 9 P. M.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Commander-in-chief, Richmond, Va.:

I have examined line of works around Weldon. They are too extensive for object in view. A few detached redoubts would have answered better. Too late now to modify the system.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., April 25th, 1864: 4.25 P. M.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Commander-in-chief, Richmond, Va.:

If enemy reduces his forces in front of Charleston, Wise's brigade can also be recalled after Hagood's. Could I not strike Burnside in rear from Petersburg, if he advances on Richmond from Yorktown?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., April 25th, 1864.

Officer Comdg., Goldsboro', N. C.:

Colonel Harris will arrive in Goldsboro' to-morrow night or the night after. Please order him to proceed to Petersburg, Va., instead of Kinston, N. C., stopping one day at this place.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,
WELDON, N. C., *April 25th, 1864.*

General,—In view of the great uncertainty still prevailing as to the point in this Department to which Burnside's expedition may be suddenly directed, I consider it my duty to call your attention to the present scattered condition of the only available troops at my command to oppose such an attack.

The temporary displacement of troops from their defensive positions for the support of General Hoke's expedition against Washington and Newbern was ordered by you, under the supposition that, with the assistance of the ironclad gunboat in the Roanoke and the one in the Neuse rivers, those two fortified positions would be taken by a rapid movement and a sudden attack; but already several days have elapsed since the fall of Plymouth, and, through various insurmountable obstacles, neither Washington nor Newbern have been attacked; moreover, General Corse from Kinston reports that the ironclad gunboat in the Neuse is hard aground, with the water falling rapidly. It is, then, probable that the contemplated expedition will require at least one week to be brought to a conclusion. Meanwhile, Burnside's movement on Petersburg or this place (Weldon), if made suddenly, would meet with but little resistance; and the communications of the forces in Virginia with the States of South Carolina and Georgia, whence they draw their principal supplies, could be effectually cut off at almost any moment.

Major-General Pickett has now at his command in his military district, for the protection of Petersburg, only about two thousand men of all arms. At this important point (Weldon) there is only one regiment (three hundred and fifty men) of State troops, under Colonel Hinton. At Goldsboro' there are only two hundred men of all arms; and in Wilmington, for its defence and to guard its approaches, only two regiments of Martin's and Evans's brigades.

The other movable troops of the Department are about as follows: sixteen regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and twenty-five pieces of artillery, amounting, in all, to about six thousand men, under Brigadier-General Hoke, now on the march from Plymouth to attack Washington.

Three regiments of Martin's brigade are at Plymouth and Harrellsville.

Two regiments of Evans's brigade and a section of light artillery, to guard prisoners taken at Plymouth, are at Tarboro'.

Five regiments of Corse's brigade, two regiments of Evans's brigade, seven companies of cavalry, twenty-five pieces of artillery are at Kinston, under Brigadier-General Walker, to support Hoke's attack on Newbern. By the enclosed "table of distances between the principal points in this Department" it will be seen the utter impossibility of concentrating in time these troops for the defence of Petersburg, Weldon, or Wilmington, if suddenly attacked by a determined enemy.

I submit the above facts to your consideration in order that I may receive, as soon as practicable, the definite views of the Department on this important subject.

Having only just arrived in this Department, and not having yet received returns of the forces in it, I may have committed some errors in the number of

available troops, which cannot be, however, sufficiently great to affect the general conclusions arrived at.

From an experience of over eighteen months in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida I beg to submit the following general views for the proper organization of this Department. To insure its successful defence with the smallest available force it should be divided into three military districts (instead of two), each one under a competent major-general.

The first district, under Major-General Pickett, to extend from the James River to the Roanoke, with his headquarters at Petersburg, or wherever his presence may be most required in his district.

The second district to extend from the Roanoke to the Neuse River, with its headquarters at Tarboro', Greenville, or Kinston, as circumstances shall dictate.

The third district, from the Neuse to Cape Fear, under Major-General W. H. C. Whiting, with his headquarters at Wilmington, or such other point of the district as circumstances may require.

Each of these districts should be divided by their commanders (subject to my approval) into subdistricts, according to the topographical defensive features of each district. These subdistricts should be divided (when necessary) by the district commanders into military sections, subject also to my approval. These subdistricts and sections must be commanded by the ranking officers of the troops therein located.

By this system it is apparent that each commanding officer of a district, sub-district, or section would be enabled to make himself thoroughly acquainted with all the roads, rivers, fords, and general defensive features of the portion of country placed under his immediate charge, and would be prepared to make the best disposition of his troops to hold the enemy in check until reinforcements could be received, which, from his thorough knowledge of the country, could be used immediately to the best advantage.

Moreover, the adoption of this system would enable me to transfer suddenly my headquarters from one district to another, according to the emergency of the case, without interfering with the working of the system. It was the one I proposed introducing in my late Department, each State representing a district, under a major-general, but I was unable to carry it fully into effect, through the want of a proper commanding officer to each district.

Should the Department have no disposable major-general competent to command the second military district recommended in this communication, I would be pleased to have promoted and ordered to report to me for that duty Brigadier-General Taliaferro, who so highly distinguished himself in the defence of Morris Island, especially of Battery Wagner, on the 18th of July, 1863. He has, moreover, during the whole siege of Charleston, commanded the District of James Island, where he has displayed great zeal, energy, and intelligence. He is, besides, thoroughly acquainted with the system of district commands as organized in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.

I may be permitted here to call to your attention that none of the officers recommended for promotion for gallantry and meritorious services, during the memorable siege of Charleston, have yet been promoted, except Lieutenant-

Colonel Elliott, P. A. C. S. Arty., Colonel D. B. Harris and Captain John Johnson, of the Engineers—three officers who are fully entitled, by their zeal, bravery, and intrepidity, to further promotion.

In conclusion, I must be permitted to give, although just entering on my duties, what I consider the smallest movable force of all arms required (until reinforcements could be obtained) to protect this Department against the attack of an enterprising and determined enemy, to wit:

In the First Military District, infantry, cavalry, and light artillery, about	10,000
“ Second “ “ “ “ “ “ “	8,000
“ Third “ “ “ “ “ “ “	5,000
Total of all arms.....	23,000

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Commander-in-Chief, Richmond, Va.

P.S.—Since the above was written I am informed that Brigadier-General Hoke has been promoted to the rank of major-general for his gallant attack on Plymouth. He would, no doubt, be a good commander for the proposed Second Military District of this Department.

G. T. B.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., April 29th, 1864: 3.45 P. M.

Genl. PICKETT, Petersburg, Va.:

Order General Clingman to make a reconnoissance, with one strong regiment of infantry, three or four companies of cavalry, and a battery, in the direction of Suffolk and Portsmouth, with a view of obtaining positive information of the enemy's movements and intentions. He must be absent few days, for his services may be required soon.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

KINSTON, N. C., May 1st, 1864.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Commanding Richmond, Va.:

Gunboat in Neuse hopelessly aground or useless until river rises. *Albemarle* still at Plymouth. With its assistance I consider capture of Newbern easy. Without its sacrifice of life must be very great, unless regular approaches are resorted to. I will leave General Hoke, however, to carry out his instructions, and will afford him all the aid and advice in my power.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,

KINSTON, N. C., May 1st, 1864.

General,—Having no authority to interfere in your proposed movement on Newbern, your instructions having been received direct from General Bragg, I avail myself of your desire that I should command the expedition to offer you the following suggestions, resulting from information received or collected since my arrival here.

It appears that the enemy's forces (reported to be about six thousand men of all arms) in and around Newbern are distributed nearly as follows:

1st. One regiment of infantry and one of cavalry occupy the outer line of works about seven miles from Newbern, and guard the direct approaches to that town.

2d. Three regiments of infantry and several companies of heavy artillery occupy the forts and lines defending the town.

3d. Three regiments defend the works on the south side of the Trent.

4th. Two regiments occupy those on the north side of the Neuse.

There are three methods of attacking Newbern : first, by surprise and assault ; second, by assault without surprise ; third, by regular approaches.

The first and last methods are impracticable at present ; for the enemy must be aware of your intentions, and we have not sufficient time to execute the last. The second plan is, therefore, the only one which can now be carried into effect ; it can, however, be made to partake more or less of a surprise, and, with the assistance of the ironclad gunboat *Albemarle*, from Plymouth, should meet with complete success. I regret to say that no hope need be entertained of the co-operation of the ironclad gunboat now aground in the Neuse, near this place ; for it is not probable it can be got afloat again, or be made to pass over the bars and sand-banks below its present position, without a considerable rise in the river, an event which is not likely to take place until the next rainy season.

The attack on Newbern should be so made as to capture or destroy the separate forces of the enemy before they can be concentrated ; for that purpose the *Albemarle*, immediately after having sunken the two or three wooden gunboats aiding in the defence of the town, should destroy the long bridge across the Trent, so as to isolate the troops now stationed on its south side ; the *Albemarle* should then take such a position in the Neuse as to cut off from Newbern the communications of the forces on the north side of that river, and it should also co-operate with General Hoke's attack, by taking in flank and rear the works and lines extending from the Neuse to the Trent, defending the direct approaches to the city.

The land operations should be conducted as follows, subject to such modifications as future information may develop :

1st. One regiment of cavalry, supported by two regiments of infantry and one light battery, should be sent, by the best and safest route, to cut off, about Croatan, the railroad from Newbern to Morehead City, and prevent reinforcements being thrown from the latter to the former, or the retreat of the garrison from Newbern to Morehead City.

2d. A strong demonstration should be made in front of the enemy's advanced lines on Batchelor Creek, about seven miles from Newbern, to hold in position the forces there stationed until the main body of General Hoke's troops shall have got to their rear, about half-way between that creek and the town of Newbern.

The best route to be followed by General Hoke's main column seems to be the Trenton road (south of Trenton River) as far as the nearest cross-road to Tar Landing, or Rock Landing, on the Trent, where this river must be crossed on a pontoon-bridge, hastily constructed ; from this point the Trent road must be reached by the shortest route and followed until coming to the Savannah

road, near James Branch or Creek. The column will then move along the Savannah road until reaching the Neuse road from Kinston to Newbern, where it will take up its position, throwing forward some cavalry and light troops to threaten Newbern and guard the roads leading out of that town.

A proper force should be left to guard the crossings of James Branch, by the Trent and Savannah roads, in order to prevent a part of the enemy's troops occupying the advanced lines from retreating into Newbern.

A small force of cavalry, with a section of artillery, should be thrown towards Clermont bridge, on the Trent, to prevent the troops from the south side of the Trent from getting into Newbern after the destruction of the long bridge by the *Albemarle*.

3d. General Hoke will then throw forward a sufficient force from his main body to attack in rear the enemy's advanced lines, already referred to, along Batchelor Creek, and from thence to the Trent. General Hoke's troops left on the west side of Batchelor Creek should attack also with vigor as soon as they shall have heard the firing in their front.

4th. A rapid reconnoissance should determine, meanwhile, where and how to attack the line of works constructed near the town from the Neuse to the Trent. It is probable that the portion of the line nearest to the former stream will be found the least difficult to take, especially with the co-operation of the *Albemarle* operating in the Neuse.

Circumstances may be such, however, as to render it advisable to attack the works on the south side of the Trent, and afterwards (or perhaps at the same time) the forts on the north side of the Neuse, so as to isolate more completely the garrison of the town, which, reduced and demoralized by these repeated losses, might gladly surrender without prolonging further a useless struggle which might terminate so fatally to them, especially if made fully to understand the dangers of further resistance.

Should the forces on the south side of the Trent endeavor to retreat to Morehead City, they should be pursued vigorously until checked by the troops already thrown towards Croatan, near Otter Creek, to intercept their retreat in that direction.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

Major-Genl. R. F. HOKE, Comdg. expedition against Newbern.

P.S.—It is important to diminish as far as practicable the artillery fire of the enemy's work; hence the faces of all the forts and batteries bearing in the direction of the points of attack should be prolonged, and field rifled pieces put in position to enfilade them at long range just as the attack shall have commenced. Two pieces to each face would probably be sufficient.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.

Telegram.

KINSTON, N. C., May 1st, 1864: 9 A. M.

Major-Genl. W. H. C. WHITING, Comdg., etc., Wilmington, N. C.:

Send Hagood's brigade to Richmond at once. Apply to General Cooper whether it shall march or go by railroad.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 4th, 1864.

Major-Genl. W. H. C. WHITING, Wilmington, N. C.:

Last order from War Department is to send Hagood's brigade to Richmond in manner prescribed to you by the Secretary of War. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, May 4th, 1864.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Weldon, etc.:

Unless Newbern can be captured by *coup de main* the attempt must be abandoned, and the troops returned with all possible despatch to unite in operations in Northern Virginia. There is not an hour to lose. Had the expedition not started, I would say it should not go. Have all practicable arrangements made to transport the troops to this place with the greatest despatch.

JEFF'N DAVIS.

(Received at 4. P. M.)

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 4th, 1864.

President JEFF. DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

Your telegram just received. All necessary orders are already being given to carry out your instructions. One of my aids will leave this evening with special orders to General Hoke. Utmost despatch will be used.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 4th, 1864.

Genl. S. COOPER, A. and I. G., Richmond, Va.:

Was it intended, in the order for movement of troops from this Department, that the cavalry and artillery should go also? If so, in what proportion?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, May 5th, 1864.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Weldon, etc.:

Recall all from Washington and Plymouth, except half a regiment at each, as suggested.

BRAXTON BRAGG, Genl.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864.

Major-Genl. W. H. C. WHITING, Wilmington, N. C.:

Order now is, to send forward everything available as fast as practicable. Pickett has already been relieved; his troops will follow immediately. I write you to-day.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864: 12 M.

Major-Genl. R. F. HOKE, near Newbern, N. C.:

Circumstances render it necessary that you should send your forces here

forthwith, as instructed in my letter of yesterday, sent through my aid, Lieutenant Chisolm. The telegram addressed to him at Goldsboro' is annulled.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

General Pickett reports: "Enemy have reconstructed Grove Wharf, eight miles from Yorktown"—evidently, he thinks, "to make a depot there for army supplies, or to embark troops for south side of James River." Ought not, then, Clingman's and Dearing's brigades be kept to guard Petersburg and vicinity?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864.

Major-Genl. G. E. PICKETT, Petersburg, Va.:

Have telegraphed General Bragg as you have reported, but as yet have no reply. Continue to report direct to General Cooper any movement of the enemy, at the same time reporting the same to these Headquarters.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864.

Genl. WHITING, Wilmington, N. C.:

Hurry Hagood's brigade through to Petersburg without delay. Use passenger trains and all others.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864.

Genl. PICKETT, Petersburg, Va.:

Corse's and Kemper's brigades have been ordered. They will move with despatch. The 68th North Carolina, Colonel Hinton, has been ordered to Petersburg.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th: 12 M.

Major-Genl. PICKETT, Petersburg, Va.:

Should it become necessary, call directly on War Department for assistance until your troops reach you.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864: 12.30 P. M.

Major-Genl. PICKETT, Petersburg, Va.:

Concentrate your forces towards Petersburg.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864: 12.35 P. M.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

General Pickett reports four steamers coming up James River, and had passed Fort Powhatan at eleven o'clock, still coming up; two more below, loaded with

troops, and having barges in tow, now in sight of City Point. I have ordered General Pickett, for the present, to remain in command of the troops around Petersburg, and to stop at that point Hagood's brigade, now on its way there.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, May 5th, 1864.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Weldon, etc.:

Order General Pickett not to stop Hagood's brigade; send it immediately here.

BRAXTON BRAGG, Genl.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864: 4.30 P. M.

Genl. PICKETT, Petersburg, Va.:

General Bragg directs that Hagood's brigade must be sent straight through to Richmond. It must not be stopped in Petersburg.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864: 6.45 P. M.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

The following just received: "The following written despatch just received from Evergreen Station, three (3) miles below City Point, from Captain N. W. Small, of the Signal Corps, who went down on a reconnoissance: 'There are two single-turreted monitors, one double-turreted monitor, three gunboats, and about forty transports in the whole fleet. Two gunboats gone up Appomattox. Each transport will average five hundred men. Some of the transports have horses on board. White and negro troops in the expedition. They are landing at City Point, and have hauled down the Confederate flag and raised the Yankee flag.'—G. E. PICKETT, Major-Genl."

Is it not advisable to stop Hagood's brigade at Petersburg? None of Hoke's troops have arrived at this point yet, and cannot for several days.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864.

Genl. G. E. PICKETT, Petersburg, Va.:

Your despatch received at 12.30 P. M. You are authorized to halt Hagood's brigade at Petersburg until otherwise ordered. Remain in command of your present District until further orders, and assume command of all troops that may arrive therein.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 5th, 1864: 9.40 P. M.

General BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

General Pickett reports a large force landing at Bermuda Hundreds. He asks for reinforcements. Have none here to send him. Am using all possible despatch to push the troops forward from North Carolina. I have directed General Pickett to communicate directly with you, in order to save time.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., *May 6th*, 1864.

Major-Genl. HOKE, Kinston, N. C.:

Enemy is advancing in force from Bermuda Hundreds and City Point. Hurry forward your troops as rapidly as possible.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., *May 6th*, 1864.

Major-Genl. R. F. HOKE, Kinston, N. C.:

Let the infantry that was to have marched to this place march to Goldsboro', where transportation will be supplied them. Let the cavalry and artillery march as ordered. Send also Corse's infantry brigade with the other infantry.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., *May 6th*, 1864.

Major-Genl. G. E. PICKETT, Petersburg, Va.:

Destroy bridges referred to, if you cannot defend them; but be careful not to destroy too soon, as we may need them shortly, especially the railroad bridges, which should be merely rendered temporarily unserviceable. The city should be held as long as practicable, with a due regard to the safety of your command, which must not be captured, as it will be required for future operations.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., *May 6th*, 1864: 9 P. M.

Genl. PICKETT, Petersburg, Va.:

Despatch received. Will it not be well for you to send scouts in the direction of Suffolk, to ascertain whether that section has been evacuated by the enemy, so you can concentrate Clingman's command and the cavalry at important points fifteen or twenty miles in advance of railroad? Guards have been ordered to the different bridges on the line of railroad.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., *May 6th*, 1864: 3½ P. M.

President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

Am still confined to my tent by sickness; but hope to leave to-morrow morning for Petersburg, where I am concentrating as rapidly as possible all available troops. I will then do all in my power to meet successfully present emergencies. We are most happy to hear of Lee's success yesterday.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., *May 6th*, 1864.

Genl. HOKE, Kinston, N. C.:

Hurry forward the troops to this place as rapidly as possible.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 6th, 1864.

Genl. S. COOPER, Richmond, Va.:

Telegram received. Every effort is being made to transport the troops as rapidly as possible.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 7th, 1864.

Genl. R. F. HOKE, Kinston, N. C.:

Urge forward the cavalry called for with all speed possible. It is much needed on the line of railroad to Petersburg.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 7th, 1864.

Genl. S. COOPER, A. and I. G., Richmond, Va.:

General Pickett reports three thousand enemy's cavalry have crossed Blackwater, cut wire along Norfolk Railroad, and marching probably on Stony Creek, or this place. Am making best arrangements practicable to oppose them; but most of the cavalry of this Department is still with General Hoke, whose forces will only commence arriving to-night at Kinston. Half of Wise's brigade is expected here in a few hours, on its way to Petersburg. Hagood's last detachment passed here last night.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

In General Hagood's "Memoirs of the Campaign of 1864"—a certified copy of which is among General Beauregard's files—we find the following paragraphs:

"Hagood's brigade commenced moving by rail on the night of the 28th April for Wilmington, where it was directed to report by letter to General Beauregard, whose headquarters were at Weldon. The whole brigade, with its transportation, was not concentrated at Wilmington till the 4th May. * * * On the 5th May the brigade received orders to proceed by rail to Petersburg, its train to move by highway. Owing to insufficient transportation it moved in fragments. Lieutenant-Colonel Dargan was despatched, with seven companies of the 21st, on the 5th, early in the day. He was followed by Colonel Graham, with the remaining companies of that regiment and three companies of the 25th. Next day (the 6th) General Hagood moved with the 27th regiment and the remaining companies of the 25th. Later in the day the 11th regiment and 7th battalion followed. * * *

"The City of Richmond was Grant's objective, and he proposed to move upon it by the direct overland route; while Butler, moving from Fortress Monroe up the James, was to secure a point at its junction with the Appomattox, from which to operate on the southern communication of Richmond. * * * To sap the Confederate sources of material supply, razzias by light movable columns, for the purpose of destroying railroads, mills, provisions, growing crops, farm stock, and buildings, were to be speedily organized. * * * The move from Fortress Monroe was the most important and threatening diversion in the programme of the Virginia campaign; and, with thirty or forty thousand men and

a large naval armament, was intrusted to General B. F. Butler, of New Orleans notoriety. * * *

"On the night of the 5th Butler debarked at Bermuda Hundreds, the peninsula made by the confluence of the James and the Appomattox, and began to intrench across the narrow neck, about three miles from the railroad connecting Petersburg and Richmond. On the 6th he threw out a brigade to destroy the railroad at Walthall Junction. Beauregard's troops were much scattered over his extensive territorial command, pending the development of the enemy's designs. * * * Very few, if any, troops other than local militia of an inferior character were under General Pickett, commanding at Petersburg; and it was to meet and delay Butler's advance that Hagood's brigade had been pushed forward while Beauregard got the balance of his troops in hand, and drew reinforcements from farther south.

"Colonel Graham, of Hagood's brigade, with the companies he had moved with, arrived at Petersburg, and was pushed forward by General Pickett to Walthall Junction, reaching the latter place a little before 5 P. M. on the 6th May, and there found Lieutenant-Colonel Dargan's detachment, which had preceded him about an hour. This raised his force to about 600 men, composed of his own regiment and three companies of the 25th, under Major Glover. As Graham's men jumped off the platform-cars upon which they were borne, the brigade of the enemy, before alluded to as thrown forward against the railroad, was in view, some thousand yards off, across an open field, advancing in line of battle, and supported by artillery. * * * A brisk action ensued. The enemy made two direct attacks, and, after his second repulse, at nightfall withdrew, leaving some of his dead and wounded upon the field. * * *

"At 8 P. M. the same evening General Hagood arrived at Petersburg with the remaining seven companies of the 25th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Pressley. After some delay in rationing the men, he moved forward to reinforce Graham. * * * Arrived at the Junction, General Hagood found General Bushrod Johnson there, who informed him that, hearing Graham's firing, he had marched to his assistance from the direction of Drury's Bluff with a brigade of 1168 Tennesseans, and had arrived during the night. Galliard, with the 27th regiment, joined Hagood at daybreak, and raised his command to an aggregate of 1500 men. * * *

"About 10 A. M. General Hagood was directed to move across Ashton Creek towards the church, to feel and develop the strength and position of the enemy. * * * The skirmishers encountered the enemy's cavalry advancing, and fired upon them, driving them back. The 27th was at once deployed to the right of the road, and the skirmish line strengthened. * * * The enemy showing a disposition to develop to our left, the 25th regiment was deployed on the line of the 29th and to the left of the road. * * * General Hagood was directed to withdraw and take position along the railroad at the Junction. * * * It was evident that an attack in force was now about to be made. Our line was formed along the railroad, with Hagood's left resting where the turnpike crossed it, and Johnson's men prolonging the right towards and beyond Craig's house. * * * After a half-hour's brisk fighting the enemy retired his line somewhat, though still en-

gaging us at long range, and, under cover of an immediate wood, moved his second line by a flank across the railroad, and it soon reappeared approaching upon Hagood's left and rear, the left of this force being upon the prolongation of our line of battle. * * *

"As soon as his new line was taken General Hagood ordered an advance. The brigade rushed forward with enthusiasm, and drove back the flanking line—they not again appearing in that direction. * * * The enemy again massed heavily in Hagood's front and essayed an advance; but his men, sheltered in the railroad-cut, easily repelled this attack, with little loss to themselves. Between 4 and 5 o'clock P. M. the engagement ceased, except the firing of sharpshooters and artillery on both sides; and before dark the enemy withdrew from the field, unpursued, and carrying off most of his wounded. Hagood's force, as before stated, was 1500 men, and his loss during the day was 22 killed, 132 wounded, and 13 missing. The force of the enemy was five brigades of infantry, under General Brooks, with the usual proportion of artillery, and a regiment of cavalry. His loss was heavy, * * * estimated at 1000. Prisoners put it larger. It was probably not as great. * * * The brunt of this action fell upon Hagood's brigade; and in the progress of the narrative it will be seen that it saved Petersburg. By the time the enemy were again ready to advance sufficient reinforcements had arrived to hold the place. The citizens appreciated the fact, and were enthusiastic in their gratitude. A flag was voted the brigade by the ladies. The merchants would take no pay from the men for their little purchases, and from at least one pulpit thanks were offered for the timely arrival of 'the 1500 brave South Carolinians.' The brigade did acquit itself well. It was its first fight upon Virginia soil, and a creditable letter of introduction to the battle-scarred veterans of Lee, among whom it was shortly merged." * * *

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 8th, 1864.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Comdg. C. S. Armies, Richmond, Va.:

Despatch of 4 o'clock just received. I should have started to-day for Petersburg; but, burning of Stony Creek Bridge and movements of enemy's cavalry at Jarratt's requiring new orders and arrangements, have delayed my departure until morning, when I shall run through and assume command, as desired. Two of Hoke's brigades have passed here to-day, and been forwarded; he himself will arrive to-night, and follow immediately. The water here has improved my health.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, N. C., May 8th, 1864.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

Despatch received at 10.30 A. M. Orders had been given before destruction of bridge at Stony Creek to have necessary timbers prepared for all bridges between here and Petersburg. After destroying Stony Bridge enemy's cavalry engaged guards at Nottoway and Jarratt's, but were repulsed. All troops are being hurried forward as rapidly as possible. I hope to leave to-day for Petersburg, where prompt and energetic measures will be adopted as soon as practicable.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, *May 10th*, 1864.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

Have just arrived. Will take the offensive as soon as practicable.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, *May 10th*, 1864.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

General Hoke has arrived, and will assume command, as ordered.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, *May 10th*, 1864.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

We are seriously threatened here from above. You should make a heavy demonstration and change to attack, if practicable, at an early hour in the morning.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, *May 10th*, 1864: 3.30 P. M.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

General Ransom reports he has pressed the enemy with his force, and finds them too strong for him. Let us know when you will be ready, that Ransom may co-operate. Every hour is now very important. We have nothing from Lee to-day. A heavy cavalry raid in his rear has destroyed Beaver Dam Depot and our supplies on Central Railroad. Stuart is in pursuit, as they move in this direction.

BRAXTON BRAGG, Genl.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, *May 11th*, 1864.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Division of your force is earnestly objected to; it is decidedly preferred that you carry out the instructions given last night, and endeavor to unite all forces.

J. A. SEDDON, Secy. of War.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, *May 11th*, 1864: 1 P. M.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Petersburg:

This city is in real danger; it should be defended with all our resources, to the sacrifice of minor considerations. You are relied on to use every effort to unite all your forces, at the earliest practicable time, with the troops in our defences, and there, together, either fight the enemy in the field or defend the intrenchments. Our lines are a little in front of Drury's Bluff, crossing the railroad and turnpike.

J. A. SEDDON, Secy. of War.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, *May 11th*, 1864: 12.45 P. M.

Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON, Secy. of War, Richmond, Va.:

My division of forces is only temporary, to meet present emergency. Please state your objections, and your wishes, if practicable, will be complied with. I

am carrying into effect, to the best of my ability, instructions received. The movement is now in progress, and, as soon as possible, I will unite forces with Major-General Ransom. The equivalent of two full brigades is still due.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, *May 11th, 1864* : 3 P. M.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va. :

Please read two telegrams of to-day from Honorable Secretary of War, and my answers. I must insist on receiving orders only from one source, and that from the General Commanding.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, *May 11th, 1864.*

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Your two telegrams of this date are received. They pain and surprise. I do not feel this to be an appropriate time to reply fully to them. I may do that hereafter. At present I have only to say that while your past services, patriotism, and reputation are fully appreciated, you are, on these accounts, only the more relied on, and expected to use every effort in your power, with all your forces, to carry out the instructions of the Department, and accomplish the junction of all our forces to fight the enemy or defend the capital.

JAMES A. SEDDON, Secy. of War.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, *May 11th, 1864.*

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va. :

Major-General Pickett reported himself sick yesterday evening, and has been confined to his room since.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, *May 11th, 1864* : 8 A. M.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va. :

Have ordered General Hoke, should enemy have evacuated his front and be re-embarking, to attack him, while I send a force from here to attack those at City Point. If this does not meet your views, please send him *via* Drury's Bluff, and courier a duplicate of your answer.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, *May 11th, 1864* : 7 A. M.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va. :

Offensive movement against enemy has commenced. General Hoke's division in the advance, supported by Pickett's division. Give necessary orders to Major-General Ransom.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

RICHMOND, VA., *May 11th, 1864.*

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Petersburg, Va. :

Your telegram to General Ransom received, and your orders to General Hoke

approved. The enemy fell back last night from their position yesterday towards the James River, apparently in some haste. Their pickets have appeared in large numbers on James River, in vicinity of Howlett's House and Dutch Gap, on south side. This information received this morning from General Ransom, at Drury's Bluff.

B. BRAGG, Genl.

Official.

JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, May 11th: 2.30 P. M.

To Commanding Officer, Petersburg, Va.:

What forces have gone to-day to unite with General Ransom? When did General Beauregard leave?

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, VA., May 11th, 1864: 5.15 P. M.

President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

I have not yet left here, my presence being absolutely necessary. Will leave immediately after arrival of two last brigades, hourly expected from Weldon. General Hoke leads advance with six brigades and eight (8) batteries. He commenced moving this morning to clear his front of enemy and form junction with Major-General Ransom; but, having been informed after movement had been ordered that enemy had retired to Bermuda Hundreds, I ordered General Hoke to make forced reconnoissance in that direction to ascertain fact, and press on enemy, if he were re-embarking, when I would join him, to assume command, if necessary. About noon to-day the spirit of this order was objected to by Secretary of War, and consequently countermanded by me. An immediate junction with Ransom was ordered; but two hours afterwards the order to make forced reconnoissance was approved by General Bragg, and is now being executed. Please see plan of this movement.

Enemy is now constructing works on north side of the Appomattox, and occupying threatening attitude in that direction. Please inform me if my course is approved by you.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, May 12th, 1864.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Your better knowledge of circumstances enables you better to judge the proper time for departure. The order for a forced reconnoissance, under the condition stated, seems to me entirely appropriate. The operations of General Ransom and events on this side have changed the state of affairs, as will be communicated you. We are now engaged with the enemy before Richmond. I will send fuller despatch when I return from the field.

JEFFN. DAVIS.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, May 12th, 1864: 5.15 P. M.

Major-Genl. R. F. HOKE, Comdg., Drury's Bluff:

Your despatch of 12 M. has just been received. Obey instructions of Secretary of War. Hold the lines referred to. I will join you with remainder of troops as soon as they arrive here.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

WELDON, *May 12th*, 1864.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Am here on my way; coming as fast as I can.

W. H. C. WHITING, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, VA., *May 13th*, 1864.

Major-Genl. R. F. HOKE, Drury's Bluff:

Advance a brigade and battery half-way between your lines and Swift Creek to meet us. Will leave Swift Creek, *via* Pike, at 12 m.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, VA., *May 13th*, 1864: 7.15 A. M.

President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

I merely wish to explain my position and condition. Propose leaving to-day, about noon, with part of Colquitt's and Corse's brigades, which arrived yesterday. Martin's and Wise's remain here. Light batteries will follow, as soon as practicable, after arriving.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, *14th*.

General BEAUREGARD:

An order from Secretary of War has just been sent to you by a courier extending your command to include the south side of James River, including Drury's Bluff and its defences.

T. ROWLAND, A. A. G.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, VA., *May 14th*, 1864: 8 A. M.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

You are assigned to the command south of the James River. It is also expected that you will meet any sudden move of the enemy against the city on the north side. Should they cross the river below you I shall immediately send you all the assistance in our power, and you will take the offensive at once. We can draw nothing from above, and our information is that reinforcements will reach the enemy in your front. If you can dislodge him from the Petersburg road, some additional force may reach you from there. The cavalry should certainly come through. Our communications must be restored.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

RICHMOND, VA., *January 2d*, 1862.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, New Orleans, La.:

My dear General,— * * * Your impression is undoubtedly correct that you sent me, on the day prior to your engagement at Drury's Bluff, to General Whiting with a copy of your order of battle and special written instructions to him to advance directly towards Drury's Bluff and attack Butler, while you were attacking him in front. I recollect distinctly your emphasizing verbally to me your instructions that he was to march towards the sound of your guns and attack whatever forces he might meet, without regard to their numbers.

In response to your request I take great pleasure in giving you a short narrative of my mission in this connection the week preceding and on the day of the battle of Drury's Bluff.

In the spring of 1864 the Hampton Legion, of which I was Lieutenant-Colonel, had been ordered to South Carolina, to procure horses, with a view of being assigned as mounted infantry to a brigade which was then being organized for special service around Richmond. * * *

At the time the demonstration was made upon Petersburg by General Benjamin F. Butler the Hampton Legion was on the march from South Carolina to Richmond, and I, having been ordered in advance to Richmond, to procure suitable arms and accoutrements for the Legion, happened to be in Richmond at the time. Having made all the necessary arrangements for these arms and accoutrements, I applied at the Adjutant-General's office, in Richmond, for permission to go out upon the lines nearer Petersburg and offer my services to the officer in command. My request was granted, and I proceeded accordingly to Petersburg, and was assigned to the duty of inspecting and reorganizing the picket lines of communication between our lines north of Petersburg and south of Richmond. I was on this duty when you determined to move your headquarters from Petersburg to Drury's Bluff, and accompanied you on your march from the lines north of Petersburg, *via* Chesterfield Court-house, to Drury's Bluff. After reaching Drury's Bluff I was retained at your headquarters, and assigned to duty temporarily as one of your staff-officers. During the day of May 15th Colonel Samuel Melton, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, notified me that you desired me to take your written and verbal instructions to General Whiting, at his headquarters, near Petersburg, as you intended attacking the enemy on the morning of the 16th, and felt anxious that there should, by no possibility, be any miscarriage of your instructions to General Whiting, or any misunderstanding as to their import. My impression is that you had sent copies of your instructions through another source, and that you were merely taking the additional precaution to insure their receipt by him through me. Just before starting on my mission I was sent for by you, and in the presence of Colonel Melton the written despatches were given to me, and their contents carefully explained to me by you.

You desired me to be in position to give them verbally to General Whiting, in case it became necessary for me to destroy them, to prevent any risk of their falling into the hands of the enemy, and at the same time you impressed upon me the importance of General Whiting implicitly obeying them, and you authorized me, if necessary, to state this to him. I received the despatches, started on my mission, and reached General Whiting's headquarters during the night of the 15th, and found him at his headquarters, in the "Dunlop Castle," near Swift Creek, about three miles from Petersburg. General Whiting read the despatches, expressed himself as understanding them entirely, and gave orders for the advance of his entire force by daylight the next morning.

I remained at his headquarters during the night, and accompanied General Whiting in the morning upon his advance. His forces were on the march by daylight, and advanced steadily until they struck the enemy's picket line. The

column was then halted, and the force placed in line of battle. We had heard the sound of your cannon at Drury's Bluff, and I expected an immediate advance by General Whiting of his line of battle, according to instructions. For some reason not known to me at the time, however, there seemed to be considerable and unnecessary delay in the advance even of his skirmish line towards the enemy's pickets. General D. H. Hill, who was also with General Whiting, and who was at that time occupying a similar position to me, that of acting temporarily as one of your staff-officers, had had some conversation with me during the morning as to your order of battle and your special instructions to General Whiting. He also began to show considerable uneasiness at the unnecessary delay of General Whiting in making his advance. We repeatedly approached General Whiting on the subject, together, but got no satisfactory replies—he apparently being engaged in arranging and rearranging his line of battle. He finally stated that he was waiting to get reliable information from his scouts on his right flank, and that he did not desire to advance until satisfied that his right flank and rear were not threatened. Later in the morning, upon being urged by General Hill and myself to advance, and on our insisting that your instructions were explicit, and after my stating to him that you had authorized me to say verbally to him that nothing should prevent him from attacking in his front, he said that his scouts reported that a force of the enemy had been seen near Port Walthall, and that he was apprehensive of being attacked on his right flank, in case he made any advance. The enemy in our front had by this time placed a few pieces of cannon in position, and had opened fire with them; but General Hill and myself made a reconnoissance on the left, and reported to General Whiting that we were satisfied that a very small force confronted him. General Whiting, however, could not be induced by us to advance; and while intimating that he would do so later in the day, when he felt he could do so with safety, both General Hill and myself felt perfectly satisfied that, for some reason, he would not do so. After conference General Hill and myself decided that it would be best for him to remain with General Whiting, and, if possible, force him to advance; and that I should make my way as rapidly as possible around the lines and report the situation to you.

General Dearing, who was in command of the cavalry forces, undertook to force a way for me through Chester Station, so as to avoid the detour around by Chesterfield Court-house. He met with the enemy's pickets at Chester, and they were driven in by a gallant charge of General Dearing, who forced them back as far as the Half-way Station, and captured between Chester and that point a large number of stragglers from the enemy's lines; and on reaching Half-way Station we saw that the enemy was in a state of great disorganization and demoralization. General Dearing captured several hundred prisoners at this point. He then gave me a small escort, and I soon made my way around, and joined you on the turnpike, in advance of Drury's Bluff. President Davis was with you, and you were occupying a position which had been occupied in the morning by the enemy. I reported substantially what I have stated above as to General Whiting's position, and I recollect distinctly stating to you very emphatically that you need not rely on any advance being made that day

by General Whiting. My impression is that you had already arrived at that conclusion. It was then quite late, and I understood that your right flank was then advancing. Dark, however, soon came on, and during the night the enemy retired to the lines north of Bermuda Hundreds. I have never had the slightest doubt that if General Whiting had followed your instructions the result would have been the capture by you of the entire force of General Butler.

Yours, very truly,

T. M. LOGAN.

Telegram.

DRURY'S BLUFF, May 15th, 1864: 6.45 A. M.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

Slight firing last night; all quiet this morning. Whiting cannot be here until Tuesday afternoon. Attack will take place Wednesday morning. Gunboats must participate. Send General Ransom to confer with me as soon as practicable.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

DRURY'S BLUFF, May 15th, 1864: 9.30 P. M.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

I have just seen your aid. Utmost despatch will be made in proposed attack. Change of plan of operations since President was here necessitated a corresponding change in Whiting's instructions, which I have ordered accordingly.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

DRURY'S BLUFF, May 15th, 1864.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

I have already sent General Whiting his instructions to co-operate with me. Please telegraph him to follow them as delivered by Colonel Logan; yours may conflict with mine.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

DRURY'S BLUFF, May 16th, 1864: 5 A. M.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

The battle has just commenced. Our trust is in God, the valor of our troops, and the justice of our cause.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS, NEAR FORT STEPHENS, May 16th: 9 A. M.

Major-Genl. W. H. C. WHITING:

All has been going on well. Ransom turned and broke enemy's right early, and is driving them along our front. We are pushing them back on our right. Success is certain everywhere. Press on and press over everything in your front, and the day will be complete.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

ON TURNPIKE, May 16th, 1864: 4.15 P. M.

Major-Genl. W. H. C. WHITING:

The enemy has been driven back on our right. Corse's and Clingman's forces

have moved to the line of works on hill west of railroad. We are about making a general advance with all forces. Can you not aid in the movement at once?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

ON FIELD, *May 16th, 1864.*

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

It is 5.45 P. M. The enemy have been driven from our right to south side of Proctor's Creek and east of railroad; also from our immediate vicinity on turn-pike. I am organizing combined general attack on line of Proctor's Creek, and hope good results. The movement has commenced, though late. We shall occupy the works on hill west of railroad. Nothing positive as to the position of Whiting, save the knowledge that he was at Port Walthall Station at ten o'clock this morning.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

PORT WALTHALL JUNCTION, NEAR PETERSBURG, VA.,

May 16th, 1864.

I have been some time in advance of Walthall Junction, having drawn enemy, after sharp skirmish. He appears to be retiring to his line of fortification. I hear nothing of you. I cannot assault his left on Appomattox. I am advancing my left, and have crossed Baker-house Creek. Enemy retiring in my front. If they cross the river Petersburg is gone. Can't you press down the river, provided you don't press him in my rear?

WHITING, Major-Genl. Comdg.

DRURY'S BLUFF, VA., *May 16th, 1864: 8.30 P. M.*

Please read over my telegrams of 15th inst., and you will perceive that you were not ordered to assault enemy's left on the Appomattox, but "to march on the firing" in this direction. The best way to defend Petersburg is to annihilate the enemy here by a combined attack or a concentration of our forces. Remember Dessaix at Marengo and Blucher at Waterloo.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

To Genl. WHITING, Walthall Junction, near Petersburg, Va.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS, ETC., *May 16th, 1864: 9.15 P. M.*

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

The approach of darkness made it imprudent to execute this evening the plan set forth in my despatch of 5.45 P. M. It will be prosecuted without variation, commencing at daylight to-morrow; and I hope to have the co-operation of General Whiting, having sent him renewed despatches to urge it.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXXVI.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, May 17th, 1864.

General BEAUREGARD:

As soon as it is ascertained with certainty that the enemy has retreated within his intrenchments on the south side of James River, Major-General R. Ransom will return to his command in Richmond.

S. COOPER, A. and I.-Genl.

Received at 1 P. M.

G. W. LAY, Lieut.-Col.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPT. N. C. AND SO. VA. IN THE FIELD,
NEAR CHESTER, VA., May 29th, 1864.

To his Excellency President DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

Sir,—I had the honor to receive yesterday afternoon, through Colonel Wood, your letter of the 28th inst., enclosing a copy of General Lee's letter of the same day, from near Atlee's Station. I have telegraphed him to inform me when and where I could meet him in conference. I am now awaiting his answer.

The report you refer to of Butler's breaking up his encampment in my front is only partially true, and indicates probably a change of position, not a withdrawal of part of his forces. The latest information received from the Signal Corps (27th inst.) is, that about four thousand men have been sent off by him. (See report of Major Milligan, herewith enclosed.) *My force is so small at present that to divide it for the purpose of reinforcing Lee would jeopardize the safety of the part left to guard my lines, and, consequently, endanger Richmond itself.**

The question of abandoning, in part or in whole, my present position is a momentous one, which requires the most earnest consideration of the Government before it is adopted.

The pontoon-train, reported by Major Milligan, on the 27th inst., as having been sent up to Butler, signifies probably an intention on his part to co-operate with Grant in his operations against Richmond, by throwing a bridge across the James River.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, May 30th, 1864: 5 P. M.

Genl. B. BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

Lieutenant Wooley, Signal Corps, reports from Fort Boykin: "Several transports went down last night, and more to-day, heavily loaded with troops. Are coming down as far as he can see." I have ordered a demonstration made to ascertain the position of enemy's forces in our front.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

* The italics are ours.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, VA., *May 30th, 1864: 5.15 P. M.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, Atlee's Station, Virginia C. R.R.:

War Department must determine when and what troops to order from here. I send to General Bragg all information I obtain relative to movement of enemy's troops in my front. Have you been attacked to-day?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, *May 30th, 1864: 10 P. M.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, Atlee's Station:

Hoke's division and Read's battalion of artillery have been ordered to report to you forthwith. I will follow with Johnson's as soon as enemy's movements here will permit.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, *May 30th, 1864: 11.15 P. M.*

Genl. B. BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

General Lee having called upon me for reinforcements, and feeling authorized by the President's letter of 20th inst. to send them, I have ordered Hoke's division to report to him. I will follow with Johnson's as soon as enemy's movements in my front will permit.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, VA., *June 1st, 1864: 7 P. M.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, Shady Grove Church, Va.:

Prisoners and deserters report Gillmore with two divisions—about 8000 men—still in my front. One of his divisions with Smith's corps—say 16,000 men in all—have gone to White House, probably to form junction with Grant. I have left here only one division, which can be moved to north side of James River soon as balance of Gillmore's corps shall have been withdrawn, or Government shall have determined to abandon line of communication from Petersburg to Richmond.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA:

12.45 P. M., *June 1st, via MC 2D.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

It would be disadvantageous to abandon line between Richmond and Petersburg; but, as two-thirds of Butler's force has joined Grant, can you not leave sufficient guard to move with balance of your command to north side of James River, and take command of right wing of army?

R. E. LEE, Genl.

Official.

W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G.

Telegram.

Genl. R. E. LEE, A. N. Va.:

NEAR CHESTER, *June 2d, 1864: 7 A. M.*

I have ordered a forced reconnoissance to ascertain more of enemy's position and condition; have ordered Ransom's brigade to Bottom's Bridge, as requested by General Bragg. I am willing to do anything for our success, but cannot leave my Department without orders of War Department.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, *June 2d, 1864: 10 A. M.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, A. N. Va.:

No definite information can be obtained from prisoners taken this morning, but they represent enemy still in strong force in our front under General Gillmore. I may not be able to spare Ransom's brigade immediately.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, *June 2d, 1864: 10 A. M.*

Genl. B. BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

No definite information can be obtained from prisoners taken this morning, but they represent enemy still in strong force in our front, under General Gillmore. Shall I send Ransom's brigade as requested? General Johnson says it cannot be spared.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, *June 2d, 1864: 2.45 P. M.*

Genl. B. BRAGG, Richmond, and Genl. R. E. LEE, A. N. Va.:

I am just from the front; reconnoissance in force of this morning shows it might be dangerous to send away Ransom's brigade, constituting over one-third available infantry force now here. We must elect at present between Bottom's Bridge and railroad communication between Petersburg and Richmond.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,
June 3d, 1864.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Comdg., etc., Richmond, Va.:

General.—That there may not be hereafter any possible misapprehension of the part I am called upon to act in the momentous events which are transpiring, and which I cannot but watch with the most intense interest and solicitude, I send you herewith copies of the telegrams which have been exchanged between General Lee and myself since the 1st inst., at 4 P. M.

You will not doubt of my readiness and anxiety to co-operate with General Lee in any manner that may be deemed most conducive towards the crushing of the foe in his front. I shall be found ready and willing, at all times, to obey any orders the War Department may judge fit and proper to give on the subject; but I cannot, under existing circumstances, advise the withdrawal of more troops from this vicinity. Already thirteen thousand out of twenty thousand infantry have been sent to the north side of the James River since the battle of Drury's Bluff, and with the forces remaining, unless taken temporarily and for an immediate encounter with the enemy, it might become impossible to prevent the latter from destroying the communications between Richmond and Petersburg; nay, from capturing Petersburg, which could not be re-taken without great sacrifice of life.

If Ransom's brigade, numbering over one-third of the present available force in Johnson's division, were withdrawn from here, it would become necessary to abandon our lines in front of Bermuda Hundreds Neck, to assume a strategic

position at Port Walthall Junction, from thence to protect Drury's Bluff, the railroad, and Petersburg; the ironclad gunboats guarding the crossing of James River as far below Chaffin's Bluff as practicable.

If Johnson's division were ordered to the north side of James River it would then be necessary to occupy the junction with at least one brigade of infantry, assisted by such cavalry (at least two regiments) as might be spared from General Dearing's brigade, or other cavalry in the field, to watch closely in front of the enemy's lines across Bermuda Hundreds Neck, and give timely notice of any offensive expedition from that quarter.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, *June 3d*, 1864: 5 o'clock A. M.

Genl. BRAX. BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

Have no further developments of enemy's forces in my front since my letter this morning to you. Please inform me if Ransom's brigade shall be sent to north side of James River; it constitutes one-third of my force, and will be only one-twenty-fifth of Lee's. I will obey with alacrity any order of the Department, and will do the best possible under existing circumstances.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, *June 3d*, 1864: 9 P. M.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Ransom's brigade is required for temporary service north of James River. Please send it immediately across at Drury's Bluff, with orders to proceed without delay to Bottom's Bridge and report to the senior officer there.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, *June 3d*, 1864: 2.20 P. M.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

General Lee urges reinforcements to Ransom on north side James River. The question is again submitted to you. Have you any further developments of the enemy. It is certain Butler, with a large portion of his force, is in Lee's front.

BRAXTON BRAGG, Genl.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, *June 3d*, 1864: 9.45 P. M.

Genl. B. BRAGG, Richmond:

Despatch of 9 P. M., ordering Ransom's brigade to Bottom's Bridge, has just been received. It will leave immediately after being relieved from the lines.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, VA., *June 3d*, 1864: 10 P. M.

Genl. R. E. LEE:

Ransom's brigade will leave here to-night for Bottom's Bridge, crossing at Drury's Bluff.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

NEAR CHESTER, VA., June 4th, 1864: 4 A. M.

Genl. B. BRAGG, Richmond:

I have ordered Ransom's brigade to move at daylight, if no hostile demonstration is made during the night.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

SWIFT CREEK, June 8th, 1864: 10 P. M.

Genl. B. BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

All quiet in our front to-day. Pickets on lower part James River report one steamer, towing up canal-boats and pontoons, with pontoniers; also steamers and schooners going up, heavily loaded; whereas those going down are light. This may indicate future operations of Grant.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, June 9th, 1864.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

11. Telegrams received and submitted. Will answer you soon. Telegraph also to General Lee, Mechanicsville Road.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

Telegram.

SWIFT CREEK, June 9th, 1864.

Major-Genl. B. R. JOHNSON:

General Bragg telegraphs that since the enemy has been repulsed at Petersburg the movement for Gracie's brigade had been suspended. It is, however, held in readiness to move from Chaffin's Bluff.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

SWIFT CREEK, June 9th, 1864: 1.30 P. M.

Brig.-Genl. WISE, Petersburg:

I cannot furnish you at present with reinforcements. Defend the place to the last, and, if compelled, retire, fighting, in the direction of Swift Creek Bridge.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

GAINES'S MILL, *via* MECHANICSVILLE ROAD,
June 9th, 1864: 2.30 P. M.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Your telegrams of 9.30 and 10.15 A. M. to-day to General Bragg received. No troops have left General Grant's army to my knowledge, and none could have crossed James River without being perceived. I think it very improbable, under present circumstances, that Grant would diminish his force. Stanton's despatches state that all available troops have been drawn from Butler except sufficient to hold his lines. The force seen by General Wise is small, truly—a reconnoissance to discover your operations.

R. E. LEE, Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,
June 14th, 1864.

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., C. S. A., Richmond, Va.:

General,—In forwarding my report of the battle of Drury's Bluff, May 16th,

1864, it seems necessary that it should be accompanied by an explanation of the apparent inconsistency of its conclusions with my Special Order No. 11, May 17th, 1864, relieving the commander of the left wing, and commending in high terms the conduct of his command in the battle. A copy of that order is annexed. When it was issued I still assumed that he had properly felt and estimated the obstacles and hostile force reported by him in his immediate front, and that his reports were to be accepted as maturely considered and substantially accurate. Subsequent investigation, necessarily requiring time, has, I regret to say, brought me to a different conviction.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,
DUNLOP'S, ON SWIFT CREEK, *June 14th, 1864.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, Comdg. Army of No. Va., Riddell's Shop, Va.:

General,—Not being able to visit you in person, I send you one of my volunteer aids, Colonel Paul, to explain to you the exact condition and position of my forces between Drury's Bluff and Petersburg, both inclusive. He will communicate to you a statement of forces and a letter bearing on the subject. I beg you will send me by Colonel Paul such a verbal statement of your present position and future movements as you may feel at liberty to communicate, in order that I may be prepared to act in concert with you, according as circumstances may make it expedient.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Synopsis of General Wise's Report of the Operations around Petersburg on the 15th of June, 1864.

The following forces were engaged: the 26th, 34th, 46th Virginia; 64th Georgia, Company F.; 23d South Carolina, Archer's Militia, Battle's and Hood's battalions, Sturdevant's battery, Dearing's cavalry, and other transient forces, making a total strength of 2738, but a really effective one of 2200 men of all arms.

This force was distributed from Battery No. 1, on the left, to Butterworth's Bridge, on the right—a distance of nearly six miles, giving one effective man to every four yards and a half ($4\frac{1}{2}$). The extreme right, from Butterworth's Bridge to the Appomattox River—say five miles—was without any force at all.

At 7 A. M., on the 15th, General Dearing informs General Wise that his forces were hotly engaged with the enemy on the Broadway and City Point roads, not far from their forks. General Wise takes command of the centre, from Battery 14 to 23, exclusive, and requests Colonel Colsten to take command of the right, from Battery 23 to Butterworth's Bridge.

The cavalry made a handsome stand at their breastworks, and Graham's battery did great execution among the enemy's ranks. But they advanced in such overwhelming force that, although their assaults were several times repulsed, they prevailed in flanking our cavalry breastworks, which were finally aban-

doned, with the loss of one howitzer. During that gallant stand of Dearing's command time was gained to make all possible preparations on the lines, and at about 10 A. M. the skirmishing on the left began to be serious.

At 12 M. the enemy's cavalry approached our centre, dismounted, deployed skirmishers, and moved up as infantry. Reinforcements had already been called for, from the north side of the Appomattox. The repeated reply was to hold on—that reinforcements would be sent.

From 12 M. to 2 P. M. the enemy pressed on the centre, apparently threatening the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. The line was, in consequence, closed from the right to support Colonel Goode and 34th Virginia. At the same time Hood's battalion was sent to reinforce Colonel Page, on the left.

Again additional troops were called for, the reply being that one brigade from Johnson's division had been ordered on, and that Hoke's division, which had left Drury's Bluff at 12.15 P. M., would arrive in Petersburg at 5 P. M. Orders to hold on at all hazards were given all over the lines.

From 3 to 5 P. M. the enemy continued to press the centre, and, as was expected, concentrated upon batteries 5, 6, and 7, where the works were "ineffably and contemptibly weak." At 7.10 P. M. they entered a ravine between Nos. 6 and 7 and flanked No. 5.

The line then broke, from No. 3 to No. 11, inclusive. The whole line on the right was then ordered to close to the left, up to Battery No. 14; batteries 1 and 2 being still ours. The 59th Virginia arriving at that time, was sent on the City Point Road towards Battery No. 2, to arrest the retreat of the line on the left. Between 8 and 9 P. M. General Hagood's brigade of Hoke's division arrived, and, soon after, General Hoke himself, who took command.

A new line was formed during the night from Battery No. 2, through Friend's field to the woods, and thence through them across the road leading to Dunn's house, and thence on the road to Webb's house.

Hoke's division was placed on the left, Clingman's brigade forming its right. On Clingman's right was Wise's brigade. The right of Wise's brigade terminated on the apex of a high hill, between which and Webb's house there is a deep ravine. An interval of a quarter of a mile was left across this ravine. General Wise called the attention of General Hoke and General Johnson to that fact. He was told that a regiment would be sent from Elliott's brigade to fill it. But on the night of the 16th, as late as 10 P. M., that gap had not been filled.

At daybreak next morning it was announced that the enemy had driven back the brigade on the right of Wise's, leaving its right entirely exposed, except as far as protected by Blunt's battery.

Wise's brigade stood firm and aided in restoring the lines, but sadly suffered from an enfilade fire. Colonel Page was killed, Captain Wise, Brigade Inspector, wounded. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Colonel Goode.

The casualties in Wise's brigade, on June 15th, amounted to 12 killed, 62 wounded, and 129 missing. Only three regiments engaged.

Ten guns were lost from batteries 3, 5, 7, 8, and 9. No other reports were sent in. Every officer and man under General Wise's notice behaved with gal-

lantry, and the enemy were successfully repulsed and checked against great odds, until reinforcements arrived. Respectfully submitted,

H. A. WISE, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

Statement of Forces which Attacked Petersburg on the 15th Day of June, 1864.

Enemy's right, Martindale's division	6,000
“ centre, Brooks's division and two brigades of Ames's	9,000
“ left, Hink's division	6,000
18th corps, infantry	21,000
Cavalry, two regiments.....	1,200
	<u>22,200</u>

The effective force under General Wise of all arms was 2200.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, June 15th, 1864.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Gracie's brigade was sent to you in place of Ransom's, being more convenient; they can be exchanged again, should you prefer it.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

Telegram.

CLAY'S HOUSE, June 15th, 1864.

To Capt. OTEY:

General Hoke left here about six o'clock this evening.

R. E. FOOTE, A. A. G.

Telegram.

DRURY'S BLUFF, June 15th, 1864.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

I am on the move down the Petersburg turnpike. Cannot railroad transportation be used?

R. F. HOKE, Major-Genl.

Telegrams to Generals Bragg and Lee as to Withdrawal of Bushrod Johnson from Bermuda Hundreds Line.

1. SWIFT CREEK, VA., June 15th, 1864: 1 P. M.
Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

Hoke's division is ordered to Petersburg. Hope it will get there in time. I will hold lines of Bermuda Hundreds Neck as long as practicable; but I may have to reinforce Hoke with Johnson's division, when lines would be lost. I advise sending forthwith another strong division to intersection of turnpike and railroad near Port Walthall Junction.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegraph operator will send a copy of this despatch to General R. E. Lee.

2. SWIFT CREEK, June 15th, 1864: 1.45 P. M.
Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

Your telegram of 12 M. received. I do not ask for advice with regard to movement of troops, but wished to know preference of War Department between Petersburg and lines across Bermuda Hundreds Neck, for my guidance, as I fear my present force may prove unequal to hold both.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

3. PETERSBURG, VA., *June 15th, 1864: 9.11 P. M.*
 Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

Reinforcements not having arrived in time, enemy penetrated lines from battery 5 to 8, inclusive. Will endeavor to retake them by daybreak. I shall order Johnson to this point with all his forces. General Lee must look to the defences of Drury's Bluff and the lines across Bermuda Neck, if practicable.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegraph operator will send a copy of this despatch to General R. E. Lee.

4. PETERSBURG, VA., *June 15th, 1864: 11.15 P. M.*
 Genl. R. E. LEE, Headquarters, A. N. Va.:

I have abandoned my lines on Bermuda Neck to concentrate all my forces here. Skirmishers and pickets will leave there at daylight. Cannot these lines be occupied by your troops? The safety of our communication requires it. Five or six thousand men may do.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

DRURY'S BLUFF, *June 15th, 1864.*

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

General Lee sees no reason why Ransom's brigade may not be sent you. His army covers position it holds, and he does not need it. It is not in his command. Shall be at Headquarters by six o'clock.

SAM. B. PAUL.

Telegram.

CLAY'S HOUSE, *June 15th, 1864.*

To Capt. JNO. M. OTEY:

Ransom's brigade was ordered by General Lee to report to General Beauregard without loss of time. I was sent forward to report. The brigade moved at 7 P. M. from Chaffin's farm. Let me hear from you.

S. H. GEE, A. A. and I. G.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, *June 15th, 1864.*

To Capt. J. M. OTEY, A. A. G.:

Captain Dejarnett and Private Clarke, of the 2d company, Independent Signal Corps, were captured by a company of the 20th Massachusetts Cavalry, sent out from City Point. Privates Dew and Ruffin escaped. Dew reports that the enemy's transports passing up yesterday, from 2 P. M. until he left, were crowded with troops. Up to sunset twelve transports had passed up by Coggin's Point. All quiet above Westover and Beakly at sunset yesterday.

Respectfully, etc.,

J. F. MILLIGAN, Major, etc.

General Beauregard to Generals Lee and Bragg. (Telegram repeated.)

SWIFT CREEK, *June 15th, 1864: 9 A. M.*

General Dearing reports at 7.35 A. M.: "Enemy still in force in my front; reported advancing in heavy force on Broadway road. A prisoner says some of Burnside's troops are here." If so, it is very important.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS, PETERSBURG, *June 16th, 1864: 7.45 A. M.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, Headquarters, Army No. Va., Riddell's Shop:

Prisoner captured this A. M. reports that he belongs to Hancock's corps (2d), and that it crossed day before yesterday and last night from Harrison's Landing. Could we not have more reinforcements here?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

PETERSBURG, *June 15th, 1864.*

To Lieut.-Col. OTEY, A. A. G.:

The following just received at Mrs. Archer's twelve noon: "Enemy's line of skirmishers across Beasely field, advancing in this direction."

E. C. GOODWIN, Sergt. Sig. Post.

Telegram.

DRURY'S BLUFF, *June 16th, 1864: 7.45 A. M.*

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Four (4) monitors, four (4) tugs, three (3) transports, one (1) armed transport, four (4) schooners, and one (1) bark. Schooners and bark are lying along and near to the buoys.

G. H. TERRETT, Major Comdg.

DRURY'S BLUFF, *June 16th, 1864: 4 P. M.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

The transports you mention have probably returned Butler's troops. Has Grant been seen crossing James River?

R. E. LEE.

DRURY'S BLUFF, *June 16th, 1864: 1.15 P. M.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Despatch of 11.30 just received. I fear the withdrawal of your pickets has lost your lines in front of Bermuda Hundreds. General Anderson thinks they are occupied. He was pushing back enemy's skirmishers at 12.30 P. M. I have directed they be repossessed, if practicable to all advantage. What line have you on your front? Have you heard of Grant's crossing the James River?

R. E. LEE.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,

June 16th, 1864.

Major-General R. F. HOKE, Comdg. Division on Pike:

General,—I am instructed by the Commanding General to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram, and to say that railroad transportation has been ordered to Chester Station for your command. It is probable that you can march to Petersburg earlier by highway. If you are of this opinion you will move by the pike direct to Petersburg, as instructed by telegraph. The utmost despatch is required.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

PETERSBURG, *June 17th, 1864: 5 P. M.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, Chester, Va.:

Prisoners just taken represent themselves as belonging to 2d, 9th, and 18th Corps. They state that 5th and 6th Corps are behind coming on. Those from 2d and 18th came here by transports, and arrived first. Others marched night and day from Gaines's Mill, and arrived yesterday evening. The 9th crossed at Turkey Bend, where they have a pontoon-bridge. They say Grant commanded on the field yesterday. All are positive that they passed him on the road seven miles from here.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, PETERSBURG, *June 18th, 1864: 12.30 A. M.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, Clay's House:

Enemy in large force—reported to be three corps, 2d, 9th, and 18th—attacked heavily our lines at 6.30 P. M. Affair lasted until 11.30 P. M. Enemy was finally repulsed at all points. Some three hundred prisoners and two stand of colors were taken. Success not yet ascertained.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

PETERSBURG, *June 18th, 1864: 12.40 A. M.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, Clay's House:

All quiet at present. I expect renewal of attack in morning. My troops are becoming much exhausted. Without immediate and strong reinforcements, results may be unfavorable. Prisoners report Grant on the field with his whole army.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,

PETERSBURG, *June 18th, 1864: 2.20 A. M.*

Major-Genl. J. B. KERSHAW, Comdg. Division, Red Water:

General,—General Beauregard desires me to inform you that prisoners captured this evening represent the 2d and 9th Corps, Army of the Potomac, and state with certainty that the 6th, 5th, and 18th Corps besides, are also in our front. General Beauregard desires me further to direct that you move to this point as rapidly as possible, and endeavor to reach the city by daylight, as in his opinion, as well as from statements of prisoners, the enemy will make their general attack to-morrow (this morning).

I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,

June 18th, 1864: 2.20 A. M.

Major-Genl. R. F. HOKE, Comdg. Division:

General,—The Commanding General directs me to inform you that the division of Major-General Kershaw is on its way to this point as reinforcement, as also the whole of the army corps commanded by Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill.

General Lee will himself be here in person some time to-day. This should be published to the troops at once.

You will send to Major-General Johnson a copy of this for his information and action.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,
PETERSBURG, VA., *June 21st, 1864.*

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Comdg. C. S. Armies, Richmond, Va.:

General,—Your communication of the 16th inst.—requesting me to inform you at what hour last night (15th) I ordered Major-General Johnson to evacuate the lines across Bermuda Hundreds Neck; at what hour during the night he made the movement; what force was ordered to replace him; and whether I informed General R. E. Lee of the movement; if so, at what hour, and by what channel of communication; also, whether any guns or other military stores were left by General Johnson's command—was not received by me until the evening of the 19th inst., else it would have met with an earlier acknowledgment.

In reply thereto I have the honor to submit that, on the morning of the 15th inst., the force under my command for the immediate defence of Petersburg (about 2200 of all arms) consisted of Wise's brigade, some artillery, two regiments of Dearing's cavalry, and a few militia. During the night of the 14th I received from you the following despatch:

“RICHMOND, *June 14th, 1864: 9.10 P. M.*

“Genl. BEAUREGARD:

“General Lee reports Grant has abandoned his depot on the York, and moved to James River, he supposes about McClellan's old base, at Harrison's Landing. Lee is on a line from Malvern Hill to White Oak Swamp. He has sent Hoke's division to Drury's Bluff, with a view to reinforce you, in case Petersburg is threatened.
BRAXTON BRAGG, Genl.”

On its receipt the following order was immediately sent to Major-General Hoke:

“HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,
June 14th, 1864.

“*General*,—The Commanding General directs that you move at once, as rapidly as possible, with your division to Petersburg, leaving one brigade at Walthall Junction.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,

“JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

“To Major-Genl. R. F. HOKE, Drury's Bluff.”

Early on the morning of the 15th I advised you in several despatches that the enemy had been strongly reinforced; that Dearing's pickets had been driven in; and that the enemy was moving in force towards the Baxter and Jerusalem plank road, and asked for reinforcements. I also added that the time had arrived when an election must be made between the lines of Bermuda Neck and Petersburg. With my small force it was an impossibility to hold both. At 7 A. M. of the 15th I sent you the following despatch:

“SWIFT CREEK, VA., *June 15th, 1864: 7 A. M.*

“Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

“Return of Butler's forces sent to Grant, arrival of latter at Harrison's Landing, renders my position more critical than ever, if not reinforced immediately; for enemy could force my lines at Bermuda Hundreds Neck, capture Battery Dantzler, now nearly ready, or take Petersburg, before any troops from Lee's

army or Drury's Bluff could arrive in time. Can anything be done in the matter?
G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl."

Battery Dantzler was a new battery of heavy guns at Howlett's Hill, and formed the extreme left of our lines in front of Bermuda Hundreds Neck.

At 1 h. P. M. I sent you and General R. E. Lee the following telegraphic despatch:

"SWIFT CREEK, VA., *June 15th*, 1864: 1 P. M.

"Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

"Hoke's division is ordered to Petersburg; hope it will get there in time. I will hold lines of Bermuda Hundreds Neck as long as practicable; but I may have to reinforce Hoke with Johnson's division, when lines would be lost. I advise sending forthwith another strong division to intersection of turnpike and railroad near Port Walthall Junction.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

"Telegraph operator will send a copy of this despatch to General R. E. Lee."

I received at 1.20 P. M. the following:

"RICHMOND, *June 15th*, 1864: 12 M.

"To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

"Hoke's division was ordered to you early this morning in time to be near at hand now, though his telegram of 11.30 says he had just received his orders and was marching. You are better able to judge than I can be of the movements necessary to be made by the troops immediately with you.

"BRAXTON BRAGG, Genl."

At 1.45 P. M. I telegraphed you as follows:

"SWIFT CREEK, *June 15th*, 1864: 1.45 P. M.

"Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

"Your telegram of 12 M. received. I did not ask advice with regard to movement of troops, but wished to know preference of War Department between Petersburg and lines across Bermuda Hundreds Neck, for my guidance, as I fear my present force may prove unequal to hold both.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl."

To this I received no reply.

The alternative of abandoning our lines in front of Bermuda Hundreds or Petersburg was thus presented. My force was inadequate to maintain our extended lines, reaching from Drury's Bluff to this place. The enemy, having been strongly reinforced, continued to press heavily towards Petersburg, and at 9.11 P. M. I sent you and General R. E. Lee the following telegraphic despatch:

"PETERSBURG, VA., *June 15th*, 1864: 9.11 P. M.

"Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

"Reinforcements not having arrived in time, enemy penetrated lines, from Battery 5 to 8, inclusive. Will endeavor to retake them by daybreak. I shall order Johnson to this point, with all his forces. General Lee must look to the defences of Drury's Bluff and the lines across Bermuda Neck, if practicable.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

"Telegraph operator will send a copy of this despatch to General R. E. Lee."

Accordingly, at 10.20 P. M. I ordered Major-General Johnson to evacuate the lines in front of Bermuda Hundreds, leaving pickets and skirmishers to cover the movement until daylight, or later if necessary. I hereto append a copy of the orders to Major-General Johnson. At 11.15 P. M. I addressed the following telegraphic despatch to General R. E. Lee:

"PETERSBURG, VA., *June 15th, 1864: 11.15 P. M.*

"Genl. R. E. LEE, Headquarters A. N. V.:

"I have abandoned my lines on Bermuda Neck, to concentrate all my forces here. Skirmishers and pickets will leave there at daylight. Cannot these lines be occupied by your troops? The safety of our communication requires it. Five or six thousand men may do.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl."

In obedience to orders Major-General Johnson, after entirely securing the guns and other military stores, evacuated the lines of Bermuda Hundreds during the night, giving orders to the officer commanding the pickets and skirmishers to hold the lines until 6 A. M. of the 16th. At the time of the evacuation no information had been received that reinforcements would be sent to refill these lines.

The heavy guns, carriages, and châssis at Fort Dantzler were buried by Major-General Johnson, and were recovered on the re-occupation of lines, having been undisturbed and uninjured by the enemy.

About 4 A. M. on the 16th a despatch was received from General R. E. Lee that a division was on its way to replace Major-General Johnson. A staff-officer was immediately sent to General Johnson with this information and instructions to hold the lines as long as possible. The promised division not arriving in time, our pickets and skirmishers left in charge of the lines were driven in early on the morning of the 16th.

The result of the concentration of my forces at Petersburg was the successful defence of that place against repeated and persistent assaults, which were immediately afterwards made by the enemy with largely superior numbers.

The foregoing simple narrative of the course of events contains, I believe, answers to all the inquiries embraced in your letter.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

PARISH OF SAINT JAMES, LOUISIANA,

Feb. 21st, 1874.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, New Orleans:

My dear General,—I take pleasure in forwarding to you, as I had promised I would, the following narration of an incident of the siege of Petersburg, which, from the circumstances of the case, may not be altogether useless to you, as an additional leaf to what is left of your valuable notes about the war.

I remember that on or about the 17th of June, 1864, pending the heroic, and to me Providential, defence of Petersburg (the immediate result of which, from the battle of Drury's Bluff to that time, was the saving of Richmond), some forty or fifty prisoners were brought to me, for the purpose, as usual, of being

examined as to the name of their particular commands, their precise location, their aggregate number, and the time of their arrival in our front.

These examinations, as you know, formed part of my general duties as Inspector, and I always endeavored to carry them through with all due care and attention. I was ever exceedingly courteous towards prisoners, and made it a point to speak to them with the greatest kindness. As far as my experience goes, I may safely assert that eight prisoners out of ten, whenever examined with prudence and discretion, invariably spoke the truth, to the best of their knowledge and understanding. Very few ever refused to answer me; and I must say that information of more than ordinary importance to us was, at times, thus acquired from what they reported.

On the occasion I here refer to I was more than usually careful in my demeanor towards these prisoners, because of your suspecting General Grant's army to be already on the move towards Petersburg, as was indicated, you thought, by Butler's evident boldness in our front.

The substance of the information I obtained that day was, that General Grant was actually crossing the James; that such and such corps of his army, supposed to be facing General Lee's army, were already with Butler's troops; that the men had been made to go through long and fatiguing marches, and, to quote their own language, were loudly complaining of "hard march and hard tack."

As soon as the result of my examination was reported to Headquarters you immediately despatched one of your aids, Captain Chisolm, to General Lee, to inform him of the circumstances above related. General Lee's headquarters were, at that time, near Drury's Bluff, and yours, on account of the general skirmishing we had had the day previous, were, temporarily, in the very town of Petersburg.

Not satisfied, apparently, with the message you had given to Captain Chisolm, and feeling more and more the necessity of being immediately reinforced, you also sent me to Drury's Bluff on the evening of the same day, my instructions being to see General Lee and read to him, as I had written them down, the answers of the different prisoners I had examined. You told me to impress upon the General's mind the necessity of his sending over reinforcements to your assistance as soon as possible; that you had suspected for several days what had at last happened, and had so informed the War Department, but, as usual, with no satisfactory result; that you had no troops—or nearly none—left you, and that if the General did not come to your assistance, with his whole army, in less than forty-eight hours, *God Almighty alone would save Petersburg and Richmond.*

I left as soon as I could get my horse ready, and arrived at General Lee's headquarters between twelve and one o'clock that night, having first procured a guide at General Anderson's headquarters, then established at the very spot where ours had been the day after the battle of Drury's Bluff.

I was not admitted to General Lee. Colonel Taylor—I think it was Colonel Taylor—General Lee's Chief of Staff, thought it unadvisable to disturb the General, who had not long since retired, he said, and who needed rest. Know-

ing that I had no right to insist upon being shown into the General's presence, I thereupon informed Colonel Taylor of my whole message to General Lee, read him the prisoners' statements, and asked him to see the General, if I could not.

His answer was, in substance, as follows: "Those prisoners have evidently deceived you. The corps you speak of as being in front of Petersburg, or thereabout, are reported by our scouts as being still in our front. We are certain of the fact, and, therefore, I see no use in speaking again to General Lee, who, by-the-by, has already seen Captain Chisolm to that effect, and has told him, substantially, what I now say to you. Tell General Beauregard that, as far as these corps are concerned—and we believe it to be the case with the others—there is, just now, no apprehension to be had."

My disappointment, on hearing the above, was so apparent, that Colonel Taylor, no doubt struck by it, left his tent, where I remained with an officer whose name I do not remember, and, coming back a few minutes afterwards, told me he had seen General Lee, and that he still maintained his first view of the case.

It was evident to me that the report of the prisoners was looked upon as nothing but a fable, altogether unworthy of General Lee's attention, and scarcely worthy of our own. I was told, furthermore, that General Lee's reply to your remarks—"that unless reinforcements were sent before forty-eight hours, God Almighty alone would save Petersburg and Richmond"—was, that he "hoped God Almighty would."

Now, I cannot exactly say whether it was Colonel Taylor who gave me the above as General Lee's answer, or whether it was Major Giles B. Cooke, of General Beauregard's staff, the evening after my visit to General Lee's headquarters. Major Cooke had seen the General; I had not. Remarks identically the same as those made by me in your name might also have been made to General Lee, personally, by Major Cooke. But I know the words quoted above by me were given as being those made use of by General Lee in answer to your remarks.

Having nothing more to do or to say just then, I took leave of Colonel Taylor, and hastened back to Petersburg as fast as I could go. While on my way back I met Major Cooke, one of my assistant inspectors, who was hurrying to General Lee's headquarters with a third message from you. Major Cooke is the same officer I referred to in the preceding lines. We exchanged a few words, I telling him of my ill-success, he declaring he would see the General and convince him of the absolute necessity of coming to our assistance; and, having no time to lose, we both started anew, on our respective errands.

I was back at Headquarters early on the morning of the 18th of June, as you may remember, having taken no rest at all, and having ridden the whole night, going and coming.

Petersburg was not taken. Through you, and, thanks to your far-seeing ability, "God Almighty did save it."

General Lee, with the high-minded, soldierly, as well as gentlemanly motives which ever characterized his acts, was no doubt impressed with the importance as well as the insistence of your different messages; and though, perhaps, still relying on the reports of his scouts, he nevertheless issued orders in compliance

with your most urgent request. The fact is that Kershaw's division was already on the move before I had time to reach Petersburg, and on the 19th of June (I think it was a Sunday), before night, all, or nearly all, of General Lee's army was at Petersburg or its immediate vicinity, where also, and at the same time, was all, or nearly all, of General Grant's army.

Your advice was to attack the very next day (19th), but General Lee was unwilling to issue the necessary orders to that effect, on account of the heavy marching his men had just gone through; and when, a few days afterwards, we did attack, the enemy, with the facilities he always had at his command, had already so intrenched himself as to give us no hope of dislodging him.

I am, dear General, very sincerely yours,

ALFRED ROMAN.

Extract from a Diary Kept by Major Giles B. Cooke during the late War.

Wednesday, June 15th, 1864.—About 12.30 P. M. was sent into Petersburg by the General (Beauregard) from Dunlop's house, on Swift Creek, to advise General Wise that Hoke's division and Johnson's brigade had been ordered to reinforce. The enemy commenced advancing on the city about 10 A. M. Was engaged all the afternoon bearing orders for the General. About 7.30 P. M. the enemy carried by assault Battery No. 5, and soon after Batteries Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 9. These redoubts are the outer works of the city. Hagood's brigade of Hoke's division arriving about the time that No. 5 fell, I accompanied General Hagood to his position, and was engaged with him on that duty until about 11 P. M.; was then ordered to assist Colonel Roman in posting the forage-trains of Johnson's and Hoke's divisions, and in moving Headquarters.

Thursday, June 16th.—Left Colonel Roman for the front about 5 A. M. Breakfasted at Mrs. Paul's, and then reported to the General. Was ordered by him to post Colonel Luke's regiment at the four bridges crossing the Appomattox. Was then sent to look for the Chief of Artillery, and then joined the General at the Custom-house. Was sent by the General about 9.45 A. M. to telegraph General Lee for reinforcements, as the enemy was pressing us in heavy force. Returned to the General about 11.15 A. M., in company with Major Malloy, Chief Commissary. About 1.30 P. M. rode over to camp at Dunn's Hill (across Appomattox) to assist Colonel Roman in arranging the wagon-trains; could not find him, but rode myself to see about the same; then returned to Headquarters, and slept for about an hour, as the firing had ceased. Rode over to the Custom-house to see the General about striking tents about 6.30 P. M.; then went back to tell Colonel Roman to have the tents re-pitched at Dunn's Hill. Walked into the city about 7.30 P. M., and went to Mrs. Paul's to supper.

Friday, June 17th.—Arose about 7 A. M. and breakfasted. Rode to the headquarters of General Johnson, and thence along our lines to General Hoke's headquarters, to make the necessary arrangements to prevent straggling. Engaged up to about 7 P. M. in arranging and giving instructions about straggling. Hearing heavy firing in the direction of Johnson's division, just as I reached the heights, I rode at once towards the headquarters of General Johnson. * * * For six mortal hours Johnson's division was sorely pressed by the Yankees. Our

two divisions, Hoke and Johnson, held at bay for six hours three Yankee army corps (Hancock's, Burnside's, and Baldy Smith's); for about one hour of the six hours referred to the enemy's firing was perfectly terrific. We were driven back some two or three times; but our men rallied and drove the Yankees back in their turn. The firing ceased about 12.30 night; at which time I came in to the General at Johnson's headquarters, and gave him some despatches that were captured from a Yankee courier.

Saturday, June 18th.—General Beauregard sent me at 1 A. M. to General Lee, to ask for reinforcements. Rode about seventeen miles in about two hours, and after talking with the General (Lee) for some time and accomplishing, in part, my object in seeking him, I left for Petersburg. On my way to General Lee's headquarters I called at General Anderson's headquarters, at the Hancock house, to tell him of my mission to General Lee, and to impress him with the importance of having some of his troops ready to march to General Beauregard's assistance. On my return called at General Anderson's again, and joined Kershaw's division of his command that had been ordered by General Lee to proceed at once to Petersburg. Reached Petersburg about 7 A. M., at the head of Kershaw's division, after posting which repaired to my quarters for rest.

PETERSBURG, VA., *May 18th, 1874.*

My dear General,—Major Cooke has just handed me your package for examination. I happen, fortunately, to have memoranda of the important period referred to, which throw a very strong light on it.

On the morning of Tuesday, June 14th, 1864, you sent for me to come to your quarters—we were then at Dunlop's, on Swift Creek. Mr. Soule was with you at the time, and Colonel Otey, Adjutant-General, was sent for. You detailed to me with some minuteness the evidence of a large increase of strength to the enemy immediately in your front, and stated that a considerable force had been thrown across the river to the south side of the James, below City Point, the mouth of the Appomattox. Hoke's division had some time before been sent to General Lee, and your force consisted then of Bushrod Johnson's division, Dearing's small command of cavalry, and the local forces. After giving me these details of fact you directed Colonel Otey to have a statement made in detail of your force and its distribution on your lines; and ordered me to proceed with the same to General Lee, to place before him the facts of the situation, to express to him your conviction that the enemy would commence operations at Petersburg in a short time, and request that he should send you back Hoke's division, and aid you with such other force as would be adequate to the gravity of the situation. The papers were finished in the Adjutant-General's office by about 2 A. M. on the morning of Wednesday, 15th, and I started to General Lee's headquarters. These were difficult to find, but I reached them at about 12.30 o'clock, and saw Colonel Taylor, who secured me an interview with General Lee some half-hour afterwards. About 1 P. M.—my notes say—General Lee declined to permit me to open the papers, stating that he knew we were weak, but that we would simply have to accomplish all we could with what we had. At first I feared that I would be dismissed without further attention, and an

intimation was made that I should return at once to you with that answer. The General seemed much preoccupied. I told him that it was but a small part of my instructions to show him your weakness, the importance of your line to his own safety, and the possibility of disaster to you, but to show the fact that attack was imminent. Gradually his interest seemed to increase, and he stated that he had ordered Hoke's division to rejoin you before my arrival. He then stated that you might rest assured that you were mistaken in supposing that the enemy had thrown any troops to the south side of James River; that a few of Smith's corps had come back to your front—nothing more—and that it was probable the enemy would cross the James, though, he reiterated, no part of his force had yet done so, because he could do nothing else, unless to withdraw altogether, as had been done by McClellan, which he did not believe General Grant thought of. He then said you might be assured that if you were seriously threatened he would send you aid, and, if needed, come himself. With some kind messages to you he then dismissed me.

When I reached Dunlop's you, with your whole staff, I was informed, were at Petersburg, and I rejoined you there, making a verbal report substantially as herein stated. You informed me that Batteries 5 to 8 had been taken, and ordered me to proceed to the road east of Hare's Newmarket race-course, where I would aid in posting Hagood's command, just in by rail, on Wise's left, the brigade of the latter to rest its right on Battery 9. When I met General Wise, at the point indicated, he informed me that Battery 9 had also been captured, and your orders were modified. You then determined to withdraw Bushrod Johnson from Bermuda Hundreds Neck, leaving a thin picket-line, and quickly followed the order by another to bring his whole force. They arrived during the night and next morning, Thursday, 16th. Colonel Roman and Major Cooke had in the mean time been despatched to General Lee successively on substantially the same message with mine, but with improved evidence of the enemy's presence.

The enemy strangely contented themselves with the capture of the line up to Battery 9, and showed no activity until Thursday morning, when they skirmished sharply on our right, and a brief action of some importance took place on our right. On Friday, 17th, skirmishing was very active in the morning, which in the evening increased to a battle, distinguished by heavy loss on our right and easy success on our left. At one time matters looked more critical to the integrity of our line than I ever saw it up to the time when we left for the Southwest. Prisoners captured showed that you had in front of you Smith's corps, Burnside's corps, and Hancock's—your sole force being Hoke's and Johnson's divisions, and the local force, with Dearing's cavalry and Jones's artillery. At the most critical time the capture of one of Burnside's aids with a despatch from Burnside asking aid from General Meade, endorsed by General Meade with directions to get support from Smith, occurring just as a message from Hoke arrived announcing the easy repulse of Smith, enabled you to reinforce Johnson from Hoke's command and make your position safe. That Friday night the lines up to the Jerusalem plank road were finished and occupied, which never were taken.

The next morning, Saturday, 18th, General Lee arrived, and his whole army were in position confronting Grant by Sunday morning.

I have reason to believe that on Saturday you proposed to General Lee to turn Grant's left flank, you covering his own left flank, and attacking Grant's right as he made the new front, giving the opinion that the two forces, flushed with the confidence of recent success, would crush Grant in the fork of the two rivers. And General Lee objected, on the ground that it would compromise his army, though he believed the movement would succeed.

Most truly, your old friend and servant,

SAMUEL B. PAUL.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

NEW ORLEANS, *March 20th, 1874.*

Dear General,—Agreeably to your request I take pleasure in giving you my recollection of some of the incidents connected with your memorable defence of Petersburg, when first attacked by General Grant's army, in June, 1864.

On a Wednesday, the 15th day of June, 1864, at about 12 o'clock, while we were encamped at Dunlop's farm, on Swift Creek, near Petersburg, you received intelligence that our lines in front of Petersburg were being attacked in force by the enemy. You left at once, with such members of your staff who were with you at the time, for Petersburg, examining on your way there our lines of fortifications situated on the left, and you reached Petersburg at about 6 o'clock P. M.

Upon your arrival you found that Batteries Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, situated nearest the Appomattox on our left, had been attacked and taken by the enemy.

After visiting General Wise, inspecting with him the lines of fortifications in our possession, and giving the necessary orders for the defence of the city during the night, you repaired to the Post-office Building, in Petersburg, and established there your temporary headquarters.

General Hoke, with his division, arrived at about ten o'clock that evening, and was stationed on our left, fronting the enemy, where we had lost our batteries. Owing to the jaded condition of General Hoke's troops, after their forced march, you determined not to attack, and ordered the General to intrench himself in the position he occupied. This he effectually did during the night.

On Wednesday, 15th, 10.20 P. M., finding that the enemy was still increasing his numbers and encroaching on your lines, you telegraphed General Lee that you would order General Bushrod Johnson to Petersburg, and would henceforth intrust the defence of our lines at Bermuda Hundreds to him (General Lee). General Bushrod Johnson arrived during Thursday night, and was placed on the right, near the Jerusalem plank road.

I remained with you constantly, night and day, from Wednesday, 15th, until Saturday, after the arrival of General Lee, and witnessed the almost superhuman efforts by which Petersburg was saved through the heroism and undaunted courage of the handful of men under you. I shall ever remember with pride your noble and successful resistance of that terrible onslaught of three

corps of General Grant's army on the three feeble divisions under Generals Hoke, Wise, and Bushrod Johnson, during that eventful Friday night, the 17th of June.

During those three memorable days, in the capacity of your aid, I received, read, and wrote out all the telegrams you received from and sent to General Lee, and to the Government at Richmond.

After informing General Lee several times that you were being confronted by the whole of Grant's army, and receiving no reply, you sent, on Friday, the 17th, at 5 P. M., a telegram to General Lee, that unless reinforced you would evacuate Petersburg the next day (Saturday), at 12 o'clock. In answer to this—and my memory is very clear upon this point—you received a telegram couched in these terms:

“DRURY'S BLUFF, *Friday, June 17th*: P. M.

[*Or, Saturday, June 18th*: A. M.]

“Genl. BEAUREGARD:

“Am not yet satisfied as to General Grant's movements; but upon your representations will move at once on Petersburg. R. E. LEE.”

Early Saturday morning General Kershaw's division, leading the advance of General Lee's army, arrived in Petersburg, and was at once ordered to extend our lines on the right.

General Lee arrived, I think, at about nine o'clock* Saturday morning. You rode with him to the front, with the view of inducing him to attack the enemy, if he found it practicable. He decided not to attack, and our men commenced putting up the intrenchments, which they so nobly defended until April, 1865.

Hoping that the few data I have herein given you may be of service to you for your history of the siege of Petersburg,

I remain, yours truly,

SAML. CHOPPIN, M. D., ex-Medical Inspector, C. S. A.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CLAY'S HOUSE, *June 17th, 1864*: 1.45 P. M.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Petersburg, Va.:

Fifth Corps (Warren's) crossed Chickahominy at Long Bridge on the 13th; was driven from Riddel's Shop by General Hill, leaving many dead and prisoners on our hands. That night it marched to Westover. Some prisoners were taken from it on the 14th. Have not heard of it since. All prisoners taken here are from 10th Corps.

R. E. LEE, Genl.

Official.

W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G.

* He arrived at 11.30 A. M. on that day.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Major-General B. R. Johnson's Statement of the Explosion of the Mine at Petersburg, July 30th, 1864.

On the 27th of July, 1864, the enemy was observed to be moving large forces to the north side of the James—to be showing much activity in that direction, leading us to anticipate some active operations there. This was, no doubt, a piece of strategy or a trick to deceive us; and it had, to a certain extent, that effect, for movements were made on our side correspondingly. General Field's division, which had been holding the part of our line of defences on the right of my division, was taken out of the trenches, and Colquitt's brigade, of Hoke's division, was temporarily transferred to my command, in exchange of Gracie's brigade, and I was left to hold, with less force, defences double the length, or more, of that which I had previously defended. Indeed, my understanding is that my command was all the troops in our trenches when the mine was exploded; all of the rest of the army having been moved or held ready to meet any demonstration the enemy might make on the north side of the James River.

About five minutes before five o'clock on the morning of the 30th of July the enemy sprung a large mine under that portion of my breastworks, about two hundred yards north of the Baxter road, known as Pegram's salient. In this salient there were four guns of Captain Pegram's battery, and the 18th and 22d South Carolina regiments of Elliott's brigade occupied the parapet in the battery and adjacent to it. The 22d extended from a point some seventy yards to the right of the right gun to a point beyond, but near the left gun of the battery. The 18th was posted on the left of the 22d South Carolina regiment. The regiments of Elliott's brigade were distributed along the parapet from left to right as follows: the 26th, 17th, 18th, 22d, and 23d South Carolina regiments. Wise's brigade was next to the right, and Colquitt's brigade our very extreme right; Ransom's brigade on my left, extending to the Appomattox River, and my whole line was extended to an extreme and insecure attenuation, without any reserve under my command, or that I am aware of. We had suspicions that the enemy was running a mine under our works, and, under direction of our Engineers, a trench-cavalier was made in the rear of the salient, but terminating on the south, just to the right of Pegram's battery. It should have been run farther to the south.

The mining gallery was run along two wings extending to the right and left of the main shaft, parallel to the interior crest of our work, nearly under the foot of the slope of the banquette, and it destroyed a portion of the front or main line of our fortification and a little part of the right of the trench-cavalier at its junction with the main line.

The crater measured 135 feet in length, 97 feet in breadth, and 30 feet deep. It was estimated that more than one hundred thousand tons of earth were thrown out. The two right guns of Pegram's battery were not disturbed. The two left guns were thrown out in front of our works and the carriages destroyed,

and only 8 men out of 28 men and 2 officers of the battery escaped alive and unhurt. Five companies of the 22d and four companies of the 18th South Carolina regiments were blown up, or mainly destroyed, by the falling earth.

The 22d South Carolina regiment lost 170 men and officers	170
" 18th " " " " had killed 4 officers and 39 men }	86
" " " " " " wounded 5 " " 38 " }	
Battery	22
<hr/>	
Aggregate losses known to have occurred from explosion....	278

Of 4 officers and 72 men missing from the 18th regiment, over and above the foregoing estimate, a part may have been blown up or killed by falling earth, but most of them were supposed to have been captured. Each brigade of my division had been previously instructed that, in case of an attack or breach on any point of my line, they should close and fight towards that point, leaving a picket-line behind; which was promptly done on this occasion. When the cloud of dust had subsided the enemy was found in the breach. Some four flags were counted, and a continued line of white and black troops came pouring on from the enemy's lines to support those in advance, while their artillery, mortars, and cannon opened all along their lines, the heavier fire being concentrated on our works and ground adjacent to the crater, and mainly from batteries near the Baxter road, where since the 16th of June the enemy seemed to be building batteries and strong works.

The 23d and part of the 22d South Carolina regiments, on the right, and 17th and 18th, on the left of the crater opened a destructive fire from our parapets on the advancing column and on the enemy in the breach. The flanking arrangements of our works on both sides of the breach afforded peculiar advantages, and soon the fire along the line of my division extended far out on each flank, wherever the enemy's column could be reached, and swept the ground in front of the crater.

To the men on the left of Wise's brigade, occupying the eminence south of Baxter road, about two hundred yards from the crater, the enemy's masses presented a most inviting target.

Wright's battery of four guns, admirably located and intrenched on the left of Elliott's brigade, and in rear of our front line, poured its whole column of fire on the enemy's masses and right flank. The position of this excellent battery was perhaps unknown to the enemy, and the superior manner in which it was served, the rapidity of its fire, and the terrible effect on the enemy's forces, no doubt greatly astonished and demoralized them. One gun of Davidson's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Otey, occupied a position on the right of the Baxter road, on the eminence at the left of Wise's brigade, admirably adapted to throwing canister into the enemy's left flank, and, with Wright's battery, to sweep the ground in front of the breach with a destructive cross-fire. It opened with a few rounds, but was soon deserted by officers and men (for which the officer was duly sentenced). The gun was afterwards manned and officered from Wise's brigade, and did excellent service under Colonel Goode.

Major Haskell's mortar-battery, in charge of Captain Lamkin, consisting of

four Coehorns, on the Jerusalem plank road, and one Coehorn and two 12-pound mortars, in the ravine some two hundred yards to the left and rear of the breach, and two mortars, to the left of Wright's battery, were all opened promptly on the assaulting columns. The practice of the four mortars on the plank road was admirable. Their shells dropped with precision upon the enemy's masses, huddled in disorder in front and in the crater.

Some three mortars, on the right of Baxter road, commanded by Lieutenant Langhorn, opened and continued at intervals with good effect until the close of the engagement. As soon as I ascertained that the enemy had sprung the mine and broken my line (the explosion aroused me) near the centre, I communicated with the brigade commanders in both wings of the division, now completely cut apart, and instructed them to carry out former injunctions, extend the intervals between the men on the parapet, and reinforce the wings of Elliott's, where the weight of the enemy's attack must first fall. At the same time I sent two staff-officers to get reinforcements. One of them returned in due time, and reported that General Mahone would move to our support with part of his command.

As soon as the enemy occupied the breach they attempted to advance along our trenches upon the flanks of our broken line; but our men, sheltering themselves behind the angles and flanks of our works and temporary barricades, and in boyaux, covered ways, and ravines, running out to the rear of our line, and about piles of earth at their bomb-proofs, opened a fatal fire at every point where the foe exposed themselves. Thus their advance was stayed (for five hours), and they commenced the work of intrenching, while they still tried by more cautious means, and by organizing advancing columns, to press back our men and to march through our line to the rear. Brigadier-General S. Elliott, commanding the South Carolina brigade, was making prompt disposition of his forces to meet the enemy and to occupy the main portion of the trench-cavalier, when he was dangerously wounded. The command of the brigade devolved on Colonel F. W. McMaster, of the 17th Regiment. Having received reinforcements of one regiment from Colonel McAfee, commanding Ransom's brigade, he directed Colonel Smith, with the 26th South Carolina regiment and three companies of the 17th South Carolina regiment, to form in the ravine running up from the left to the rear of the breach, and thus a rear line was formed, consisting of the 25th North Carolina, 26th South Carolina, and three companies of the 17th South Carolina regiment, from left to right, in the order named. Some fourteen Federal flags were soon counted in our works. At the same time the 24th and 49th North Carolina regiments had promptly closed in on the part of the 17th South Carolina regiment remaining at our breastworks. Now the enemy attempted, with a force extending to the front and rear of our parapet, to charge on our left; but our forces on the left, aided by the fire from the new line in rear, met and repulsed this charge; and though the enemy continued to fight along our parapets, our men on the left, taking advantage of every little covered point, returned their fire and held them in check.

In the mean time similar contests were going on on the right of the crater. The remaining men of the 22d South Carolina regiment, under Captain Shed, and those of the 23d South Carolina regiment, aided by the 26th and part of the 46th

Virginia regiments, held the enemy in check on that side. They succeeded in placing a barricade across our trenches and planting themselves behind it and in boyaux running to the rear, and maintained a position within seventy-five yards of the crater for about five hours, during which the enemy never drove them a foot to the right, though they several times attempted to move on that flank.

The 59th Virginia regiment, under Captain Wood, also formed in a ditch running perpendicular to the rear of our main works, and whenever the enemy formed in rear of the breach, or attempted to change to the right or left, opened fire and aided to drive them back to the crater and lines. On this side the forces mainly engaged were the 59th and 26th Virginia regiments, and the 22d and 23d South Carolina regiments; two guns of — battery, near the junction of the Jerusalem plank road and Baxter road; one gun of Davidson's battery, on left of Wise's brigade, and two mortar batteries.

The assailing force of the enemy was said to be the 9th Army Corps and parts of two others. They were held in check for five hours by little more than three regiments of Elliott's South Carolina brigade, two regiments of Ransom's brigade, two regiments of Wise's brigade, and artillery. Demonstrations were also made by the enemy on the south of the Baxter road and on Ransom's brigade, towards the left of my command, where they were engaged for a time on Taylor's Creek.

General Mahone's command arrived about 10 o'clock A. M., and the 61st North Carolina regiment, of Hoke's division, arrived at the same time. This regiment and one brigade of Mahone's division had formed in the ravine, in rear of Pegram's salient, and Mahone was waiting for a second brigade to come up, when the enemy made a demonstration to advance. He met them by a charge in which the 25th and 49th North Carolina, and the 26th and part of the 17th South Carolina regiments, all under Colonel Smith, of Elliott's brigade, joined, moving on the left of General Mahone's line. The enemy were driven from three-fourths of the trench-cavalier and most of the works on the left of the crater. During this charge of our troops many of the enemy, black and white, abandoned the breach and fled precipitately to the rear, while the left of Wise's brigade, and one gun of Davidson's battery, poured their fire, at a distance of from one hundred and fifty to five hundred yards, upon the flying mass.

A second unsuccessful charge having been made with Wright's brigade, of Mahone's division, about 11 o'clock A. M., I proceeded to concert a combined movement on both flanks of the crater, and a charge was accordingly made about 1 o'clock P. M.—time agreed upon—which gave us entire possession of the crater and our whole line. This charge was made on the left and rear of the crater by Sanders's brigade of Mahone's division, and by the 61st North Carolina regiment, Hoke's division, and 17th South Carolina regiment, Johnson's division; and on the right by the 23d and a fragment of the 22d South Carolina regiments, no other forces being available on this end of the line. General Mahone took charge of the forces charging on the left of the crater, while I proceeded to the right through the long line of boyaux necessary to be passed in going from left to right of the crater, through which only our communication

could be prudently made. Previously to this charge the incessant fire and attacks made on both flanks of the enemy at the crater had caused many to run the gauntlet of our cross-fire in front of the breach, so that we captured but three stands of colors and about one hundred and thirty men. The final charge was therefore made with little difficulty.

My losses were 66 officers and 856 in killed, wounded, and missing—aggregate 922, including Colquitt's brigade, and omitting Gracie's.

The losses of the enemy were estimated at that time, from such information as we gathered, at between five and six thousand. I suppose accurate statements can be now commanded.

I have not time to be concise or to write with any care, or even to read over this paper. I have heard that all the credit has been given, by some one publishing his views, to Mahone's division. I think this has been rebutted by General Cadmus Wilcox, of New Orleans. You can accumulate facts from him and General Beauregard, as well as from officers named in command—especially Colonel McMaster.

COLUMBIA, S. C., Feb. 14th, 1872.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, New Orleans:

Dear Sir,—General W. H. Wallace, the commander of Evans's old brigade and successor of General Stephen Elliott, sent me, in December last, your letter of November 13th, 1871, forwarded through General Bonham, with the request that I should give you the report of the brigade at the explosion at Pegram's salient, July 30th, 1864, as I had the honor to command the brigade on that occasion.

I was so overwhelmed with railroad trials in the United States Court at the time of the arrival of your letter it was impossible for me to send even the meagre account this communication contains. My trunk, with copies of all my reports, was burned at Petersburg, and it is difficult for me to recall any items which would be of service to you. General Elliott being in command of the brigade before the battle, I know nothing accurately of the batteries except those immediately on the lines. I have forgotten even the names of the batteries and the mortar companies on the hills and ravines concentrating on Pegram's salient.

Although the subject was one of all-absorbing interest—for, not more than ten days before, I heard your Engineer (Colonel Stevens, I believe, was his name) say, while we were standing in the little redoubt behind Pegram's battery, that in a week's time the Yankees would explode their mine there—still, many facts which seemed to me indelible have faded away.

As my *burrow* was immediately behind the battery I was much relieved the next day to be removed down the hill about seventy-five yards. Colonel Fleming, of the 22d, was buried up in my old quarters.

At break of day the explosion occurred. I bounced out of my *den* and saw the descending mass of matter. The brigade present consisted of the 26th, 17th, 18th, 22d, and 23d regiments of South Carolina Volunteers, in the order mentioned, the left of the 26th resting on right of Ransom's brigade, in the hollow towards the river.

Nearly the whole of the 18th and a small portion of left wing of 22d were in the most of the explosion.

As soon as I gained the trench there was a rush of the men of the 18th down the trench against my regiment (17th); and numbers of my own men, panic-stricken, and just aroused from their sleep, scratched at the counterscarp like frightened cats. This was momentary. Jumping on the banquette, I discovered the Yanks pouring into the mine, and very little firing on their line. In less than five minutes' time our men recovered from their panic, the men of the 18th falling in indiscriminately with mine, and we shot with great rapidity and execution. About the same time the battery on the left of the ravine, a short distance in rear of Ransom's brigade, did great execution, and fired about six hundred shots in a short time. This battery I observed specially; the others, in rear and on right, also did good execution.

In ten or fifteen minutes after the explosion General Elliott came along, with Colonel Smith, who commanded the 26th Regiment, and ordered me to take my regiment and follow him on the brow of the hill and form a line, and charge the enemy out of the mine. Smith had a few of his men cramped up in the ditch following him. I waited a few moments until Smith and some of his men were out of the way, and extended the order along my line. Saw Elliott, Smith, and about half a dozen men get out of the ditch on the brow of the hill. General E. was shot immediately after he got up. The ditch being crowded, it was a slow process to get out.

As soon as Elliott was shot he was borne past me, and spoke to me to do the best I could. His aids reported to me immediately, and rendered good service during the day.

As soon as I took command I countermanded the order given by General Elliott. It struck me as rashness to endeavor to make men get out of the ditches and attempt to form a line under fire on the top of the hill, at fifty or seventy-five yards from the crater, exposed from head to heels to the fire from the crater and the enemy's line, which was eighty yards from the crater. It was simply an impossibility. I observed at this time the crater full of men, and at least fourteen regimental flags. I counted either fourteen or sixteen flags, and I was in a rock's throw of them.

My apprehension was the men in the crater would rush down the hill and get in the rear of my line in the ravine which General Mahone afterwards came up in. I ordered Colonel Smith, of the 26th, to take all his men he could gather and immediately to go down the ditch to General E.'s quarters, to go up this ravine and lie down, and if the Yankees endeavored to rush down to resist them. As Smith's regiment was quite small I detached three of my largest companies, under Captain Crawford, to co-operate with Smith. It gave me the greatest anxiety until Smith's command got in position. As I believed the fate of Petersburg depended on filling up this gap, I spread the remainder of the 17th and the part of the 18th that remained along the line until it struck Ransom's brigade, and fought the enemy from behind the traverses as well as I could. We threw up barricades across the trench at various places. Many of the enemy jumped over the back part of the crater, got into the rear ditch,

which communicated with the trench which went into Pegram's salient, and pressed me on my right flank. Nearly all of my two right companies were killed, wounded, and captured in the successive hand-to-hand fighting we had here. Once, when my men retreated to the succeeding bend, I was left between the enemy and my command. Being anxious about Smith occupying the position I assigned him, I had taken a position back of a little mound close to the sink, from which position I could make a reconnoissance of the ravine, and on return up the little ditch to the main trench I observed the trench for twenty yards free of men. As soon as I got back we made a new barricade.

I had before this time sent couriers to General Bushrod Johnson, and one to the right wing of the brigade, from which I was cut off by the crater, informing them I was in command, and to resist as best they could until the reinforcements which General J. was sending up should arrive.

The battle raged, with intervals, until near 10 o'clock A. M. By this time the enemy pushed advances half-way down the area. I was near the place where the covered way entered the trench. As soon as I arrived there Colonel Fleming, of Ransom's brigade, suggested to me a capital place for a barricade at a bend about thirty yards distant, and I ordered him to superintend its construction. As he left my side he was shot in the neck, and fell dead at my feet.

In a few moments afterwards General Johnson sent for me to come to Elliott's quarters by the spring on the covered way. When I went I told him how I had arranged the men in the ravine to resist the enemy, if they attempted to get in our rear. It is surprising they did not make that break. I myself saw officers in the crater endeavoring, as I thought, to induce their men to make the dash; but Smith, after the battle, informed me they did make the attempt; but his men rose and delivered a volley, and intimidated them so they did not repeat the effort, but pursued what they supposed the safer course and followed down the trench.

A short time after I first met General J., General Mahone came up with a few men. From my present recollection I would say this was, at the earliest, 10 o'clock A. M. It was a considerable time before any number of men came; when they did they marched up the ravine and laid down with the men Smith had already there. General M. had a long interview with General J., and obtained from him information of localities, etc.

It must have been two hours before General M. got his men ready. General J. then directed me to add the balance of the 17th Regiment to General M.'s command, and asked me to put my best officer over them. I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel J. N. Culp to come up and receive orders from General J. He then took all of the 17th he could collect and formed on line with General Mahone.

I think the charge was made about 12 o'clock M., and the whole battle was over in an extremely short time. I never have seen so sudden a suspension of a battle.

I remember a little circumstance which impresses the fact of the time on my memory. My orderly brought my dinner about 3 o'clock P. M.—certainly not later than 4 o'clock. My adjutant sent for me to the brigade headquarters, and I went up to my own quarters. I had to walk over dead Yankees and niggers,

the little passage from the trench to my *den* having two or three dead in it, and in my quarters there were two wounded negroes, one of whom had rested his head on a copy of Paley's "Philosophy" I had to while away a leisure moment with and bloodied it up. And my lieutenant-colonel, adjutant, sergeant-major, and myself ate with great relish our coarse fare literally in the midst of the dead and dying. To enable my orderly to come with safety to the lines by this time from the wagon-camp to the battle-field the battle must have been over by 1 o'clock P. M.

My adjutant prepared as correct a report as we could a few days after the explosion, and, feeling a little indignant that General Mahone's troops had all the credit for the fighting, got the editor of the *Petersburg Index* to publish a list of the casualties of Elliott's brigade.

I had the article, clipped from the paper, in my pocket for months after the war, and, unfortunately, the casualties of my regiment (17th) was torn off; but by deducting from the aggregate the balance will indicate the loss of the 17th Regiment at 135; of these, I remember, 24 were killed outright on the field, including 3 officers—all I can now recall. I found out afterwards that 27 men of my right company next the mine were captured and carried to Elmira; 14 of these 27 died of harsh treatment in the few months' confinement.

The part of the publication I have preserved is as follows:

The 18th Regiment: killed,	6 officers, 53 men	59	
" " wounded,	8 " 63 "	70	
" " missing,	4 " 72 "	76	205
The 22d Regiment: killed,	2 officers, 10 men	12	
" " wounded,—	" 18 "	18	
" " missing,	7 " 179 "	186	216
The 23d Regiment: killed,	1 officer, 14 men	15	
" " wounded,	3 " 31 "	31	49
The 26th Regiment: killed,	3 officers, 7 men	10	
" " wounded,	2 " 41 "	43	
" " missing,	2 " 17 "	19	72
Adding loss of 17th Regiment		135	
Total		677	

It will be seen from the above that the brigade lost a total of 677. In the explosion 6 officers and 50 men are known to have been killed; 11 officers and 249 men are still unaccounted for; but the majority are supposed to have been killed by the explosion. The 18th and the 22d are the regiments which suffered most from the explosion. My recollection is, 21 men of Pegram's battery were buried in the mine.

I regret I have no copy of my report, and fear the details herein furnished will be of no service. Colonels Bonham and Wallace—the latter afterwards my brigadier—were my ranking officers, but both were absent on leave.

With the hope that history will yet do you justice for your noble defence of Petersburg, and especially for your remarkable repulse of Grant on the 17th and

18th of June, when your hundreds repelled his thousands, I remain, with undiminished attachment for you, as one of the beloved Generals of our lost cause,

Your most obedient servant,

F. W. McMASTER, Lieut.-Col. 17th Regt. S. C. V.

NOTE.—We kept the enemy at bay on the trench at the mine for, I suppose, three hours. We had the advantage in using the little embankments running to our works; but after they were foiled here some of their men, who were on the outside of the mine and our trench, ran down on the outside of our trench and shot in rear of our men on these traverses, and cut off some, that caused the men to retreat down the hill. But when we made the last barricade which Lieutenant-Colonel Fleming pointed out to me the enemy in front of the trench could no longer use our front breastwork, as the lines so bent the left wing of Ransom's brigade commanded it, and they were checked there, and never could advance a step farther; and if Mahone had never come up the enemy's only chance would have been by a sally from the rear of the mine.

I have read this over to Mr. T. J. Lamothe, who acted as sergeant-major for me—a very intelligent gentleman, who came to the regiment that morning, just before the explosion, and he confirms the above narrative. He thinks the explosion occurred about half an hour before sunrise. He believes the lines were saved that day by keeping the men in the trenches and sending Colonel Smith and his men in the ravine.

F. W. McM.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXXIX.

BATTLE OF WELDON ROAD.

Extract from General Hagood's "Memoirs."

ABOUT the middle of August, Grant threw a large part of his force across the James at Deep Bottom and advanced towards Richmond. It resulted in his repulse, but drew a large part of our force from Petersburg, and thus gave him an opportunity to strike at the Weldon Railroad, within three miles of which his left then rested. He obtained possession of a considerable portion of it—from Davis's farm, near the city, southward—suffering a loss of a thousand men. On the 19th Colquitt's and Clingman's brigades of Hoke's division were detached to take part with other troops in an effort to dislodge him. They failed of success, though the operation resulted in inflicting heavy loss upon the enemy, including the capture of three thousand prisoners. General Clingman was wounded, and never again rejoined his brigade. The fight was to be renewed on the 20th, and on the night of the 19th, about nine o'clock, General Hagood received an order to turn over his brigade in the trenches to the senior officer present, and, taking with him only his aid, report to General A. P. Hill to command a brigade from Bushrod Johnson's division in the expected fight. Bushrod Johnson was holding the lines next to Hoke, and he sent no organized brigade, but a regiment from each brigade of his division. It seemed that his

habit was to keep one regiment from each of his brigades resting in rear of the lines, and he sent such as happened to be there at the time. The regiments commenced arriving at the rendezvous, near the Lead-works, where Hagood was to meet them about 11.30 P. M., and by 3 A. M. Hagood had effected a brigade organization with them, appointing hap-hazard an acting staff, and learning their names and those of his regimental commanders, for it was too dark to see their faces. He reported to General Hill, who was asleep in his ambulance near by. When General Hill learned the heterogeneous character of the brigade sent him he, much to Hagood's relief, declined to receive it, and directed the regiments returned to their division. Nothing was done that day; the enemy were left to intrench undisturbed across the coveted road. In the afternoon Hagood's own brigade was withdrawn from the trenches, and, marching through Petersburg, bivouacked beyond its southern limits to the right of Battery 45. But 59 officers and 681 men marched out of the trenches. Sixty-seven days and nights in them without relief had shorn the brigade of two-thirds of its numerical strength, and so debilitated were the sickly and enfeebled remainder that they tired badly in the short evening's march. The brigade was itself only in the unconquerable spirit of the remnant which clung to its banner. When General Hagood again, in pursuance of his directions, reported to General Hill he felt that justice to his men required it, and he unhesitatingly asked and received the promise that he should not be used in the next day's work, if it could be avoided. The change from the cramped and noisome trench to the freedom of the bivouac, and the call upon the men for action instead of endurance, aroused their spirits wonderfully, and, although it rained all night, the fires of brushwood crackled merrily; and then was once more heard the light laugh, the ready joke, and the busy hum of voices, as the men prepared their suppers or smoked their pipes, stretched at length before the exhilarating blaze. At 2 A. M. of the 21st of August the brigade was aroused, and, moving out at half-past three, followed the column destined for the day's engagement. It still rained; and after a toilsome march through mud and water, first down the Squirrel Level road, and then across towards the Poplar Spring church, more or less skirmishing going on all the time by the flankers on our left, the brigade was directed to halt by the road-side and remain in reserve while the column passed on. It had now ceased raining, and shortly afterwards, about a mile in front of us, the fire of skirmishers was heard, and a heavy fire of artillery was opened.

The men laid down and rested from the unwonted fatigue of the march. The firing became more earnest in front, and in about half an hour a courier from General Hill arrived, and directed us to hasten to the front and report to Major-General Mahone. Proceeding by a short cut into the Vaughan road, under the guidance of the courier, and up that towards Petersburg, until within six hundred yards of the Flowers House, we turned across the field to the right and proceeded towards the railroad, in the vicinity of the Globe Tavern. A number of pieces were in position in this field, shelling the railroad; and the enemy's batteries in that direction, though not visible from woods intervening, were replying vigorously. General Hagood, moving in column of fours, passed at double-quick across this field, suffering some casualties from exploding shells,

and as he reached its farther border a major-general rode up, announcing himself as General Mahone. Then, leading the column, this officer himself placed it in position in line of battle along the edge of the wood and facing the railroad. "Now," said he, "you are upon the flank and rear of the enemy. I have five brigades fighting them in front, and they are driving them. I want you to go in and press them all you can." Some fifty yards within the woods the swamp of a rivulet (or "branch") was to be seen; beyond nothing was visible, and firing, both of artillery and infantry, was then going on. General Mahone added, "When you have crossed the branch swamp you will come upon a clearing, in which, some three hundred yards farther, is the enemy's line, and they are not intrenched." He also urged promptness in the attack. General Hagood immediately gave the order to advance, and the men, moving in line, made their way across the swamp. Upon arriving on the other side we found ourselves in the clearing, but the enemy still not visible. We were under a hill, and they were upon the open plateau sufficiently far beyond to prevent the view. The advance of the brigade had, however, evidently attracted attention, from the fire drawn in our direction. The line had been much broken in crossing the swamp, and Hagood immediately pushed skirmishers up the hill for protection, and ordered one of his staff to accompany them and reconnoitre, while he gave his personal assistance to Captain Malony in getting the line of battle rapidly re-formed. He assisted the adjutant, instead of himself going to reconnoitre, because, from the report of a courier who had gone up the hill while the skirmishers were forming, he thought there was some danger of being himself assailed where he was, and his men were so disorganized at the moment as to be in no condition to repel an attack.

In a few minutes the brigade was formed, and the report coming at the same time from the skirmishers that the enemy was but a short distance ahead of them, and only in rifle-pits, thus confirming General Mahone's statement, Hagood, cautioning his men to move only at a quick-step till he himself gave the order to charge, moved his brigade forward. He had dismounted, and, placing himself in front of the centre, to steady the men and repress excitement, moved backward in front of the line for a short distance as if on drill. Himself halting before reaching the crest of the hill, the line passed, and he followed, with his staff, behind the right of the 21st regiment. The 25th was on the left of the 21st, and the other three regiments on its right. As soon as the brigade became visible ascending the hill a rapid fire was opened upon it, to which in reply not a shot was fired; but, moving forward steadily at quick time, with arms at "right shoulder shift," as we approached the line of enemy's pits they broke from them and fled. With one accord a battle-yell rang out along our line, and the men, as if by command, broke into double-quick in pursuit. At the same moment General Hagood discovered that the line in front of us had only been an intrenched skirmish line, though so heavy as to have deceived his skirmishers into the notion that it was a line of battle, and that two hundred and fifty yards beyond was a strongly intrenched line, crowded with men and artillery, extending right and left as far as he could see, and the five Confederate attacking brigades of which General Mahone had spoken nowhere visible. It

also appeared to him that he was moving upon a re-entering angle of the enemy's line. In this, however, he was partially mistaken. An examination of the field after the war showed that the enemy's line crossing the railroad from the east at this time bent immediately southward and followed its course in a comparatively straight line at some forty yards on its western side. Later in the siege their line extended farther west. Then, recrossing the road at a point below where we struck it, their line only bit out a piece sufficient, if he could hold and permanently intrench, to prevent its further use by us. Immediately to the right of where we struck their line a small bastioned work for field artillery was thrust forward, and our line of advance was oblique to the enemy's general line and towards its junction with the flank of this work. Thus, in fact, we were going into a re-entering made more by the vicious direction of our advance than by the actual construction of the enemy's work. The flank fire from the bastioned work we could not have avoided, but from our oblique attack we had also more or less of a flank fire from the straight line, which was an infantry parapet of fully five feet, with an exterior ditch eight or ten feet wide, and artillery at intervals. Perceiving at a glance the hopelessness of assault under such circumstances, General Hagood, stopping himself, shouted again and again the command to halt; but the crash and rattle of twelve or fifteen pieces of artillery and probably twenty-five hundred rifles, which had now opened upon us at close range, drowned his voice, and the fury of battle was upon his men. Moving forward with the steady tramp of the double-quick, and dressing upon their colors, these devoted men, intent only on carrying the position before them, neither broke their alignment until it was broken by the irregular impact upon the enemy's works, nor stopped to fire their guns until their rush to obtain the parapet was repelled.

When General Hagood saw his men thus rushing upon certain destruction, and his efforts to stop them unavailing, he felt that if they were to perish he should share their fate; and with Molony and Martin and Orderly Stoney, who were all of his staff that were with him (Moffatt and Mazyck were farther back, in discharge of their respective duties as inspector and ordnance officers), followed the advancing line. In fifty yards Lieutenant Martin fell, shot in the knee; a few steps farther and Captain Molony fell, shot through the head, and Hagood and Stoney alone reached the works—the latter shot in the shoulder, but not disabled. The 25th and 21st regiments being on the left, from the oblique direction of the advance, first struck the works; and while they staggered to get in the other three regiments swept on. When they reached the ditch there was from seventy-five to one hundred yards interval between the two divisions into which the brigade had broken.

General Hagood was with Major Wilds, commanding the 21st, who was cheering on his men to renewed assault (success now being their only hope of safety), when, looking to the right, he saw a mounted Federal officer among the men on the left of the portion of the brigade to the right with a regimental color in his hands, and a confusion and parleying immediately around him that betokened approaching surrender. The fight was still raging at Hagood's right and left; there was no cessation on our part except in the squad just around this officer,

and none whatever that was perceptible on the part of the enemy. They had pushed out from the right and left a line behind us to cut off our retreat, and this officer (Captain Daly, of General Cutter's staff) had galloped out of a sally-port, seized a color from the hands of its bearer, and demanded a surrender. Some officers and men surrendered, but were not carried in; others refused, but just around him ceased fighting. General Hagood called to the men to shoot him and fall back in retreat. They either did not hear him, or, bewildered by the surrender of part of this number, failed to obey. It was a critical moment, and demanded instant and decided action. In a few minutes the disposition to surrender would have spread, and the whole brigade have been lost. Making his way across the intervening space as speedily as he could, exposed to a regular fire by file from the enemy's line scarce thirty yards off, and calling to his men to fall back, which they did not do, General Hagood approached the officer and demanded the colors, and that he should go back within his own lines, telling him he was free to do so. He commenced arguing the hopelessness of further struggle, and pointed out the line in our rear. Hagood cut him short and demanded a categorical reply—yes or no. Daly was a man of fine presence, with long, flowing beard, and sat with loosened rein upon a noble-looking bay that stood with head and tail erect, and flashing eye and distended nostrils, quivering in every limb with excitement, but not moving in his tracks. In reply to this abrupt demand the rider raised his head proudly, and decisively answered No! Upon the word General Hagood shot him through the body, and as he reeled from the saddle upon one side sprang into it from the other, Orderly Stoney seizing the flag from his falling hands. There was no thought of surrender now; the yell from the brigade following the act and ringing out above the noise of battle told their commander that they were once more in hand, and would go now wherever ordered—whether to the front or rear. Shouting to them to face about, Hagood led them at a run against the line in his rear, Stoney holding aloft in the front the recaptured flag, which he had torn from its staff. This line melted before our charge; but the fire was terrific, after breaking through it, until the shelter of the valley of the branch was reached. Upon its margin a fragment from a schrapnel shell tore open the loin of the horse upon which Hagood rode; and struggling as he fell he kicked Lieutenant William Taylor, of the 7th battalion, upon the head, rendering him for the time so confused that he had to be led from the field by one of his men. This gallant young officer had a few days before rejoined his command with an unhealed wound received at Drury's Bluff.

This ended the fighting for the possession of the Weldon road. The Confederate losses had been very insignificant until to-day, and now it was confined principally to our brigade. Grant had lost five thousand men, *but he had the road*. A few days afterwards Hancock, with eight thousand men, was despatched southward from this point to tear up the track. A. P. Hill and Hampton met and defeated him at Reams's Station, with the loss of two field-batteries and between twenty-five hundred and three thousand men.

A week afterwards, in a conversation in General Lee's presence, General A. P. Hill stated to Hagood that on the morning of the 21st he was misinformed by

his scouts as to the position and condition of the enemy's works, believing that the point upon which Hagood was sent was the left of their line, and that they had no other work down the railroad. He also added that the haziness of the morning prevented his ascertaining his error until Hagood's attack developed it. General Mahone also said to Hagood that he shared the same misapprehension, but insisted that if the other five brigades had attacked with the same vigor that Hagood's did, we would have won. It seemed that after driving the enemy's skirmish line from the pits, out of which Hagood's men *marched* them, they stopped, and the heavy fusilade which made Mahone think they were driving the enemy was from a stationary line firing at long range. The frankness and freedom with which these two distinguished officers took the blame of the blunder upon themselves greatly relieved General Hagood, for he feared that this affair, in the misapprehension to which it would be subjected, would be similar to the assault of the 24th of June at the City Point road. It was, however, generally correctly understood in the army, and apparently not misunderstood by the public. Both Generals Lee and Beauregard were on the field, and the latter next day sent Hagood word through General Hoke that, had it been in his power, he would have promoted him before leaving it. He also, through his adjutant, called for a written report of the incident of the flag. This was briefly given and forwarded. Some months afterwards General Cooper, Adjutant-General at Richmond, very kindly sent to General Hagood an official copy of the indorsements made on the report, then on file in his office.

They were as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND SO. VA.,
NEAR PETERSBURG, *August 23d*, 1864.

"Respectfully forwarded through General R. E. Lee to his Excellency President Davis for his information. Such an act of gallantry as herein described, and of devotion to one's flag, reflects the highest credit on the officer who performs it, and it should be held up to the army as worthy of imitation under similar circumstances. Brigadier-General Hagood is a brave and meritorious officer, who had distinguished himself already at Battery Wagner and Drury's Bluff, and participated actively in battles of Wanbottom Church and Petersburg, on the 16th and 17th of June last. I respectfully recommend him for promotion at the earliest opportunity. Attention is also called to General Hagood's recommendation of his orderly, private J. D. Stoney, for a commission. I feel assured he is deserving of it. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

"HEADQUARTERS, A. N. V., *August 24th*, 1864.

"Respectfully forwarded.

R. E. LEE, Genl.

September 1st, 1864.

"BUREAU A. AND I-GEN., APPOINTMENT OFFICE.

"Respectfully submitted to Secretary of War.

"By order. E. A. PALFREY, A. A. G.

"Respectfully submitted, as requested, to notice of the President.

"J. A. SEDDON, Secretary of War.

"There are two modes of recognizing distinguished service: one by promotion, the other by announcement in orders. See recommendation for the private and note for the brigadier, whom I regard worthy of promotion when it can be consistently done.—JEFFERSON DAVIS, November 7th, 1864.

"Adjutant-General note the President's indorsement, and if opportunity of promotion occurs, submit. November 9th, 1864.

"J. A. SEDDON, Secty. of War.

"Official.

"A. and I. G. Office, Dec. 9, 1864.

H. S. CLAY, A. A. G."

CHARLESTON, S. C., *September 25th, 1864.*

General,—The President has ordered me (verbally) to repair to Charleston and await further orders. Meanwhile to inquire into the difficulties between yourself and Brigadier-General Ripley, and to examine the condition of the defences and troops at and about Charleston, assisted by my Chief-Engineer Colonel D. B. Harris, and Chief-Inspector Lieutenant-Colonel A. Roman. The former is then to remain on duty with you until further orders, as Inspector of Fortifications and adviser in that branch of the service.

You will please issue accordingly all necessary orders to carry out the views of the President.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Major-Genl. SAM. JONES,

Comdg. Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla., Charleston, S. C.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., *Oct. 11th, 1864.*

Captain W. J. BETHUNE, Enrolling Officer, Jacksonville, Ala.:

Captain,—General Beauregard directs that you take temporary command of this Post, and forward to the Army of Tennessee, at or in the vicinity of Lafayette, Ga., all the officers and men returning to the army, placing each detachment in command of a suitable officer, whose duty it will be to divide the command among the officers accompanying him.

If convenient to the route, these commands ought to go *via* the iron-works at Round-top Mountain. There they can procure rations, and learn where the army is.

You will call upon Major T. W. Francis, Commissary, to supply the men with rations.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., *Oct. 11th, 1864.*

Major T. W. FRANCIS, Commissary at Jacksonville, Ala.:

Major,—General Beauregard has assigned Captain W. J. Bethune to duty as temporary commander of this post, and has directed him to call upon you to supply rations for men returning to and coming from the Army of Tennessee.

He desires you to give him prompt assistance, so that no time may be lost by men remaining here.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 11th, 1864.

Captain EDWARD W. HALL, A. A. G.:

Captain,—General Beauregard being informed that you are on your way to rejoin the army, and that you have not sufficiently recovered from your recent wound to travel, he directs that you will remain on temporary duty at this post from this date, and act as post adjutant.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 11th, 1864.

Captain ELIAS KENADY, Jacksonville, Ala.:

Captain,—As you are the nearest quartermaster to this post, General Beauregard directs that you make arrangements with the post commandant here to furnish what may be required from your department for the post, and for the purpose of forwarding all men arriving here on their way to and from the army.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 12th, 1864.

Assist.-Surgn. R. B. HARRIS, 57th Ga. Regiment, Cleburne's Div., A. T.:

Sir,—General Beauregard, being informed that you are returning to your regiment, and that you are not sufficiently recovered from a recent illness, directs that you report for temporary duty to Colonel W. H. Forney, commanding this post.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 12th, 1864.

Brig.-Genl. J. H. CLANTON, Oxford, Ala.:

General,—General Beauregard directs me to call upon you for fifty men, with their officers, to report for courier and other duty to Colonel W. H. Forney, commandant of this post.

The General further directs that you will place yourself in communication with Colonel Forney, and give him what assistance he may desire.

He will probably require guards for stores.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 12th, 1864.

Col. W. H. FORNEY, Jacksonville, Ala.:

Colonel,—General Beauregard desires that you would temporarily take command of this post. The present commanding officer he directs that you employ as your assistant. For instructions I refer you to my note of the 11th instant to Captain Bethune.

The General further desires that you will, by means of a quick line of couriers, place yourself in communication with Brigadier-General Elzey, at Round Mountain Iron-works, by which route he thinks for the present it would

be best to send men rejoining the army. He wishes that line connected with the one in operation to Blue Mountain.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
IN THE FIELD, Oct. 12th, 1864.

To the Officer Commanding the United States Forces at Resaca, Ga.:

Sir,—I demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the post and garrison under your command, and, should this be acceded to, all white officers and soldiers will be paroled in a few days. If the place is carried by assault no prisoners will be taken.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, Genl.

Official.

S. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 12th, 1864.

Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adj. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

General,—I arrived at Newnan, Ga., on the 7th inst., where, having ascertained that General Hood's headquarters were at Cedar Town, and that his army was moving northwestwardly, after destroying in the vicinity of Marietta five or six miles of the railroad from Atlanta to Chattanooga, I left at once to join him, overtaking him at Cave Spring on the evening of the 9th inst.

I was there informed by him that General Sherman, having hastily advanced from Atlanta with five corps, amounting to about forty thousand (40,000) men, leaving one corps to guard his fortifications, he (General Hood) had determined to draw Sherman's forces still farther north by attempting to break up the railroad between Kingston and Resaca, and again between Resaca and Dalton. To effect the first of these objects he proposed crossing to the north side of the Coosa River, about twelve (12) miles below Rome (which is still occupied by one division of the enemy), and then to cross the Oostenaula about the same distance above that town. After destroying the road as contemplated, if he could not obtain the immediate surrender of Resaca, commanding the railroad bridge over the Oostenaula, he designed recrossing to the north side on his pontoon-bridge above Rome, moving thence to destroy the road between Resaca and Dalton. He proposed meanwhile to guard well the crossing of the Coosa and Oostenaula rivers, so as to protect his right flank and rear from an attack by Sherman.

Not being sufficiently well acquainted with the nature of the country referred to, and not having yet assumed command of my new department, I advised General Hood not to carry out his first project, unless confident of being able to recross the Oostenaula above Rome before General Sherman could concentrate superior forces against him, or could endanger his communications. He readily assented to this suggestion.

It was also determined that, as a success was necessary to keep up the present buoyant spirit of the Army of Tennessee, a battle should not be fought unless

with positive advantage on our side of numbers and position, or unless the safety of the army required it.

Under these circumstances, being still unprovided with a staff, baggage, and horses (left in Virginia when I was ordered to Charleston), and wishing to confer (before assuming command) with Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor relative to the condition of his department and to his ability to co-operate with General Hood in the present campaign, being desirous, moreover, of arranging matters necessarily connected with the change of base from Jonesboro', Ga., to Jacksonville, Ala., I repaired to this place for the objects stated, hoping to be able to return to the front in time for a battle, should one occur; but, to be certain of doing so, I instructed General Hood to keep me advised of the movements of the enemy. I expect, nevertheless, to rejoin him in a few days.

I desire that, until further notice, all letters and communications should be addressed to me at this place, whence they will be forwarded to my headquarters, wherever they may be temporarily located.

I remain, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 13th, 1864.

Genl. J. B. HOOD, Comdg. Army of Tenn., etc.:

General,—General Beauregard, upon arriving here, found there was no post commandant or other officers on duty here; he therefore has ordered the following named wounded and invalid officers on temporary duty until other arrangements can be made:

Colonel W. H. Forney, 10th Alabama, of General Lee's army, as commandant of the post; Captain Edward Hall, A. A. G., of Taylor's brigade, Army of Tennessee, as post adjutant; Lieutenant William Anderson, acting commissary, 57th Georgia regiment, Mercer's brigade, Cleburne's division, Army of Tennessee, as acting commissary; Assistant-Surgeon R. B. Harris, 57th Georgia regiment, Mercer's brigade, Cleburne's division, Army of Tennessee, as post surgeon.

There is neither a quartermaster nor commissary regularly stationed here, and both are much needed.

Colonel Forney is sending forward the men as fast as they arrive. Those without shoes he has detained to act as guards until some one authorized to issue shoes, etc., from the quartermaster's department can be sent here.

About seven hundred men were returned, and started, *via* Round Mountain, yesterday; many more are said to be *en route* here.

General B. suggests that it would be well for you to send an engineer officer to this place to locate some field-works for the protection of the depot established here.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XL.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 22d, 1864.

Lieut.-Genl. TAYLOR, Selma :

General Beauregard desires to see you at Gadsden as early as practicable.

The commandant of post at Blue Mountain has been ordered to supply you with a conveyance from that point. GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. 22d, 1864.

Major MOLLOY, Chief Subsistence, Care Commandant Post, Selma :

General Beauregard desires to see you at Gadsden as soon as practicable. Your headquarters will hereafter be at Oxford, Ala.

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
JACKSONVILLE, Oct. 22d, 1864.

Major-Genl. M. L. SMITH, Chief-Engineer :

General,—I am just in receipt of a note from General Beauregard, in which he expresses the desire that you shall join him at Gadsden, as soon as practicable, for conference. I shall leave to join the General at Gadsden in the morning. GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

GADSDEN, ALA., Oct. 22d, 1864.

Lieut.-Genl. R. TAYLOR, Comdg. Dept., etc., Jacksonville, Ala. :

General,—In order to save time, I desire you should attend as soon as possible to the following matters :

Order Forrest and Roddy to enter as soon as practicable into communication, by letter or otherwise, with General Hood at some point between Guntersville and Decatur, Ala., and to remain subject to his orders for the present.

If necessary, General Hood will order General Jackson's division to report to you meanwhile for the protection of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. You must call at once on the Governors of Alabama and Mississippi for all the assistance possible for the protection of those two roads, establishing garrisons at Corinth, Bear Creek Bridge, and other important points on those roads, which should be strengthened also by the construction of such block-houses and field-works as may be required. Major-General Smith will be further instructed upon the subject.

I desire to see you here, with Major-General Smith, as soon as practicable.

Respectfully, your obedient servant, G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
IN THE FIELD, Oct. 23d, 1864.

Lieut.-Genl. RICHARD TAYLOR, Comdg., etc., Selma, Ala. :

General,—General Beauregard directs me to call your attention to the following points and instructions which he desires to be carried out :

1st. The railroad from Jacksonville to Selma will be abandoned as a means of supplying the Army of Tennessee, the base having been transferred from Jacksonville to Tusculumbia. Henceforth the lines of communication for army supplies to that point will be the Mobile and Ohio, and the Memphis and Charleston Railroads. These roads will be put forthwith in complete running order, and will be supplied with rolling-stock.

2d. Block-houses and small field-works should be constructed at proper points on these roads for the protection of bridges and trestle-works. They should be large enough to hold one or more companies of infantry. Major-General Smith, Chief-Engineer, has been directed to confer with you on the subject of field-works, etc. Negro prisoners, as far as practicable, should be employed on the block-houses and field-works.

3d. You will as soon as possible place suitable garrisons at Corinth and Bear Creek. A suitable commander should be sent at once to Corinth. General Beauregard would suggest the name of Brigadier-General D. W. Adams, but the selection of a proper commandant he leaves to your judgment.

Colonel J. C. Reid has been ordered to assume command, temporarily, of the post at Tusculumbia, until you can find a more suitable person.

4th. Major-General Forrest, as soon as practicable, after executing his present instructions, will promptly report to General J. B. Hood, in Middle Tennessee, for orders.

5th. The railroad from Selma to Jacksonville will be completed as early as practicable, as heretofore ordered; but the rolling-stock will be gradually reduced to the amount used thereon prior to the movement of General Hood's army from Jonesboro'.

6th. All men returning to the army should be sent to Tusculumbia. Before, however, being forwarded, they should be properly organized and sent under proper officers. Until the Army of Tennessee shall have passed the Tennessee River the troops returning may be detained to garrison Corinth. All the returning troops now at Oxford will be sent as above directed.

7th. The iron between Memphis and Corinth should be removed, commencing at or near Memphis. The road should be destroyed as effectively as possible to prevent its use by the enemy against us.

8th. Write to their excellencies Governors Watts and Clark to furnish you with State troops and militia to cover our railroad lines of communication.

9th. A line of couriers has been established at Oxford to communicate with the rear of the army, either by this place (Gadsden) or Blue Mountain.

I have the honor to be, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
IN THE FIELD, GADSDEN, ALA., Oct. 23d, 1864.

Genl. J. B. HOOD, Comdg. Army of Tenn. :

General,—General Beauregard desires that you will have prepared for the signature of Major-General Cheatham an address to the citizens of Tennessee, stating substantially as follows :

That Cheatham's veteran corps, in connection with the gallant corps of the chivalrous Forrest, has entered upon the soil of Tennessee to enable her sons to redeem themselves from the yoke of a vile oppressor, who has violated the integrity of her independence by a cruel and lawless invasion of her territory. That he earnestly invokes their co-operation in the glorious work of her redemption; that he calls upon them to give him and his brave troops all their aid in destroying effectually the lines of the enemy's communication and breaking up his sources of supplies, while the main body of the Army of Tennessee is engaged in the similar work of destruction from Atlanta to Chattanooga.

The General desires that this address be printed at Huntsville, or elsewhere if possible, and be freely distributed within the enemy's lines. If it cannot be printed, let as many copies as practicable be manuscripted and posted at all prominent points.

The above is designed as merely indicating the character of the address, leaving all other matters to your judgment. It cannot be printed at Jacksonville as first proposed.

Governor Harris has not arrived at these headquarters.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XLI.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, *Nov. 1st, 1864.*

Genl. J. B. HOOD, Comdg., etc., etc.:

General,—General Beauregard desires to see Brigadier-General Roddy without delay on the navigation of the Tennessee River; if not incompatible with the public service, he wishes that you would direct him to report in person on the receipt of this order.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, *Nov. 2d, 1864.*

Genl. J. B. HOOD, Comdg., etc., etc.:

General,—General Taylor has been instructed to impress the number of laborers required by Major Fleming, Chief-Engineer and General Superintendent M. and O. Railroad.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, *Nov. 4th, 1864.*

General J. B. HOOD, Comdg., etc., etc.:

General,—General Beauregard has directed me to acknowledge receipt of your communication of the 3d inst., with the copies of your telegrams to the govern-

ment. He however expresses the hope that you will soon be able to comply with his request contained in his communication of the 30th ultimo. A summary statement from each corps commander would answer the purpose.

A brief report of your plan of operations from this point, for the information of the government, he deems important, and requests that you will forward the same as early as practicable.

I have the honor to enclose copy of despatch sent on yesterday to Major-General Forrest.

He has also been advised to-day of your movement, and ordered to report to you.

I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

RICHMOND, VA., Nov. 7th, 1864: via MERIDIAN.

Genl. J. B. HOOD:

No troops can have been sent by Grant or Sheridan to Nashville. The latter has attempted to reinforce the former, but Early's movements prevented it. That fact will assure you as to their condition and purposes. The policy of taking advantage of the reported division of his forces, where he cannot reunite his army, is too obvious to have been overlooked by you. I therefore take it for granted that you have not been able to avail yourself of that advantage during this march northward from Atlanta. Hope the opportunity will be offered before he is extensively recruited. If you keep his communications destroyed, he will most probably seek to concentrate for an attack on you. But if, as reported to you, he has sent a large part of his force southward, you may first beat him in detail, and subsequently, without serious obstruction or danger to the country in your rear, advance to the Ohio River.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, Nov. 9th, 1864.

Major-Genl. SMITH, Chief-Engineer, etc.:

General,—I telegraphed you yesterday relative to certain reconnoissances about Savannah,* which it is thought should be made immediately, as a change of base from this place to Purdy may become necessary at any moment. Should the roads to Savannah and the nature of the banks of the river in that vicinity not be favorable to crossing and to the command of the river, a position higher or lower should be selected at once. The west bank should be more elevated than the opposite one, to give greater command over the approaches to the point of crossing, which should be in a re-entering of the river, if practicable, in order that our batteries may have a cross-fire on those approaches.

I send you herewith the sketch of a detached floating boom armed with a torpedo, to prevent the enemy's gunboats from passing our batteries at night. Torpedoes should be anchored also in the open spaces between the booms—say

* Savannah, Tennessee, on the Tennessee River.

one to each space. These booms, triangular in shape, about 40 feet in length by about 20 feet base, should be made of five longitudinal pieces and five or six cross ones strongly halved into and on top of the former.

The booms should be anchored across the stream about forty feet apart, from centre to centre; a second row, breaking openings, should be anchored about one hundred feet below the first row. Then, if the channel at high-water be eight hundred feet broad, each row would contain twenty booms and forty torpedoes.

The torpedoes should be about six feet below the surface of the water all stages of the river. The booms should be firmly anchored, with the apex of the triangle up-stream. I do not object to a proper modification of the above plan of boom.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, Nov. 10th, 1864.

Genl. J. B. HOOD, Comdg., etc., etc.:

General,—General Beauregard instructs me to say that he desires you would instruct Generals Wheeler, Roddy, and Forrest to furnish, as early as practicable, the number of scouts they have employed; where operating; how employed, organized, and supplied with provisions; how often they report; and whether under charge of a special officer.

He desires that all independent scouts shall forthwith report to some responsible officer, and that all scouts operating in rear of the front line of the army (cavalry included) shall at once report to their proper commands, as only regularly organized companies should be kept in rear of such lines to collect information and maintain order. And they should be supplied with rations and forage in some systematic way, to prevent depredations on private property. The system of roving or independent scouts he regards as detrimental, and should be abandoned.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

Telegram.

Col. GEO. WM. BRENT, A. A. G.:

SELMA, ALA., Nov. 12th, 1864.

General Hodge reports Canby at Memphis, and Hurlburt in command of Department. Troops going north and to Texas. Movement from Memphis anticipated.

R. TAYLOR, Lieut.-Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, Nov. 12th, 1864.

Genl. J. B. HOOD, Comdg., etc., etc.:

General Beauregard desires that you will cause bridges to be constructed across those streams or creeks between Cherokee and Tuscumbia which are liable to delay our wagon-trains.

I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, ALA., Nov. 12th, 1864.

Genl. J. B. HOOD, Comdg., etc., etc.:

General Beauregard desires to know whether the negroes at work on the railroad and fortifications in and about Corinth are the same captured by your command in Georgia; and, if so, what arrangement has been made for medical attendance upon them. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
IN THE FIELD, Nov. 12th, 1864.

Colonel,—I have just been informed by General Stewart that General Beauregard would review his corps at 11 A. M. to-day. I am surprised that one so familiar with the rule that all orders, whether for review and inspection, or whatever kind, relating to this army, must pass through me, its Commanding General, should have overlooked it in this instance.

The propriety of a review at the time and place is, in my opinion, more than questionable, as it affords the enemy in our immediate vicinity an opportunity, through spies or disaffected persons, of obtaining information in regard to our strength, of which it is desirable they should be kept as much as possible in ignorance.

Very respectfully,

J. B. HOOD, Genl. Comdg.

Col. GEO. WM. BRENT, A. A. Genl., Mil. Div. of the West.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, Nov. 12th, 1864.

General,—In reply to your communication of this date relative to the review of Stewart's corps, General Beauregard directs me to say that review was designed by him as an informal one. As he passed yesterday the headquarters of Lieutenant-General Stewart, on his way to Prospect Hill, he expressed to General Stewart a desire to review his corps, provided the weather and the condition of the ground would permit, and he, meanwhile, received no orders from you interfering therewith, of which he was to inform General Beauregard this morning about nine o'clock.

General Stewart's notice reached General Beauregard about 9½ h. this morning, and he took it for granted that General S. had informed you of the fact.

With regard to your opinion as to the "propriety of a review at this time and place," he thinks you must have a low estimate of the intelligence and judgment of your wily adversary if you suppose that at this late day he is ignorant of the position of your army and the strength of your corps.

As soon as circumstances will permit, he desires to review, separately, the corps of Generals Cheatham and Lee, provided it will not interfere with the movements of the army.

I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

Genl. J. B. HOOD, Comdg., etc., etc.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, ALA., Nov. 14th, 1864.

General,—I proceeded on yesterday morning to the headquarters of General J. B. Hood, to deliver the letters of Major-Generals Cobb and Smith, and also your views in relation to the positions for pontoons and batteries on the river, and the movement of the army. On arriving at his headquarters I found that he had crossed the Tennessee, and I went in pursuit. On reaching the north bank of the river I met Major Mason, his A. A. G., and found that General Hood was out on the lines, and being apprehensive lest I might not find him, I handed your communications and expressed your views to him. When about returning I saw General Hood, and advised him of what I had done, and communicated to him your views and wishes, among which was, that in view of the information of the concentration of the enemy's force about Decatur, Huntsville, and Pulaski, and the reported movement of Canby to Memphis, you did not desire that he would make any offensive movement until you could see him, and asking when and where it would be most convenient for you to call on him.

He replied that he did not contemplate any such movement just then; that he was moving Cheatham's corps to the north side of the river, where he designed throwing up works which might be held against any attack of the enemy, and that Stewart's corps would be moved to the position held by Cheatham that morning on the south side, where works would also be thrown up to protect the bridge.

He concurred also in your view that it would be best to select points for the construction of batteries on the river as far down and as far from the railroad as practicable. I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg., etc., etc.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUSCUMBIA, ALA., Nov. 15th, 1864.

General,—As you seemed yesterday to have misunderstood my verbal communication of the 13th inst., through my Chief of Staff, I deem it of sufficient importance to communicate in writing what I had instructed him to say relative to the movement of the Army of Tennessee.

I instructed him to tell you that in consequence of the information received the night previous—to wit: the apparent confirmation of the concentration of the bulk of Sherman's army in Middle Tennessee (at Pulaski, Huntsville, and Decatur), the arrival of Canby and part of his forces at Memphis, and the condition of Cobb's and Smith's forces at Lovejoy's Station—I desired to confer further with you before you commenced the projected movement into Middle Tennessee, now partly in process of execution; that is, Lee's corps, already in advance of Florence, and Stewart's and Cheatham's corps under orders to cross the river. My purpose was to call again your attention, as I did yesterday,

1st. To the necessity of guarding well your left flank and rear, in advancing towards Lawrenceburg and Pulaski, against a sudden offensive movement of the enemy from Huntsville or Athens across the Elk River.

2d. To securing against the passage of the enemy's gunboats another point (about Savannah or Clifton) besides Florence for the army to recross the Tennessee, in the event of disaster.

3d. To giving still greater protection to Corinth and the M. and O. Railroad to that point.

I was aware that these points had already been discussed between us, but my anxiety for the safety of the troops under your command made it incumbent on me to call again your attention to these important matters.

I wish also to inform you that the third point mentioned may require greater time than was at first supposed necessary. All orders for completing the defences of Corinth, repairing and prosecuting vigorously the work on the M. and C. Railroad to this place, and for repairing the M. and O. Railroad from Okolona to Bethel have been given, and are being carried out as rapidly as the limited means of the engineer and quartermaster's departments will permit. It is at present reported that the railroads referred to will be completed in from fifteen to twenty days; but it is not unreasonable to suppose that the prevailing unfavorable weather will delay the work one or two weeks longer.

General Taylor and myself will always be anxious to aid you in your present campaign with all the means at our control, but, these being limited, ample previous notice of what may be required should be given to enable us to make all necessary preparations.

It will also give me pleasure to confer on you such powers as you may deem necessary to secure your communications, repair roads, and hasten supplies to your army, while operating in the department of General Taylor.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

SELMA, ALA., Nov. 15th, 1864.

Col. GEO. WM. BRENT, A. A. G.:

Scouts continue to report Federals coming up the Mississippi from Vicksburg and points below.

R. TAYLOR, Lieut.-Genl.

Telegram.

TUSCUMBIA, Nov. 15th, 1864.

FROM JACKSON, MISS., Nov. 15th, 1864.

Col. G. W. BRENT, A. A. G.:

The following despatch of 7th inst. received from General Hodge: "Canby at Memphis. Hurlbut in command of department Baton Rouge. Troops going north and Texas. Movement from Memphis anticipated."

J. GARDNER, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

FLORENCE, ALA., Nov. 17th, 1864.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

The following despatch from General Wheeler, dated Lovejoy's, Nov. 16th, 1864, 11 A. M., via Barnesville, Ga., just received: "Scouts from enemy's rear report that Sherman left Atlanta yesterday (15th) morning with 15th, 17th, and

20th corps, in two columns: one on Jonesboro', and one on McDonough roads. Cavalry on his flanks. Many houses been burned in Rome, Marietta, and Atlanta. Railroad north of Atlanta and railroad bridge over Chattahoochee destroyed by enemy. Enemy advancing this morning.—Jos. Wheeler, Major-Genl.”

J. B. HOOD, Genl.

Telegram.

MOBILE, Nov. 18th, 1864.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Have just reached here, and met your telegrams of yesterday and day before. Will leave, *via* Meridian, for Selma to-day, the Montgomery road being washed away. I can send no troops from Mobile, unless I abandon that place entirely, the garrison there being already inadequate. Have ordered Clanton's command, of less than one thousand cavalry, to Opelika, which comprises all I have except reserves and force at Mobile. General Cobb telegraphs the enemy would probably reach Macon on 20th. I cannot possibly reach there in time; General Hardee probably can. I will be at Meridian to-morrow morning, at Selma to-morrow evening, and Montgomery following morning, to receive your answer.

R. TAYLOR, Lieut.-Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE WEST,
MACON, GA., Nov. 26th, 1864.

Special Field Order No. 13:

I. Lieutenant-General R. Taylor is relieved temporarily from duty in the Military Division of the West, and will report forthwith at Savannah, or wherever he may be, to Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee, commanding Department South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. As soon as the present emergency shall have passed, Lieutenant-General R. Taylor will resume command of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana.

II. Lieutenant-General R. Taylor will inquire, and report as soon as practicable, into the present condition and discipline of Major-General Wheeler's cavalry, making such suggestion as may, in his opinion, tend to increase the efficiency of said cavalry.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

MOBILE, ALA., Nov. 27th, 1864.

Colonel G. W. BRENT, A. A. G.:

Following reported by Colonel Maury: "Enemy have two thousand cavalry at Pensacola. Expecting two thousand additional infantry. Enemy have light-draught boats to land troops in Mobile Bay, or ascend the Perdido inland, to attack Mobile; will move on Blakeley, *via* Camp Withers. The fleet of observation off Mobile increased; unusual number of vessels reported off Point Clear."

D. H. MAURY, Major-Genl. Comdg.

MACON, GA., Nov. 27th, 1864: 9 P. M.

Lieut.-Genl. W. J. HARDEE, Savannah, Ga.:

General,—Your letter of the 24th inst. and other letters have been delivered

by Captain Welter. General Taylor must have given you the latest news from here; nothing important has occurred since his departure. Considering that this place is now out of danger, I shall continue to send you, as rapidly as possible, all the assistance available. I regret not being able to send you General Forrest, as desired by the President; but General Hood stated *positively*, before I left Tusculumbia, that he could not spare him without endangering the success of his movement. Moreover, Forrest would not have time now to reach you.

I am more than ever convinced that Sherman is moving by the most direct routes to the Atlantic coast, as a base whence to attack Charleston or Savannah, or to reinforce Grant in Virginia; hence he shall avoid a battle, and will not attack any interior place which may delay his march. From where he is now, about Sandersville, he may move equally well on Port Royal, Ossabaw Sound, or Darien. One or two days more will decide the point he shall have selected. Augusta can now be considered out of danger, and the movable part of its garrison can safely be transferred to Charleston or Savannah.

I desire that General Taylor should return to his department as soon as he can be spared by you.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

MACON, GA., Nov. 29th, 1864.

General,—Your letter of the 25th inst. to General Taylor, informing him that Sherman's forces had neared Sandersville [about twenty-five miles east of Milledgeville, in the direction of Savannah], and were marching, you think, on Savannah, was received by him at Albany and referred to me here. General Cobb had already sent you all the disposable forces at his command, and he will continue to do so as rapidly as circumstances will permit. You are aware, however, that we have now nearly exhausted the resources at our command. Generals Taylor and Smith will give you all additional information on the subject which you may desire.

Please keep me well advised, in cipher, of your movements and those of the enemy.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Lieut.-Genl. W. J. HARDEE, Savannah, Ga.

Telegram.

MOBILE, ALA., Dec. 1st, 1864.

Col. G. W. BRENT, A. A. G.:

Enemy Tangipahoa this A. M. for Mobile, two brigades cavalry under General Davidson, eighty-seven wagons, eight wagons bearing pontoon-train. Urge Clanton's brigade to Meridian to report to General Gardner.

D. H. MAURY, Major-Genl.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 2d, 1864: 3 P. M.

Genl. S. COOPER, A. and I. G., Richmond, Va., via Tallahassee, Fla.:

Telegram 30th ultimo received here, on my way to Mobile. I will repair forthwith to Atlantic coast.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

MACON, Dec. 3d, 1864.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Orders from Richmond are here, extending your command to seaboard. Arrangements made for you to go either by Albany or Milledgeville, as you may desire.

HOWELL COBB, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

COLUMBIA, TENN., Nov. 28th, 1864, via BURTON,
via MOBILE, Dec. 3d.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

The enemy evacuated Columbia last night, and are retreating towards Nashville. Our army is moving forward. I have no difficulty about supplies, and anticipate none in the future.

J. B. HOOD, Genl.

Telegram.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 3d, 1864.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Care Comdt. of Post:

Following from Richmond: "Nov. 30th, '64. For the present emergency your command will extend eastward to sea-coast. Your minute knowledge of the low country will enable you to dispose of the forces operating against Sherman as well as those defending the coast, so as more effectually to retard the advance of Sherman and the junction of the enemy. By order of the President. —S. Cooper, A. and I. G."

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

Telegram.

MERIDIAN, Dec. 5th, 1864.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

I have information, considered reliable, that the troops lately landed at Memphis have gone up the river. I will go to Corinth as soon as I can be spared.

FRANK GARDNER, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

SAVANNAH, Dec. 7th, 1864.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

If you come on to Savannah to-morrow determine what force is necessary for the defence of the C. and S. Railroad. General Jones, on plea of pressing necessity, is stopping all troops at Pocotaligo and other points on that road.

W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Genl.

Telegram.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 8th, 1864.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Care Genl. COBB:

The following just received:

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY TENNESSEE,
SIX MILES FROM NASHVILLE, ON THE FRANKLIN PIKE, Dec. 3d:
via BURTON, via MOBILE, 8th, 1864.

"About 4 o'clock P. M., November 30th, we attacked the enemy at Franklin, drove them from their outer lines of temporary works into their inner works,

which they abandoned during the night, leaving their dead and wounded in our possession, and retreated rapidly to Nashville, closely pursued by our cavalry. We captured several stands of colors and about a thousand prisoners. Our troops fought with great gallantry. We have to lament the loss of many gallant officers and brave men. Major-General Cleburne, Brigadier-Generals John Adams, Gist, Strahl, and Grandberry were killed. Major-General John Brown, Brigadier-Generals Canty, Manigault, Quarles, Cockerell, and Scott were wounded. Brigadier-General Gordon was captured.—Jno. B. Hood, Genl."

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

Telegram.

SAVANNAH, GA., Dec. 8th, 1864.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

I need one thousand men besides artillerists, for which last I have ordered General Jones.

W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
NEAR NASHVILLE, Dec. 11th, 1864.

Hon. J. A. SEDDON, Secy. of War:

Sir,—On the 21st of November, after a delay of three weeks, caused by the bad condition of the railroad from Okolona to Cherokee, and of the dirt road from the latter point to Florence, and also by the absence of Major-General Forrest's command, this army moved forward from Florence. Major-General Cheatham's corps, taking the road leading towards Waynesboro', and the other two corps moving on roads somewhat parallel to this, but more to the eastward, with the cavalry under General Forrest, in their advance, and upon their right flank. The enemy's forces were concentrated at Pulaski, with some force also at Lawrenceburg. I hoped to be able to place our army between these forces of the enemy and Nashville; but they, hearing of our advance, evacuated Pulaski upon the 23d, our cavalry having previously driven off their forces at Lawrenceburg, and moved rapidly by the turnpike and railroad to Columbia.

The want of a good map of the country, and the deep mud through which the army marched, prevented our coming up with the enemy before they reached Columbia; but in the evening of the 27th of November our army was placed in position in front of the enemy's works at Columbia. During the night, however, they evacuated the town, taking position on the opposite side of the river about a mile and a half from the town, which was considered quite strong in front. Therefore, late in the evening of the 28th of November, General Forrest, with most of his command, crossed Duck River a few miles above Columbia, and I followed early in the morning of the 29th with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps, and Johnson's division of Lee's corps, leaving the other divisions of Lee's corps in the enemy's front at Columbia. The troops moved in light marching order, with only one battery to the corps, my object being to make a rapid march on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin pike, and, by placing

the troops across this pike at or near Spring Hill, to cut off that portion of the enemy. The cavalry engaged the enemy near Spring Hill about mid-day, but their trains were so strongly guarded that they were unable to break through them. About 4 P. M. our infantry forces, Major-General Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy about two miles from Spring Hill, through which the Columbia and Franklin pike passed. The enemy were at this time moving along this pike, with some of their troops formed on the flank of their column to protect it. Major-General Cheatham was ordered at once to attack the enemy vigorously, and get possession of this pike; and, although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Darkness soon came on, and, to our mortification, the enemy continued moving along this road, almost in ear-shot, in hurry and confusion, nearly the entire night. Thus was lost the opportunity for striking the enemy for which we had labored so long—the best which this campaign has offered, and one of the best, afforded during the war. Major-General Cheatham has frankly confessed the great error of which he was guilty, and attaches all the blame to himself. While his error lost so much to the country, it has been a severe lesson to him, by which he will profit in the future. In consideration of this, and of his previous conduct, I think it is best that he should retain, for the present, the command he now holds. Before daylight next morning (November 30th) the entire column of the enemy had passed us, retreating rapidly towards Franklin, burning many of their wagons. We followed as fast as possible, moving by the Columbia and Franklin pike; Lieutenant-General Lee, with the two divisions, and trains and artillery, moving from Columbia by the same road. The enemy made a feint of making a stand on the hills about four (4) miles from Franklin, in the direction of Spring Hill; but as soon as our forces commenced deploying to attack them, and extending to outflank them on their left, they retired slowly to Franklin. This created a delay of some hours. We, however, commenced advancing on Franklin, and attacked the place about 4 P. M. with the corps of Generals Stewart and Cheatham, Johnson's division of Lee's corps becoming engaged later. We carried the enemy's entire line of temporary works, but failed to carry the interior line.

During the night I had our artillery brought forward and placed in position to open upon them in the morning, but the enemy retreated rapidly during the night on Nashville, leaving their dead and wounded in our hands. We captured about a thousand (1000) prisoners and several stands of colors. Our loss in officers was severe: the names of the general officers I have already given by telegraph. Our entire loss was four thousand five hundred (4500). We continued our march towards Nashville, and on the 2d of December our army took its present position in front of and about two miles from the city.

Lieutenant-General Lee's corps, which constitutes our centre, rests upon the Franklin pike, with General Cheatham upon his right and General Stewart upon his left. Our line is strongly intrenched, and all the available positions upon our flanks and in rear of them are now being fortified with strong, self-supporting, detached works, so that they may easily be defended should the

enemy move out upon us. The enemy still have some six thousand (6000) troops strongly intrenched at Murfreesboro'. This force is entirely isolated, and I now have the larger part of the cavalry under General Forrest, with two brigades of infantry, in observation of these forces, and to prevent their foraging upon the country. Should this force attempt to leave Murfreesboro', or should the enemy attempt to reinforce it, I hope to be able to defeat them.

I think the position of this army is now such as to force the enemy to take the initiative. Middle Tennessee, although much injured by the enemy, will furnish an abundance of commissary stores, but ordnance and certain quartermaster stores will have to come from the rear, and therefore it is very important that the railroad should be repaired at once from Cherokee to Decatur. The cars can now run from here to Pulaski, on the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad, and we have sufficient rolling-stock, captured from the enemy, to answer our purposes. I will endeavor to put the road in order from Pulaski to Decatur as soon as possible.

As yet I have not had time to adopt any general system of conscription, but hope soon to do so, and to bring into the army all men liable to military duty.

Some fifteen thousand (15,000) of the enemy's Trans-Mississippi troops are reported to be moving to reinforce the enemy here. I hope this will enable us to obtain some of our troops from that side in time for the spring campaign, if not sooner.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, Genl.

Official.

A. P. MASON, Col., and A. A. G.

Official.

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
MONTGOMERY, ALA., *Jan. 9th, 1865.*

This report should have been addressed to these Headquarters, to be forwarded thence to the War Department.

General Hood does not seem to understand that he is responsible directly to these Headquarters, and *not* to the War Department. Colonel Brent, Chief of Staff, will call his attention to that fact.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XLII.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *Dec. 2d, 1864: 9.30 P. M.*

Genl. S. COOPER, A. and I. G., Richmond, Va., *via* Tallahassee:

Scouts report that General Steele, with 15,000 men, landed at Memphis on 24th, and went up river on 26th, it is supposed to reinforce Thomas at Nashville. General Hood has been informed of fact.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

SAVANNAH, GA., Dec. 8th, 1864.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

I cannot leave Savannah for the conference you desire without injury to the service. I deem it also important that General Jones shall not leave the threatened points on the Charleston and Savannah Railroad. I suggest that you come to Pocotaligo to see him, and then to Savannah.

I am, however, ready to conform to your wishes if you think otherwise.

W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Genl.

Telegram.

WILMINGTON, Dec. 9th, 1864.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

General Lee telegraphs march of two corps of Grant's army, and division of cavalry marching on North Carolina by Weldon, with large amount of wagons and cattle. Requires troops of this department to oppose them.

W. H. C. WHITING.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 11th, 1864.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, care Genl. COBB, Macon, Ga.:

The following from General Hood:

"General Maury telegraphs to General Dan. Adams that troops must be concentrated at Mobile immediately. Enemy was across Pascagoula yesterday, advancing on Mobile road.

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G."

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT SOUTH CAROLINA,
POCOTALIGO, Dec. 12th, 1864.

General,—I have the honor to forward for your information a summary return of the troops along the line of the railroad from this point to the Savannah River, exclusive of certain cavalry forces commanded by Brigadier-General Young and Colonel C. J. Colcock, from whom no reports have been received.

The hurried manner in which these troops have been collected—many of them having never been in the field before, and nearly all of them assembled in detachments—will account for the separation of the several organizations composing the entire command. Steps will be taken at once to secure a more perfect organization, and to collect the scattered detachments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery under their immediate commanders.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAM. JONES, Major-Genl.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg., etc., Charleston.

Artillery in Fifth Subdistrict, South Carolina, December 12th, 1864.

Command.	Commander.	No. of Guns.	Positions.
Beaufort Artillery....	Captain Stuart ..	4	Two Napoleons, at Coosawhatchie; one 12-pounder howitzer, Bee's Creek; one 12-pounder howitzer, Honey Hill.
Colcock's Horse Arty..	Lieut. Johnson..	2	At Coosawhatchie, two Napoleons.
Furman Light Arty...	Captain Earle...	4	One 10-pounder Parrott, two 6-pounders, Honey Hill; one Napoleon, Honey Hill.
De Saussure Artillery..	Captain De Pass	4	Two 10-pounder Parrotts, Honey Hill; two Napoleons, Coosawhatchie.
Lafayette Artillery	Capt. Kanapaux	4	Two 6-pounders, Bee's Creek; one 12-pounder howitzer, Honey Hill; one 12-pounder howitzer, Coosawhatchie.
German Artillery	Capt. Bachman..	4	Four 12-pounder howitzers, Tulafinny Trestle.
Girardy's Artillery	Capt. Girardy ...	6	Three Napoleons, and two 54-inch Blakelys, Tulafinny Trestle; one Napoleon, Old Pocotaligo.
Charles's Artillery	Capt. Charles ...	4	Two 12-pounder howitzers, and two 6-pounders, Sisters Ferry.
Palmetto Guards, Sec..	Captain Webb...	2	Two 20-pounder Parrotts, Old Pocotaligo.
Guns in Position.			
Old Pocotaligo.....	One 24-pounder iron howitzer, two 34-inch Blakelys.		
Honey Hill.....	Two 12-pounder iron howitzers.		
Movable guns			34
Guns in position			5
Total			39

CHARLES S. STRINGFELLOW, A. A. G.

Troops in Fifth Subdistrict, South Carolina, December 12th, 1864. Brigadier-General JAMES CHESTNUT'S Command, Grahamville.

Command.	Commanding Officer.	Effective Total.	Positions.
2d Regiment South Carolina Militia	Lieut.-Col. Duncan....	76	Honey Hill.
3d Regiment South Carolina Militia	Lieut.-Col. Harrington	412	Honey Hill.
4th Regiment South Carolina Militia	Lieut.-Col. Spearman..	249	Honey Hill.
1st, 2d, and 3d Battlins. S. C. Reserves	Brig.-Genl. Blanchard	583	{ Bee's Creek and Dawson's Bluff.
Lafayette Artillery.....	Captain Kanapaux....	125	{ Bee's Creek, Dawson's Bluff, and Honey Hill.
Beaufort Artillery, Section	Lieutenant Baker	43	Bee's Creek & Bolan Road.
De Saussure Artillery	Lieutenant Gilbert	42	Honey Hill.
Earle's Artillery	Lieutenant Furman	84	Honey Hill.
Company C, 3d S. C. Cavalry	Lieutenant Farr	42	Picket duty.
Company E, 3d S. C. Cavalry	Captain Frayser	72	Picket duty.
Total.....		1728	
Reserves.	Militia.	Confederate Artillery.	Cavalry.
583	76	125	42
	412	43	72
	249	42	114
	737	84	
		294	
Reserves			583
Militia.....			737
Confederate Artillery			294
Confederate Cavalry.....			114
Grand total			1728
Effective total of Brigadier-General Chestnut's Command.....			1728
Effective total of Brigadier-General W. B. Taliaferro's Command			3888
Grand total.....			5566

CHARLES S. STRINGFELLOW, A. A. G.

Return of Troops between Bee's Creek and Pocotaligo, inclusive, December 12th, 1864.
Brigadier-General W. B. TALIAFFERRO, Commanding.

Command.	Commander.	Effective Total.	Positions.
Colonel Moore, Commanding.			
3d Georgia Reserves.....	Colonel Moore....	465	{ Coosawhatchie and line to Tulafunny Trestle.
Beaufort Artillery, one Section.....	Captain Stuart....	
Depass Artillery, one Section.....	Lieutenant Mazyk	
Johnson's Horse Artillery, one Section..	Lieut. Johnson	163	
Earle's Battery, one gun.....	
One Company 1st South Carolina Militia	24	..
Captain Campbell, Commanding.			
Company B, 3d South Carolina Cavalry	32	..
Company H, 3d South Carolina Cavalry	66	..
Company D, 3d South Carolina Cavalry	10	..
Company C, State Reserves	40	..
Company H, State Reserves	37	..
Colonel Edwards, Commanding.			
47th Georgia Regiment.....	Col. Edwards	304	..
32d Georgia Regiment.....	Lieut.-Col. Bacon	291	..
1st North Carolina Reserves	301	..
1st South Carolina Militia	612	..
South Carolina Cadets	125	..
German Light Artillery.....	107	..
Girard's Battery.....	111	..
Young's Dismounted Cavalry.....	387	..
Colonel Daniel, Commanding.			
5th Georgia Regiment.....	Colonel Daniel....	231	..
1st Georgia Reserves	170	..
Section of Girard's Battery	54	..
Major Jenkins, Commanding.			
Company A, Siege-train.....	Captain Webb	54	Old Pocotaligo.
Detachment 1st South Carolina Cavalry	Capt. Trezvant....	130	
Detachment 1st South Carolina Cavalry	Captain Brown ...	32	
Kirk's Squadron.....	Captain Kirk.....	107	
Total.....		3898	
Reserves. Militia. Confederates.			
465	24	304	
40	612	291	
37	636	125 Cadets.	
301		387 Dismounted Cavalry.	
170		231	
1013		1338	
Cavalry. Artillery.			
32	163	636	
66	107	1013	
10	111	2987 Infantry.	
103	34	420 Artillery.	
	420	103 Cavalry.	
		Total..... 3515, Coosawhatchie.	
Two Napoleons..... Lieutenant Johnson.			
Two Napoleons..... Captain De Pass.			
One 12-pounder howitzer..... Captain Kanapaux.			
Artillery. Cavalry.			
54	107		
	130		
	32		
	269 Cavalry.		
	54 Artillery.		
Total.....	823, Old Pocotaligo.		

Movement of Fleet.

Savannah.—To remain two days after our troops have evacuated the city to protect the evacuation. Then to be ready to proceed by sea, by the way of Augustin Creek. Lieutenant McAdams to take two boats from the *Savannah* to remove the torpedoes at Turner's Rocks.

Islandiga.—After the evacuation of our troops, will proceed up the river, if there are no enemy's batteries to prevent it, and join Flag-officer Hunter. Otherwise to try the passage to sea by Augustin Creek.

Fire Fly.—Proceed up the river to join Flag-officer Hunter.

Georgia.—The General commanding will give notice of the time of dismantling Forts Jackson and Lee, when the guns will be spiked and shots jammed in the guns. The crew will leave the ship for Screven's Ferry, at the same time scuttling the ships effectually.

Guns on the Lower End of Hutchinson's Island.—Spike the guns and jam shots in them. Break the carriages.

The foregoing plan was adopted on the advice and approval of Generals Beauregard and Hardee.

THOS. W. BRENT, Comdt. Afloat, *pro tem.*

Savannah, Dec. 18th, 1864.

Memorandum for Location of Troops.

SAVANNAH, GA., Dec. 18th, 1864.

1. Smith's division (about two thousand men) as soon as it shall reach Hardeeville, to go to Augusta *via* Charleston (transportation to be provided beforehand).

2. Wright's division to be sent to Robertson's district as soon as it shall reach Hardeeville. General Robertson to report to Wright temporarily, to advise as to dispositions of the troops, and then to be assigned according to circumstances.

3. McLaws's division to go under command of Brigadier-General Taliaferro to James Island as soon as it can be spared from Hardeeville.

4. Major-General McLaws to relieve General Taliaferro of his present command at Pocotaligo, and to defend the line of the Combahee.

5. Colonel E. C. Anderson's brigade to be sent to James Island (Third Sub-district, South Carolina) as soon as it shall reach Hardeeville.

6. Young's brigade to be increased by the 7th Georgia Cavalry (dismounted, commanded by Colonel E. C. Anderson, Jr.).

7. Wheeler's cavalry corps (that part of it east of the Savannah River) will guard the crossings of the Savannah and New River; also the landings east of Screven's Ferry causeway, until compelled by the enemy to retire. He will then guard and defend the country between the Savannah and the defensive line in rear of the Combahee. He will also guard the right flank of said line, resting at or near Barnwell, to Augusta.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 19th, 1864.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

General Hood on the 12th says: "When Sherman completes his raid he deems

it important that all available cavalry should be sent to him. Wants Baker's brigade at Mobile, and all troops that can be spared."

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

Confidential Circular.

HEADQUARTERS, SAVANNAH, GA., Dec. 19th, 1864.

1. The troops in and around Savannah will be transferred to-night to the left bank of the Savannah River, and will proceed thence to Hardeeville.

2. At dark the light batteries will, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Chief of Artillery, be withdrawn by hand from their positions in line with as little noise as possible, and will be sent over the pontoon-bridge to Hardeeville.

3. The troops at Whitmarsh, Fort Jackson, and Bartow will be assembled at Fort Jackson by 9 P. M., and thence will proceed at once, *via* Screven's Ferry, to Hardeeville.

4. The troops at Rose Dew, Beaulieu, etc., will leave their positions at dark, and, marching to Savannah, will cross at Screven's Ferry.

5. Major-General Wright's division will be withdrawn from the lines at 8 P. M., and will pass the river on the pontoons.

6. Major-General McLaws's division will be withdrawn from its position at 10 o'clock P. M., and will cross the river on the pontoons.

7. Major-General Smith's division will be withdrawn at eleven o'clock, and will cross on the pontoons.

8. The lines of skirmishers will be left in position as follows: Wright's line, until 10.30 o'clock; McLaws's line, until 12.30 o'clock; Smith's line, until 1 o'clock.

9. The pontoon-bridges are placed in charge of Colonel Clarke, Chief of Engineers, who will destroy the bridges after all the troops shall have crossed; and to enable him to ascertain this, the skirmishers of each division will be placed in charge of an intelligent staff-officer, who will report to Colonel Clarke at the pontoon-bridge when the skirmishers of their respective commands shall have passed the river.

10. The Chief of Artillery will take measures to have the heavy guns in position spiked, or otherwise rendered useless, as follows: On Wright's line, at 10 o'clock; on McLaws's line, at 11 o'clock; on Smith's line, at 12 o'clock.

11. The ammunition will be destroyed by throwing it into the river or otherwise, and *not* by blowing it up.

12. The guns on the inner line will be spiked or destroyed, and all powder in the city magazines will be made useless by having water thrown on it.

13. All wagons will be sent into the city in time to cross on the pontoon at dark.

By command of Lieut.-General Hardee,

T. B. ROY, A. A.-Genl.

R. C. GILCHRIST, A. A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
POCOTALIGO, Dec. 20th, 1864.

Memorandum of Orders to be Issued by Lieutenant-General Hardee immediately after the Evacuation of Savannah.

1. Major-General G. W. Smith will proceed immediately with his command to Charleston, and thence to Augusta, after being relieved by other troops, as hereinafter directed.

2. Major-General McLaws's division (the senior brigadier commanding), and Colonel Anderson's brigade preceding, will proceed immediately to Charleston and relieve Major-General G. W. Smith's division.

3. Major-General Wright's division and Brigadier-General Chestnut's command (about 1500 men), consisting of South Carolina Reserves, and 2d, 3d, and 4th South Carolina Militia, to the Fourth Military Subdistrict, a reserve of about five hundred men being stationed at Green Pond, and another of like number near Adams's Run.

Brigadier-General Robertson will report to Major-General Wright for temporary duty, to advise as to disposition of troops, and then to be assigned to duty as circumstances may require.

4. Colonel George P. Harrison's and Colonel A. C. Edwards's brigades to be stationed on the left bank of the Combahee, guarding the several passages (about six) across that river to Barnwell Court-house. Brigadier-General Young's command to be increased by the 7th Georgia cavalry (dismounted), Colonel E. C. Anderson, Jr., commanding, as reserves, at or near Blue House, between the Combahee and Ashepoo rivers.

5. The 3d South Carolina cavalry and Kirk's squadron will cover the left (or coast) flank of the retiring troops. After crossing the Combahee, Major John Jenkins, with Captain Seabrook's and Peeble's companies, 3d South Carolina cavalry, will take post on Johns Island, and Captain Kirk's squadron will proceed, *via* Charleston, to Christ Church parish and take post near and northeast of Mount Pleasant.

6. Major-General Wheeler's corps (that part of it east of Savannah River, and the remainder if it should come up) will guard crossings of the Savannah and New rivers, and the landings east of Screven's causeway, until forced by the enemy to retire. He will then guard and defend the country between the Savannah River and the defensive line of the Combahee and the right flank of that line, resting at or near Barnwell Court-house, and extending by the shortest defensible line to the Savannah River, covering Augusta.

7. Colonel Gonzales will assign the field artillery now in South Carolina to the most appropriate positions for the defence of the Fourth Subdistrict and the line of the Combahee from Salkehatchie bridge to the coast, taking care to assign the batteries to the positions with which their respective commanders are most familiar. He will assign, subject to General Hardee's approval, the field batteries coming from Savannah as circumstances may indicate for the best defence of the line of the Combahee, the Fourth Subdistrict, and Augusta.

8. As soon as the services of Brigadier-General Taliaferro can be spared from

the duty on which he is now engaged he will proceed to James Island and resume his former command, assigning to their appropriate positions the troops of Major-General McLaws's division and Colonel Anderson's brigade, destined for that island.

9. As soon as Major-General McLaws's division moves from Hardeeville he will immediately proceed to Pocatigo and relieve Major-General Samuel Jones, and take the immediate command of the troops on the line of the Combahee.

10. On being relieved by Major-General McLaws, Major-General Jones will proceed to Charleston and resume his command, and enter on the duties designated by S. O. No. — from Department Headquarters.

11. As the cavalry retires before the enemy it will drive off all cattle, sheep, and hogs not necessary for its consumption, and impress and send to Charleston, to be turned over to the Chief-Engineer, all negroes capable of bearing arms. It will also destroy all mills, boats, buildings (that may be useful to the enemy for military purposes), and all rice, corn, and other provisions not necessary for its own subsistence, beyond such as is absolutely necessary for the consumption of the owners, and their families and slaves.

12. All teams and wagons (with their drivers) on plantations about to fall into the hands of the enemy, not required by their owners, shall be impressed for the use of the army.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

POCOTALIGO, S. C., Dec. 20th, 1864: 10.40 A. M.

The Officer Comdg. at Hardeeville, or Capt. COURTNEY, Post Quartermaster:

Send immediately by courier the following to the officer commanding the guard at Savannah River bridge:

Burn immediately and thoroughly destroy the Savannah River Railroad bridge and trestle on this side. Send copy of above to General Wheeler and General Taliaferro for their information.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

POCOTALIGO, S. C., Dec. 20th, 1864: 10.30 A. M.

It is essential that the Savannah River should be commanded by your gun-boat as long as possible from the enemy's upper battery to as high up as navigation will permit.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Com. HUNTER, on board of *Macon*, near Parysburg, S. C.,
care of Capt. COURTNEY, at Hardeeville.

Telegram.

POCOTALIGO, S. C., Dec. 21st, 1864: 10.30 A. M.

General Jones reports no transportation available to send you. Should rains commence, any delay in movement may be fatal to its success. General Taliaferro and command must be ordered back soon as practicable.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Lieut.-Genl. W. J. HARDEE, Comdg. Dept., Savannah, Ga.

Telegram.

HARDEEVILLE, Dec. 21st, 1864.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

We brought out from Savannah forty-nine (49) pieces of light artillery, which will be disposed of as follows: Twelve (12) to Wheeler, twelve (12) with the forces here, including two (2) pieces to be sent to New River, four (4) to Honey Hill, five (5) to Coosawhatchie, fourteen to report to Colonel Gonzales at Pocatigo, and two (2), manned by militia-men, to accompany Smith's division.

W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Genl.

RICHMOND, April 6th, 1875.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, New Orleans :

General,—Your letter of March 30th was received last evening. I have not seen Colonel Jones's book on "The Siege of Savannah in 1864," to which you allude, but will get it at an early day.

I have heard so many misstatements from time to time in regard to this event, that the seizure of my papers and other effects in upper South Carolina by a troop of marauding Federal cavalry just after the war, which has prevented me from being able to give any statement of the affair which I could authenticate by documents, has always been a matter of sincere regret; and I have not thought that any other kind of statement would be worthy of consideration. My recollections, however, are very clear in regard to circumstances, and my official position gave me peculiar advantages for knowing the opinions of the leading officers, and the plans determined on from time to time; yet I am unable to give exact dates, or to arrange the occurrences in the proper order.

Enclosed I send you a few papers for your perusal, which will fix some dates, and will show you what were the relations between General Hardee and myself, and also will throw some light on his intentions and views.

I happened to be at the councils of war held at both your visits to Savannah, the first about the 7th or 10th of December, and the last about the 17th, and in the absence of Colonel Roy, A. G. for General Hardee, acted as secretary of the meetings.

The first council was composed of yourself, with Generals Hardee, McLaws, Wright, and G. W. Smith. At the last one of the major-generals was absent, but I cannot state positively which one. I wrote at your dictation the general plan of operations, which was substantially followed out in the orders issued by Colonel Roy, by order of General Hardee.

Your recollection is somewhat in error in regard to the construction of the bridge across the Savannah River. It was on your first visit that the question of providing a means of evacuation was discussed, as you will see by referring to the note of General Hardee. By the 13th the bridge was completed across the main channel, and the causeway was made over Hutchinson's Island. The completion of the bridge was delayed by the destruction of rice boats, collected by my orders at different points on the river, by the cavalry we had on the South Carolina shore, who thought that they were being collected by the enemy to transport his force across. When you returned, about the 17th, you found the

bridge yet incomplete, and I well remember the anxiety you expressed when I stated the condition of affairs in consequence of this blunder. * * *

The bridge work was done by a company of engineer troops, under the command of Captain Robert M. Stiles; and the causeway by a force under Mr. Daniel Callahan, previously a railroad contractor, then in the service of the Engineer Department of Confederate States. Most efficiently did these gentlemen, and the officers and men acting with them, do their duty.

The bridge and causeway were located by myself in person immediately after my arrival at Savannah, and I received no suggestions from any except yourself as to the manner of construction. My recollection of these suggestions is the same as your own, except that they were made on your first and not on your last visit.

On or about the 13th of December General Hardee thought seriously of evacuation, without awaiting the completion of the bridge; at least such was my impression from our consultations, and this view his note of the 13th, urging the construction of a floating wharf on the north side of Hutchinson's Island, seems to corroborate. We were certainly in a precarious situation, but I urged that the enemy had not yet shown the disposition to act in the direction which it had previously been agreed on must be the signal for our departure, and that we might yet perfect our communications in time. Most gallantly and soldierly did he examine each question, take every responsibility, and make his dispositions for action, when the time came. In making this statement I would not in any manner detract from his noble fame. He may have had information that he did not care to impart to me; and while I communicate my thoughts on the subject to you, I do not desire to put this idea of his (which could only have been executed at such fearful risks) on record.

The memoranda instructing me to prepare orders for the evacuation of Charleston, and notes for the disposition of his force at other times, made in his own hand, which you will doubtless recognize, will show that the clearness of the instructions I had drawn up for him at Savannah was sufficiently satisfactory for him to trust me in the same line of duty again, though previously I had scarcely done more than to put your orders in form, and I believe that I retained his confidence during his life.

Excuse a hastily written letter. I thought it best to write at once; and if any points might suggest themselves to you on which you might wish to compare your recollection of events with mine, I would at all times be ready to write all that I can remember.

The scraps I enclose are the only ones now in my possession, I think, in which General Hardee used his own pen; and as they are of little value to others, and I prize them as relics of the past, I will be obliged to you to return them to me, after making any copy or memoranda from them that you wish.

Very sincerely and respectfully yours, etc.,

JNO. G. CLARKE.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 23d, 1864.

To Genl. S. COOPER, Adjt.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

Unless Wheeler's cavalry of twelve so-called brigades can be properly organ-

ized into divisions under good commanders, a large portion of it had better be dismounted forthwith. Its conduct in front of the enemy and its depredations on private property render it worse than useless. I regret being unable to recommend for promotion any of General Wheeler's brigadiers; but hope that if two or three available Major-Generals cannot be had, promotions might be made for the purpose indicated from General Hampton's cavalry. Brigadier-General Dearing, of that command, attracted my attention last summer as a promising officer. I would be glad to have him. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 25th, 1864.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Have no official tidings from Army Tennessee; but am apprehensive that some reverse has taken place. General S. D. Lee telegraphs from Florence, December 23d: "Will be in Okolona or Columbus in a few days, and will be glad to have your views in relation to recent events in Tennessee." I have telegraphed him for an explanation. GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, D. W. LA., SHREVEPORT,
Jan. 5th, 1865.

Colonel,—Your letter of the 3d inst., relating to the crossing of troops to the east bank of the Mississippi River, and enclosing copies of correspondence on that subject, has been received. In reply I have the honor to state that in my opinion it is impracticable at this season of the year to cross any considerable body of men. The following are some of the reasons upon which this opinion is based:

When the attempt was made last summer, under the direction of Lieutenant-General Taylor, the roads leading to the Mississippi River were practicable for all arms of the service, and the country through which the movement was made abounded in forage and provisions, a concentration of the troops with a view of forcing or surprising a passage of the river induced a corresponding concentration of the enemy's gunboats. After making renewed attempts to effect a crossing General Taylor abandoned the enterprise as hopeless, expressing the opinion that it was impracticable. The vigilance of the enemy, and their means of resisting the crossing were so great that Major-General Wharton, commanding the cavalry, after a careful reconnoissance made use of the illustration, "that a bird, if dressed in Confederate gray, would find it difficult to fly across the river." The only feasible plan to have crossed at that time would have been to have crossed the army in small squads at various points, leaving it virtually without organization, and making it equivalent, in the disaffected condition of the troops at that time, to a disorganization and dispersion of two-thirds of the army. If it were impracticable when Lieutenant-General Taylor so justly pronounced it so, the difficulties are greatly increased at this time.

The country is exhausted of its provisions and forage. The swamps are utterly impracticable for an army. The country would not support the troops,

and provisions cannot be carried with them. The Washita River being now high, any troops occupying the country east of it would be isolated between the rivers and must be ultimately lost, for I have no artillery of sufficient calibre to prevent the occupation of the Washita by the enemy's ironclad vessels. It would be impossible to place in the river the system of torpedoes suggested by General Beauregard, because the preliminary preparations would necessarily be known to the enemy, and a concentration of their gunboats would prevent the placing of even one of the frames suggested.

In my opinion, the only means of crossing a force at any time would be to occupy two points on the bank with artillery of sufficiently heavy calibre to control the river, and to support the batteries thus established with a force sufficiently strong to prevent their capture by a land-force. But there is not a gun in my command which would make an impression upon a heavy ironclad; and experience at Vicksburg and Port Hudson shows that even with numerous heavy batteries the Mississippi cannot be blockaded.

These reasons induce me to think that it is entirely impracticable to cross an army over the Mississippi River at this time. The utmost that can be done is to pass men in small squads, with the disorganization and demoralization attendant upon such a proceeding.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. B. BUCKNER, Lieut.-Genl. Comdg.

To Col. J. F. BELTON, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, T. M. D., SHREVEPORT, Jan. 6th, 1865.

Official.

H. P. PRATT, A. A. G. ———

HEADQUARTERS, TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT,
SHREVEPORT, LA., Jan. 6th, 1865.

General,—Your letter of December 2d from Montgomery, Ala., together with a communication from Colonel Brent, Assistant Adjutant-General, of the 3d of the same month, were delivered by your aid, Captain Toutant, on the 20th ultimo. Feeling convinced of the utter impracticability of operating during the winter season, I delayed answering your letter until Lieutenant-General Buckner, commanding District of West Louisiana, to whom it had been submitted, could be consulted. I enclose you a copy of his reply.

The swamps on the Mississippi are at this season impassable for conveyances; the bayous and streams all high and navigable for the enemy's gunboats; the country has been so devastated by the contending armies, and is so exhausted that the troops would require transportation for supplies for near three hundred miles from the interior to the Mississippi. Appreciating our necessities in your department, and ardently desiring the transfer of this army to your aid, I am powerless to assist you either by crossing troops or by operating in North Arkansas and Missouri. The country north of Red River is bare of supplies, and is at this season utterly impracticable for the operations of armies and the movement of troops. More than two hundred miles of destitution intervene between our supplies and the enemy's works on the Arkansas, near five hun-

dred of desert separate our base on Red River from the productive region of Missouri. Trusting you appreciate the difficulties under which I labor, and believe in an honest desire on my part to assist you, I remain,

Your friend and obedient servant,

E. KIRBY SMITH, Genl.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg. Military Division of the West.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XLIII.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY TENNESSEE, *Dec. 12th, 1864.*
SIX MILES FROM NASHVILLE, ON FRANKLIN PIKE, *via*
BURTON, 12TH, *via* MOBILE, 12TH.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Whenever you can, I will be pleased if you could visit this army.

J. B. HOOD, Genl.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS, SPRING HILL, *Dec. 17th, 1864.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD (*Duplicate*):

In front of Nashville, on the morning of the 15th, the enemy attacked both of our flanks about the same time. On our right they were repulsed with heavy loss, but towards evening they succeeded in driving in our infantry outpost upon our left flank. Dispositions were made during the night to meet any renewed attack. Early on the 16th they made a general attack on our entire line, and all their assaults were handsomely repulsed with heavy loss till 3.30 P. M., when a portion of our line to the left of the centre suddenly gave way, causing in a few moments our line to give way at all points, our troops retreating rapidly down the Franklin pike. We lost in the day's engagement fifty pieces artillery, with several advanced wagons; our loss in killed and wounded is very small. Our loss in prisoners is not yet fully ascertained, but is comparatively small. Major-General Ed. Johnson and Brigadier-Generals T. B. Smith and H. R. Jackson are among them. I still have artillery enough with the army, and am moving to the south of Duck River.

J. B. HOOD, Genl.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Dec. 23d, 1864: 10 A. M.*

Inform General Hood that no reinforcements can possibly be sent him from any quarter. General Taylor has no troops to spare, and every available man in Georgia and South Carolina is required to oppose Sherman, who is not on a "raid," but on an important campaign.

Should General H. be unable to gain any material advantage in Tennessee with his present means, he must retire at once behind the Tennessee River, and come with or send to Augusta by best and quickest route all forces not absolutely required to hold defensive line referred to.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Col. G. W. BRENT, A. A. G., Montgomery, Ala.

Telegram.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 24th, 1864.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Charleston, S. C. :

General Taylor reports enemy left Memphis on 21st, moving on State Line road. His advance reached Lafayette depot, 11 A. M. 20th. Force—two brigades negroes, one of white cavalry. Object of movement not developed. Have nothing official from Hood.

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

Telegram.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 25th, 1864.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Charleston, S. C. :

General S. D. Lee reports from Florence he will be at Okolona in a few days. States he would be glad to have General Beauregard's views in regard to recent events in Tennessee. There are no advices whatever from that quarter, and I do not understand General Lee's telegraph. Am apprehensive that some reverse may have occurred.

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, VA., Jan. 2d, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Yours of 31st December received. If you find it necessary to make the change suggested, you are authorized to employ General Taylor as proposed.

JEFFN. DAVIS.

Telegram.

AUGUSTA, GA., Jan. 3d, 1865 : 9 P. M.

I have selected a defensive line behind Brier Creek in Georgia to connect with Salkehatchie line; have ordered General Smith to have it reconnoitred and report to you. I leave in morning.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Lieut.-Genl. W. J. HARDEE, Charleston, S. C.

Telegram.

CORINTH, MISS., Jan. 3d, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Your telegrams of the 27th and 28th from Charleston and Montgomery received. Steps are being taken to execute your orders therein contained, but a certain time is absolutely necessary that the army may have some rest and obtain a supply of shoes and clothing. I am assembling army at Tupelo for these purposes. It is important that you should visit this army before the projected move if you can leave your present position.

J. B. HOOD, Genl.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
RICHMOND, Jan. 6th, 1865.

Extract—Special Orders, No. 4 :

* * * XVI. The Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida will hereafter include, besides the States of South Carolina and Florida, that portion of

Georgia embraced in the following lines: commencing at Augusta and running along the Georgia Railroad to Warrenton, thence *via* Sparta and Milledgeville, following the line of the railroad to the Ocmulgee River, but not including Macon; down the Ocmulgee to Coffee County, following the western boundary of that county to the Alapaha River, and down that river and the Suwanee to the Gulf.

By command of the Secretary of War,

JNO. WITHERS, Assist. Adjt.-Genl.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg., etc.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, VA., Jan. 7th, 1865.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Hardee needs aid. If Hood has not complied with your suggestion, please give the matter prompt attention.

JEFFN. DAVIS.

MACON, GA., Jan. 7th, 1865: 11 A. M.

To Genl. S. COOPER, Adjt.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

General Hood reports from Corinth, Miss., January 3d, 1865, that the army recrossed Tennessee River at Bainbridge without material loss since battle of Franklin, and that it will be assembled in a few days in vicinity of Tupelo to be supplied with shoes, clothing, and forage, which are necessary to render it effective for military operations, and that it absolutely requires rest. He deems it of vital importance that the Trans-Mississippi troops should be furloughed by organizations for one hundred days.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

MACON, GA., Jan. 7th, 1865: 9 A. M.

To Col. GEO. WM. BRENT, A. A. G., Montgomery, Ala.:

I leave this evening. Order General Hood in writing to make report of his operations from Tuscumbia to Nashville, and back to Tupelo. I have telegraphed him to same effect.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Jan. 9th, 1865.

To President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

I will leave as soon as practicable for Hood's army, and will send to Hardee's assistance all troops which can be spared. Condition of common roads and breaks in railroads will, however, delay their arrival. Should circumstances permit, I will return with them.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Jan. 9th, 1865.

To Genl. J. B. Hood, Genl. Comdg., Army of Tennessee, Tupelo, Miss.:

President orders that whatever troops you can spare be sent forthwith to General Hardee's assistance. Consult General Taylor, if with you, and prepare accordingly. I will be at Tupelo as soon as practicable.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

TUPELO, MISS., Jan. 10th, 1865.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

I am preparing to obey the orders contained in your cipher telegram of the 9th. Have had a full consultation with Lieutenant-General Taylor, but will be able to make no shipment before your arrival here, which will, I hope, be very soon.

J. B. HOOD, Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

Jan. 10th, 1865.

Special Orders, No. 5:

1. In pursuance of a telegram from A. and I. G. O., Richmond, Major-General D. H. Hill and personal staff will proceed to Charleston and report to Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee. Quartermaster's Department will furnish transportation for their horses. * * *

By command of General Beauregard.

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, VA., Jan. 11th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Your assignment of General D. H. Hill is approved.

S. COOPER, A. and I. G.

Telegram.

TUPELO, MISS., Jan. 11th, 1865.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Your telegram in relation to Jackson's division received. When shall I expect you here? It will require four days to remove the sick and wounded and stores from this place. When these are removed will be ready to carry out the orders of the President.

J. B. HOOD, Genl.

RICHMOND, Jan. 14th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Dear General,—I received your letter by Colonel Paul, and would have answered it sooner but for the great pressure of business which has been upon me for some time past. I cannot bring my mind to the conviction that arming our slaves will add to our military strength, and the prospective and inevitable evils resulting from the measure make me shrink back from the step as only to be taken when on the very brink of the precipice of ruin. At first I was inclined to think we might with some advantage employ negro soldiers; but the more I think of it the more disinclined I am to resort to what at best can only be regarded as a doubtful experiment. The Yankees now do not get as many of our negroes (by absconding to them) as they did at first, because the negro knows he will be put into their armies and forced to fight. If we force him to fight he will, as between the two sides, go to the enemy, because they offer him present stronger inducements—better food and clothing, and unlimited whiskey—and hold out to him as a reward in the future, in the event of success, a proprietary right in the soil to which he is attached. He is made to believe by the

artful and lying Yankee that he will have a farm given him out of his master's land, and that he shall be made in every respect the equal of the white men.

But I do not estimate him as a soldier likely to decide the fate of battles. We have on our rolls this side of the Mississippi 401,000 men; of these there are present and effective some 175,000. We ought easily to keep in the field an effective present force of 200,000. This is as many as we can well feed and clothe, and is amply sufficient to prevent subjugation or even the overrunning of our territory; and the two things are widely different if our people have the pluck, fortitude, and endurance which I believe they have. After all, what is the use of "putting men into the army," whether they be white or black, if we cannot keep them there? If we had the absentees and deserters back we would have over 300,000 effectives this side of the Mississippi, and we have on the other side nearly 70,000. I believe we want reorganization in our army—better discipline, and, as a means to that end, better officers. If we could feed and clothe our soldiers well, and pay them regularly—if we would officer them properly, and thus improve the *morale* generally, we would have numbers enough, especially if the conscription laws were firmly and impartially carried out. What we want is not new and additional legislation in army matters, so much as an energetic administration of existing laws. There are some few necessary things to be done by law—such as "consolidation," doing away with elections and promotion by seniority, a more summary mode of dropping worthless officers, the improvement of the cavalry arm (the point so forcibly dwelt upon by you), and some stringent remedy for the absenteeism of officers. Upon all these subjects my committee has been at work and framed bills which we hope may prove efficacious if adopted by Congress. I send you a copy of our Cavalry Bill as it passed our House. It is now pending in the Senate. It was drawn by General Wickham, a distinguished cavalry officer, now a member of my committee, and meets with General Wade Hampton's warm approval, as well as that of various distinguished cavalry officers whom we were able to consult. I have written Governor Magrath concerning the condition of things in South Carolina, and would be glad if you would read the letter which I have requested him to show you. Very truly yours,

WM. PORCHER MILES.

I received your telegram with reference to General J.,* and showed it to the Secretary of War. I fear he will not be assigned to duty.

MERIDIAN, Jan. 14th, 1865.

BY TELEGRAPH FROM RICHMOND, Jan. 12th, 1865.

To Lieut.-Genl. R. TAYLOR:

Yours of 9th received. General Beauregard went to Army of Tennessee with large discretionary power. Your name was referred to, and it would be well for you to see him. Sherman's campaign has produced bad effects on our people. Success against his future operations is needful to animate public confidence. Hardee requires more aid than Lee can give him. Hood's army is

* General Joseph E. Johnston.

the only source to which we can now look. If you can hold Thomas in check with the addition to your forces of Generals Forrest and Roddy restored to your Department and the cavalry of Hood's army, which cannot be profitably sent to the East, then, as fast as it can be done consistently with the efficiency of the troops, the rest of Hood's army should be sent to look after Sherman. The presence of those veterans will no doubt greatly increase efficiency of force now with Hardee. You may show this to General Beauregard.

JEFFN. DAVIS.

BY TELEGRAPH FROM MERIDIAN, *Jan. 15th, 1865.*

To President DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

My telegram of the 9th expressed the conviction that an attempt to move Hood's army at this time would complete its destruction. Hood failed to hold Thomas in check with Forrest, Roddy, and his own cavalry, and thirty thousand troops to assist them. To represent these thirty I have barely three thousand (3000) inefficient cavalry outside of the inadequate garrison of Mobile. I think it would be beneficial to the cause for me to see you.

Respectfully, R. TAYLOR, Lient.-Genl.

Private and Confidential.

MERIDIAN, *Jan. 15th, 1865.*

General,—I send you herewith translation of a cipher telegram received late last evening (14th) from the President, with a copy of my reply thereto. He evidently has failed to understand what I intended to convey, relative to General Hood's army, in my despatch of the 9th. The despatch referred to was as follows:

"Have just returned from General Hood's army at Tupelo. This army requires rest, consolidation, and reorganization. Without these latter it will be useless anywhere. Full power should be given to the commander at once to reorganize and consolidate."

You will observe that in this despatch I say nothing about Thomas, nor any plan of campaign; but merely refer to the condition of Hood's army, and what, in my judgment, that condition demanded. My opinion, as expressed to you verbally, is, that unless the authorities at Richmond can be made to see the military position as it now exists, we can expect nothing but disaster during the impending campaign. In any event, the condition of the railroads will not permit the speedy removal of troops to the East; and I believe I can effect more good to the cause by an interview with the President than in any other way. I feel it my duty to propose this, unpleasant as the trip to Richmond at this time is. I go to Mobile to-night, where I hope to hear from you.

I am, General, most respectfully, etc., R. TAYLOR, Lient.-Genl.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD, Tupelo, Miss.

Telegram.

TUPELO, *Jan. 17th, 1865.*

Col. G. W. BRENT, Chief of Staff:

Order General Smith to inspect works at Choctaw and Open Bluff, and give

such orders as may be necessary for defence of rivers at those points; obstructions and torpedoes recommended for Tennessee River must be used there.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUPELO, MISS., Jan. 18th, 1865.

Genl. J. B. HOOD, Comdg. Army of Tenn.:

General,—General Beauregard directs that you will hold Lee's corps in readiness to move as soon as necessary preparations can be made for its transportation, and that you will cause it to be thoroughly equipped for the field as soon as practicable.

He also directs that you will cause a battalion of three light batteries of Napoleons, composed, if practicable, of South Carolina and Georgia companies, thoroughly equipped for the field, to proceed to Macon, Ga. (under a good field-officer), as soon as they can be equipped, and there await further orders.

They will take steamer at Columbus for Montgomery, Ala.

The field transportation of the above-named troops shall accompany them.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY BRYAN, Major, and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUPELO, MISS., Jan. 18th, 1865.

Genl. J. B. HOOD, Comdg. Army of Tenn.:

General,—Understanding that the transportation of Lee's corps will be ready in the morning, I desire the movement of Lee's corps from here to Augusta, *via* Montgomery, Macon, and Milledgeville, should commence as soon as practicable. The troops should leave here with at least twenty (20) rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, with three days' cooked rations, which should be renewed at Meridian and Montgomery, and four days' at Macon. The troops sent *via* Mobile will renew their rations and forage sufficient to last to Montgomery, where they will renew their supplies as well as at Macon.

Your chief quartermaster and commissary will make the necessary arrangements for the rapid transportation of these troops to their destination.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUPELO, MISS., Jan. 19th, 1865.

Genl. J. B. HOOD, Comdg. Army of Tenn.:

General,—General Beauregard directs that you hold Cheatham's corps (except Gibson's brigade, ordered to Mobile) in readiness to move at any time an order may be issued to that effect from these Headquarters.

He also directs that you hold in readiness to move, upon the receipt of similar orders, another battalion of three light batteries at Columbus, Miss.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY BRYAN, Major, and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUPELO, MISS., Jan. 19th, 1865.

Lieut.-Col. A. R. MASON, A. A. G., Headquarters Army of Tenn.:

Colonel,—General Beauregard desires that General Hood will send with the troops going to Georgia one hundred rounds of small-arms ammunition per man, including what they have in their cartridge-boxes, and one hundred rounds of ammunition per gun for the light batteries. He desires, also, that the ordnance wagons, ambulances, and a due proportion of the supply train belonging to them, should also be sent. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY BRYAN, Major, and A. A. G.

Telegram.

RICHMOND, VA., Jan. 19th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

General Hill having arrived at Augusta, General Hardee has been authorized at his request to place him on duty there. S. COOPER, A. and I. G.

*Return of the Army of Tennessee, Commanded by General J. B. HOOD, for period ending
January 20th, 1865.*

	PRESENT.			PRESENT AND ABSENT.		
	Effective Total.	Total.	Aggregate.	Total.	Aggregate.	Agg. last Return.
INFANTRY.						
General Staff	15	15	12
Stewart's Corps	11	12	11
Loring's Division	1,887	2,700	2,973	8,841	9,516	9,590
Walthall's Division	1,036	1,607	1,754	5,460	5,933	6,468
French's Division	1,517	2,170	2,390	7,384	7,967	2,409
Total of Stewart's Corps	4,440	6,477	7,123	21,685	23,428	18,478
Lee's Corps	9	24	24
Johnson's Division	1,817	2,640	2,874	9,288	10,004	10,345
Stevenson's Division	2,343	3,103	3,471	8,529	9,248	8,640
Clayton's Division	1,552	2,210	2,463	8,234	8,875	8,948
Total of Lee's Corps	5,712	7,953	8,517	26,051	28,151	27,957
Cheatham's Corps	9	13	15
Cleburne's Division	2,358	3,374	3,658	10,720	11,624	11,923
Cheatham's Division	1,381	1,795	1,984	9,272	10,250	10,605
Bates's Division	1,038	1,555	1,734	7,045	7,683	7,886
Total of Cheatham's Corps	4,777	6,724	7,585	27,037	29,570	30,429
Engineer Troops	375	469	484	743	767	767
Total of Infantry	15,304	21,623	23,517	75,516	81,945	77,630
CAVALRY.						
Escort of Army Headquarters	130	151	153	241	248	248
Escort of Stewart's Corps	29	51	55	93	97	98
Escort of Lee's Corps	76	79	84	192	202	198
Escort of Cheatham's Corps	28	37	39	56	60	62
Jackson's Cavalry Division	2,001	2,890	3,152	4,163	4,508	4,508
Total of Cavalry	2,264	3,208	3,433	4,745	5,115	5,114
ARTILLERY.						
Artillery of Stewart's Corps	760	905	958	1,386	1,457	1,457
Artillery of Lee's Corps	705	863	909	1,008	1,153	1,153
Artillery of Cheatham's Corps	706	839	880	1,157	1,210	1,210
Artillery of Jackson's Cavalry Division ..	243	306	321	377	383	383
Total of Artillery	2,405	2,913	3,068	4,028	4,203	4,203
Grand Total of Army	19,973	27,764	30,579	84,289	91,263	89,917

Official.

JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

Tupelo, Miss., Jan. 20th, 1865.

Telegram.

TUPELO, MISS., Jan. 23d, 1865.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Cheatham stands forty-seven hundred, sixty-seven hundred, then seventy-three hundred.

A. P. MASON, Lieut.-Col., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
TUPELO, Jan. 23d, 1865.

Col. GEO. WM. BRENT, A. A. G., Montgomery, Ala.:

Colonel,—General Hood, desiring to leave, I have to-day assumed command of this army without waiting longer for a response from the President.

Enclosed is a copy of the order from the General Commanding, under which I have assumed command, the original having been left with me with blank date, with directions to advise you of the date of its going into effect.

General Hood left this morning for Richmond.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. TAYLOR, Lieut.-Genl.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Jan. 25th, 1865.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Enemy made a demonstration on Little Britain Island yesterday. Reinforcements for Charleston are needed immediately. Send me, if possible, three thousand men at once. All quiet on the Combahee. I will keep you fully advised.

W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Genl.

Telegram.

AUGUSTA, GA., Jan. 28th, 1865.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

The enemy is moving rapidly upon Augusta. Hope that troops will be hurried up.

Respectfully,

D. H. HILL, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Jan. 28th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

General Hill reports from Brier Creek, enemy advancing on all roads from Savannah on west side of river.

I think your presence of extreme importance at this juncture.

W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Genl.

Telegram.

MONTGOMERY, Jan. 28th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Every energy is being used to push troops forward rapidly. They are being sent both *via* Selma and Mobile as fast as capacity of the railroad will permit.

R. TAYLOR, Lieut.-Genl.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Jan. 29th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

The enemy have failed so far in all attempts to cross the Combahee. Indications are that the 15th and 17th corps, now in Carolina, will cross Savannah and unite with the column moving towards Augusta.

W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Genl.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Jan. 29th, 1865.

Gov. JOS. E. BROWN, Gov. of Georgia, Milledgeville, Ga.:

General Beauregard desires that you will use the militia of your State and all other means to secure the return of all deserters and absentees to their commands.

The militia can be used profitably on this duty.

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

The same despatch sent to Governor Charles Clark, of Mississippi.

Telegram.

MACON, MISS., Jan. 30th, 1865.

Col. G. W. BRENT:

Am corresponding with General Taylor as to the means of carrying out the recommendations of General Beauregard about militia.

CHAS. CLARK, Gov. of Miss.

Telegram.

OPELIKA, ALA., Jan. 30th, 1865.

To Brig.-Genl. MACKALL, Macon, Ga.:

Hold Palmer's battalion in readiness to move on General D. H. Hill's order. General Beauregard desires that you will procure one hundred and fifty horses for the artillery now *en route*. If they cannot be had from Majors Smith and Wheeler's horse camp at Macon, they must be impressed. General Beauregard will reach Macon to-morrow.

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

Telegram.

MERIDIAN, MISS., Jan. 30th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Sherman's movements render a victory necessary to us at once, and it will require all our means to insure it. I can resist a raid without Stewart's corps, and cannot fight a battle with it against an army; and French's division is very weak, but will enable me to fully garrison Mobile and Choctaw Bluff. The remainder of the corps should go east at once to insure success there. We can thus save Lee's communications, raise the siege of Mobile, should it be invested, or be prepared to meet Thomas when he advances in the spring. Last of Cheat-ham's corps, except furloughed men, will leave here on Wednesday. I find upon inquiry that his Tennessee division has been furloughed until tenth, and Brantley's and Sharp's brigades until twelfth, proximo. Will report further about artillery.

R. TAYLOR, Lieut.-Genl.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XLIV.

AUGUSTA, *Feb. 2d*, 1865.

Lieut.-Genl. W. J. HARDEE, Charleston, S. C.:

I have concluded to send Stevenson's forces to Branchville to-morrow. Can you furnish him with artillery?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

AUGUSTA, GA., *Feb. 3d*, 1865.

Major-Genl. D. H. HILL, Green's Cut, Ga.:

General Beauregard desires that you will send at once the brigade of Lee's corps now with you to this place, by rail, to report to General Stevenson.

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

RICHMOND, VA., *Feb. 4th*, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Augusta, Ga.:

* * * You will assume command of all the forces in the district as defined before your departure to the west, and should you deem it advisable will direct General Hardee to resume the command of his old corps when it arrives, and add to it any other forces which may be advantageously associated with it. * * *

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Official.

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

*Telegram.*CARTER'S FORD, *Feb. 4th*, 1865: 11 P. M.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

The enemy crossed the Salkehatchie between Broxton and River's bridges; also above River's bridge, compelling me to fall back upon Branchville. It was with difficulty that my command could be withdrawn, as I was completely flanked on both sides. The fighting at River's bridge was quite sharp, and lasted several hours.

L. McLAWS, Major-Genl.

*Telegram.*AUGUSTA, *Feb. 5th*, 1865.

To Gov. JOS. BROWN, Macon, Ga.:

The crisis is again upon your State. I earnestly call on your Excellency to send at once to General Smith, for the defence of Augusta, all the forces you can possibly put in the field. Any man who returns to the army an absentee should be exempted.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

*Telegram.*AUGUSTA, *Feb. 5th*, 1865.

To Gov. W. J. MAGRATH, Columbia, S. C.:

The crisis is again upon your State. I earnestly call on your Excellency to

assemble, at Columbia, all the available forces of the State, exempting, however, any one who will return an absentee to the army.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

AUGUSTA, Feb. 6th, 1865.

To Commanding Officer, Columbia, S. C.:

It is still uncertain whether enemy, after reaching Branchville, will move on Augusta, Columbia, or Charleston. He may move on two last at once, without our being able to check him long. Make, accordingly, all necessary preparations. Communicate this to Governor Magrath and General Winder.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

GRAHAMS, Feb. 6th, 1865: 11.50 P. M.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Enemy will certainly take possession of railroad to-morrow, and I shall get between him and Augusta. I have sent one brigade to reinforce Colonel Crews, who is now between enemy and Augusta; should he move towards Columbia I will cross bridge above and get in his front. I have ordered all bridges below Holman's bridge destroyed.

J. WHEELER, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Feb. 7th, 1865.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

If your health will permit, I consider it of great importance that you should come here at once.

W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Genl.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Feb. 10th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

The enemy have crossed the South Edisto at Bennaker's bridge. Stevenson has concentrated his force on North Edisto to oppose him. Wheeler telegraphs that General Allen having informed him that enemy is moving on Augusta, he is going with all his available forces to Aiken to meet him. Enemy's gunboats have left the Tugador. Enemy repulsed to-day by General Wright. This morning enemy crossed from Dixon, Horse, and Battery islands to James Island, and are now in front of our works in some force. One monitor in Stono. The enemy have kept up a constant fire to-day, but not on city.

W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Genl.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Feb. 10th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

General Hardee is very anxious for you to come here, if only for one day, as you did in Savannah. It would be a great relief to him. He desires me so to inform you.

A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 10th, 1865.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

I feel sure your presence here, if possible, would do great service at this juncture.

THOMAS JORDAN.

Telegram.

COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 10th, 1865.*

Lient.-Genl. W. J. HARDEE, Charleston, etc. :

I have just arrived here. Will join you as soon as practicable. Meanwhile I advise concentration from the Combahee on the Edisto line.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 11th, 1865.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

Do you direct that the agreement made on the 2d inst. be carried into effect immediately? Please answer at once.

W. J. HARDEE, Lient.-Genl.

Yes—undoubtedly.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 12th, 1865.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

General Wright has been withdrawn from Ashepoo across Edisto, and enemy having crossed North Edisto near Orangeburg, McLaws is retiring from Branchville to the Four-hole swamp. Sixteen transports appeared in Bull's Bay to-day.

W. J. HARDEE, Lient.-Genl.

Telegram.

COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 14th, 1865.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

Scouts report enemy camped on State road, 15th Corps in front, 20th next, 10th next, think 14th in rear. Prisoner from Kilpatrick's wagon train reports him on Blackville and Columbia road—says they are marching on Columbia.

WADE HAMPTON, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 14th, 1865.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

Enemy demonstrating at Thewitz ferry; think they will cross there. Reinforcements should go to Kingsville. Think movement against this place serious. All quiet in front.

WADE HAMPTON, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

KINGSVILLE, S. C., *Feb. 14th, 1865.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

The enemy appeared in force at the railroad bridge at 12 M., to-day; after skirmishing awhile, our forces fell back across the bridge and burned the bridge. Scouts brought in prisoner of 17th Army Corps, who says that corps near Fort Motte, 15th Army Corps confronting Columbia. All quiet to-night.

H. D. CLAYTON, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 14th, 1865.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

The enemy have driven Clayton across the railroad bridge, and it has been burnt. He reports heavy force moving on McCord's ferry. Reinforcements sent there from Kingsville. Cavalry been skirmishing with the enemy in front, on Little Congaree bridge, and have checked their advance.

C. L. STEVENSON, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 14th, 1865.*

Major-Genl. CHEATHAM, Comdg. Corps, Augusta, Ga. :

General Beauregard directs you to hasten your movement on Columbia.

JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

N. B.—Same was sent to Lieutenant-General A. W. Stewart.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 15th, 1865.*

Major R. RHETT, A. Q. M. :

General Beauregard wishes every effort made to remove all quartermaster stores from this place to some point on the Charlotte Railroad, beyond Chester-ville.

JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
COLUMBIA, S. C., *Feb. 15th, 1865.*

Capt. J. D. WITHERSPOON, A. C. S. :

Captain,—General Beauregard directs that all the subsistence stores, except fifty thousand (50,000) rations, be sent from the city in the direction of Chester-ville and Charlotte, N. C.

JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 16th, 1865.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

Your telegram from Columbia received. On receipt of your despatch yesterday from Florence preparations been again pushed forward. The movement will begin to-day, and be carried out without delay.

W. J. HARDEE, Lieut.-Genl.

Telegram.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *Feb. 16th, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

General Hardee has been sick in bed for two (2) days, threatened with typhoid fever. His surgeon says he must be sent off to-morrow. I have telegraphed General McLaws, who is the next in rank, to come to Charleston and take command.

T. B. ROY, A. A. G.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XLV.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
COLUMBIA, S. C., Feb. 16th, 1865.

Major-Genl. B. F. CHEATHAM, Comdg. Corps:

General,—General Beauregard directs me to say, that, as the enemy now occupies a position between his forces and those under yourself, he deems it best that you move to the Greenville Railroad, at the nearest point, and, if forced by the enemy, take cars with your command to Abbeville, and await further orders, reporting to these headquarters your arrival and the condition of your command. You will also report to Major-General D. H. Hill your movements, that Lieutenant-General Stewart may be kept advised.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. M. OTEY, Lieut.-Col., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
SEVEN MILES FROM COLUMBIA, ON RICE CREEK SPRING ROAD,
Feb. 17th, 1865.

Lieut.-Genl. W. HAMPTON, Comdg. Cavalry:

General,—General Beauregard wishes you to inform General Stevenson that, in view of the danger of the enemy crossing Broad River above Wheeler's right, it is deemed best that Stevenson and his command should reach Cookham to-night, between Big Cedar and Little Cedar Creek; and his train, the vicinity of Ridgeway, if possible. Cookham is about eighteen miles from Columbia; Ridgeway, about twenty-five miles.

The cavalry will necessarily follow its movements. Delay the enemy as much as possible. I will await at Killian's Station to hear from you.

The General wishes you to keep him advised of the enemy's movements.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. M. OTEY, Lieut.-Col., and A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
COLUMBIA, S. C., Feb. 17th, 1865.

Col. G. W. BRENT, A. A. G., Augusta, Ga.:

Colonel,—We leave here this morning, retreating in the direction of Charlotte, N. C. Chesterville, S. C., is the first point of concentration, and if it cannot be accomplished there, then Charlotte.

Every inch of ground will be contested, and it is hoped Cheatham and Stewart may reach Charlotte at least in time to join us. Let the orders for Cheatham and Stewart to join us remain in force and be executed with the least delay practicable, by the best and shortest routes, according to existing circumstances. The following routes might be followed by troops and trains moving to Chesterville or Charlotte, according to circumstances.

1st. Augusta, Edgefield, Newberry, and Chesterville; the portion of the route from Newberry to Chesterville may be unsafe should the enemy advance northward from his present positions, extending along Broad River, from Columbia towards Alston. It is not yet known how near he is to the latter place.

2d Route: Augusta, Edgefield, 96 Depot, on Greenville and Columbia Railroad, Huntsville, on Laurensville and Newberry Railroad, Unionville, and Chesterville.

3d Route: Washington, Abbeville, Laurensville, Unionville, and Chesterville.

Should the concentration have to be made north of Chesterville, from Laurensville, the troops should move on the Spartanburg, thence to Yorkville and Shelby, N. C., thence to Charlotte, N. C. Provisions and forage should be collected in advance, at proper points on any of the routes indicated which may be selected or adopted. Working parties should be sent in advance to restore roads and bridges, or construct bridges when required.

A detachment of cavalry should accompany each column of troops, or each train moving as above referred to. The troops and trains should not be sent in small detachments, but should move regularly, as much as circumstances will permit. By command,

JNO. M. OTEY, Lieut.-Col., and A. A. G.

General Hampton's Plan of Concentration proposed to General Beauregard.

DOKO, Feb. 18th, 1865.

General,—As Sherman marches in so extended a manner, it has occurred to me that we might concentrate on one of his corps and destroy it. At present the 15th Corps is on the Winnsboro' road; the 17th on the railroad; and the other two, I suppose, across the Broad River. The country between the two corps here is rough and inaccessible, so that if we could concentrate in front of the 17th Corps, we might defeat it before support could reach it. All the cavalry with the infantry could, I think, defeat one corps.

I think that you might get some troops from Charleston, if they were sent by rail at once to Camden. The road to Camden, as you are aware, turns off from the Wilmington Railroad, seven miles beyond Kingsville. Now, if troops could come up to the junction of the Camden and Wilmington road, they could hold the crossings of the Wateree till you could get reinforcements to them. The swamp is very wide and very difficult, even in the best weather, so that a small body of troops could check a much larger one. I could send some cavalry to aid, if necessary. If Sherman comes this way, you will be able to get some of your troops by Camden to the line of our march. If, on the contrary, he moves on Charleston, the troops at the Wateree would be in the proper position. Cheatham, too, can now join us, if you send, telling him to make forced marches. With a few thousand more men we can cripple Sherman greatly.

I am, very respectfully yours,

WADE HAMPTON, Lieut.-Genl.

Genl. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
WHITE OAK, S. C., Feb. 19th, 1865 : 4.15 P. M.

Lieut.-Genl. W. HAMPTON, Comdg. Cavalry :

General,—General Beauregard directs me to inform you that the trains and infantry will turn off from this place, taking the road *via* Hazlewood and Rich Hill to Landsford, on the Catawba; thence they will move along the east bank of the Catawba to Belair; thence to Charlotte. He desires your cavalry to conform its movements accordingly, protecting the flanks and rear of the column. Thirty thousand (30,000) rations are still at Chesterville; if not needed by you, let the order be given for their removal.

Should the report of the advance of the enemy in this direction be confirmed, the trains and troops will leave here about daylight in the morning.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. M. OTEY, Lieut.-Col., and A. A. G.

WHITE OAK, Feb. 19th, 1865.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Wilmington, N. C. :

Have ordered McLaws to move as rapidly as possible by rail to Greensboro', N. C. Please communicate with him fully, and aid him all in your power. Am obliged to you for your information.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

WHITE OAK, Feb. 19th, 1865.

Genl. L. McLAWS, Charleston, S. C. :

Orders for movement to Cheraw countermanded. Send infantry, with due proportion of artillery, by rail to Greensboro', N. C., as rapidly as possible. Call upon General Bragg and Governor Vance for all the assistance in their power. Not a moment must be lost in executing this order. Leave your cavalry to protect country north of Santee River.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, PETERSBURG, Feb. 19th, 1865.

His Excellency J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Sec. of War, Richmond, Va. :

Sir,—The accounts received to-day from South and North Carolina are unfavorable. General Beauregard reports from Winnsboro' that four corps of the enemy are advancing on that place, tearing up the Charlotte Railroad, and that they will probably reach Charlotte by the 24th, and before he can concentrate his troops there. He states, General Sherman will doubtless move thence on Greensboro', Danville, and Petersburg, or unite with General Schofield at Raleigh or Weldon.

General Bragg reports that General Schofield is now preparing to advance from Newbern to Goldsboro', and that a strong expedition is moving against the Weldon Railroad at Rocky Mount.

He says that little or no assistance can be received from the State of North Carolina; that exemptions and reorganizations under late laws have disbanded the State forces, and that they will not be ready for the field for some time.

I do not see how Sherman can make the march anticipated by General Beauregard; but he seems to have everything his own way, which is calculated to

cause apprehension. General Beauregard does not say what he proposes or what he can do. I do not know where his troops are or on what lines they are moving. His despatches only give movements of the enemy.

He has a difficult task to perform under present circumstances, and one of his best officers—General Hardee—is incapacitated by sickness. I have also heard that his own health is indifferent, though he has never so stated. Should his strength give way there is no one on duty in the Department that could replace him, nor have I any one to send there. General J. E. Johnston is the only officer whom I know who has the confidence of the army and people, and if he was ordered to report to me I would place him there on duty. It is necessary to bring out all our strength, and, I fear, to unite our armies, as, separately, they do not seem able to make head against the enemy. Everything should be destroyed that cannot be removed out of the reach of Generals Sherman and Schofield. Provisions must be accumulated in Virginia, and every man in all the States must be brought out. I fear it may be necessary to abandon all our cities, and preparations should be made for this contingency.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
NEAR WHITE OAK, S. C., *Feb. 20th, 1865.*

Major-Genl. C. H. STEVENSON, Comdg. Lee's Corps:

General,—General Beauregard directs that you move with your command by the shortest and best route to Landsford's ford, thence to Charlotte, *via* Belair and Pleasant Valley. You will await further orders at Charlotte. Unless otherwise pressed, you will move at the rate of about twenty miles a day. He will move along the railroad, so as to be in telegraphic communication with General Hampton and the War Department. He will probably pass the night at Chesterville, and to-morrow night at or about the railroad bridge, on the Catawba. General Hampton has been instructed to give orders to his trains whether to accompany yours or remain under his protection.

Respectfully, your obedient servant, A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C.

WHITE OAK, *Feb. 20th, 1865.*

Lieut.-Genl. HAMPTON, Winnsboro', S. C.:

Stevenson moves this morning *via* Landsford, Belair, and Pleasant Valley, to Charlotte, where he will await further orders, carrying his own trains. I shall move along the railroad, that I may be in telegraphic communication with yourself and the Department. You will now have to guard your own trains, unless you prefer sending them on with General Stevenson's.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

General HAMPTON to General BEAUREGARD.

CHESTER, *Feb. 21st, 1865.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

No movement reported on Monticello road. Enemy did not occupy Winns-

boro' till to-day. Wheeler reports force this evening two miles west Youngville. All quiet here.

WADE HAMPTON, Lient.-Genl.

Telegram.

WILMINGTON, Feb. 21st, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Chester:

On my arrival I find my forces driven from west side Cape Fear, and the railroad in possession of the enemy. Have notified General Hardee. Two corps, Schofield and Terry, are opposing Hoke's division.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

Telegram.

CHESTER, Feb. 22d, 1865.

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Enemy are evidently moving eastward. The 14th Corps is on the railroad. Sherman has moved to his right. Kilpatrick is also here. Butler reports enemy moving towards Catawba River. I think they intend to cross low down, or to move towards Camden. Scouts report them leaving Broad River and moving east.

WADE HAMPTON, Lient.-Genl.

Memoranda.

CHERAW, Feb. 22d, 1865.

General Hardee, after receiving General Beauregard's orders, ordering the movement to be made by rail to Greensboro', communicated immediately with General Bragg, who informed him that he had been compelled to withdraw to the east side of the Cape Fear River, thereby leaving the railroad unprotected, and advised General Hardee that the route by Wilmington was impracticable. General Hardee has returned to the original plan of leaving the railroad at Cheraw, and thence by overland to Greensboro', N. C. The first troops will arrive at Cheraw to-night, and, the wagons coming through by common road, it will be five or six days before the head of the column will probably leave this point. The distance to Greensboro' from this point is one hundred and thirty-one miles, and a good route can be had on east side of Yadkin River, and through a country that is represented to be sufficiently productive to furnish forage and commissary stores for the command. The Yadkin is crossed on bridge at this point, and there will be no ferrying on the route. The left flank of the column will be protected by the Yadkin River, which at this season is said to be beyond fording.

Immediate steps will be taken to establish communications with General Beauregard by Charlotte.

W. D. PICKETT, Lieut.-Col.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES C. S., Feb. 22d, 1865.

Special Order No. 3:

General J. E. Johnston, C. S. A., is hereby assigned to the command of the two military departments known as the "Department of Tennessee and Georgia," and the "Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida," and the troops therein. He will proceed at once to effect a concentration of all available forces and make the necessary dispositions to thwart the designs of the enemy operating in those Departments.

General Beauregard, C. S. A., will report to General Johnston, commanding, etc., for assignment to such duty as he deems most advisable.

By command of General R. E. Lee.

W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Commanding, etc.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES C. S., *Feb. 23d, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg., etc.:

General,—I enclose a copy of the order assigning General Johnston to command, of which you have already been notified by telegram. I did not need the assurance contained in your reply to my despatch, of your cheerful acquiescence and willing co-operation in a measure deemed necessary for the good of the service, knowing as I do that personal considerations have no place in your mind when the welfare of the country is concerned. The situation of affairs in my judgment requires that we should put forth our best efforts, and I was desirous that we should not, in such an emergency, be without the assistance of the skill and ability of one of our most distinguished officers. The reports that have reached me of the precarious condition of your health made me the more anxious lest the arduous and responsible duties that have devolved upon you should prove too great for your physical capacity, and I could not but feel apprehensive of the consequences of being deprived of your services at a critical moment. I trust, however, that you will now be able, without injury to yourself, to afford General Johnston the full benefit of your support.

I beg to return you my thanks for the gratification I derive from the knowledge that the course I have thought most judicious is not misunderstood or unappreciated by yourself. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
CHARLOTTE, N. C., *Feb. 22d, 1865.*

Colonel,—General Beauregard directs that you proceed forthwith and without delay to Cheraw, S. C., with the despatch placed in your charge, and deliver it to Lieutenant-General Hardee. Should General Hardee not have arrived there you will have the same telegraphed to him wherever he may be, if practicable, and obtain from him an acknowledgment of its receipt.

Should you not be able to telegraph to General Hardee, you will call upon the Superintendent of the Darlington and Cheraw Railroad for a locomotive to convey you to the headquarters of that officer. As it is all important that you reach General Hardee at the earliest practicable moment, you are authorized to call on citizens along the road for relays of horses, and, if necessary, you are authorized to resort to impressment. Care must be taken by you to return to the owners their animals on your return.

Citizens along the route, from Charlotte, N. C., to Cheraw, S. C., are requested to render Colonel Cook every assistance in the performance of his duty.

Respectfully, Colonel, your obedient servant,

JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

Lieut.-Col. COOK, 8th Texas Cavalry,
Bearer of despatch to General Hardee.

Telegram.

GOLDSBORO', *Feb. 23d, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Wilmington was evacuated at 7 A. M., 22d inst. I saw General Bragg at his Headquarters ten miles this side. He had advised our friends to pass to Cheraw. I return by first train.

D. H. HAMILTON.

Important Appeal.

HEADQUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE WEST,
CHARLOTTE, N. C., *Feb. 23d, 1865.*

To delay the advance of the enemy, until our troops can be massed in strength sufficient to crush them, I appeal to all good and patriotic citizens in the region of country threatened by the enemy to turn out in full force all available labor, with axes, spades, and mattocks, to destroy and obstruct roads leading towards Charlotte from the south, commencing first along the roads leading to Landsford, and other crossings between that point and the railroad bridge, obstructing at the same time all roads parallel to the river within the following limits: the Pleasant Valley road, on the east, to a point opposite Landsford, thence across the Catawba to Fishing Creek; thence up said creek to the Charlotte and South Carolina Railroad. Afterwards the work should be continued farther up the river, should the enemy threaten an advance in that direction. The negroes should be assembled at the following points, viz.: Charlotte, Pleasant Valley, Belair, Landsford, Fort Mills, and Rock Hill, under the direction of their owners, each with six days' provisions, cooking utensils, and blankets. As far as possible the negroes will be employed at points not distant from their homes. They will be protected by guards, and assisted by the Home Guards of the State.

An engineer officer will be at each of the points of rendezvous to give proper direction to the labor of all who will now join us in the struggle to stay and destroy the ruthless invaders of our homes.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

CHARLOTTE, *Feb. 23d, 1865.*

I earnestly appeal to the people of North Carolina to comply promptly with this request. I am satisfied they could render no greater service to their country.

Z. B. VANCE, Governor of North Carolina.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
IN FIELD, CHARLOTTE, N. C., *Feb. 24th, 1865.*

General,—General Beauregard directs that you order the headquarters' staff of the Army of Tennessee to report to General J. E. Johnston, at or near this place, as soon as possible. The officer of the Adjutant-General's Department should be directed to bring with him such records as will be indispensable to a reorganization.

He further orders that the troops and trains of that army (except the light

artillery), as have arrived in Augusta (accompanied by Young's division of cavalry, if not indispensable to the safety of Augusta), to move to this place *via* Newberry, Unionville, and Yorkville, or Chesterville. Should movements of enemy permit it, latter route.

The light batteries of the Army of Tennessee now at Augusta and Macon will remain at those points until further orders, reporting themselves to their headquarters.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

Major-Genl. D. H. HILL.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

MACON, GA., *Feb. 24th, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

The great necessity for the services of the militia of this State for a time in the agricultural field, in connection with the fact that the State is, for the first time in some ten months, free from threatened advance of the enemy upon the interior, and the further fact that they are composed of a class of men not subject to Confederate service, induce me to withdraw them for a time from your command, that they may have a furlough till the State is again threatened by the enemy.

When needed for the defence of this State I hope to have them ready for the occasion, prepared to act with the same distinguished gallantry and patriotic devotion which has heretofore characterized their conduct upon the battlefield.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOS. E. BROWN.

CHARLOTTE, N. C., *Feb. 24th, 1865.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, Petersburg, Va.:

Telegram 22d inst. duly received. March of Hardee's troops on this place from Cheraw was changed to railroad *via* Wilmington and Raleigh, on assurance of Governor Vance and General Bragg that the troops could reach here much sooner. The fall of Wilmington, however, caused the order to be immediately countermanded by General Bragg and myself.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLOTTE, N. C., *Feb. 24th, 1865.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, Petersburg, Va.:

General Hampton reports from Chesterville yesterday evening no enemy nearer than White Oak; he is reported crossing Peay's Ferry. A large force of cavalry moved from Hopewell Church towards Rocky Mount Ferry. Butler is now across river. Hampton will put himself in front of enemy, leaving one brigade to press his rear. I have ordered Hardee to hasten his march from Cheraw. Mail courier reports Cheatham at Jones's Ferry, on Ennoree, morning of 22d inst. I have ordered him and Stewart here *via* Unionville and Chester-ville, where I may stop them temporarily. Enemy's movement would seem to indicate Cheraw and Fayetteville as their present objective point.

General Taylor reports from Meridian, Miss., on 15th, twenty-five (25) transports, loaded with troops, accompanied by General Thomas, reached Vicksburg on the 13th inst.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

General J. E. Johnston's Address to his Troops.

CHARLOTTE, N. C., Feb. 25th, 1865.

General Orders No. 1:

In obedience to the orders of the General-in-chief, the undersigned "assumes command of the Army of Tennessee and all troops in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida." He takes this position with strong hope, because he will have, in council and in the field, the aid of the high talents and skill of the distinguished general whom he succeeds.

He exhorts all absent soldiers of the Army of Tennessee to rejoin their regiments and again confront the enemy they so often encountered in Northern Georgia, and always with honor. He assures his comrades of the army who still are with their colors, that the confidence in their discipline and valor which he has publicly expressed is undiminished.

J. E. JOHNSTON, Genl.

CHARLOTTE, N. C., Feb. 26th, 1865: 7.30 A. M.

Genl. BRAXTON BRAGG, Rocky Fish Creek, near Wilmington, N. C.:

Should enemy move as supposed the plan proposed is the best, if concentration can be made in time, especially before Sherman and Schofield could unite. Johnston now commands here.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLOTTE, N. C., Feb. 27th, 1865.

Genl. R. E. LEE, Petersburg, Va.:

General Johnston assumed command day before yesterday (25th). Enemy's position still about same, on Lancaster and Camden road, made almost impassable by heavy rains.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLOTTE, N. C., Feb. 28th, 1865.

Genl. B. BRAGG, Rocky Point, near Wilmington, N. C.:

As Fayetteville may be our future point of concentration, will you order all roads and bridges repaired forthwith to it from Warsaw, Smithfield, and Raleigh?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XLVI.

General Hampton's Statement before United States Commissioner Brooks, in Relation to the Burning of Columbia.

BEING duly sworn, General Hampton said: On the night of the 16th of February he received a telegram from President Davis, announcing his promotion to the position of Lieutenant-General, and directing him to assume command of all the cavalry in South Carolina; General Beauregard was the

Commander-in-chief. General Hampton's command consisted of Wheeler's corps of cavalry, and a division of cavalry under General M. C. Butler, amounting in all to about 4100 men, in and about Columbia, when Sherman advanced on the city with 75,000 men. The only attempt to check the advance of the Federal troops was made at Congaree Creek by General Butler, who had under his command a few of his own and Wheeler's men and a small Kentucky brigade under Breckinridge, the whole number not exceeding six hundred men. This affair occurred on the 15th, after which the advance of Sherman was undisputed. The Federal army arrived opposite Columbia on the 15th, and without any warning began to shell the town in every direction. Hunt's Hotel, where General Beauregard had his headquarters, was struck by a piece of shell; two or three shells struck the workshops; one passed through the old State House, and three struck the new State House, the marks of which are still to be seen. Some of the shells were thrown as far as the Charlotte road, which is two miles from the river, and some passed near the asylum, which is the northeastern boundary of the city. The shelling took place early on the morning of the 16th, and during that night the Federal troops commenced the passage of the river. On the morning of the 17th General Hampton directed the officers under his command to withdraw their men from Columbia and its vicinity, as the city was to be surrendered and no offensive acts were to be committed. The Confederates were ordered to be moved to Winnsboro'. When General Beauregard was advised of what had been done he left the city and also went off towards Winnsboro', feeling quite unwell at the time. General Hampton then instructed the Mayor of Columbia, Dr. T. J. Goodwyn, to send out a flag of truce to meet the advance-guard of Sherman's army, and to announce that the city was evacuated, and that he had come out to surrender it. This was about six o'clock on the morning of the 17th. General Hampton gave the Mayor directions how to proceed, where to go, and what he was to do; he then called his attention to the cotton that was lying along Richardson Street, and recommended that he should put a guard over it, telling him there was danger that it would take fire, and that if it did so it would endanger the city. This cotton had been removed from the warehouses where it had been stored, in order to transport it to the open fields adjoining the city, where it might be burned; but finding there was not sufficient means for transportation, it was left in Richardson Street. The Mayor, with a flag of truce, met the leading column of the Federal army, composed of Stone's brigade, and surrendered the city. General Hampton had moved out by the Asylum road, with one of Butler's brigades, and stationed himself at the upper boundary street, facing towards Richardson Street. From the position he occupied he commanded a view of the whole town and vicinity. He saw the Mayor come back with the flag, and surrounded by columns of troops. It was about 10 A. M. when the Federal troops entered Columbia, and about 9 A. M. when General Hampton had the conversation with the Mayor in the vicinity of the cotton. There were no Confederate troops in Columbia when the Federal army entered. General Hampton was the last officer in the town, and he left just prior to the entry of the Federal army. He states positively that up to that time there

were no fires in progress in Columbia. When asked what orders were given in reference to the disposition of the cotton in Columbia, immediately prior to the 17th of February, General Hampton stated that an order had been issued by General Beauregard on the 14th to Major Allen J. Green, the post commander, to have the cotton moved out of the warehouses to a place where it could be burned, if it became necessary to do so, without endangering the town. Not having the transportation at his disposal, Major Green had placed it in the streets. On the night of the 16th, when General Hampton was assigned to duty at Columbia, he called General Beauregard's attention to the position of this cotton, telling him that if it were burned it would endanger the town, and urged him to order that the cotton should not be burned. This he did. Being asked whether that order not to fire the cotton had been carried out by the Confederates, he answered that he knew by official investigation and by personal observation that it had not been fired by them.

General Hampton's Letter to General Beauregard.

WILD WOODS, MISS., April 22d, 1866.

General,—General Sherman having charged me in his official report with the destruction of Columbia, and having repeated the same falsehood in a recent letter to Benjamin Rawlins, of that city, may I beg you to state such facts in reference to this matter as are in your possession? You were in command of the Confederate troops when Sherman entered Columbia; you had left the city just before he occupied it, and you gave orders not only as to the movements of troops, but as to the disposition of all the public property, as well as of the cotton which was in the city. You were, therefore, fully cognizant of all the facts relating to the burning of the city, and you can state with entire certainty who is answerable for this atrocious crime.

I am, very respectfully yours,

WADE HAMPTON.

General Beauregard's Endorsement of the Foregoing Letter.

NEW ORLEANS, May 2d, 1866.

The above statement of General Wade Hampton, relative to the orders issued by me at Columbia, S. C., not to burn cotton in that city, is perfectly true and correct. The only thing on fire at the time of the evacuation was the depot building of the South Carolina Railroad, which caught fire accidentally from the explosion of some ammunition ordered to be sent towards Charlotte, N. C.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Governor Orr's Letter to General Hampton.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 28th, 1872.

Dear Sir,—I have received your letter inquiring as to my recollection of a conversation that occurred in the Executive Office in Columbia, in 1867, between yourself and General Howard, of the United States Army, as to the burn-

ing of Columbia. I do not remember all that was said; but General Howard said, in substance, that the city was burned by the United States troops; that he saw them fire many houses, and that he tried to arrest the conflagration; and that he regretted the destruction of the city. Without undertaking to give his words, the foregoing contains the substance of what he said relative to the destruction of Columbia.

Very respectfully,

JAMES L. ORR.

General John S. Preston's Letter to Dr. Trezevante.

COLUMBIA, Jan. 2d, 1873.

Dear Sir,—I have your note asking me to state my recollection of the conversation between Wade Hampton and Howard, in the presence of Governor Orr, myself, and others. The substance of the conversation was that General Howard said, and reiterated it, that no one was authorized to say that the Federal troops did not burn Columbia, and he saw them doing so in numerous instances and in various localities in the town. The conversation was almost exclusively between General Hampton and General Howard, the other persons present saying but very little.

Very truly yours,

JOHN S. PRESTON.

Extract from the Rev. A. Toomer Porter's Testimony before the Committee of Citizens, appointed by Authority of the South Carolina Legislature.

"* * * In the bright light of the burning city, General Sherman recognized me and remarked: 'This is a horrible sight!' 'Yes,' I replied, 'when you reflect that women and children are the victims.' He said, 'Your Governor is responsible for this.' 'How so?' I replied. 'Who ever heard,' he said, 'of an evacuated city being left a depot of liquor for an army to occupy? I found one hundred and twenty casks of whiskey in one cellar. Your Governor, being a lawyer or a judge, refused to have it destroyed, as it was private property, and now my men have got drunk, and have got beyond my control, and this is the result.'"

Extract from Mayor Goodwyn's Testimony before the same Committee.

"* * * The same day (18th of February) General Sherman," deposes the Mayor, "sent for me. I went to see him about 1 o'clock. He met me very cordially, and said he regretted very much that our city was burned, and that it was my fault. I asked him how? He said, in suffering ardent spirits to be left in the city after it was evacuated, saying, 'Who could command drunken soldiers?' There was no allusion made to General Hampton, to accident, or to cotton. * * * I saw very few drunken soldiers that night; many who appeared to sympathize with our people told me that the fate and doom of Columbia had been common talk around their camp-fires ever since they left Savannah."

*Extract from the Report of the Committee of Citizens appointed by the South Carolina Legislature to Collect Evidence in Relation to the Burning of Columbia.**

"* * * Within an hour afterwards three rockets were seen to ascend from a point in front of the Mayor's dwelling. But a few minutes elapsed before fires in swift succession broke out, and at points so far apart that they could not have been communicated from the one to the other. At various parts of the town the soldiers, at the appearance of the rockets, declared that they were the appointed signals for a general conflagration. The fire companies, with their engines, promptly repaired to the scene of the fires and endeavored to arrest them, but in vain. The soldiers of General Sherman, with bayonets and axes, pierced and cut the hose, disabled the engines, and prevented the citizens from extinguishing the flames."

Extracts from General Sherman's Testimony as Filed, with other Official Depositions in certain Claims vs. United States, before "The Mixed Commission on British and American Claims," in Washington, D. C.

* * * * *

Question. You, however, entered the city of Columbia with the main army about two hours later?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Q. I would like for you to be particular; please try and remember how long it was afterwards?

A. Stone's brigade could not have been in town more than an hour and a half before I came in; we came in very quickly; the pontoon-bridge was nearly done when I got this message from Stone, and sent back and told him to go right into town. * * *

Q. Wouldn't this be about correct if you were to say that the main army entered Columbia about 12 o'clock?

A. Near 11; I suppose nearer 11 than 12 o'clock. Somewhere between 11 and 12.

Q. You were riding at the head of the column?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. With General Howard?

A. General Howard was by my side; he was commanding the right wing and I was commanding in chief. * * * Our staffs rode right behind us, and then came the head of the column, which, I think, was the second division, 15th Corps, commanded by General Charles R. Woods.

Q. General Howard, then, I understand you to say, had orders from you as to the disposition of troops?

A. Yes, sir. * * * The leading division of the 15th Corps, commanded by General Woods, was to occupy Columbia, and the other two divisions to pass through and encamp just outside the town. * * *

* The document referred to, besides being made the subject of a special Report to the South Carolina Legislature, was also published in full in the *Charleston News and Courier* of September 11th, 1879.

Q. Do I understand you to say that burning cotton flies in the air?

A. Indeed it does.

Q. About how many feet high in the air?

A. As many as six hundred feet; yes, I saw it fly, probably, from four or five hundred yards—fifteen hundred feet in distance.

Q. I do not mean rolling along the ground.

A. No, sir; I mean up in the air, like a fire-ball.

Q. How about height: does it rise above ten feet?

A. Yes, sir; one hundred and fifty feet; whirling round.

Q. Balls of what size?

A. Probably fifty pounds—forty or fifty pounds.

Q. How many feet in the air?

A. One hundred, or one hundred and fifty feet in the air. * * *

Q. But the police force was from Woods's division of the 15th Corps, save such stragglers as may have strayed in from other commands?

A. Yes, sir; all the troops in Columbia were from the 15th Corps, save such stragglers as may have strayed in from other commands. * * *

JAS. O. CLEPHANE, United States Commissioner.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XLVII.

General Beauregard's Instructions to General Hardee.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
CHARLOTTE, N. C., Feb. 26th, 1865.

Lieut.-Genl. W. J. HARDEE, Cheraw, S. C.:

General,—The enemy at last accounts having been at Rocky Mount and Peay's Ferry, on the Catawba River, and it being still undetermined whether he will move thence on this place or upon Fayetteville, N. C., *via* Cheraw, you will please concentrate your forces as rapidly as possible at the latter place, and there hold them in readiness to move at a moment's notice, either on this point, as already instructed, or to oppose his advance as long as possible should he march by the way of Cheraw, in which event Hampton's cavalry will co-operate with you.

Should any movement of Schofield from Wilmington threaten to intercept your march upon Fayetteville, and you are not strong enough to give him battle, you will then retire slowly in the direction of Raleigh, doing all in your power to check your adversary's advance at all favorable positions.

A line of couriers has been established hence to Fayetteville, *via* Cheraw or Rockingham, as the movements of the enemy shall make necessary.

Please keep General Bragg (who is still near Wilmington) and myself advised of your movements, and of those of the enemy which may come to your knowledge. There is telegraphic communication from Fayetteville with these Headquarters.

Your Engineers should repair forthwith the roads and bridges on the route

to Fayetteville and Salisbury, including, especially, a new bridge across Rocky River. In conclusion, I will again call your attention to the importance of saving surplus stores and supplies of all descriptions at Cheraw. To that end they should be held stored in trains, ready, at the proper moment, to be sent by rail, either in the direction of the Santee River or towards Manchester, or even to Camden, as may become most judicious, in view of known movements of the enemy.

In case of a retrograde movement before the enemy, you will please remove or destroy all supplies of every kind liable to fall into his hands, in which connection I enclose General Orders No. 4, A. and I. G. Office.

Respectfully, General, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
CHARLOTTE, N. C., *March 1st, 1865.*

Lient.-Genl. W. J. HARDEE, Cheraw, S. C.:

General,—Your letter of the 27th ult. has been received. My letter of the 26th covers all the points submitted by you. The enemy moving to the eastward, your forces will no longer be required here; you will therefore act as already instructed. It is of the utmost importance that he should not get any of the surplus stores and supplies at Cheraw; they should be destroyed, as well as the rolling-stock of those railroads, sooner than fall in the enemy's hands. For fear that the enemy may have some engines and cars to run on the North-eastern, the Wilmington and Manchester, and the Wilmington and Charlotte railroads, it is advisable to destroy effectually the bridges on the Santee (if not already done), on the Little Pedee and on the "Big Swamp." The cars and engines should be so disposed of as not to fall in the hands of the enemy. In case of danger they should be thoroughly destroyed. The prisoners at Florence should be sent forthwith to Fayetteville or Raleigh if not received by the enemy at Wilmington. Should the enemy move towards Georgetown, you should endeavor to co-operate with the cavalry to press on his flanks and rear. Under present circumstances no instructions will be sent to await your arrival at Wadesboro'. The most energetic measures should be taken by the military and civil authorities to obstruct all roads on which the enemy is likely to move, using, freely, torpedoes to prevent the removal of these obstructions. Mr. Frazer Mathews knows how to lay these torpedoes to the best advantage. The bridge on Rocky River should be rebuilt.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
CHARLOTTE, N. C., *March 6th, 1865.*

Lient.-Genl. W. J. HARDEE, Rockingham, *via* Troy:

General,—I have just received a copy of your telegram of the 4th inst., from Rockingham to General Johnston, who is on his way to Fayetteville. You

should have followed the instructions contained in my letter of the 26th ult. (acknowledged by Colonel Roy) and not of the 24th. Fayetteville and Raleigh being evidently the objective points of the enemy, General Johnston and myself contemplate a concentration of forces at the first of those points, if possible, otherwise at the latter. You are therefore directed to remove at once, and rapidly, from your present position to Fayetteville, if still practicable; if not, to Raleigh.

The ends to be attained by this movement are so momentous, indeed so vital to success of operations which have been determined upon, that it is expected you will permit none but insurmountable obstacles to turn you aside from the attempt, except, of course, if General Johnston should see cause, in the existing state of affairs, to change your instructions and give other orders.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

CHARLOTTE, N. C., March 7th, 1865.

Genl. JOS. E. JOHNSTON, Fayetteville, N. C.:

Have just received copy telegram to you from Hardee, saying he is moving on Greensboro'. He has not obeyed my instructions of 26th ult. He should be recalled at once to Fayetteville or Raleigh.

Shall troops from here be sent to Smithfield or Raleigh?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHARLOTTE, N. C., March 7th, 1865.

Genl. JOS. E. JOHNSTON, Fayetteville, N. C.:

To save time I have sent following despatch from here and Greensboro' to General Hardee, on road from Rockingham: "March at once on Fayetteville, if possible; if not, then on Raleigh."

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RALEIGH, N. C., March 11th, 1865.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Federal army is in Fayetteville this morning. Hardee and Hampton near on this side. General Bragg's troops are returning to Goldsboro' from Kinston, where the force opposed to his was heavily reinforced from Wilmington. That force was beaten by General Bragg with Hill's and Hoke's troops on the 8th.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

RALEIGH, March 13th, 1865.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Following received, dated March 12th, 8 P. M., from near Fayetteville: "Enemy crossed Cape Fear River (at 11 A. M.) at Cedar Creek, Fayetteville, and Elliott's ferry, seven miles above. I move up to cover all ferries above. Enemy's purpose not developed.—W. J. Hardee."

If these crossings are in force, a movement eastward is intended. Hope to see you soon.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

GREENSBORO', N. C., *March 14th, 1865.*

Genl. Jos. E. JOHNSTON, Raleigh :

Sherman is moving, doubtless to form junction with Schofield's forces about Goldsboro'. As you cannot yet check him, it would be well to concentrate all your forces against Schofield and crush him before that junction can be made.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS, RALEIGH, N. C., *March 15th, 1865: 7 A. M.*

Received from Smith's Ferry, 2 P. M., 14th, via Bonbee's 15th, 4 A. M., by General Johnston :

"The enemy advanced on the river and plank roads to-day to Silver Creek, where I had a brigade of infantry. Hampton fell back. At his request the infantry was withdrawn, and the line occupied by dismounted cavalry. The enemy came up, felt the lines sharply, and retired about four miles. I was on the cavalry front myself to-day, and don't think the advance in this direction was serious or in large force. Distant cannonading heard this evening; supposed to be on the Clinton road, in Butler's front. I expect to hear from him during the night."

W. J. HARDEE.

Official.

W. HAMPTON, Jr., Lieut., and A. D. C.

Telegram.

AVERYSBORO', *March 15th, 1865, via BONBEE'S*
15TH: 12.30 P. M.

Genl. J. E. JOHNSTON, Raleigh, N. C. :

The enemy, after being checked at Silver Run, retired towards Fayetteville. Hampton has transferred his command over Black River to be in front of any movement upon Goldsboro'. I heard nothing from Butler on the Clinton road during the night, and I am holding my command here awaiting further information. Prisoners say Sherman is receiving supplies at Fayetteville, by water, from Wilmington.

W. J. HARDEE.

Telegram.

SMITHFIELD, *March 16th, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

General Orders No. 2: General G. T. Beauregard is announced as second in command of this army. By order of General Johnston.

ARCHER ANDERSON, A. A. G.

Telegram.

SMITHFIELD, *March 17th, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

The enemy were attacking General Hardee's position, five miles south of Averysboro', all day yesterday. Always repulsed. Our loss between four and five hundred. Prisoners taken this morning report Federals at thirty-three hundred. Please hurry S. D. Lee, and desire commanding officer at Salisbury to send our transportation and artillery horses along the railroad, to be taken up wherever they may meet trains.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

SMITHFIELD, *March 20th, 1865.*

To Genl. BEAUREGARD :

The 15th and 17th corps were yesterday moving on the road from Fayetteville to Goldsboro'; the 14th and 20th on that from Averysboro'. We attacked the latter force at 3 P. M., routed one corps, capturing three guns; but a mile in rear the enemy rallied on fresh troops. We were able to press all back slowly until six, when, apparently receiving fresh troops, he attempted the offensive, which we resisted without difficulty until dark. Our troops behaved handsomely. This morning enemy was intrenched. We have now the whole army in our front. The 15th Corps, moving from direction of Goldsboro' on our left flank and rear, made it necessary to change our front so as to look to the south. There has so far been only skirmishing to-day. Please give this information to the Governor in my name.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

NEAR BENTONVILLE, *March 21st, 1865: 7.10 A. M.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

We are remaining here to cover the removal of our wounded to railroad at Smithfield. The enemy's intrenched position and greatly superior number—Sherman's army being in our front—makes further offensive impracticable.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

NEAR SMITHFIELD, *March 23d, 1865.*

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Sherman's whole army being intrenched in our front on morning of 20th, we did not attack, but held our position to cover removal of wounded and occupy enemy. There was heavy skirmishing 20th and 21st, and several partial attacks by him handsomely repulsed. Troops of Tennessee Army have fully disproved slander that has been published against them. Evening and night of 21st enemy moved towards Goldsboro', and yesterday we came here.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

SMITHFIELD, *March 24th, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Sherman and Schofield have united at Goldsboro'. Seven corps. I am placing our troops north of the depot and near it. Our cavalry is moving forward. Do urge Lee forward. His troops ought to march in several bodies, those leading never to wait for those following. General Lee seems to be committing the error of making the front wait for the rear. On reaching railroad, marching should be continued by those not taken up at Chester until they meet trains.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

RALEIGH, N. C., *March 24th, 1865: 1.35 P. M.*

Genl. S. D. LEE, at Chester, S. C. (or to be forwarded):

General Johnston desires you to urge forward your troops as rapidly as pos-

sible. On reaching the Charlotte Railroad, marching should continue by troops not taken up until they meet train coming for them. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RALEIGH, N. C., *March 26th, 1865: 12 M.*

Lient.-Genl. S. D. LEE, care of Capt. Buck, A. A. G., at Fort Mills, Rock Hill, or Chester, S. C.:

From Newberry you should have reached railroad at Blackstocks or Chester, where instructions were sent you. I will order cars to meet you at Catawba bridge. Troops must continue to march along railroad, and trains will take up the first they meet with. Major E. Willis, at Salisbury, my chief-quartermaster, will attend to your transportation wants. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

CHESTER, *March 27th, 1865.*

Genl. BEAUREGARD:

I have crossed nearly all my infantry over Broad River. Will get all wagons with me across to-morrow. Will send one division to Rockville on Charlotte and South Carolina Railroad to-morrow; will move the other towards Charlotte the next day. S. D. LEE, Lient.-Genl.

Telegram.

CHESTER, *March 28th, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

One division will leave this point to-morrow morning. The other division will be at Rock Hill to-morrow evening. Brigade with trains and artillery will be at Rock Hill 31st. S. D. LEE, Lient.-Genl.

Telegram.

SMITHFIELD, *March 30th, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Brigadier-General Bradley Johnson, at Salisbury, reports, on authority of Mr. Macrae, formerly of 28th North Carolina, a raid reaching Lenoir at 8 A. M. yesterday. He supposes it Stoneman's party, four thousand. Please communicate with General Johnson, and, if necessary, go to the point to direct measures for meeting this expedition. J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

RALEIGH, N. C., *March 30th, 1865.*

Brig.-Genl. BRADLEY JOHNSON, Salisbury, N. C.:

Keep me informed here, and General S. D. Lee at Chester, of enemy's movements at Lenoir. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RALEIGH, N. C., *March 30th, 1865.*

Genl. S. D. LEE, Chester, S. C.:

General Bradley Johnson reports from Salisbury enemy's raiders (about four thousand strong) at Lenoir. General Johnson will keep you advised of en-

emy's movements, and, if necessary, you will stop a part of your forces at or about Salisbury to meet and defeat him.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

RALEIGH, N. C., *March 30th*, 1865.

Genl. JOS. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, N. C. :

I have telegraphed General Lee, at Chester, to stop, temporarily, part of his forces at Salisbury, if necessary, to meet enemy from Lenoir. I'll go to Salisbury should enemy move in that direction.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

NEAR SMITHFIELD, *March 31st*, 1865.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

Major Stringfellow, at Greensboro', telegraphs that Colonel Hoke now reports the raiding party to be Terry. Telegraph to Brigadier-General Martin on the subject, at Asheville, N. C.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

NEAR SMITHFIELD, *March 31st*, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Brigadier-General Bradley Johnson reports that Stoneman, with cavalry, is moving on railroad. You had better stop troops at Greensboro' and Salisbury for the present. Be well for you to go as far as Greensboro'. Hurry up Ferguson coming from South Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

SALISBURY, *March 31st*, 1865.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

I have two brigades here; expect one more by morning, and I expect Johnston's battalion of artillery here by morning. I will begin to fortify here at the bridge to-morrow. Scouts are scarce, and not very reliable, and their reports indicate a move on Danville Railroad by Stoneman or Grierson. One regiment of cavalry is expected here to-morrow night.

W. S. FEATHERSTONE, Brig.-Genl.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XLVIII.

Telegram.

SMITHFIELD, *April 1st*, 1865.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

Following just received from Genl. R. E. Lee: "General Beauregard can assume command of all troops from Western Virginia and Western North Carolina that come within his reach. Generals Echols and Martin, commanding those troops, have been ordered to co-operate in opposing Stoneman."

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

ON RAILROAD FROM GREENSBORO', *April 1st, 1865.*

Lieut.-Genl. S. D. LEE, or Brig.-Genl. B. T. JOHNSON, Salisbury, N. C.:

Should you have three thousand men and two batteries for defence of Salisbury and Yadkin bridge, send the rest of troops and one battery forthwith to Greensboro', and stop there, by telegraph, battery coming from Hillsboro'.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

HIGH POINT, N. C., *April 1st, 1865.*

Brig.-Genl. FEATHERSTONE, Salisbury, N. C.:

Enemy reported yesterday evening about Huntsville, moving towards Salem and Winston. Push up troops rapidly as possible, and look out for him on way to Greensboro'.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

LEXINGTON, N. C., *April 1st, 1865.*

Genl. J. E. JOHNSTON, Smithfield, N. C.:

On arrival at Salisbury, I find Stoneman will probably move on Greensboro' or Danville. Have, in consequence, ordered Featherstone's troops to Greensboro'. Are there any at Danville? Shall I send some there?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

NEAR SMITHFIELD, *April 1st, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Your despatch received. If you find Stoneman going towards Danville, protect it if you can, as well as Greensboro'.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

HIGH POINT, N. C., *April 1st, 1865: 9.45 P. M.*

Genl. R. E. LEE, Petersburg, Va.:

Genl. J. E. JOHNSTON, Smithfield, N. C.:

Have just returned from Salisbury. Not now threatened by enemy. Reported to be about Huntsville yesterday evening, apparently moving on Greensboro', where I have ordered troops from Salisbury. Danville will probably be next point aimed at. Are there any troops there?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

SALISBURY, *April 1st, 1865.*

Major C. S. STRINGFELLOW, A. A. G.:

Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Stowe reports Stoneman's advance at Jonesville, Yadkin County, last night, moving in two (2) columns, one on each side of the river. Force from six to eight thousand (8000); six (6) pieces artillery.

J. F. HOKE, Comdg.

Telegram.

Confidential.

RICHMOND, *April 2d, 1865.*

To Col. OTEY:

I do not think Richmond and Petersburg will be held by us after to-morrow.

BULLOCK.

Telegram.

SALISBURY, April 3d, 1865.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Up to yesterday at two (2) o'clock the enemy had not crossed the Yadkin River. They are moving slowly, and eastward. Estimate at four thousand (4000), and seven (7) pieces of artillery.

WM. LEE DAVIDSON.

Telegram.

DANVILLE, April 4th, 1865.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Please give me any reliable information you have as to movements of enemy, and disposition to protect the Piedmont Railroad. I have no communication from General Lee since Sunday.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Telegram.

SMITHFIELD, April 4th, 1865.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

It is too late for Wheeler to attempt to reach Danville. You must depend on reinforcing it with infantry by rail. To save time, I tell Wheeler to await further instructions at Raleigh. Any more news of Stoneman?

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

RALEIGH, April 5th, 1865: 11 A. M.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Am returning to army with command, by orders of General Johnston.

J. WHEELER, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

NEAR SMITHFIELD, April 5th, 1865: 7 A. M.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Events in Virginia will make Sherman move. Wheeler is therefore absolutely necessary here. The returning troops and Ferguson are all that can be afforded for your object, especially as we do not learn Stoneman's objective.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

DANVILLE, April 5th, 1865.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

Your telegram of Friday received; the reports in regard to the raiders very contradictory. Best evidence indicates that they have not been at Madison. The cavalry you have ordered here will be of special value at this time; with the infantry *en route* will probably serve the immediate necessity. Have sent courier to General Lee.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Telegram.

MACON, April 6th, 1865.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Nothing certain known of movements of enemy since fall of Selma; rumored at Montgomery that Forrest fought them yesterday at Columbus, Miss. This place and Southwestern Georgia in great danger. In two weeks I may get to-

gether six thousand men, including mounted and locals. I submit to you the importance of more thorough protection to these points and the invaluable resources of Southwestern Georgia. The enemy have reinforced Dalton and other points beyond, and driven our pickets this side of Calhoun.

HOWELL COBB, Major-Genl.

Telegram.

MACON, April 7th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

From Montgomery General Buford reports Commodore J. E. Montgomery just arrived at Greenville. Reports he left Demopolis Monday, and crossed Alabama River Tuesday; that General Jackson whipped the enemy, three thousand (3000) strong, that, moved from Tuscaloosa River, six (6) miles from Selma; the enemy retreated. Enemy's main column reported moving towards Demopolis.

HOWELL COBB.

Telegram.

FIFTEEN MILES EAST HENRY COURT-HOUSE,
via GREENSBORO', April 8th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

At dark to-night the enemy was still in Henry Court-house. During the day he was reinforced by about eight hundred (800). They tell citizens that they will advance on Danville in the morning; as yet no buildings have been burned in town.

J. T. WHEELER, Col.

Telegram.

TWELVE (12) MILES EAST HENRY COURT-HOUSE,
via GREENSBORO', April 8th, 1865.

To Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

The enemy attacked me at seven (7) A. M. to-day. After a spirited fight were repulsed, with several loss on his side. Prisoners report Stoneman at Christiansburg, and say that he has sent troops on several roads, all of which are to concentrate at Danville. The force which attacked me was eight hundred (800) strong. Our loss small. I am now on the pike between Henry Court-house and Danville. Have scouts watching enemy, and will report any movements.

J. T. WHEELER, Col.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS, GREENSBORO', April 10th, 1865.

To Col. G. W. BRENT; A. A. G.:

Reliably reported that Lee and army capitulated yesterday. You can depend upon this.

JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G.

Telegram.

GREENSBORO', N. C., April 10th, 1865: 10.45 P. M.

Have just arrived on way to Danville. Is my presence still necessary there? Matters here require my attention.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Brig-Genl. H. H. WALKER, Danville, Va.

Telegram.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

DANVILLE, VA., April 10th, 1865.

I think your presence here is needed. You must judge where you are most needed. I have what is likely to be a very active command, and only one foot; but will do my best if you cannot come. The President will be in Greensboro' to-night.

H. H. WALKER, Brig.-Genl.

Telegram.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

RALEIGH, April 11th, 1865: 1 P. M.

Twelve hundred (1200) men, Pettus's brigade, are at depot to start to you. One-half leave immediately.

ARCHER ANDERSON, A. A. G.

Telegram.

To Genl. BEAUREGARD:

RALEIGH, April 11th, 1865: 4.30 P. M.

Send us immediately one hundred cars to remove stores from here. We can afterwards remove them from Greensboro'. One-half (1200) troops left at 3 P. M.; other half at 4 P. M. These will make Greensboro' safe.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Telegram.

GREENSBORO', April 11th, 1865: 6 P. M.
Genl. J. E. JOHNSTON, Headquarters, Raleigh:

Will send you all the cars practicable. Enemy cut road between this place and Salisbury at High Point and Jamestown; also cut road between this place and Danville, about twelve miles from here, this morning. Hope to repair road at High Point and Jamestown in short time. Can hear nothing of pontoon train.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Telegram.

Col. OTEY:

GREENSBORO', April 12th, 1865: 1.35 P. M.

Order the troops* sent to Salisbury to leave here by any trains which may be here. Let them start as soon as possible. If no trains be here, or can be had before the troops could march to the first break in the road, let them march forthwith to that point. Expedition is important. They must move with one or two-days' provisions.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

GREENSBORO', April 12th, 1865: 12.50 P. M.

General Iverson reports that the "mail-rider" was captured by the enemy at or near Shallow Ford, and released. He reports that Stoneman's main body camped last night near Shallow Ford, on the west bank of the Yadkin.

May not this column now move down that river either to Yadkin bridge

* B. Johnson, with five hundred men.

(railroad) or Salisbury? Would it not be well to send, say five hundred men, under General B. T. Johnson, who is still here, to Salisbury?

JNO. M. OTEY.

Genl. BEAUREGARD.

Order General Johnson to repair forthwith to Salisbury. I am surprised at his delay. Send five hundred men with him by cars to break, and five hundred more soon as practicable after. Order trains from Salisbury to meet troops across the break.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Yadkin bridge should be well guarded on both sides—especially on south side now.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Inform Generals Ferguson and Johnson of enclosed news.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Telegram.

HEADQUARTERS, GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 12th, 1865.*

The aid of your cavalry will be required in executing the order communicated to Brigadier-General Walker this morning, which is now repeated for your instructions: "Send cars loaded with the most important supplies to break in road, which, if not repaired, unload and return them to Danville for other supplies. Should the enemy advance in large force, sacrifice everything save your command." Recall your cavalry from the Valley, bringing them and all others you can collect to this place, after the shipment of supplies as above described. To economize transportation, fully equip your troops from the supplies. What has become of the rest of your command?

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

To Major-Genl. L. L. LOMAX, Danville, Va.

General Johnston to General Beauregard.

BALTIMORE, MD., *March 30th, 1868.*

My dear General,—I have been told by a gentleman who has read the life of Mr. Davis, recently published, that it contains the identical statements of the interviews and discussions at Greensboro', in which we had a part, mentioned to you in my note of December 26th, 1867. That our statement may be on record, too, I write you my recollections of these circumstances, suggesting that, where yours are different, you write the difference, and that, if yours agree with mine, you express your concurrence.

On the afternoon of April 11th, 1865, I received at Raleigh a telegraphic order from the President to report to him at Greensboro'. I arrived about nine o'clock next morning (12th), and was your guest, your quarters being in a burden car, near and in sight of the President's.

In discussing the probable object for which I had been called to Greensboro', we agreed in the supposition that it was connected with the decision of the question of terminating or continuing the war. We agreed, also, that it would

not be worth while to go into any military discussion before information was received of the condition of General Lee's army.

We were summoned to the President's office in an hour or two, finding Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan with him. We supposed that we were to be questioned upon the military resources of our Department. The President's object seemed to be, however, to give—not to obtain—information; for, addressing the party, he explained to us how, in a few weeks (he said two or three), he would raise a large army by bringing back into the ranks those who had abandoned their regiments, and by calling out the enrolled men that the officers of the Conscript Bureau had been unable to bring into the military service. It was remarked by me, and supported by you, that men who had left the army when our cause was not desperate, and those who, under the same circumstances, could not be forced into it by the agents of the Conscript Bureau, would scarcely, in our present condition, enter the service upon mere invitation. No other subject was introduced.

General Breckinridge arrived that evening (12th), and confirmed the reports of General Lee's surrender, which had been spread through the country by fugitives from his army. We then reviewed the state of affairs, and agreed in the opinion that the Confederacy was overthrown; that, practically, we had no longer a Government, because Mr. Davis and his Cabinet had lost all the attributes of one: having no control over the people, no money, nor credit, nor basis of credit, nor army, nor ammunition, nor means for obtaining them. They could not, therefore, support the little army then existing. Under these circumstances we regarded it as criminal to continue the war, and thought that the only function of Government left the President should be exercised at once—that of making peace.

In consultation with General Breckinridge next morning (13th) I expressed to him these views of ours, and, believing that none of his Cabinet would do it, offered to suggest to the President to act upon them. General Breckinridge promised to endeavor to make the opportunity for me. I also conversed with Mr. Mallory on the same subject afterwards, and he appeared to be anxious that negotiations should be proposed.

We were summoned to the President's office the same morning (13th), an hour or two after the meeting of his Cabinet. There I, as oldest, speaking first—you sustaining me—we compared the military forces: ours about 17,000, infantry and artillery, and 4000 cavalry; that of the enemy about 180,000 men, under Grant, about 110,000 under Sherman, and about 60,000 under Canby. We, without the means of purchasing supplies of any kind, or procuring or repairing arms, could continue the war only as robbers or guerillas. Under such circumstances it was represented that it would be the greatest of human crimes on our part to continue the war, and therefore the opening of negotiations was suggested. The members of the Cabinet present were then invited to express their opinions. All, except Mr. Benjamin and Mr. Davis, agreed with us. He (Mr. B.) repeated something very like Sempronius's speech for war. Mr. Davis received these suggestions of mine as if annoyed by them. He said that it was idle to propose that he should attempt to negotiate, when it was certain, from

the result of an attempt of his to treat, that his authority to treat would not be recognized by Mr. Lincoln, nor terms that he might offer considered. I suggested that it had not been unusual for military commanders to arrange preliminaries, which led to treaties of peace, and asked permission to make such an attempt. After speaking for a short time in opposition to that idea, he suggested, or rather consented, that I should propose an armistice to General Sherman, "to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war," and sketched the letter to be addressed to the Federal commander. I immediately proposed that Mr. Mallory—a good penman—should write such a letter at his dictation, and that I should sign and send it. And this was done, and the conference then terminated.

Yours truly,

J. E. JOHNSTON.

General Beauregard's Endorsement.

NEW ORLEANS, *April 10th, 1868.*

I fully concur in the above recollections of General Johnston, relative to the events which transpired at Greensboro', N. C., at the time of the surrender of his forces. He took the initiative in suggesting the negotiations with General Sherman, and conducted them, with the assistance of General Breckinridge, to a successful issue, as far as that Federal officer was concerned.

I suggested to General Johnston the propriety of having a member of the Cabinet (General Breckinridge) with him to protect him from the invidious and ungenerous remarks which would certainly be made, otherwise, by the surroundings of the President, relative to any terms he might agree upon with General Sherman.

General Johnston telegraphed to that effect to President Davis, who was then on his way to Charlotte, N. C., and General Breckinridge returned to Greensboro', to take a part in the impending negotiations with General Sherman.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,

April 16th, 1865: 4 P. M.

General,—I have the honor to inform you that General Johnston's headquarters are established about one mile and a quarter west of Greensboro'.

In accordance with instructions from General Johnston, I have directed Lieutenant-General Hardee to halt at New Salem until further orders from these headquarters.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ARCHER ANDERSON, A. A. G.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg., etc.

HEADQUARTERS, ETC., GREENSBORO', *April 16th, 1865.*

Colonel,—General Hardee is expected to be to-night at New Salem, on the road from this place to Ashboro'—about seventeen miles from here; direct couriers

accordingly. Enemy reported to be at Haywood, on Haw River, on road from Raleigh to Carthage.

Respectfully,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl.

Col. GEO. WM. BRENT, A. A. G.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, C. S. A., GREENSBORO',
N. C., *April 15th, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg., etc.:

Sir,—I have the honor to submit the order of the President, of which the following is a copy, in relation to the coin held by me as Treasurer of the Confederate States:

"April 15th, 1865.

"Mr. HENDREN, C. S. Treasurer:

"Sir,—You will report to General Beauregard with the treasure in your possession, that he may give to it due protection as a military chest, to be moved with his army train. For further instructions you will report to the Secretary of the Treasury.

JEFFERSON DAVIS."

I have, in accordance with said order, respectfully to request that you will at once designate the officer to whom the silver coin (estimated to be \$39,000) may be transferred, the transfer to be accompanied by a schedule of explanation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN N. HENDREN, Treasurer C. S.

General Beauregard's endorsement upon this paper read as follows:

HEADQUARTERS, ETC., GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 16th, 1865.*

Respectfully referred to General Jos. E. Johnston for his information and action. The Hon. Secretary of War informed me this day that, in case of necessity, the sum referred to was to constitute a part of the military chest of the army to be used for its most urgent wants.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. 2d Comdg.

TREASURY, C. S. A., GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 16th, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg., etc.:

Sir,—I have the honor to again invite your attention to the wishes of the President in connection with the coin of the Confederate States remaining in my hands, as indicated in his order addressed to you, which I had the honor to communicate to you on yesterday.

In your reply to my letter I was informed that the matter would be submitted to General Johnston upon his arrival here (and he is understood to have arrived this morning), when he would designate the proper officer to receive the money. It is now half-past three o'clock, and I have not yet been advised of such designation. In view of the public situation, and the risk to which I am subjected, it does not seem to me, isolated as I am from the Government, that I should be expected, nor am I disposed to attempt longer the vain and dangerous task of its guardianship, and therefore respectfully insist that the ar-

rangement ordered by the President may be consummated without further delay.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN N. HENDREN, Treasurer C. S.

General Beauregard's endorsement on this communication read as follows:

HEADQUARTERS, ETC., GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 16th, 1865.*

Respectfully returned. I desire to have and will receive no admonition from the writer. This communication is considered out of place. I fully understand my duties and responsibilities.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. 2d Comdg.

Duplicate.

HEADQUARTERS, GREENSBORO', *April 16th: 1 P. M.*

General,—General Johnston directs that you halt your command wherever this order shall reach you. You will draw all supplies from this post.

Please report at once your headquarters and the position of your corps.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

Lieut.-Genl. WM. J. HARDEE, Comdg. Corps.

HILLSBORO', *April 17th, 1865: 2 P. M.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

At 2 P. M. I telegraphed General Breckinridge to come here to-night; if he has not received the despatch, tell him to come to this house near railroad, two miles east of town. Answer. I must see him before 9 o'clock A. M. to-morrow.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

NEAR SALEM, N. C., *April 17th, 1865.*

Dear General,—The order directing my command to halt was received last night. We are all agog respecting the object, and surmises are made that negotiations are afoot between Johnston and Sherman. If such be not the case, it would be well for me to know it as soon as practicable, that I may contradict it. The report, as you may well conceive, can do our troops no good.

Very truly yours,

W. J. HARDEE.

Genl. BEAUREGARD, Comdg., etc., etc.

GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 17th, 1865: 11.30 A. M.*

General,—Your note of this day from near Salem has just reached me. I regret I am not at liberty to inform you as to your inquiry. General Johnston will probably do so himself in the course of the day, or as soon as he shall have returned from Hillsboro'. Meanwhile, keep your troops well in hand for rapid movement at a moment's notice, should it become necessary.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. 2d Comdg.

Lieut.-Genl. W. J. HARDEE, Comdg. Corps near Salem, N. C.

Official.

R. C. GILCHRIST, A. A. G.

HAMPTON'S HEADQUARTERS, *April 18th, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Please give the necessary instructions to carry me by train from Greensboro' to Salisbury to-morrow morning.

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secty. of War.

HEADQUARTERS, NEAR SALEM, N. C., *April 18th, 1865.*

General,—A large number of my command deserted last night—some with horses from the reserve artillery. I anticipate many more will go to-day and to-night.

Very respectfully,

W. J. HARDEE, Lient.-Genl.

Genl. BEAUREGARD, Comdg., etc.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, NEAR
GREENSBORO', N. C., *April 19th, 1865.*

General Orders, No. 14 :

It is announced to the army that a suspension of arms has been agreed upon, pending negotiations between the two governments.

During its continuance, the two armies are to occupy their present positions.

ARCHER ANDERSON, Lient.-Col., and A. A. G.

By command of General JOHNSTON.

Official.

KINLOCH FALCONER, A. A. G.

Telegram.

CHARLOTTE, *April 20th, 1865.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

General Duke's brigade is here without saddles. There are none here on this side of Augusta. Send on to this point six hundred, or as many as can be had.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Telegram.

GREENSBORO', *April 20th, 1865 : 6 P. M.*

President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Charlotte, N. C. :

Your telegram of this day just received ; has been referred to General Johnston, who is now here.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, N. C., *April 27th, 1865.*

Genl. JOHNSTON, Comdg. Confederate Armies, etc., Greensboro' :

General,—I herewith enclose you copies of my Field Orders, No. 65, which give General Schofield full and ample power to carry into effect our convention, and I hope at your personal interview with General Schofield you satisfied your mind of his ability and kind disposition towards the inhabitants of North Carolina.

In addition to the points made at our interview of yesterday, I have further instructed General Schofield to facilitate what you and I and all good men desire, the return to their homes of the officers and men composing your army,

to let you have of his stores ten days' rations for twenty-five thousand men. We have abundance of provisions at Morehead City, and if you send trains here, they may go down with our trains and return to Greensboro' with the rations specified. Colonel Wright did intend to send his construction train up to-day, but did not get up his carpenters in time. The train with square timber and carpenters will go up in the morning, and I think by the morning of the 29th your trains can run down on the road and fall in with ours of the 30th.

I can hardly estimate how many animals fit for farm purposes will be "loaned" to the farmers, but enough, I hope, to insure a crop.

I can hardly commit myself how far commerce will be free, but I think the cotton still in the country, and the crude turpentine, will make money with which to procure supplies. General Schofield, in a few days, will be able to arrange all such matters.

I wish you would send the enclosed parcel for General Wilson, as it contains the Orders, 65 and 66, and instructions to release all his prisoners on the conditions of our convention.

Now that war is over, I am as willing to risk my person and reputation as heretofore to heal the wounds made by the past war, and I think my feeling is shared by the whole army. I also think a similar feeling actuates the mass of your army; but there are some unthinking young men, who have no sense or experience, that unless controlled may embroil their neighbors. If we are forced to deal with them it must be with severity; but I hope they will be managed by the people of the South.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-Genl. U. S. A.

Official.

KINLOCH FALCONER, A. A. G.

Telegram of General J. E. Johnston to the Governors of North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, dated April 27th, 1865:

"The disaster in Virginia, the capture by the enemy of all our workshops for the preparation of ammunition and repairing of arms, the impossibility of recruiting our little army, opposed to more than ten times its number, or of supplying it, except by robbing our own citizens, destroyed all hope of successful war. I have made, therefore, a military convention with Major-General Sherman, to terminate hostilities in North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. I made this convention to spare the blood of this gallant little army, to prevent further suffering of our people by the devastation and ruin inevitable from the marches of invading armies, and to avoid the crime of waging a hopeless war."

General Breckinridge to President Davis.

HALF MILE WEST OF SAVANNAH BRIDGE, May 3d, 1865: 8 P. M.

Dear Sir,—I have not heard from you in answer to my note of this day, and the condition of things here, together with great fatigue, has prevented my going forward.

Nothing can be done with the bulk of this command. It has been with difficulty that anything has been kept in shape. I am having the silver paid to the troops, and will in any event save the gold and have it brought forward in the morning, when I hope Judge Reagan will take it.

Many of the men have thrown away their arms. Most of them have resolved to remain here under Vaugh and Dibbrell and will make terms. A few hundred men will move on and may be depended on for the object we spoke of yesterday. I would respectfully and earnestly repeat the suggestions I then made. Let me know if you desire me to adopt any other course than that proposed. If you are at Washington, or this side, I can ride forward in the morning to see you.

Yours, very truly,

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secty. of War.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XLIX.

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A., RICHMOND, VA.,
Dec. 4th, 1864.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Montgomery, Ala.:

Your telegram of the 2d inst. is referred to me for answer. If General E. K. Smith can now act as you suggest, it would be well he should do so. You are authorized so to inform him, and to request his prompt action. He has, however, failed heretofore to respond to like necessities, and no plans should be placed* on his compliance.

J. A. SEDDON, Secty. of War.

Circular.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
April 27th, 1865: 11.30 A. M.

The guns, caissons, and forges, with all the horses and harness of the artillery of this army, will be immediately brought under charge of suitable officers to Greensboro', when instructions as to their further disposition will be given through Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Garnett.

ARCHER ANDERSON, A. A. Genl.

By order of Genl. JOHNSTON.

Circular.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, NEAR
GREENSBORO', N. C., April 28th, 1865.

I. Corps commanders will immediately send to the Ordnance officer at Greensboro', under charge of Ordnance officers, four-fifths of the small-arms, accoutrements, and ammunition in their commands.

II. The field transportation of the army belongs to the troops, and at the end

* Probably the word should be "*based*," instead of "*placed*."

† Changed to six-sevenths. See General Johnston's telegram to General Beauregard.

of the march will be fairly distributed among the officers and men of each organization.

ARCHER ANDERSON, A. A. Genl.

By command of General JOHNSTON.

General Johnston to General Beauregard.

Telegram.

CHARLOTTE, May 9th, 1865.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Second (2d) Article, one-seventh ($\frac{1}{7}$) instead of one-fifth of arms. General Canby requested to give transportation to troops from Texas and Arkansas.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

HEADQUARTERS, ETC., ETC.,
GREENSBORO', N. C., May 1st, 1865.

List of Staff-officers and Detached Officers and Men serving at the Headquarters of General G. T. Beauregard, Second in Command, at Greensboro', N. C., May 1st, 1865.

GENL. G. T. BEAUREGARD, C. S. A., SECOND IN COMMAND.

PERSONAL STAFF.

Major A. R. Chisolm, A. D. C.

" A. J. Toutant, "

" R. T. Beauregard, Prov. Arty., A. D. C.

Second Lieut. A. R. Toutant, Tucker's Pioneer Regt., Acting A. D. C.

Cadet H. T. Beauregard, C. S. A., Acting A. D. C.

Lieut.-Col. A. G. Rice, Vol. A. D. C.

" S. B. Paul, " "

Col. Chas. J. Villeré, " "

Brig.-Genl. Thomas Jordan, Acting A. D. C.

Private J. A. Hincks, Bridge's Battery, Detached Clerk.

" James M. Kokernot, Confederate Batt'n, Detached Orderly.

GENERAL STAFF.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Col. Geo. Wm. Brent, A. A. G.

Lieut.-Col. Jno. M. Otey, A. A. G.

Private Jno. C. Latham, Jr., Co. A, 7th Georgia Cavalry, Detached Clerk.

" M. N. Blakemore, Orleans Gd. Battery, Detached Clerk.

" James F. Salvo, Co. B, 25th S. C. Vol., Detached Orderly.

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Lieut.-Col. Alfred Roman, A. I. G.

Major Henry Bryan, A. I. G.

Capt. Albert Ferry, "

Private Chas. Weysham, Orleans Gd. Battery, Detached Clerk.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

Lieut.-Col. J. R. Waddy, Chief Ordnance Officer.

QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Major E. Willis, Chief Quartermaster.

Lieut. Jno. J. Mellen, Crescent La. Regt., A. A. Quartermaster.

Private Henry C. Robinson, Co. A, 7th S. C. Cavalry.

"	Robt. Downey,	"	I, 18th La. Vols., Detached Teamster.		
"	W. L. Thomas,	"	H, 19th Ala.	"	"
"	L. B. Spencer,	"	D, 12th Tenn.	"	"
"	G. Wash. Perry,	"	G, 14th Texas	"	"
"	Jno. Jenkins,	"	C, 13th La.	"	"
"	Wm. H. Thompson,	"	A, 8th Ark.	"	"

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

Major F. Malloy, Chief Commissary.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

Surgeon R. L. Brodie, Medical Director.

" S. Choppin, Medical Inspector.

DETACHMENT COURIERS.

Second Lieut. W. H. Ragsdale, Co. K, 1st S. C. Cavalry, Comdg.

Private	Oliver Rickey,	"	A,	"	"	"
"	G. D. Copeland,	"	B,	"	"	"
"	J. T. Carey,	"	C,	"	"	"
"	A. Mallenhawer,	"	C,	"	"	"
"	Wm. Reedy,	"	D,	"	"	"
"	T. W. Weeks,	"	E,	"	"	"
"	R. Dukes,	"	F,	"	"	"
"	J. H. Belcher,	"	G,	"	"	"
"	J. E. Heise,	"	G,	"	"	"
"	J. R. Harper,	"	H,	"	"	"
"	G. D. Haste,	"	K,	"	"	"
"	J. C. Hull,	"	B, 4th Tenn. Cavalry.			
"	S. Manion,	"	C, 5th S. C.	"		

SUPPLEMENTARY.

Capt. J. F. Mathews, Engineer Corps.

" P. R. Proctor, Assistant Quartermaster.

Lieut. Jas. P. Proctor, Ordnance Officer.

Private Volney Metcalf, Jeff Davis Legion.

"	W. H. Ker,	"	"	"
"	A. Sledge,	"	"	"

GREENSBORO', N. C., *May 1st, 1865.*

In accordance with the terms of a military convention, entered into on the 26th day of April, 1865, between General Jos. E. Johnston, commanding Confederate Army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, commanding United States Army in North Carolina, the officers and men whose names are borne on this roll have given their solemn obligation not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly released from this obligation; and they are permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities so long as they observe this obligation and obey the laws in force where they may reside.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. C. S. A., Comdg.
WM. HARTSUFF, Brevet Brig.-Genl.,
and A. I. G., U. S. A., Spec. Com.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER L.

ATLANTA, GA., *Dec. 21st, 1882.*

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, New Orleans, La.:

My dear Sir,—Your very kind and highly appreciated letter of the 9th ult., enclosing a slip from the New Orleans *Times-Democrat*, containing an article signed "D," commenting upon my speech in Macon, Ga., last fall, in which I referred to the policy of the Confederate Government, in relation to the proper use of cotton, was received several weeks ago.

You will please excuse the delay of my response to it. Pressure of public duties has been the cause.

I thank you for the slip containing the article signed "D," to which I have referred. This article, in answer to what I was reported to have said at Macon, reproduces two letters: one from Mr. Memminger and one from Mr. Trenholm, former secretaries of the Confederate Treasury, written in 1874, in reply to General Johnston's statement upon the same subject.

You asked if I have replied to this article; in answer I can only say that I have not, and do not think I ever shall. My views upon the question have been too long before the country to need any explanation from me, now or hereafter, so far as I see. Whether Mr. Davis is the author of this article signed "D," or not (as you suggest he probably is), I do not know; and while I do not intend myself to make any communication to the public upon the subject, yet it might be very well indeed for you, or some one else who has time and ability who agrees with me on the general policy, to make suitable comments upon it, and especially upon Messrs. Memminger and Trenholm's letters, in reply to General Joseph E. Johnston. These letters, as they stand, are calculated to mislead, if not deceive. For Messrs. Memminger and Trenholm, I need hardly say, I ever entertained the highest personal respect; but their letters, it seems to me, were not written with that mature consideration of the facts which was due to the magnitude of the subject. They are utterly inconsistent with each other, and are alike deceptive in argument. Mr. Memminger, for instance, makes no issue

upon the point that there were four millions of bales of cotton in the country at the time of the formation of the Confederacy; this point he seems to admit, while Mr. Trenholm attempts to show that the entire crop of 1860, amounting to less than four millions of bales, had at that time been shipped from the South, either to the North or to Europe, and that there was no surplus on hand. If Mr. Trenholm was right in his figures and facts, then why need Mr. Memminger, who was at the time at the head of the Treasury Department, have said what he did in defence of the Administration against the charge of negligence or a blunder in policy? Why need he have argued that there was no way in which the Government could have got possession of this cotton except by "seizure, purchase, and donation," and the utter impracticability of the Government getting possession of the cotton in any practicable or feasible way? This argument implies the presence of the cotton within the limits of the Confederacy at the time. Then, with Mr. Trenholm's figures and facts, what becomes of Mr. Memminger's argument that it would have required four thousand ships to have removed the cotton, which was impossible, while Mr. Trenholm claims that it had already been done? He claims that 3,800,000 bales had actually been shipped, and was already beyond the reach of the Confederacy before its formation. How these gentlemen, with all their great eminence and ability, can reconcile these views, I leave for them and others to settle.

Then again, how fallacious and delusive is Mr. Memminger's argument attempting to show the difficulties attending the payment for the cotton in Treasury notes, and in this way flooding the country with a depreciated currency. The truth is, the plan advocated by me and my associates on this line of policy, from the beginning, was not to issue Treasury notes, to be given in payment of the cotton, but it was for the Government to offer as much as ten cents a pound for all the cotton then in the country, to be paid for in bonds running for years at eight per cent. per annum. It was believed by us that at least two million bales of cotton would have been sold by the planters at these rates, taking the bonds as an investment running for twenty or thirty years, as might have been thought best. These bonds would not have been thrown upon the market as currency, for there was far too much currency in the form of Treasury notes already in the country: the planters would have held these bonds as an investment. This at least was my view of it. Some might have sold their bonds, just as many people afterwards sold their Confederate bonds, given under what was known as the Confederate Produce Loan; and just as many persons to-day sell at a premium United States bonds; but these do not in this way become a part of the currency or tend to depreciate it.

What Mr. Memminger says about the short time from the formation of the Confederacy in February and May, when the blockade was declared, is equally without point or force; it is well known that the blockade so-called, during the summer and fall of 1861, and the winter of 1862, was nothing but a paper blockade, it did not amount at all to an effectual closing of our ports; it was not until after the early part of 1862 that the blockade was made effectual along the southern coast, from Savannah to New Orleans. In the mean time it appeared to me that, of the crop on hand, whether two or three millions of bales of 1860,

and the two or three millions of bales of 1861, at least four million bales, with proper forecast and military energy, might have been gotten abroad before the ports were effectually closed as aforesaid. I maintained and showed conclusively, as I thought, that two million bales in hands of the Government could have been so used as to prevent the blockade from ever being made effectual. This I maintained in numerous speeches in 1861 and 1862.

The report of my Macon speech, an extract of which is given by the New Orleans *Times*' correspondent, "D," in the main was correct, but in details was very erroneous. This must have been apparent to every intelligent reader. The word "reverently," in the extract quoted from the report, was not used at all by me in that connection. The word used was "earnestly;" but I cannot now undertake to point out the various verbal errors in the report; but if the writer, "D," in the *Times* be (as you say is supposed) Mr. Davis, he ought, it seems to me, to have denied the correctness of the statement of Dr. Craven cited by me in that speech. Dr. Craven, you may recollect, in his prison life of Mr. Davis, stated, in substance, that Mr. Davis, in conversations, admitted to him that if cotton had been used, as had been urged by some, the result of the struggle might have been different; and he said to Dr. Craven in substance that he himself knew nothing of finances, that he left all such matters to Mr. Memminger, the Secretary of the Treasury, and who was opposed to the policy. I have not the book before me, and only give the substance of what Mr. Davis said, as reported by Dr. Craven, to the best of my recollection.

The policy in regard to the proper use of cotton, as advocated by me from the beginning, is to be found in numerous speeches made, from the time the Confederate Congress sat at Montgomery up almost to the collapse which closed the war.

I send you an extract of one of these speeches, made in the town of Crawfordville (the place of my residence) in the fall of 1862; it was immediately published in the newspapers, and has been in a book containing almost all my public speeches, published in 1866.

The facts, so far as concerns my position during the whole time on this subject, I have never heard questioned. This is what I then said:

" * * * The ability of a people to support and wage war depends partly upon their resources, and partly upon the skill and economy with which they are wielded. We have resources—elements of power to wage war successfully—unknown to Frederick or the men of '76. All necessities of life, food and clothing, with the munitions of war, can, with skill and forecast, be made and supplied within ourselves. This goodly land of ours is unequalled, or at least unsurpassed by any other part of the habitable globe, in the character and variety of its natural products, suited to man's needs and wants in every emergency. Its mineral resources are also inexhaustible. It is a land well worth fighting for. Our means are sufficient; they have only to be properly and skilfully developed and applied.

"But besides the products necessary to sustain ourselves, to support our armies, and carry on war, we have another element of tremendous power, if properly used and applied—a resource and power unknown in European

wars, and unknown to our ancestors in the war of their revolution. Mr. Stephens here said he alluded to our great staple—cotton; and he should not have said more upon it at this time, than barely to ask those present to call to their minds what he had said to most of them last year upon that subject when he addressed them upon the cotton loan, but for some misconceptions that had got in the public mind, from a phonographic report of some remarks he made at a meeting lately in Sparta. Some, from that report, said Mr. Stephens, have taken the idea that I urged upon the planters there to plant largely of cotton next year. Allow me, in this connection, to say that nothing could be further from the fact. I urged upon the planters there, first and above all, to grow grain and stock for home consumption, and to supply the army. What I said at Sparta upon the subject of cotton many of you have often heard me say in private conversation, and most of you in the public speech last year to which I alluded. Cotton, I have maintained and do maintain, is one of the greatest elements of power, if not the greatest at our command, if it were but properly and efficiently used, as it might have been, and still might be. Samson's strength was in his locks. Our strength is in our locks—not of hair or wool, but in our locks of cotton. I believed from the beginning that the enemy would inflict upon us more serious injury by the blockade than by all other means combined. It was in the judgment of all a matter of the utmost, if not vital importance, to have it raised, removed, or broken up. How was it to be done? That was and is the question. It was thought by many that such was the demand for cotton in England that she would disregard the blockade, as it was, and has been all along, not within the terms of the Paris agreement, that is, has not been at any time entirely effectual, though close enough to do us great injury. I did not concur in this opinion, as most of you well know. I thought it would have to be done by ourselves, and could be done through the agency of cotton, not as a political, but as a commercial and financial power. I was in favor, as you know, of the Government's taking all the cotton that would be subscribed for eight per cent. bonds at a rate or price as high as ten cents a pound.

“Two millions of the last year's crop might have been counted upon as certain on this plan. This at ten cents, with bags of the average commercial weight, would have cost the government one hundred millions of bonds. With this amount of cotton in hand and pledged, any number short of fifty of the best ironclad steamers could have been contracted for and built in Europe. Steamers at the cost of two millions each could be procured every way equal to the *Monitor*. Thirty millions would have got fifteen of these, which might have been enough for our purpose. Five might have been ready by the first of January last to open some one of the ports blockaded on our coast. Three of these could have been left to keep the port open, and two could have convoyed the cotton across the water, if necessary. Thus the debt could have been promptly paid with cotton at a much higher price than it cost, and a channel of trade kept open till others, and as many more as necessary, might have been built and paid for in the same way. At a cost of less than one month's present expenditure on our army, our coast might have been cleared. Besides

this, at least two more millions of bales of the old crop on hand might have been counted on; this with the other making a debt in round numbers to the planters of \$200,000,000. But this cotton held in Europe until its price shall be fifty cents a pound, would constitute a fund of at least \$1,000,000,000, which would not only have kept our finances in sound condition, but the clear profit of \$300,000,000 would have met the entire expenses of the war for years to come.

"In this way cotton, as a great element of power at our command—such an element as no other people ever had—might have been used, not only in breaking up the blockade by our own means, without looking to foreign intervention, but in supplying the treasury with specie to pay interest on their bonds, thus giving a credit that no government ever had before. The public credit is as essential as subsistence in war: such at least was and is my opinion. The Government, however, took a different view of the subject. Many thought it unconstitutional; some looked upon it as a project to relieve the planters; others thought it nothing short of a South-Sea speculation. I considered it then and now just as constitutional as to give bonds for gunpowder, or to buy other munitions of war. It was not with a view to relieve the planters, though its incidental accommodation to them would not have been objectionable, but with the view of wielding effectually the element of the greatest power we could command, that I wished the course adopted. This resource, then, this element of power, we still have, though not to the same extent. There is enough, however, to effect wonderful results, if properly used, as it can be. We may have lost a year or two, but we are far short of seven years' war yet. With our ports open, many of the present evils and hardships of the war would be relieved. We would no longer have to give fifty dollars for a bushel of Liverpool salt, or ten dollars for the roughest sort of shoes. With ports open and this in hand, we should be much better able to make it a Peloponnesian struggle, if our enemy choose so to make it. This view and one other idea I presented to the people at Sparta, upon the subject of cotton, which I will repeat here.

"Many to be met with suppose that by abandoning the growth of cotton, and burning what we have, we can force our recognition abroad. This, I told the people there, and tell you, is, in my judgment, a radical and fundamental error. England will never be controlled by such a policy. Our cotton should be treasured up, not destroyed. More precious is it than gold, for it is more powerful, as a sinew of war, than gold is.

"Like gold, and everything else of value, it should be destroyed, if need be, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, but with no view to a foreign policy; nor should the production of cotton be abandoned with such a view. You could not please Lord Palmerston better than to let him know that there would not be grown a pound of cotton in the Southern Confederacy for twenty years. The power of cotton is well known to and felt by British statesmen. They know it is king in its proper sphere, and hence they want the sceptre of this king for their own use.

"The great error of those who suppose that King Cotton would compel the English ministry to recognize our Government and raise the blockade, and who

will look for the same result from the total abandonment of its culture, consists in mistaking the nature of the kingdom of this potentate. His power is commercial and financial, not political. It has been one of the leading objects of Lord Palmerston, ever since he has been in office, to stimulate the production of cotton in his own dominions—or those of his sovereign—so as not to be dependent upon us for a supply. This he cannot do to any extent while his inexperienced producers have to compete with us. Cotton can be raised in their East India possessions and those of the western coast of Africa at eighteen or twenty cents a pound; but it cannot be raised there profitably, to any extent, in competition with us at eight or ten cents.

“If assured, however, of no competition from this quarter, they could, or it is believed would, after a while get to producing it as cheaply as we can.

“Improvements in agriculture are slower in their progress than in any other department of life. No one can safely or wisely say how cheaply cotton may or may not be grown in those countries with a few years’ absolute control of the market, nor that the quality of the article may not be as good. No one can tell what may be effected by improvements in agriculture, and the introduction of new varieties suitable to climate and soil. More money can be made here by growing cotton now at eight cents a pound than could be made at eighteen cents forty years ago. The quality is also greatly superior to the old black seed. More persons can now pick three hundred pounds a day than could pick one hundred when I first recollect; and one hand and horse, or mule, can cultivate twice as much land. It is a great mistake, I think, to suppose cotton cannot be grown as cheaply, and with as good a staple, fine a fibre, in other countries as it can in this—not in all places where it is now grown, but in some.

“We should not, therefore, think of abandoning the production of cotton with any idea of thereby advancing our interests, politically, abroad. This would be but playing into the hands of those powers who are trying to break it down. We have had to curtail it, and shall have to curtail it while the war lasts, especially while the blockade continues. Duty and patriotism, as well as necessity, require this. The first great object of all now should be to sustain our cause, to feed as well as clothe men in the field. To do this, besides raising sufficient provisions for home consumption, will necessarily require larger grain crops. To have an abundance for home consumption, and for the army, should be the object of every one. This is dictated by the highest considerations of home policy, and not from any view of advancing our interests abroad. On the contrary, after sufficient provisions are made for home consumption, and to supply the army, the more cotton that can be grown the better. How to regulate this is a difficult matter. When the duty rests upon all alike, to grow grain and raise stock for food, some may be disposed to neglect it. How to meet this difficulty is itself a difficult question. It might perhaps be done by each State passing a similar law upon the subject, limiting the production of each band engaged in its culture. This would require concert of action. What the limitation should be I am not prepared to say. I have not the necessary estimates and statistics.

“On the subject of foreign recognition, Mr. Stephens said he saw no change

in the prospect. Foreign governments, he thought, were very much disposed to stand aloof from this contest. He did not believe they really sympathized with either side—he meant the ruling classes. The masses of the people and the commercial interests generally, he thought, did sympathize with us. Not so with the rulers. They care but little for the success of either the North or the South; some of our people were disposed to think that their sympathies were with the North, while the northern people were charging them with sympathy for us. He thought they had no kind feelings for either, but rather rejoiced to see professed republicans cutting each other's throats. He thought the remark reported to have lately been uttered by Carlyle in his quaint style, embodied in a nutshell the diplomatic feelings of Europe towards the cause on both sides. The remark was that "it was the foulest chimney that had been on fire for a century, and the best way is to let it burn itself out." * * *

From the foregoing extract it will be seen that I counted upon two millions of bales of the crop of 1860, and two million bales of the crop of 1861, to be gotten out before the ports could be effectually closed by blockade. It was upon this basis the four millions of bales (not four million and a half bales), stated by me in my Macon speech, was estimated, and from this extract, without further remark or comment, the whole outline of the policy advocated by me on this subject from the beginning clearly appears.

I will only add that I continued to advocate this policy in the Confederate Congress. I also presented it with all the earnestness I could to Mr. Davis, the President, on several occasions; but he uniformly replied that it was a matter that belonged to the Treasury Department, and referred me to Mr. Memminger.

It is proper, also, here to say that notwithstanding Mr. Davis did not entertain my proposition, and notwithstanding our differences upon other matters of policy, yet there never was any breach between us, and our relations were always friendly. But upon my urging the policy to Mr. Memminger, he persistently, on all occasions, opposed it most decidedly. He was not only opposed to the policy upon the impracticability of working it, but also held it to be unconstitutional upon some ground. I thought it altogether feasible and practicable in its operation, and considered it quite as constitutional as to give bonds for gunpowder or other munitions of war.

This letter you can use as you please.

Very truly,

ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS.

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